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The role of human and social capital

FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AS OUTSIDE DIRECTORS:

THE ROLE OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

RICHARD H.LESTER Texas A&M University AMY HILLMAN Arizona State University ASGHAR ZARDKOOHI Texas A&M University ALBERT A.CANNELLA JR.

Tulane University

The resources that individual directors bring to corporate boards are largely a function of their human and social capital.Although research has explored the value of having former federal government officials join boards,we study factors that make one particular former government official more,or less,attractive as a director than another.Specifically,we explore the depth,breadth,and deterioration of former government officials’human and social capital and find that these dimensions of human and social capital are influential predictors of corporate outside directorships.

The number of public company boards that in-clude former government officials has increased dramatically in recent decades (Korn/Ferry Interna-tional,2000).In 1973only 14percent of large cor-porate boards included former government offi-cials,yet by 1998this number had grown to 53percent.During this same period,the average num-ber of outside directors per board shrank from 16to 9.This level of board participation strongly sug-gests that former government officials bring value to corporate boardrooms.However,we ask what makes one former government official more attrac-tive as a board member than another?Our study focuses on former federal government officials,in-cluding former presidential cabinet secretaries,senators,and representatives.

Research has indicated that there are firm-level benefits to having former government officials as corporate directors (Hillman,2005;Hillman &Hitt,1999).A major shortcoming of this research,how-ever,is that it treats all directors from a particular occupation (e.g.,government service)alike without exploring what makes one more valuable than an-other.To address the issue of why some former government officials are more attractive to corpo-rate boards than others,we develop theory regard-

ing the depth,breadth,and deterioration of former government officials’human and social capital.To do so,we utilize insights from resource depen-dence theory as well as research on human and social capital.

In our study we strive to make three contribu-tions.First,our level of analysis—the individual director candidate—examines the issue of what makes a particular candidate attractive as a corpo-rate director.We view this as an important contri-bution because extant theory has not moved much past the notion that firms should “select resource-rich directors”(Boyd,1990),or that having direc-tors from specific occupations (e.g.,finance)is valuable (Mizruchi &Stearns,1994).If a director’s “capital”(both human and social)is critical to a board’s resource provision function (Hillman &Dalziel,2003),a more detailed understanding of what differentiates one director candidate from an-other is needed.Our focus here is on former gov-ernment officials,yet we believe the dimensions of human and social capital identified here (depth,breadth,and deterioration)should be generalizable to director candidates from other professions as well.

The second contribution of our study is to exam-ine an understudied aspect of business-government linkages;in particular,the placement of former government officials into the public sector as out-side directors.Ideally,business and government operate with a degree of isolation from one another

Asghar Zardkoohi would like to thank the Private En-terprise Research Center at Texas A&M University for financial support.

?Academy of Management Journal 2008,Vol.51,No.5,999–1013.

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(Friedman,1970)or,at a minimum,attempt to en-gage in arms-length transactions and information flows.However,government policy has a signifi-cant impact on the way business is conducted and vice versa.Because we believe that the exchange of personnel is a very important mechanism for link-ing organizations(Pfeffer&Salancik,1978;Boeker, 1997;Hillman,Zardkoohi,&Bierman,1999),our study contributes to this dialog.

Finally,our third contribution is to highlight that both human and social capital can deteriorate over time.Virtually all upper echelons research relies on the notion that the past experiences and inter-personal networks of executives affect their current actions(see,for example,Finkelstein&Hambrick [1996];Hambrick&Mason[1984]).However,to our knowledge,no other study has considered how the knowledge of individuals can become outdated and how their network connections can atrophy once they are removed from the context in which those networks were created.Our context—former gov-ernment officials—provides an excellent setting for empirically investigating the concept of human and social capital deterioration.

This study is organized as follows.First,we review the context in which former government officials develop actionable capital as a result of their service in government.Next,we draw upon resource dependence theory and research on hu-man and social capital to develop testable hy-potheses.Specifically,we identify dimensions of directors’interdependent human and social cap-ital(i.e.,depth,breadth,and deterioration)that affect the likelihood of directorship appoint-ments.Although we recognize the contributions of network scholars who have carefully theorized social capital as distinct from human capital(e.g., Adler&Kwon,2002;Florin,Lubatkin,&Schulze, 2003),we did not attempt to unpack the network resources of our sample and therefore focused on the constructs of human capital and social capital jointly.Further,we captured social capital indi-rectly,since we did not know the networks to which former government officials were linked. We tested our predictions in the population of U.S.members of Congress and cabinet appointees who left office between1988and2003.Finally, we discuss the results,conclusions,study limi-tations,and some implications for future research.

FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AS OUTSIDE BOARD CANDIDATES

A key assumption of much governance research is that“when an organization appoints an individual to a board,it expects the individual will come to sup-port the organization,will concern himself with its problems,will variably present it to others,and will try to aid it”(Pfeffer&Salancik,1978:163).A large body of research has supported this assumption.For example,boards have been found to provide valuable expertise,advice,and counsel to firms(Baysinger &Hoskisson,1990;Carpenter&Westphal,2001; Westphal,1999);to serve as conduits for infor-mation(Haunschild&Beckman,1998)and as links between the firm and important stakehold-ers(Provan,1980;Zald,1967)and resources (Goodstein&Boeker,1991;Mizruchi&Stearns, 1994);to aid in strategy formulation and other important strategic decision making(Judge& Zeithaml,1992;Lorsch&MacIver,1989);and to provide legitimacy and add to the reputation of firms(Bazerman&Schoorman,1983;Certo, 2003).

Governments have long been acknowledged as critical sources of dependency for firms(e.g.,Keim &Zeithaml,1986;Shaffer,1995;Schuler,1996; Schuler,Rehbein,&Cramer,2002).Nearly every aspect of business is shaped by government regu-lation,which can significantly modify firms’op-portunity https://www.sodocs.net/doc/0a11012970.html,ernment policy can affect the competitive positions of firms and influence their future performance by changing the size of markets, establishing entry and exit barriers,providing spe-cial tax or subsidy treatments,and altering firm costs through legislation on employment,safety,or environmental protection standards(Gale&Buch-holz,1987;Shaffer,1995).Government can also be a very large customer(e.g.,defense).Given firms’dependency on government,it is not surprising that many have sought to form links with the gov-ernment through their boards.

