!Organisational principles for co-operative firm

Scand.J.Mgmt.17(2001)329–356

Organisational principles for co-operative?rms$

Jerker Nilsson*

Department of Economics,Swedish Uni v ersity of A g ricultural Sciences,P.O.Box7013,S-75007Uppsala,

Sweden

Accepted9September1999

Abstract

Co-operative?rms have been the subject of criticism by many economists,who base their arguments on property rights and agency theory:members do not control management, investments are short term,accumulated investments are below the economic optimum,etc. Nevertheless,many co-operative organisations do function well for their members.An analysis of the assumptions underlying the criticism reveals that this is not generally justi?ed. As it focuses mainly on the functioning of capital markets,it disregards the vertically integrated character of the co-operatives,i.e.that their purpose is to counteract market failures on product markets.For many co-operatives,however,the critique is valid.Individual ownership in the form of tradable residual rights is thus motivated in many co-operatives.# 2001Elsevier Science Ltd.All rights reserved.

Keywords:Co-operatives;Cooperatives;Agriculture;Investments;Financing;Equity capital;Residual rights;Property rights;Agency theory;Transaction cost theory

1.Co-operative e?ciency

Co-operative?rms occupy a strong position in many business sectors.Mention could be made of agriculture,where farmers’co-operatives in the European Union and in North America both often account for30–70%of the market(Cropp& Ingalsbe,1989;van Bekkum&van Dijk,1997).On many retail markets in Europe retailers have formed strong co-operatives,often described as voluntary chains,to run wholesale operations.Consumer co-operatives are to be found in both Europe $Paper presented at the14th Nordic Conference on Business Studies(14–16August1997,Bod , Norway).

*Tel.:+46-18-671768;fax:+46-18-673502.

E-mail address:jerker.nilsson@ekon.slu.se(J.Nilsson).

0956-5221/01/$-see front matter#2001Elsevier Science Ltd.All rights reserved.

PII:S0956-5221(01)00010-0

and America,although their strength is not what it used to be (Brazda &Schediwy,1989,1994).

On the aggregate level,too,the co-operative sector is substantial.A governmental investigation assesses that co-operative enterprises account for 8%of the Swedish gross national product and 14%of the country’s private consumption (Attityder och

lagstiftning i samverkan;bet .a nkande av F .oretagskooperativa utredningen,1996).

Sweden’s agricultural markets are dominated by farmers’co-operatives;the largest grocery chain (35%market share)was until recently a retailer co-operative and the second largest is a consumer co-operative;housing co-operatives account for a substantial percentage of all dwellings;mutual insurance societies play a dominant role in many insurance markets;etc.Parallels can be drawn with other countries such as Finland,Denmark and Norway,where co-operative ?rms occupy a similar strong position.

Over the last few decades,however,economists have voiced some criticism of the co-operative business form,on the grounds of its unclear property rights and high agency costs (e.g.Porter &Scully,1987).Co-operatives are ine?cient,it is claimed:

1.‘‘Technical ine?ciency .Because the co-operative has higher costs of control

resulting from the many principals–agent problem,because of the reduced incentive of its principals to monitor and reduce shirking when the bene?ts of this e?ort are a public good for all the members,and because the inability to concentrate ownership reduces the incentive to innovate,the co-operative will be less technically e?cient than its non-co-operative counterpart.

2.Allocati v e ine?ciency.Because the co-operative member’s claim on the return to

long-term investments will be truncated at his horizon of patronage (i.e.the full value of the marginal product of an investment will not be realised by the decision maker)and because the ability to diversify to avoid risk or to concentrate ownership in the least-cost bearers of risk is denied the co-operative (i.e.the risk-adjusted cost of capital is greater),the co-operative will be allocatively ine?cient.It will tend to under-utilise capital and intangible assets.

3.Scale ine?ciency.Achieving the cost-minimising scale of output requires su?cient

patronage.Because the costs of control increase with the number of principals (patrons in a co-operative)and because legal constraints on the amount of business that the co-operative can conduct with non-members inhibit expan-sion,the co-operative is likely to be scale-ine?cient.’’(Ferrier &Porter,1991,pp.166–167)

Such arguments are convincing,but co-operatives still continue to thrive and grow,even on very competitive markets (Cook,1995).If co-operatives were really ine?cient,they would be forced out of the markets.According to Porter and Scully (1987)the explanation of this contradiction is that co-operatives enjoy public support.On the basis of an empirical study of the US dairy sector the authors state that dairy co-operatives survive due to ‘‘tax breaks,interest subsidies,and the gratis services of the Department of Agriculture’’(Porter &Scully,1987,p.511).

This may be correct in this particular case,and similar explanations might apply to the large co-operative sectors in many countries and industries.In many southern

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J.Nilsson/Scand.J.Mgmt.17(2001)329–356331 European countries,for instance,co-operatives do enjoy subsidised interest rates and lower taxes.However,this can be regarded as compensation for e?ciency losses due to the governments’requirement that the co-operatives should perform some socially valuable tasks(Marini&Zevi,1996;Monz!on,1996).Anyhow,there is no justi?cation for claiming that all co-operatives in all industries and all countries survive decade after decade,due to public support.On the contrary,in Sweden,for example,there was such a widespread belief that co-operatives were legally discriminated against,that the government even called for an investigation of the whole issue(Attityder och lagstiftning i samverkan;bet.a nkande av F.oretagskooperativa utredningen,1996).

Likewise,the question of e?ciency in co-operatives as against investor-owned ?rms has been the subject of a large number of studies,and the?ndings are quite varied.According to the theoretical arguments co-operatives should always be less e?cient,but a host of empirical studies of co-operatives reveals no clear-cut pattern. The e?ciency issue remains to be solved but there is no evidence to prove that co-operatives are generally less e?cient than investor-owned?rms(see overviews in Sexton&Iskow,1993;Gentzoglanis,1997).

On these grounds it seems justi?ed to suspect that property rights theory and agency theory overlook some underlying variables.Under certain circumstances,co-operatives may be less e?cient than other?rms,while under others they are superior. The task of the present article is thus

(1)to search for explanations as to when co-operative?rms are e?cient or when

they are not,and

(2)to seek remedies for the type or types of co-operative which prove to be

ine?cient.

The paper is organised as follows.The next section introduces various theoretical rationales for co-operatives,and this is followed by a presentation of the common critique of co-operatives in terms of property rights and agency theory.A combined look at the di?erent theoretical approaches in the next section indicates that the criticism is not valid under all circumstances.The subsequent section thus contains an analysis of the types of co-operative for which the critique is or is not justi?ed as well as some suggestions for remodelling the problematic co-operatives.In the?nal section some conclusions are drawn.

2.Rationales for co-operative business

Co-operative business has been studied from several theoretical perspectives(see Staatz,1989;Torgerson,Reynolds,&Gray,1997,for overviews).These include institutional theory(Emeliano?,1948/1995;Craig,1993),neo-classical economic theory(LeVay,1983;Tennbakk,1996),transaction cost theory(Staatz,1984;Ollila, 1989;Schrader,1989),game theory(Sexton,1986;Staatz,1987),property rights

theory (Fulton,1995)and agency theory (Bergeron &Lalancette,1993;Hansmann,1996).

The property ri g hts and a g ency theories deviate from the other theories in so far as they claim that co-operatives ?rms are immanently ine?cient,while the other theories are able to explain why co-operatives exist under certain business conditions.According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972),Jensen and Meckling (1979)and Fama and Jensen (1983),for example,co-operative businesses cannot be e?cient because the owners (members)have only vaguely de?ned property rights in the co-operative ?rm.The control possessed by members is insu?cient,the organisation’s use of ?nancial resources is suboptimal,raising equity is problematic,etc.

Another way of applying the property ri g ht theory to co-operatives is suggested by Fulton (1995),who explains the existence of co-operatives as follows:

Consider a production process that uses two inputs:a farm output and processing services.If the quality of processing services is highly variable and unpredictable,...the most e?cient method of organizing production is to make the owners of these services the residual claimants.If the farm output is highly variable and unpredictable (at least without some cost),...the most e?cient method of organizing the production process is to make the owners of the farm output the residual claimants;i.e.a cooperative should be formed.(Fulton,1995,p.1146).During the last two decades the transaction cost theory has become an accepted point of departure amongst researchers on co-operatives (Staatz,1984,1989;Fahlbeck,1996).The rationale for co-operative enterprises in transaction cost theory is the same as for other cases of vertical integration (Williamson,1985).Co-operative enterprises are based on the members’e?orts to integrate either forwards or backwards in the processing/distribution chain,albeit jointly because each one is too small to accomplish the task separately.Together,however,they can ameliorate the possibility of market failure that faces them all.

In the case of an agricultural co-operative,for example,the farmers are vulnerable on the market as they have made large transaction-speci?c investments in herds,machinery,personal skills,etc.There are considerable uncertainties in agricultural production,due among other things,to varying weather conditions.The quality of the produce is often di?cult to assess by the farmer.In other words there is information asymmetry.Agriculture is always geographically dispersed,which increases the risk that the farmer will come up against a local or regional monopsonist.All in all,if the farmers were selling to independent trading partners,they would often face high transaction costs.By owning the trading partner their transaction costs can be reduced,and due to the di?erence in the optimal scale of operations }farming in small scale and processing in large scale }this ownership becomes joint,that is to say in the form of a co-operative.

The rationale for co-operatives o?ered by neo-classical economic theory is that the co-operative business form is constructed so as to attain large volumes of business and thereby reap economies of scale.Hence,co-operative ?rms have a competitive

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advantage in industries where the average cost curve shows an ever declining pattern}an expression of market failure(Sexton,1986).

To the extent that an agricultural marketing co-operative has unallocated equity capital and does not remunerate the allocated capital according to a market rate,the prices for the raw produce are raised,with the result that the volume handled increases due to a larger membership and to increased production by the average member.Co-operatives often practice a policy of cross-subsidisation between member categories,a practice that may have the e?ect of stimulating farmers,whose production conditions are not so good,to increase their production,with the result that the total volume increases(Nilsson,1998a).Claims of this kind seem to accord well with observations reported from most agricultural markets.Co-operatives do have these attributes,and they do have large market shares in the markets where the economies of scale are most pronounced,that is to say in the collection and primary processing of the raw produce.