Hillman(2005)argued that the four general ben-efits derived from directors identified by Pfeffer and Salancik(1978)also apply to the specific con-text of government officials as directors.She con-tended that government officials can provide valu-able advice and counsel regarding the public policy environment of a firm(see also Hillman et al., 1999);channels of communication to existing gov-ernment officials,bureaucrats,and other political decision makers;influence over political decisions; and legitimacy.Hillman’s(2005)empirical find-ings support the notion that firms with government officials on their boards enjoy better financial per-formance than those lacking such directors.Hill-man’s theory treats former government officials as homogeneous,but a purpose of our study is to differentiate among them.

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THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF HUMAN AND

SOCIAL CAPITAL An individual’s expertise,experience,knowl-edge,reputation,and skills are defined by Becker (1964)and Coleman (1988)as “human capital,”whereas an individual’s “social capital”refers to “the sum of actual and potential resources embed-ded within,available through,and derived from,the network of relationships possessed by that in-dividual”(Nahapiet &Ghoshal,1998:243).We be-lieve that what makes any given former government official attractive as a corporate director derives from a combination of the person’s human and social capital.1These attributes are the foundation of value creation for a firm through the resources the directors provide to the firm (Hillman &Dalziel,2003).

Although some scholars empirically distinguish between human and social capital (e.g.,Florin et al.,2003),we join Coleman (1988)and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998),who recognized that the two are conceptually and empirically difficult to untan-gle.Consequently,we do not attempt to isolate the effect of one from the other,or determine whether a director candidate was selected specifically be-cause of either human or social capital.For exam-ple,Burt argued that “while human capital is surely necessary to success,it is useless without the social capital of opportunities in which to ap-ply it”(1997:339).Moreover,he contended that “managers with more social capital get higher re-turns to their human capital”(Burt,1997:339),suggesting an interactive effect.We propose three distinct dimensions of a former government offi-cial’s combined human and social capital,in an attempt to explain what makes some director can-didates more (or less)attractive to firms in need of outside directors for their boards:depth,breadth,and deterioration.Depth

The depth of human and social capital refers to the profundity of a directors’expertise,knowledge,

skills,and social networks.Each director brings a different and unique set of attributes and resources to a firm (Kosnik,1990).The depth of these at-tributes and resources affects the value of the indi-vidual to the firm and thus the attractiveness of the individual as a director candidate.

Hillman,Cannella,and Paetzold (2000)argued that former government officials provide valuable nonbusiness perspectives on issues,intimate knowledge of the public policy process,legitimacy,and access to key decision makers still in govern-ment.As described above,the government is a key source of uncertainty for firms (Carroll &Hall,1987),so having a “government insider”on a board can reduce the transaction costs of securing infor-mation about political decisions and potentially provide superior access and/or influence with cur-rent government officials.

One way to gauge the depth of a potential direc-tors’human and social capital is through tenure in government service.Previous work has established a relationship between the length of an employee’s service and selection,retention,and promotion de-cisions (e.g.,McEnrue,1988;Mills,1958).An un-derlying assumption of this work is that vis-a `-vis others,those with the deepest experience and most influential networks will be more valuable to their employing firms.However,tenure in government positions varies greatly.For example,in the United States,elected government officials serve either two-or six-year terms (depending on whether they are representatives or senators)and can be re-elected for multiple terms.In contrast,federal ap-pointments have an average tenure of 20months,whereas civil officials in regulatory offices or the judiciary can serve their entire careers.Addition-ally,many elected federal officials gain experience at the local and state levels before moving to Wash-ington.Therefore,the attractiveness of any given government official’s human and social capital logically flows from the knowledge,experience,and connections gained as a result of his or her time in government service (Baron,1995).As ten-ure in government service increases,so will the depth of the individual’s human and social cap-ital.Therefore:

Hypothesis 1.Depth of human and social cap-ital is positively associated with the likelihood that a former government official will join a board as an outside director.Breadth

The breadth of directors’human and social cap-ital refers to the extent of the skills,expertise,and

We recognize that former government officials em-body both human and social capital.However,social capital is very difficult to measure for government offi-cials.In general,government officials prefer not to dis-close their social networks because doing so might jeop-ardize the perception that they are independent of outside influences.Such behavior contrasts sharply with that of corporate executives,who often have incentives to highlight their social networks as a way of increasing their market value.

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social networks(i.e.,connections and relation-ships)they possess.Depth denotes focused human and social capital,breadth refers to the range or scope of human and social capital(Mizruchi,1996; Pfeffer,1972).Thus,director candidates with a broader set of skills,connections,and relationships will be,on average,more attractive as director can-didates than those with a narrower set of skills. Work in political economy suggests that the breadth of jurisdiction is a differentiating factor among government officials and bureaucrats in-volved in public policy decisions(e.g.,Majone, 1996;Niskanen,1971).Majone’s work on the Euro-pean Union,for example,indicates the European Commission tries to maximize“its influence,as measured by the scope of its competencies”(1996: 65).Similarly,Bonardi,Hillman,and Keim(2005) argued that regulatory agencies engage in what Lewin(1991)termed“bureau shaping,”wherein they try to expand their jurisdiction over a broader range of issues as a way to gain power.

The breadth of human and social capital indi-cated by different positions within the government (e.g.,cabinet,Senate,House)will make some former government officials more attractive as di-rectors than others because it indicates not only their prestige(which may bring legitimacy to a firm),but also a range of valuable expertise and contacts that can be called upon to serve the firm (Leonard,1990).For example,senators have a wider range of constituents and legislative issues in which they are called to play active decision-mak-ing roles than representatives,who are more spe-cialized in political expertise and geographic in-fluence(Baker,1989;Oleszek,1974).However, cabinet members possess the greatest breadth of human and social capital because they interact with the widest number of constituents and other political decision makers on both national and in-ternational stages(Cohen,1988;Mann&Smith, 1981).Therefore:

Hypothesis2.Breadth of human and social capital is positively associated with the likeli-hood that a former government official will join a board as an outside director. Deterioration

Our theory suggests that the depth and breadth of the social and human capital of former government officials increase their capacity to provide re-sources and,hence,their attractiveness as outside directors.However,as noted earlier,we expect that the value of these resources will atrophy over time, in a process similar to that which occurs to muscles in the human body—without the ability to replen-ish,muscles deteriorate.Our setting provides a unique opportunity to capture the extent to which a director’s human and social capital may atrophy over time.There is a clear separation between those in government service and those on the outside.For example,to permit individuals to be both cabinet members and corporate directors at the same time would pose very clear conflicts of interest.Once their service ends,they are denied much of the access of sitting government officials and therefore have less policy-shaping influence than sitting gov-ernment officials.Thus,their ability to access and acquire new human and social capital is severely reduced.