Even the ideological motivations commonly found in the sociolo g ical and institutional literature on co-operatives(Stryjan,1989;Craig,1993),can be said to have an economic rationale.If the members are motivated by values such as solidarity,equality and fairness,the e?ect will be that the membership grows, whereby the volume increases and economies of scale are consequently reaped. 3.Alleged de?ciencies of co-operatives

3.1.Property ri g hts and a g ency costs

A?rm can be viewed as a nexus of contracts(Jensen&Meckling,1979,p.470). The?rm has contracts with stakeholders such as its employees,suppliers,customers, creditors,managers and owners.All these contracts,apart from the one with the owners,set out?xed remunerations,while the owners have the right to receive the residual of the?rm’s operations.

Agency theory concerns the way the owners,as residual rights holders,can prevent the other stakeholders from behaving deceitfully.To the extent that deception does occur the allocation of capital is a?ected to the detriment not only of the owner(s)of the?rm but also of the economy at large.

The core of the theory is the relationship between a principal and the agent,for example between the owner of a?rm and its management.If the organisation is large and complex,the owner(s)are not able to manage the?rm and a speci?c management is engaged instead,i.e.ownership and leadership are separate.The agent is assigned to act to the bene?t of the principal,which in part means that the agent can make independent decisions regarding questions a?ecting the principal’s wealth.Even though the relationship between the two parties is de?ned by contract, it may be di?cult for the principal to prevent the agent from acting in his own interest.The problem is complicated by the fact that no contract is perfect,and because contracts are costly to draft,maintain and follow up.The theory explains that by means of a system of rewards the principal can reach an agreement between

his own goals and those of the agent,and describes how the principal can direct and control the agent.

The assumptions concerning individual utility goals combined with bounded rationality allow for the possibility of fraudulent behaviour.The theory is based on an assumption of information asymmetry:the agent,possessing superior knowledge,is able to act opportunistically against the principal.This means that the principal must protect himself from losses which may result from the agent’s deceitful behaviour.However,such measures require resources,and the principal must thus face a variety of agency costs (Jensen &Meckling,1976,1979;Barney &Ouchi,1986,pp.209–210):

*

Monitorin g expenditures on the part of the principal :The principal must use resources to regulate and monitor the behaviour of the agent.This is done partly by establishing a contract and partly by controlling and ensuring the ful?lment of the contract.*

Bondin g expenditures on the part of the a g ent :In order to reassure the principal that he is acting in accordance with the interests of the principal,the agent must employ a certain amount of resources.*Residual loss :Since the agent has the right to make independent decisions,there is

a risk that he will not manage the organisation in such a fashion as best to bene?t the principal.The principal has rights to the surplus created by the organisation’s activities (residual rights),but it is the agent who is able to direct the organisation so that its surplus may be smaller and so that he personally may usurp some of the surplus.Since the principal is unable to direct and control the agent perfectly (assuming that he is unwilling to accept heavy costs to do so),he will have to be prepared for the agent acting deceitfully to some extent.For this reason welfare losses will occur for the principal.

Agency costs are found in all organisations,but their size varies.There are a number of ways in which the principal can reduce the costs and risk of losses (Fama,1980;Fama &Jensen,1983;Shleifer &Vishny,1996).In this respect there seems to be some di?erences between investor-owned and co-operative ones,all to the disadvantage of the latter (see Table 1).

The di?erences between investor-owned and co-operative ?rms are due essentially to the v a g uely de?ned property ri g hts in co-operati v e or g anisations.‘‘A cooperative can be de?ned as an economic organisation whose residual claims are restricted to the agent group that supplies patronage under the organisation’s nexus of contracts (i.e.the member-patrons)and whose board of directors is elected by this same group’’(Vitaliano,1983,p.1079).Hence,the so-called co-operati v e residual claim is not openly tradable.

The co-operative residual claims are speci?c because of the type of property rights normally found in co-operative ?rms.The co-operative ?rm is owned by a co-operative society composed of a number of members.The members have no individual ownership right to the co-operative ?rm;they simply own the monetary value of their shares in the co-operative society,which are generally redeemable at par value.All decisions concerning these individually owned shares are made by the

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Table1

Owner control in investor-owned and co-operative?rms

Investor-owned?rms Co-operative?rms

If the organisation is controlled hierarchically and each superior is responsible for all the actions of his subordinates,the total responsibility is concen-trated to one person at the top of the hierarchy. The organisation will work for a well de?ned objective The same for co-operatives inside the organisation, although there are di?erences when it comes to the membership.There is generally considerable het-erogeneity within the membership when it comes to the goals of the?rm

If the ownership of the organisation is fairly concentrated,the owner is better suited to monitor the organisation Co-operatives have by de?nition no concentrated ownership

To the extent that there is a well-functioning market for managers,the managers can be expected to adhere better to the interests of the residual claimants.If they are aware of the fact that they can be easily hired and dismissed and that there is publicly available information about their records,they should be less inclined to act fraudulently In many cases the market for co-operative man-agers may be more restricted.This has been the case for many decades at least

In investor-owned?rms,the ownership of the residual claims is separated from the managing of the?rm,i.e.there is a market for residual claims and thus also a market price.‘‘Stock prices are visible signals that summarize the implications of internal decisions for current and future cash?ows. This external monitoring exerts pressure to orient a corporation’s decision process toward the interests of residual claimants.’’(Fama&Jensen,1983,p. 313)In co-operatives,there is normally no market for any residual claims.There are the so-called co-operative residual claims,meaning that the mem-bers of the co-operative society have an interest in the organisation so long as they remain members, but no longer.Tradable residual claims endow the owners with an in?nite time horizon,while the co-operative residual claimants’time perspective is the remainder of their membership period

Measures can be taken to make the stock market (the market for residual claims)function better,e.g. through‘‘the existence of organizations that specialize in stock analysis.Such organizations generate information that aids in pricing common stock and in interpreting stock price signals for current and potential holders of residual claims’’. (Condon&Vitaliano,1983,p.15)As the co-operative residual claims are not market-able,no stock analysis specialists can reasonably have any interest in them,and on the whole the business operations of co-operative organisations get very limited space in the?nancial media

The existence of marketable common stock also allows for external monitoring through takeovers. The risk for takeovers may often operate to discipline the management.‘‘...hostile takeovers are probably the most e?ective way for share-holders to get rid of non-value-maximizing man-agers...’’(Shleifer&Vishny,1988,p.11)Co-operatives seldom face takeover bids,and when such a thing happens the bids are usually rejected. It requires very resource-consuming e?orts to convince a large circle of members that they should sell their co-operative?rm,and for the members the co-operative is usually not an investment object

The functioning of the market for residual claims is further improved by allowing the‘‘stockholders to garner voting power via proxy?ghts’’.(Vitaliano, 1983,p.1079)Most co-operative societies are governed according to the one-member-one-vote principle,and as their memberships are generally extensive,it is di?cult to mobilise members to become strong owners

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society,i.e.collectively.Apart from the shares,the co-operative society normally also has some unallocated equity capital,i.e.capital that is collectively owned and subject to collective decision-making.Hence,the members of a co-operative have hardly any individual property rights in the co-operative society,which means that no market signals in terms of capital can ?ow from the owners to the ?rm.

Instead,the members of the co-operative receive the surplus in the form of improved terms of trade,e.g.better prices and service.It is therefore di?cult to operationalise goals or to assess goal attainment.Because owners cannot generally sell their shares at a market price,their time perspective is reduced.There is only a minimal risk of the kind of hostile take-over that would otherwise impel the managing directors to act prudently.In brief,it is di?cult for the members of a co-operative ?rm to force the managing director to operate in the interest of the members.It is evident that in a co-operative ?rm the agency costs will be large.In an investor-owned ?rm the residual rights can be transferred to the new owners at a market price.Consequently the owners will make certain that their contracts with the agent,the board of directors and the managing director,are e?ective from their own point of view.The owners have a long-term perspective on their ownership and can redistribute their stock holdings.There are conditions for e?ciently functioning market mechanisms that allow both the principal and the agent to carry out e?ective operations.

According to agency theory there are a number of problems associated with the separation of the ownership and control of a ?rm.These problems become particularly marked in co-operatives,because in these organisations ‘‘the multiple interpretations of ...vaguely de?ned property rights lead to con?icts over residual claims and decision control,especially as cooperatives become increasingly complex in organizational structures’’.(Hackman &Cook,1997,p.105)The problems have been classi?ed in di?erent ways (Jensen &Meckling,1979,p.481;Schuster,1990;Hackman &Cook,1997).Here,the categories suggested by Schuster are used:*

the problem with common ownership (or the free-rider problem);*

the horizon problem;*

the portfolio problem;*

the follow-up problem (or the control problem);and *the decision-maker problem (or the in?uence costs problem).

3.2.The problem of common ownership

A co-operative ?rm is owned by a co-operative society,which is composed of a number of members.Hence,the ownership of the ?rm’s assets is collective,which means that individual action may result in certain negative e?ects (Vitaliano,1983,p.1081).When a new member joins a co-operative society he immediately has access to all assets that earlier generations of members have accumulated.Further,new members generally pay only a small entrance fee to join the co-operative,and this dilutes the equity of the existing members.From this it follows that capital growth is low.It is di?cult to justify to members that they should invest in the co-operative

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J.Nilsson/Scand.J.Mgmt.17(2001)329–356337?rm,when they have to share this investment with others(Condon&Vitaliano, 1983,p.20).Likewise,when a member leaves a co-operative organisation he does not have access to the assets to which he has contributed.

The result is that certain market mechanisms do not work properly,since the economic actors do not have to bear the full consequences of their actions.Members are encouraged to be free-riders,thus making resource allocation sub-optimal.The unallocated capital functions as a?lter between members and the?rm,i.e.the market signals from the owners do not get through.This a?ects what investments should be made and how the?rm should be managed and thus ultimately the continued existence of the?rm.It is widely noted that co-operatives tend to have di?culty in raising capital,even for investments that would be pro?table(see e.g. Chukwu,1990).

Thus,since the use of capital in a co-operative?rm is not optimal,lenders are more cautious,which results in higher costs for borrowed capital.This contributes to reducing the value of the co-operative?rm for its members(Condon&Vitaliano, 1983,pp.22–23).In their desire to get the most out of the co-operative without contributing accordingly,the members prefer to borrow capital,rather than to invest.The logic is then that the burden of the borrowed capital will be carried by future member generations(Jensen&Meckling,1979,p.484).