Furthermore,this deterioration is ongoing.For example,while in government service,he or she develops and maintains an extensive network of official and other contacts(Kotter,1982).This net-work is needed for effective performance in the government role.Many of those others the person is connected to are powerful individuals inside gov-ernment,whose cooperation,coordination,and support are needed(Granovetter,1973)—precisely the same others that make the former government official highly valuable as a prospective director. However,over time,those other powerful individ-uals retire,are replaced,or simply feel less obli-gated to respond to the former official.This process greatly depreciates the social capital that the gov-ernment official accumulated while in office.The effect is not limited to social capital.Indeed,the deep knowledge about key issues and the inner workings of government that the official built dur-ing his or her term of service also deteriorates over time,as key issues change,old policies are dropped,others are adopted,and so forth.Thus,we expect that the resources government officials ac-cumulate in office are the most valuable immedi-ately after the officials leave public service and deteriorate over time.Therefore:

Hypothesis3.The likelihood that a former gov-ernment official will join a board as an outside director decreases over time.

Finally,to sharpen our understanding of how human and social capital deteriorates after leaving public office,we consider a factor that we believe will importantly affect the deterioration process.If the political party in power(i.e.,in control of both the executive branch and the Congress)is not the political party with which the former government official is affiliated,the deterioration of his or her human and social capital is likely to accelerate.As noted,old contacts retire or are replaced,and pol-icies and key issues change.This process is sharply

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accelerated when there is a change in power(i.e., from Republican to Democrat).

Shifts in government leadership brought about by the rise of one party relative to the other often lead to important and discontinuous changes in government policy.Because networks consist not only of interpersonal relationships,but also of the resources that can be accessed through those rela-tionships(Lin,2001),changes in government lead-ership may sharply depreciate the value of a former government official’s network if the change brings the opposition party to power after he or she leaves office.Moreover,changes in power imply a policy environment that fosters new regulations and laws (Sissell,2007).Such shifts tend to diminish the value of the specific contacts,expertise,and chan-nels of communication former government officials can offer to the companies on whose boards they serve.Therefore:

Hypothesis4.When the party in power(i.e.,in control of the House,Senate,and executive branch)is not the party that the former govern-ment official is affiliated with,the likelihood that he or she will join a board as an outside director decreases.

METHODS

Sample

We studied outside director appointments by identifying all U.S.senators,congressmen,and presidential cabinet secretaries who left office be-tween1988and2003.The unit of analysis in our study is the former government official,defined as a former senator,representative,or cabinet secre-tary.We chose this specific group because its mem-bers possess high name recognition and influence and include both elected and appointed govern-ment officials.Further,service at high levels in the federal government implies good national and in-ternational access and influence.We excluded low-er-level appointed political officers such as under-secretaries,state,or local officials because these have lower visibility and less access and influence. Individual cabinet secretaries were identified through each of the14cabinet department web-sites,and senators and representatives were iden-tified through the Lexis-Nexis congressional data-base(we included the100th–107th Congressional terms).The year1988was chosen as the start date because it enabled us to examine(1)the impact of an outgoing administration(i.e.,the Reagan admin-istration)that placed our sample in the prospective director pool and(2)to utilize electronic archives for data consistency and reliability.We then con-sulted the Thompson SDC database of U.S.public corporations’Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)filings to identify any public company that elected one or more former government officials to their board.Through news accounts in Lexis-Nexis Universe and other public records(e.g., Hoover’s,firm websites),we were able to identify the date(if there was one)a former government official joined a corporate board.

Our sample consists of66former cabinet secre-taries,74former senators,and96former represen-tatives,a total of236individuals.Our group of former senators and cabinet members includes the entire set of those who served in each respective capacity and subsequently left office during our sample window.However,433representatives de-parted from office during our sample window.We therefore elected to choose100of them at random to make our sample more balanced over the three groups.Missing data reduced this number to96. Demographic data on each former government offi-cial were obtained primarily through the Lexis-Nexis congressional database for senators and rep-resentatives and the respective cabinet department websites for cabinet secretaries.

Analytical Methodology

We used survival models to test Hypotheses1,2, and4because our interest lay in analyzing the likelihood of an event—a formal official’s accepting an appointment as an outside director(Cox,1972; Cleves,Gould,&Gutierrez,2002).Our methodol-ogy models the implications of our independent variables on the hazard rate of joining a board as an outside director.The hazard rate of an event’s oc-currence is the instantaneous likelihood that the event will occur at any given time t.We used a class of models known as repeated failure models be-cause the event can be observed multiple times within each cross-sectional unit.Put differently, former government officials can join more than one board.Therefore,the fact that a former government official has joined a board does not remove him or her from the pool available to join more.Indeed,as our models indicate,joining one board sharply in-creases the likelihood of joining more.Significant coefficients for our independent variables can be directly interpreted as significant impacts on the likelihood of joining a board(Box-Steffensmeier& Jones,2004;Tuma&Hannan,1984).

To structure the data set during our sample pe-riod,we observed each former government official from the date he or she left office until December 31,2003,or death,whichever came first.We di-vided this time span into shorter spells signaled by

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the occurrence of four types of events(Tuma& Hannan,1984),each of which may terminate a span of time:(1)board joining(the key event of interest), (2)death of the person(a censoring event),(3)a change of control of the government from one po-litical party to the other(a censoring event),and(4) December31,2003(a censoring event).For board joining and changes of control,we created new time intervals,with updated independent vari-ables,starting the day after the respective event. For death and the end of the observation period,we censored(dropped from further consideration)the person.Time,in our study,starts on the date of departure from government service.