The problem of common ownership does not only a?ect the owners,it is also a socio-economic problem.An important condition for a productive market economy is that resources are mobile.It must be possible to move assets from a shrinking sector to an expanding one,from a failing?rm to a successful one,from poor investments to prosperous investments,etc.However,when a?rm is built upon unallocated capital,such movement is di?cult.This is particularly serious for activities subjected to?erce competition.Co-operative?rms have great di?culty in being competitive in this regard,because weaker?rms are not easily sifted out of the competition.

In the same way that co-operative?rms often have di?culty in expanding their equity quickly and easily or decrease;there are also impediments to reducing and redirecting operations.According to a co-operative’s statutes,capital should only be used to bene?t the members in speci?c respects(consumption,workplace,sales,etc.) and if market conditions change so that the needs of the members become weaker,or if they change or disappear,it is di?cult to modify the focus of the?rm.A co-operative?rm,in which unallocated capital represents a dominating part of the equity,will not necessarily be shut down if the members’need for the?rm disappears,nor is it likely that operations will be redirected if the needs of the members change.

A contributory reason for this is that the management(and the board of directors) have made personal transaction-speci?c investments.These leaders can ensure that they have better working conditions than they would have with any other employer (cf.Furubotn&Pejovich,1972,p.1151).They have achieved a speci?c competence, a lifestyle,a professional network and other types of attributes that cannot be fully utilised elsewhere(LeVay,1983).There is thus little incentive on the management’s part to terminate or restructure an ine?cient?rm.Further,it is claimed that

management of a co-operative ?rm is rarely replaced.The situation is di?erent,however,if there is a strong market for these leaders,for example if non-co-operative ?rms are interested in their services or if there are other co-operative ?rms in the ?eld that could employ them.

The problem is particularly noticeable in those co-operatives whose statutes contain a clause stipulating that in the event of liquidation,remaining assets should be transferred to common funds,to a federation or the like.In such a case the members have no incentive to dissolve an ine?cient co-operative while assets are still available that could be distributed to the members.

As a consequence of the unallocated capital,the market signals between members and the ?rm are distorted or even removed altogether.Because the use of unallocated capital is not recorded as a depletion of resources,the product prices o?ered by the ?rm to its members are not equivalent to actual resource use:members pay too little when buying and receive excess payments when selling.The market forces are distorted in so far as there is a weak accord between incentives and rewards.This implies a sub-optimal allocation of resources.

3.3.The horizon problem

The horizon problem occurs as a result of the limited planning horizons of the actors in a co-operative organisation,and the fact that residual rights cannot be transferred when members withdraw.In addition to the members having di?erent planning horizons,the horizons also di?er between members and the management and elected representatives.Because members of varying ages have di?erent planning horizons,it is not possible to make optimal investment decisions,which in turn inhibits the development of the ?rm (S gaard,1994).

As the residual rights cannot be transferred upon the withdrawal of a member,the planning horizon of members is reduced.Because members are not speci?cally motivated to think in the long term,they are concerned with what their membership o?ers ‘‘right now’’.Members who will not still be members at the time when an investment pays o?will oppose it,so that a number of potentially pro?table investments }particularly long-term investments }will not be conducted (Jensen &Meckling,1979,p.484).Capital growth is thus hindered and the value of the ?rm is reduced.‘‘Residual claimants will not choose to make investments in ?rm-speci?c assets when the payo?s from these investments extend beyond their expected terms of employment’’(Condon &Vitaliano,1983,p.19).However,to a certain albeit limited extent the horizon problem may be abated if the market value of agricultural holdings is clearly dependent on how well the agricultural co-operative acts on behalf of its members (Condon &Vitaliano,1983,p.42).

3.4.The portfolio problem

In economic undertakings it is normally bene?cial for assets to be diversi?ed between di?erent operations.A well-composed investment portfolio reduces the risk to the investor.In co-operative ?rms it is not possible to reduce risk e?ectively as the

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J.Nilsson/Scand.J.Mgmt.17(2001)329–356339 members are so heterogeneous in regard to their risk preferences,capital worth,and other pivotal variables(Vitaliano,1983,p.1082).An investment decision in a co-operative?rm can at best be adapted to an‘‘average’’of member preferences,but as this average covers a diversity of individual preferences,the investment will be optimal for only a small fraction of the members.

Even principals and agents can have di?erent ideas about how a portfolio should be composed,which can cause con?ict between the agent(elected representatives and managing director)and the principal(members).The result is economic ine?ciency.

3.5.The follow-up problem

As a result of the lack of conformity between the sacri?ces and rewards of the members,the members themselves tend to behave in a manner that does not serve their own best interest.For example,most co-operatives allow members to join without paying an entrance fee corresponding to their share of the co-operative ?rm’s assets.The fact that new members are allowed to become free-riders is an expression of distorted market signals.Such distorted market signals reduce the members’motivation to become involved and to invest,thus creating a vicious circle. This is an indication of market forces in the relationship between the member and the organisation}members receive insu?cient compensation for their involvement, which means that the owner control does not work.The control over the?rm is weakened,since attempts by members to a?ect change cannot achieve the intended aims.

Consequently,the dominating element of collective ownership can create a risk that members lose their interest in monitoring the?rm and their ability to do so,with the result that the management being able to promote its own interests}take control instead(Boettcher,1980,pp.89–93).This probably means expansion for the organisation,although this may not bene?t the principal.Expansion may concern the?rm’s position in the industry,increased market shares,diversi?cation and vertical integration(Eschenburg,1971,p.147).‘‘...cooperative managers may...be able to pursue such goals as growth maximisation and others posited in the various so-called‘managerial theories of the?rm’’’.(Condon&Vitaliano,1983,p.47)

In larger organisations the management generally obtains higher salaries,secure employment,greater prestige and more challenging responsibilities.Management grants bene?ts to itself and its closest associates.Costs increase without equivalent increases in income,since the incentives for the organisation’s associates are based not upon satisfying market demand but on satisfying the interest of the executives (Eschenburg,1971).

If members are more or less passive,and if equity}both collective and individual}is cut o?from the capital market,management will get poor feedback on its investment decisions.‘‘...in...‘coops’,the future consequences of improved management are not capitalised into present wealth of stockholders’’(Alchian& Demsetz,1972,pp.789–790).

The management of a co-operative?rm is said to enjoy considerable power.It is further maintained that this leads to a less e?cient market for executives in the realm

of co-operatives,‘‘...the agent markets for decision managers of cooperative organisations are more restricted than those for decision managers of open corporations ...’’(Condon &Vitaliano,1983,p.33).Once an executive has been placed in a leading position in a co-operative ?rm,it is di?cult to replace him,nor will he be demoted as it is di?cult for the principal to evaluate his contribution.Only a few can be placed in such positions,and the positions are seldom vacant.

3.6.The decision-makin g problem

Due to the di?ering opinions among members regarding investments,consolida-tion and yields,it can be di?cult for the management of a co-operative organisation to decide how the members’opinions should be weighted (Richards,Klein,&Walburger,1998).In the worst case,the managers may lose the ability to satisfy member interests.If this occurs,management may decide to go solely by the market signals stemming from the members,particularly as it does not get any inputs from a stock exchange (Condon &Vitaliano,1983,p.51).

Problems may also arise in relations between the board of directors and the members,but they are reduced by the fact that the board is speci?cally responsible for controlling and directing the management:

Board members of cooperative organizations can be expected to derive satisfaction from developing reputations as stewards of successful organizations that serve human needs in an essentially self-help fashion.Members of the boards of agricultural cooperatives may value such reputations because of the high value placed on service to agricultural and rural communities in certain close,rural social structures.(Condon &Vitaliano,1983,p.33)

4.Other views on co-operatives

4.1.Explanations of the presence or absence of problems in co-operati v es

It is easy to ?nd empirical observations to support the assertions about problems in co-operatives.However,there is also a lot of contradictory evidence,implying that the critique of co-operative business cannot be fully accepted.Many of today’s co-operative organisations have existed for decades,and new co-operatives are continually being established throughout the world.Co-operative ?rms often have large market shares and they are successful in maintaining as well as extending these shares (van Bekkum &van Dijk,1997).

So how can we explain that co-operatives do exist,and in many cases seem to be prosperous businesses?

1.In some countries and some industries co-operatives enjoy public support,as

noted above.This may take the form of low taxes,subsidised interest rates,

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J.Nilsson/Scand.J.Mgmt.17(2001)329–356341 protected markets to give the co-operative a chance to exploit market power and technical assistance(Sexton&Iskow,1993;Cook,1995).These co-operatives represent such a great diversity that it is not possible to comment upon them.In certain circumstances the policy of public support may foster ine?ciency to the detriment of the national economy;in other circumstances the support may contribute to the e?cient production of a socially valuable service.

2.In other cases,the explanation may be that the critical theoretical propositions do

not hold true,because co-operatives are not necessarily organised collectively.

Some co-operative businesses are?nanced from shares that are transferable at a market price and are associated with the residual rights.This point will be discussed in Section4.2.

3.Even when co-operatives are organised in such a way as to promote considerable

problems,there are some arguments on the other side.This will be discussed further in Section4.3.

4.Finally,there are certainly a great many co-operatives which do have problems,

i.e.they may be dissolved at some future date unless an e?ective rescue action can

be mounted.Section4.4discusses how to identify these co-operatives and how to discover the appropriate organisational action.

4.2.Co-operati v es with tradable residual claims

The core of the problems that face co-operatives is to be found in the element of collectivity,notably in the unallocated(collective)capital as well as the collectively determined allocated(individual)capital.These collective traits prohibit the exchange of equity shares at market prices.The great majority of co-operatives in most industries and in most countries have a substantial amount of unallocated capital,and transferable shares are rare.

However,neither unallocated capital nor non-transferable shares are necessary components of co-operative?rms.Hence,the most widely recognised de?nition of a co-operative?rm simply states that the co-operative?rm is owned by members,but it does not say how:

‘‘A cooperative is a user-owned and user-controlled business that distributes bene?ts on the basis of use.

*Persons who own and?nance the cooperative are those that use it.

*Control of the cooperative is by those who use the cooperative.

*Bene?ts of the cooperative are distributed to its users on the basis of their use.’’(Barton,1989,p.1)

So,there is nothing to prevent...

‘‘a cooperative business structure that reduces the e?ciency-robbing e?ects of vaguely de?ned property rights[which]would possess some of the following characteristics:

1.Transferable equity shares.

2.Appreciable equity shares.

3.De?ned membership.

4.Legally binding delivery contract or a uniform grower agreement.