Measures

Board joining.Our key dependent variable (joined board)was set to1when we observed a former government official joining the board of a U.S.public corporation as an outside director,and 0otherwise.

Depth.We measured the depth of a former gov-ernment official’s human and social capital by ten-ure in government service(service tenure).We ob-tained data for this measure from the Lexis-Nexis congressional database,which contains detailed bi-ographies on each government official.In calculat-ing service tenure,we included any time in govern-ment service at the local,state,or federal level.In most cases,the majority of tenure was accumulated at the last position held in federal government service.In analyses not reported here,we limited our measure to the tenure accumulated in federal government service,and the results remained unchanged.

Breadth.To assess the breadth of human and social capital we relied upon the last position of the government official.Previous work on job breadth suggests that job complexity and prestige are influ-ential in assigning an overall assessment of breadth (Treiman,1977;Xie&Johns,1995).Accordingly, we expected presidential cabinet members to have the greatest breadth of human and social capital, followed by senators and representatives,respec-tively.For example,the primary constituency of a U.S.representative from the San Joaquin Valley in California is agriculture.2However,a senator from California has to deal with a much broader range of constituents and interests than only those from the San Joaquin Valley(i.e.,San Francisco,Los Ange-les,Bakersfield,etc.).Presidential cabinet members have the greatest breadth of human and social cap-ital because their jobs involve the broadest range of constituents and interests;cabinet members are re-sponsible at the national and sometimes interna-tional levels as members of the executive branch (Cohen,1988;Mann&Smith,1981).Thus,we cat-egorized each individual on the basis of his or her last position before exiting federal service(cabinet, Senate,or House)as a set of three indicator vari-ables(coded as1,indicating membership in the category,and0otherwise).

Deterioration.To capture whether a former gov-ernment official’s likelihood of accepting an out-side board appointment depreciates over time(Hy-pothesis3),we modeled the hazard function stratified by the former official’s breadth of human and social capital after removing the impact of chronological age.

To further capture changes in the environment hypothesized to diminish the value of a former government official’s human and social capital (Hypothesis4),we initially created three dummy variables to identify whether the former govern-ment official was of the same political party as the one in control for each branch of government:Sen-ate,House,or White House3(e.g.,for a Democrat senator,we asked,“Are Democrats in charge of the House,Senate,or White House?”We coded the answers as1,“yes,”and0,“no.”).We then created our time-varying predictor,opposition party in power(coded as1if none of the three branches of the government were controlled by the individual’s political party affiliation,and0otherwise). Control variables.We controlled for individual-level characteristics shown to be influential in pre-vious work,including political affiliation(Repub-lican),prestigious education(Finkelstein,1992); chronological age,business experience prior to government service,other board experience after leaving government but before the start of the spe-cific observation,4and policy expertise.Policy ex-pertise comprised17categories(see Table2)rang-ing from“Agriculture”to“Veterans Affairs”and was identified for cabinet secretaries by their re-

2House districts are redrawn every ten years,which works to aggregate similar constituent interests together, thus concentrating a representative’s constituents.

3During our observation window,the Senate and House are correlated identically,as either Republicans or Democrats controlled both bodies at all times from1989 to2003.Both were under Democrat control from January 16,1989,through January15,1995,and both were under Republican control from January16,1995until the end of our observation period on December31,2003.

4This variable is always0on the day government service ended.However,if and when the first board seat is secured,the value becomes1.

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spective departments and for senators and repre-sentatives through their primary committee responsibilities.

RESULTS

Table 1reports means,standard deviations,and correlation coefficients 5for our variables,and Ta-ble 2provides some summary categorizations.From 1988through 2003our 236former govern-ment officials were elected and appointed to a total of 304outside directorships at U.S.public corpo-rations.By a large margin,former cabinet members were the most prolific outside director appointees,as 63.6percent of former cabinet secretaries subse-quently obtained an outside directorship,while only 39.2percent of senators and 13.5percent of representatives did so.Furthermore,as panel 1in Table 2portrays,of the top 11individuals (i.e.,those with the greatest number of board appoint-ments after leaving office),8were cabinet secretar-ies,2were senators,and 1was a representative.These top 11represent 31.9percent of all board joining observations.Panel 2of this table provides a listing of all firms (n ?10)that elected more than one former government official to their board dur-ing our observation window,leaving 284firms ap-pointing the remainder.Panels 3,4,and 5of Table 2provide some additional summary statistics and

frequencies.Of interest is the fact that of the 236unique former government officials observed,35.6percent joined firms as outside directors,thereby leaving 64.4percent of the sample with no public corporation directorships during our observation window.Approximately two-thirds of our sample members were either not invited to serve as outside directors for public corporation boards or had no interest in serving.

Table 3provides the results of our Cox propor-tional hazard model,with coefficients reported as odds ratios.These are interpreted as the propor-tional change in the hazard function associated with a one-unit change in the independent vari-able.Odds ratios of 1indicate no effects (similar to a regression coefficient of 0).Odds ratios greater than 1indicate a positive association between the independent variable and the hazard of the event’s occurrence,and odds ratios of less than 1indicate a negative association.Hypothesis 1predicted that a former government official’s tenure (our depth proxy)in government service would be positively associated with the likelihood of his or her joining a board as an outside director.Results in Table 3support this hypothesis,as longer tenure in govern-ment service (our depth proxy)is significantly re-lated to the likelihood of accepting an outside di-rectorship (odds ratio ?1.04;p ?.001).Every additional year of government service increased the odds of our sample individuals joining a public corporations board as an outside director by 3.9percent.

Regarding the breadth of human and social cap-ital of government officials,Hypothesis 2predicted a positive relationship between the breadth of re-sponsibilities undertaken as a government official and the likelihood of joining a board as an outside

Care should be taken when interpreting Table 1be-cause it represents an event history data set that has more than one observation per person.Additionally,the more boards a person joins,the more observations he or she has in the data set.For parsimony,we leave out our controls for political expertise.These coefficients are available from the first author on request.