5.Minimum up front equity investment requirement.’’(Cook &Tong,1997,p.115)This type of co-operative exists,and their numbers are increasing,especially in the USA but also in Europe (Nilsson,1997;van Dijk,1997).They function in the same way as investor-owned ?rms,the di?erence being that ownership is generally limited to those who conduct some sort of business with the ?rm.The critique has little bearing upon co-operative ?rms,which can certainly possess unallocated capital but also have shares,carrying the residual rights,which are bought and sold at market prices.During the 1990s,at least a hundred of these so-called new g eneration co-operati v es have been formed,especially in the upper Midwest of the United States (Nilsson,1997).It is also claimed that their members are more involved and willing to invest larger amounts because their planning horizon is greater.The co-operatives generate positive experiences in terms of pro?tability and expansion.

Another organisational model that has been created to alleviate the above-mentioned problems refers to the so-called co-maker co-operati v es.Their business operations are conducted within a subsidiary joint-stock company,that is owned partly by a co-operative society and partly by individual farmers and possibly also by external ?nanciers (van Dijk,1997).This type of co-maker co-operative usually works with businesses that are not very close to the members’own activities.They operate according to general business principles.This model o?ers considerable opportunities for expanding the capital base,but it also means that the control of the business must be shared with others.

In the agricultural co-operative sector there is an increasing awareness that unallocated capital may be harmful to operations.In the Netherlands people speak of ‘‘capital of the dead hand’’and in Sweden of ‘‘ownerless capital’’}both expressions have negative connotations.In addition,there are indications of an ambition to individualise the equity of co-operatives (van Bekkum &van Dijk,1997,pp.175–177).

4.3.Market failure corrections may outwei g h monitorin g problems

Even if we look only at co-operatives with a dominant collective element in their ?nancing,management and operations,it is easy to ?nd empirical evidence contradicting the claims of agency theory.There are ?rms that are e?cient and competitive on international markets,and that do not enjoy any public support (van Bekkum &van Dijk,1997).Other variables must therefore be present that are not observed by the critics.

The aforementioned theories focus on the way the capital markets operate for ?rms with di?erent governance structures.It may be correct that most co-operatives have some de?ciencies in this respect.However,the co-operative business form was constructed not for the sake of capital markets but for ameliorating market failures for economic actors in their dealings with various product markets.It is widely acknowledged that co-operatives are established when a group of economic actors

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J.Nilsson/Scand.J.Mgmt.17(2001)329–356343 experience high transaction costs in their exchange with independent trading partners(Bonus,1986;Staatz,1987;Ollila,1989),and/or because an industry is characterised by a continuously falling average cost curve,which means unbalanced market relations(Sexton,1986;Nilsson,1998a).By acting within the framework of a co-operative the weak market actors are able to establish a better balance of power on the market.

For members,the attainment of a better functioning product market may outweigh the disadvantages resulting from the problems mentioned above.The validity of this argument may be especially strong,for instance when the risk of monopsony is high,as if it is in sparsely populated areas,or in businesses where the members’transaction-speci?c investments are considerable,or when the quality of the products traded is di?cult to assess.

What matters is not the extent to which the co-operative in any objective way succeeds in creating a stronger market position for its members,rather it is how far the members subjectively perceive their situation to be better as a result of the operations of the co-operative.Hence,if the members consider the co-operative valuable,they may be willing and able to sacri?ce some of the costs that arise due to the vaguely de?ned property rights.If we adopt a welfare theoretical perspective, there is no basis for claiming that such a co-operative is ine?cient.

It should also be acknowledged,however,that the larger the?rm’s unallocated equity and the smaller the proportion of its allocated capital(shares)that is subject to the members’own decision-making,the less likely it is that the market failure correction could outweigh the property rights problems.A co-operative with a very substantial amount of equity capital that is collectively decided upon,can hardly ever be defended as e?cient,no matter how much the members appreciate the market failure corrections.

4.4.Trust may foster clan-like g o v ernance

It is well documented that social factors are crucial to co-operative organisations. For a co-operative to function there must be at least some trust between the members}mutual understanding,a feeling of community,common problem conceptions,etc.(Hakelius,1996).This may be expressed in terms of low interpersonal transaction costs between the members as regards the way the co-operative should be run(Nilsson,1996a).These transaction costs for the exchanges between members should be so low that members can reach a common position regarding the?rm’s goals and policies.Members of a well functioning co-operative ?rm thus generally exhibit a high degree of homogeneity in many respects.There is a common philosophy,a group spirit,common problems,etc.,which contribute to a sense of solidarity and reduce the transaction costs for the membership’s internal relationships.To a certain extent,there is a sense of clan within the membership (Ouchi,1979).

When the patrons involved all have essentially identical interests}for example, where they all transact with the?rm under similar circumstances for similar

quantities of a single homogeneous commodity,as in the case of the farmers’cheese cooperative ...}the costs associated with collective decision-making are naturally small.(Hansmann,1988,p.278)

If membership of a co-operative ?rm is recognised as possessing the two qualities }the business corrects market failures for members,and members enjoy a certain trust in their internal relationships }then the theoretical criticism has less relevance.Under these conditions members actively control the ?rm,since it is meaningful for them.There are of course still problems,but they are smaller }so small that they can be balanced by the bene?ts due to the markets functioning better when the members purchase and sell goods and services.