TABLE 1

Means,Standard Deviations,and Correlations a

Variable

Mean s.d.1234567891011

1.Joined board 0.340.47

2.Service tenure 20.6311.65.11

3.Cabinet 0.440.50.25?.26

4.Senate 0.290.46?.001.29?.57

5.House

0.270.45?.28?.003?.54?.396.Opposition party in power 0.260.40?.09?.07.03?.06.027.Republican 0.630.48.05?.18.25?.04?.24?.238.Age

64.269.64?.23.42?.04.18?.14.13.039.Prestigious education 0.320.47?.02?.09.19?.03?.18?.04.11.0810.Died

0.060.25?.06.13?.03.02.01?.16?.16.20.0311.Business experience 0.210.41.01?.24.12?.09?.04?.04.11?.12.01?.00212.

Other board experience

0.52

0.50

.29

?.04

.33

.01

?.37

.13

.15

?.03

.02

?.06

?.01

Correlations greater than .07are significant at p ?.05.n ?869.For parsimony we do not report correlations for the 17categories of political expertise.Results are available from the authors.

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TABLE 2

Summary Analysis of Former Government Officials

(a)Panel 1:Top Former Government Officials Appointed as Outside Directors,1988–2004Rank Name

Boards Joined Position Government Expertise Left Office Government Tenure

Average Size a

1Ann D.McLaughlin 13Cabinet Labor 198913$14,5792Frank Carlucci 10Cabinet Defense

1989266,3112Samuel Skinner 10Cabinet Transportation 1991141,7272Jack Kemp 10Cabinet HUD

1993239522Louis Sullivan 10Cabinet HHS-HEW 1993519,5413Daniel Evans

8Senate State 1988308313Lawrence Eagleburger 8Cabinet State

1993335,2894Tony Coelho 7House Agriculture 1988241,0074Clayton Yeutter 7Cabinet Agriculture 1991148,6014Barbara Franklin 7Cabinet Commerce 1993136,0474

George Mitchell

Senate

Treasury

1994

7,332

(b)Panel 2:Firms That Appointed More Than One Government Official,1988–2004b

Firm Name Cabinet Senate Hired

House

Average Government

Tenure

Expertise Appointed

Boeing 216Defense State Comsat

1122.5State

Treasury Dow Chemical 1116Commerce Commerce Everen Capital 218.5HUD Transportation General Electric 1117.5Justice Defense General Motors 29Labor HHS-HEW WR Grace 2

11Treasury State Kaiser Group 1

27Agriculture Energy Saf T Lok 2

18.5Defense State

Stimsonite

23.5

State

Transportation

(c)Panel 3:Mean Comparisons of Former Government Officials by Last Position Held

Variable Cabinet Senate House Government tenure 17.6326.3119.87Education level c

3.43 3.06 2.85Prestigious education 0.460.290.21Age

58.6163.9157.60Republican

0.620.520.45Business experience d 0.210.200.23Legal experience d

0.59

0.72

0.59

(d)Panel 4:Mean Comparisons of Former Government Officials Who Did and Did Not Become Outside Directors

Variable Appointed as Outside Director

Not Appointed as Outside Director Cabinet Senate House Cabinet Senate House Service tenure 17.0925.2026.0718.5827.0218.90Education level c

3.30 3.24 2.76 3.66 2.95 2.87Prestigious education 0.400.270.150.580.310.21Age

59.3061.2459.3857.3765.6457.32Republican

0.640.580.380.580.480.46Business experience d 0.230.140.230.160.240.24Legal experience d

0.57

0.79

0.53

0.62

0.68

0.60

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Academy of Management Journal

director.We selected former senators as our omit-ted category (the comparison group)and found that former cabinet secretaries were 2.14times more likely to join public corporation boards as outside directors than senators (odds ratio ?2.14;p ?.001).Further,representatives (who,we argued,have less breadth than senators)are 58.1percent less likely to gain outside directorships than sena-tors (odds ratio ?0.42;p ?.01).6These results support our hypothesis that those former govern-ment officials with the greatest breadth of govern-ment experience have a higher probability of join-ing the boards of public corporations as outside directors.

Hypothesis 3predicted that the value of a former government officials’human and social capital de-teriorates over time.To test this hypothesis,we graphed the hazard of joining a board,controlling for chronological age.Figure 1provides separate lines for each of our breadth categories (cabinet

secretary,senator,and representative).As depicted in Figure 1,there is a sharp spike in the likelihood of obtaining an outside directorship the first year after leaving government service for cabinet mem-bers and senators.However,there is a dramatic decline in this likelihood from the second year on (although we might characterize the line for repre-sentatives as a steady decline).Former cabinet members seem to have a slight resurgence of in-creased likelihood to join between years four and five,which again declines around year eight.This pattern is observed to a lesser degree for senators as well.We will have more to say about this result in the discussion section.However,the graphic evi-dence in Figure 1provides support for Hypothesis 3,which predicted that the value of former govern-ment officials’human and social capital deterio-rates over time.

Hypothesis 4predicted that when the political party in control of the executive and legislative branches of government is not the political party of a former government official (opposition party in power )the value of the former official’s human and social capital would deteriorate significantly.The

6We arrived at this number by subtracting the odds ratio (carried to three places)from 1(1–0.419?0.581,or 58.1%).

TABLE 2Continued

(e)Panel 5:Comparison of Former Government Officials and Their Government Expertise

Government-Acquired

Expertise Appointed as Outside Director

Not Appointed as Outside Director

Cabinet

Senate

House Totals Cabinet

Senate

House Totals Agriculture 311532914Commerce 35831610Defense 423915814Education 44123Energy 31

61438HHS-HEW 3311Interior 331236Justice 111352613Labor 44224State

2913812Transportation 325189Rules 11123HUD 3311Treasury

3121

161161633Veterans Affairs 1

122

114Unknown

011Ways and Means

351116Number of former officials

42291384

152

Average size is the sum of the annual sates of the firms joined as an outside director divided by the number of boards joined,in millions of dollars.b

There were 284discrete firms hiring only one former government official during our observation window.c

Measured as a categorical variable (1?“no college”2?“bachelor’s degree”3?“master’s degree”4?“terminal degree”).d

Obtained from biographical sketches,coded as most prominent profession held by an official prior to entering government service.e

Individual-level analysis,regardless of number of appointments.

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Lester,Hillman,Zardkoohi,and Cannella

evidence from Table 3,model 2,supports this pre-diction (odds ratio ?.71:p ?.05).If a former government official belongs to a political party that is not in control of either the legislative or the executive branch,the chances of obtaining an out-side directorship are reduced by 29.4percent.In analyses not reported here,we considered the ex-tent to which the opposition party was in power (a number ranging in value from 0to 3),and whether the particular branch of government that the offi-

cial had served in was under the control of the opposition party.None of these measures,how-ever,were significant.It seems that only when the former government official’s party is com-pletely out of power is there a significant depre-ciation in the value of the individual’s human and social capital as it relates to obtaining out-side directorships.

DISCUSSION

Our research highlights the growing relationship between corporations and former government offi-cials and sheds important light on the characteris-tics that make one former government official more valuable to corporations than another.Our research is consistent with findings that firms are devoting increased attention and resources to a wide array of legislative activities;by doing so,they may mitigate competition from abroad,avoid costly regulatory compliance,or dodge increases in capital gains taxes in an attempt to eliminate threats,reduce uncertainty,and create opportunities (Lord,2000).Moreover,Lipton and Harris (2007)found renewed interest by U.S.corporations in further federal leg-islation and market protection.It is,therefore,not surprising that former government officials are in-creasingly sought after for America’s corporate boardrooms (Korn/Ferry International,2000).Al-though some work has examined such board ap-pointments (Agrawal &Knoeber,2001;Hillman,2005),there has been less research aimed at the specific dimensions of director candidates’human and social capital that make them more,or less,attractive as outside directors.Thus,our treatment of each government official as an individual with heterogeneous depth,breadth,and deterioration of human and social capital represents an important step forward.

Our study promised three primary contributions.First,we focused on individual director candi-dates,emphasizing what makes any specific candi-date more attractive as a corporate director than another.We predicted that the depth and breadth of human and social capital embodied in each di-rector candidate is an important determinant of his or her attractiveness as an outside director.Our evidence that length of service and type of service (cabinet,Senate,or House of Representatives)are strongly associated with the likelihood of accepting outside directorships provides important evidence about the depth and breadth of human capital and their importance to corporations seeking outside directors.Rather than treating all former govern-ment officials as homogeneous,our evidence sug-gests that their human and social capital is quite

TABLE 3

Results of Maximum-Likelihood Survival Time Regression Analysis for Joining a Board a

Variables

Model 1Model 2Odds Ratio

s.e.Odds Ratio

s.e.

Independent Service tenure 1.04***(.01)Cabinet b 2.14***(.45)House b

0.42**(.13)Opposition party in power 0.71*(.11)

Control

Republican 1.28(0.22) 1.19(.22)Age

0.97***(0.01)0.93***(.01)Prestigious education 0.91(0.18)0.78(0.18)Died

1.00(0.32)0.84(0.32)Business experience 0.85(0.16) 1.01(0.20)Other board experience 8.82***(1.29) 5.17***(.91)

Policy expertise c

Agriculture 1.02(0.39)0.86(.37)Commerce 1.25(0.35) 1.01*(0.31)Defense 1.35(0.36) 1.08(0.31)Education 0.72(0.19)0.61(.22)Energy 0.73(0.18)

0.51*(0.17)HHS/HEW 1.79?

(0.61) 1.31(.80)Interior 0.82(0.20)0.57(0.18)Justice 0.49(0.26)0.49(.33)Labor 1.96*(0.62)0.88(0.31)State

1.09(0.37)0.96(.33)Transportation 0.93(0.47)0.69(0.40)Rules 0.47(0.32)0.73(.62)HUD

1.83(0.96)0.75(.42)Miscellaneous 0.70(0.26)0.38**(0.14)Veterans Affairs 0.00***(0.00)0.00***(.00)Ways and Means 0.71(0.31)0.85(0.40)Wald ?2

1,607.68***1,370.66***

n ?869.Odds ratios of less than 1represent negative associations,and those larger than 1represent positive associations.b

The omitted category is “Senate.”c

The omitted category for policy expertise is “Treasury”(the most prevalent category).

p ?.10*p ?.05**p ?.01***p ?.001

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Academy of Management Journal

heterogeneous,and that heterogeneity is reflected in opportunities for outside directorships.

Our second contribution is our focus on an im-portant (but often ignored)factor in business-gov-ernment links—corporate boards of directors.As we noted in our introduction,business and govern-ment are supposed to operate separately (Fried-man,1970),but in reality they are highly inter-twined.Resource dependence theory has long held that this will be the case (Pfeffer &Salancik,1978).However,direct co-optation (inviting sitting gov-ernment officials to serve on corporate boards)is not possible.Therefore,our evidence might suggest firms wait until government service is ended before the co-optation process starts.We were,of course,unable to observe the actual resources provided by the former government officials through their direc-torships,so although our theory was supported,more research is needed about the specific benefits that corporations receive by inviting former govern-ment officials onto their boards.We feel this poten-tial co-optation process deserves more scrutiny.Moreover,our approach is based on the notion that former government officials bring valuable re-sources to corporate boards.However,an alterna-tive view might be that hiring former government officials for corporate directorships represents a “tit-for-tat”(Bernheim &Whinston,1990)phenom-enon.That is,it is possible that corporate board seats are payment for services directors rendered while in government service.Certainly,it is at least theoretically possible that serving government offi-cials who support corporate initiatives are re-warded after leaving office—a timing that would render such rewards extremely difficult for inves-tigators to link to favors provided in the past.The idea is unpleasant (such activities might be uneth-ical),yet we cannot discount the possibility.

Our final contribution involves highlighting that both human and social capital resources can dete-riorate over time.There has been a virtual explo-sion in research on the upper echelons (Hambrick,2007),and nearly all of it relies on the notion that the past experiences and interpersonal networks of executives affect their current actions.Addition-ally,researchers such as Mintzberg (1978)and Kot-ter (1982)provided qualitative descriptions of how managers build networks to gather information and exert influence over others,as well as how they gain specific knowledge on the job.Yet very little empirical research has addressed whether,or how,human and social capital may depreciate or deteri-

FIGURE 1

Former Government Officials Serving as Outside Directors

Adjusted for Chronological Age

“Hazard”refers to the likelihood that a sample individual will join a board on the given day.We computed this estimate of the hazard function by calculating the hazard contributions at each observed board joining and fitting a density curve to them.“Analysis Time”is the number of days since an official left office;1,000days is approximately 2.7years.

20081009

Lester,Hillman,Zardkoohi,and Cannella

orate over time.The context of our study provided an opportunity to examine,in an empirically rigor-ous way,our theory of resource deterioration.Be-cause of the business-government separation,we could identify the exact date on which an official’s human and social capital potentially began to de-preciate.We found that former government offi-cials’likelihood of joining corporate boards is time dependent;that is,over time and irrespective of chronological age,their attractiveness as directors tends to depreciate.Regardless of political party or position,many former government officials ac-cepted board seats within a month or two of leav-ing office.Additionally,we found that political party control shifts influence the likelihood of board appointments.When a former government official’s political party was completely out of power for all three branches of the federal gov-ernment,he or she was significantly less likely to gain a board appointment.

An interesting aspect of our evidence on the deterioration of human and social capital de-serves mention.Our graph of the hazard rate of board joining(Figure1)is consistent with our hypothesis.Most former government officials join boards soon after departure from their gov-ernment positions.The hazard rate declines soon after.However,the hazard rate peaks twice for former cabinet members,with the second peak taking place about five years out of office.One possible explanation for this increase might be that many former cabinet members joined boards quickly after leaving government service,and their service on those boards was coming to an end.Therefore,new boards were sought.Clearly, our former government officials were,as a group, sought-after for board service,as they accepted over300directorships during our study period. Should this admittedly speculative explanation be borne out,it would suggest that new human and social capital was being accumulated through the outside directorships that former government officials held.

Despite the support for our hypotheses,our study is not without limitations.First and most importantly,we cannot separate the specific re-sources former government officials bring to boards(i.e.,information,contacts,preferential access,influence,or legitimacy),nor can we iso-late the effects of their human or social capital. We consider it important for future research to better isolate these forms of capital.Second,ours is a U.S.–centric view of the business-govern-ment relationship and may not be generalizable to other countries(Hillman,2005;Hillman et al., 1999).It is possible that the relationships we uncovered are substantially different in different political systems,suggesting that future research would benefit from exploration across different institutional settings.Third,our study period covers three Republican(Reagan,Bush41,and Bush43)and one Democrat(Clinton)presidency but is heavily weighted toward Republicans. Fourth,we focused on public corporations’boards for consistency and access to https://www.sodocs.net/doc/0a11012970.html,-ernment policies have significant impacts on the operations of both private and not-for-profit firms,and many of these may also seek the ser-vices of former government officials for their ad-visory or other governing boards.This issue war-rants further study.Finally,we were unable to control for those former government officials who were approached about serving on corporate boards but declined the opportunity to do so. Although our research focuses on former gov-ernment officials as directors,we believe the cat-egories of director candidates’human and social capital introduced here(depth,breadth,and de-terioration)are generalizable to other occupations sought by corporate boards(e.g.,CEOs,members of financial institutions,academics,and other com-munity leaders).Examining these categories across various professions is a natural extension of this work.Theories of human and social capital suggest that these dimensions are likely to apply to multi-ple types of expertise and networks,but this idea remains open to further investigation.For example, it would be interesting to explore whether the same dimensions we proposed here would affect the likelihood of former or current CEOs securing di-rectorships.Does the depth and breadth of these candidates’human and social capital matter in the same ways as for former government officials?Does human and social capital among former or current CEOs also deteriorate over time?

In conclusion,we believe ours is an important first step toward answering the question,Why are some candidates chosen as directors while others not?Because the literature strongly suggests that the resource provision role of corporate directors is a key one(Daily,Dalton,&Cannella,2003), research that furthers understanding about how human and social capital create value for corpo-rate boards is essential.

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Richard H.Lester(rlester@https://www.sodocs.net/doc/0a11012970.html,)is a clinical associate professor in the Department of Management at Texas A&M University.He received his Ph.D.in strategic management from Texas A&M University.His research interests focus on corporate governance,upper echelons, and entrepreneurship.

Amy Hillman(amy.hillman@https://www.sodocs.net/doc/0a11012970.html,)is the Jerry and Mary Ann Chapman Professor of Business in the Depart-ment of Management,W.P.Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.She received her Ph.D.from Texas A&M University.Her research interests include resource dependence linkages,corporate political strate-gies,and boards of directors.Asghar Zardkoohi(azardkoohi@https://www.sodocs.net/doc/0a11012970.html,)is the T.J.Barlow Professor of Business Administration in the Department of Management,Mays Business School, Texas A&M University.He received his Ph.D.in econom-ics from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univer-sity.His research interests include organizational archi-tecture,decision making,law and economics,and public policy.

Albert A.Cannella Jr.(acannell@https://www.sodocs.net/doc/0a11012970.html,)is the Koer-ner Chair in Strategy and Entrepreneurship at Tulane University.He received his Ph.D.from Columbia Univer-sity.His research interests focus on executives,entrepre-neurship,and competitive

dynamics.

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PEP六年级上册英语教案全册

Unit 1How can I get there? 第一课时一、教学内容 Part A Let's try & Let's talk 二、教学目标 1．能够听、说、读、写句子：“Where is the museum shop？”“It's near the door.”。 2．能够听、说、认读单词ask、sir和句型“Is there a…？”“I want to…”“What a great museum！”。三、教学重难点 1．学习句子“Where is the museum shop？”“It's near the door.”。 2．正确使用方位介词。四、教学准备单词卡、录音机、磁带。五、教学过程 Step 1 热身(Warming－up) Let's do Go to the bookstore.Buy some books. Go to the post office.Send a letter. Go to the hospital.See the doctor. Go to the cinema.See a film.

Go to the museum.See some robots. Step 2 新课呈现(Presentation) 1．学习Let's try (1)打开课本读一读Let's try中呈现的问题和选项。 (2)播放录音，让学生听完后勾出正确的选项。 (3)全班核对答案。 2．学习Let's talk (1)播放Let's talk的录音，学生带着问题听录音：Where is the museum shop？Where is the post office？听完录音后让学生回答这两个问题，教师板书：It's near the door.It's next to the museum.教师讲解：near表示“在附近”，next to表示“与……相邻”，它的范围比near小。最后让学生用near和next to来讲述学校周围的建筑物。 (2)讲解“A talking robot！What a great museum！”，让学生说说这两个感叹句的意思。 (3)再次播放录音，学生一边听一边跟读。 (4)分角色朗读课文。 Step 3 巩固与拓展(Consolidation and extension) 1．三人一组分角色练习Let's talk的对话，然后请一些同学到台前表演。 2．教学Part A：Talk about the places in your city/town/village.

人教版六年级上册英语知识点总结

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PEP7最新六年级下册Unit4-Unit6英语课文翻译 Unit4 I have a pen pal.单词表：学习的三单形式，迷，远足，笔友，业余爱好，茉莉，想法主意，堪培拉，令人惊奇的，表示征求意见，射门，加入，俱乐部，分享 P38Let’s talk奥利弗：彼得的爱好是什么？张鹏：他喜欢读故事。他住在一个农场上，所以有时他读给那些奶牛！奥利弗：那是有趣的。张鹏：他喜欢练功夫和游泳。奥利弗：真的吗？我也是。张鹏：他也喜欢唱歌。奥利弗：哦，你也喜欢唱歌。张鹏：是的。我打算教他中国歌曲《茉莉花》！奥利弗：好主意！P39Let’s learn彼得：嘿，张鹏，你的爱好是什么？张鹏：我喜欢读故事。我也喜欢唱歌和练功夫。跳舞唱歌读故事踢足球练功夫 P40Let’s talk约翰：嘿，一。你正在干什么？（现在进行时）吴一凡：我正在写一份电子邮件给我的朋友在澳大利亚。约翰：他住在悉尼吗？吴一凡：不，他不是。他住在堪培拉。他的名字是约翰，也。约翰：真的吗？他喜欢猜字谜和去远足吗？吴一凡:是的，他是。约翰：太神奇了！我也喜欢这些。我也能成为他的笔友吗？吴一凡：当然。为什么不呢？约翰：酷！ P41Let’s learn约翰：过来并且看看我的新的笔友。他的名字也是约翰！兄弟：真的吗？他也住在中国吗？约翰：不，他不在。他住在澳大利亚，但是他学语文。烧中国食物学语文猜字谜去远足 P42let’s read布告栏：我们能跳舞吗？有一个跳舞课在星期天在下午一点。我喜欢跳舞,兵器我需要一个搭档。打电话给艾米：3345567射门！射门！射门让我们一起读。你的爱好是什么？你喜欢阅读吗？我有很棒的书。我们能分享！打电话给迈克：4435678 科学俱乐部，你的俱乐部。你想学习关于机器人吗？来到科学房间。见见罗宾。他教学生制作机器人。robin Unit 5 What does he do?单词表：工厂，工人，邮递员，商人企业家，警察，渔民科学家，飞行员，教练，国家，校长，大海，保持，大学，体育馆，如果，记者，使用，打字，快速地，秘书 P48Let’s talk莎拉：你的爸爸是在这里今天吗？奥利弗：不，他在澳大利亚。莎拉：他是干什么的？奥利弗：他是一个商人。他经常去其它的城市。莎拉：并且你的妈妈是干什么的？奥利弗：她是一个班主任。莎拉：那是好的。奥利弗：是的，她将要是在这里今天。莎拉：你想成为一个班主任吗？奥利弗：不，我想成为一个出租车司机。 P49Let’s learn职业日工厂工人邮递员商人警察张鹏：你的爸爸是一个邮递员吗？奥利弗：不，他不是。张鹏：他是干什么的？：奥利弗：他是一个商人。 P50Let’s talk迈克：我的叔叔是一个渔夫。小雨：他在哪里工作？迈克：他工作在海上。他看到很多鱼每天。小雨：我知道了。他怎么去工作的？乘小船？迈克：不，他工作在小船上。他骑自行车去工作。小雨：他有一个很健康的生活。迈克：是的。他工作非常努力并且保持健康。小雨：我们也应该努力学习并且保持健康。 P51Let’s learn渔民科学家飞行员教练奥利弗：我的叔叔是科学家。吴一凡：他在哪里工作？奥利弗：他工作在一个大学。 P52let’s read胡斌喜欢运动。他擅长足球，乒乓球和篮球。他经常去跑步放学后。他想工作在一个体育馆。提示：

人教版六年级英语上册期末重点知识点汇总--最新版

人教版六年级英语上册期末重点知识复习资料六年级上册复习要点 Unit1 How can I get there? 一、重点单词：地点：science museum科学博物馆post office 邮局bookstore 书店 cinema 电影院hospital 医院动作：go straight 直走turn left/right 左转、右转方位：in front of :在···前面behind 在···后面near在…旁边next to 紧挨着beside 在旁边 over 在…上方on the left 在左边on the right 在右边二、重点句型：（1）Is / Are there…？某处有某物吗？肯定回答：Yes, there is/are. 否定回答：No, there isn’t/aren’t. （2）Where is the + 地点？... ... 在哪里？ It’s + 表示地点的名词. 它... ... 例句：Where is the cinema? 电影院在哪？ It’s next to the bookstore. 在书店的旁边。（3）How can + 主语+get（to）+ 地点? ... ...怎么到... ...? （如果get后面接的词为副词，则要省略介词to.）例句：我们怎么到那儿？同义句型：Can you tell me the way to + 地点？ ( 4 )Where is + 地点？Which is the way to + 地点？到书店左转。 Unit 2 Ways to go to school? 一、重点单词/短语：交通方式：by bike /bus /plane /subway /train /ship /taxi /ferry 骑自行车/乘公共汽车/飞机/地铁/火车/船/出租汽车/轮渡take the No.57 bus 乘57路公共汽车 on foot 步行其他：slow down慢下来pay attention to 注意traffic lights 交通信号灯look right 向右看cross the road 横穿马路at home 在家二、重点句型：（1）How do you come (to) + 地点？你们怎么来... 的？我通常/经常/有时... How do you go(to) + 地点？你们怎么去...的？ How do you get (to) + 地点？你们怎么到达...的？

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