If the membership is homogeneous and if the joint assets are small,the problem of common ownership is less signi?cant,and vice versa .A new member undeniably bene?ts from the ?rm’s existing assets,but for the established members it can be economically rational to allow the new member to join without paying a fee.The new member contributes to an increase in the volume,which means that economies of scale can be reaped (Nilsson,1998a).When members withdraw,they cannot take with them the wealth to which they have contributed during their period of membership,but they have still bene?ted positively from their membership in terms of more favourable market exchanges.Further,presuming that the co-operative ?rm operates solely in connection with activities related to the badly functioning markets and with nothing more,then there will only be limited capital assets in the ?rm and the withdrawing member will lose only a small amount.

The concern regarding the common property issue is that the collective characteristics may make it di?cult for individuals (members)to receive clear signals regarding the ?rm’s returns.Unallocated capital functions as a shock absorber.While this reasoning is correct,it can also be said that it is in the interest of the members that their co-operative should possess a certain amount of unallocated property,as this induces a lag that protects members’transaction-speci?c investments.The risk that the co-operative ?rm will suddenly vanish is reduced.The assumption that the co-operative’s operations strengthen the market position of the members and that there is trust between the members,also implies that the portfolio problem is less potent.If the membership is homogeneous and if the co-operative ?rm operates only in the problematic market,all the members will bene?t from all the investments and operations in the ?rm.The ?rm is not engaged in diversi?ed activities.The activities of the ?rm are straightforward,becoming less capital-intensive and stable over the years.Hence,it does not matter very much that the unallocated capital is in?exible or that owner-shares are not transferable.

Due to the homogeneous membership and the low level of investments,the losses in e?ciency resulting from the horizon problem may be overshadowed by the fact that members enjoy better functioning markets during their period of membership.In addition,the homogeneous membership includes strong social and economic interdependencies,which means that the members tend to have longer time horizons.The individual utility-maximising behaviour can therefore reach beyond a person’s own lifetime.It is typical,for instance,that a farmer attempts to ensure that his co-

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J.Nilsson/Scand.J.Mgmt.17(2001)329–356345 operative will continue to be strong when his son takes over the farm.Hence,long-term investments are rational.

Assuming,then,that the co-operative business undertakes activities closely related to the members’own business,it is likely that the co-operative’s undertakings will consist of uncomplicated and stable business functions,such as the collection of raw materials from farmers and the basic re?ning of these materials.Such types of activity change so little over time that the importance of the horizon problem declines.

Neither the follow-up problem nor the decision-makin g problem is signi?cant under the high member-commitment that is likely if the membership is homogeneous and the co-operative is successful in correcting the market failures that the members may face.The proceeds from the member’s investments are in the form of improved trading conditions,whereby their investments result in positive gains.

The homogeneity and commitment of the members are enhanced by the fact that the members of a newly established co-operative are often acquainted,indirectly at least,with one another and with the appointed managing director.There is thus a social control to complement the economic kind.

5.Solutions to the problems

5.1.Applicability of the property ri g hts and a g ency theories

The critique of co-operative operations is justi?ed when the co-operative?rms are collectively?nanced and run,i.e.there are no individual property rights to the co-operative?rm,and when at the same time one or both of the following conditions are ful?lled:(1)the co-operative does not correct market failures to any signi?cant degree,i.e.the membership is uninvolved;(2)the degree of trust within the membership is low,i.e.the social ties are weak and the heterogeneity high.

No speci?c co-operative problems exist(1)if the members do have individual property rights to the co-operative?rm,or(2)if the co-operative is collectively ?nanced and organised(even if the amount of collectively determined capital is fairly limited),while at the same time there is high commitment and strong social integration within the membership.

To put it brie?y,the criticism is valid as regards co-operative organisations whose characteristics do not correspond to the characteristics of their members,if in other words the two sets of characteristics are incongruent.This conclusion accords with contingency theory(Kast&Rosenzweig,1979).

Co-operative?rms exhibiting this kind of incongruence certainly exist,even in considerable numbers.Over the years changes in the business environment,the co-operative organisation itself or the attributes of its members may have occurred gradually and incrementally,so that the co-operative and its membership have become increasingly incongruent.The market failure rationale for co-operatives is no longer always valid for real-life co-operative?rms.Lots of collectively?nanced co-operatives have a large amount of equity.The members are not necessarily in

great need for better trading conditions;strong and co-operative ?rms often invest in operations that are not vital to the correction of market failures.The membership very often consists of a heterogeneous and anonymous body with weak social links.There may be several reasons for this lack of congruence,for example:

*

The need to correct for market failures may have disappeared due to external changes,i.e.forces that once caused high transaction costs for members may have changed over time.Or,as a result of the co-operative ?rm’s operations,other market actors may have changed their conduct so that transaction costs are no longer high.Thus,the commitment of the member is understandably weaker.*The de g ree of trust may have fallen because over time the co-operative has

expanded so much that a high degree of heterogeneity has arisen.Or,a (perhaps false)belief has been instilled in the members that there would not be any great market failure if they should act on the market without the co-operative ?rm.So,the members tend to lose interest.

To which types of co-operative ?rm do these arguments apply?It is not possible to analyse this in detail,but several tendencies can be noted:

*

Transaction cost arguments are probably valid for newly founded ?rms }other-wise nobody would bother to establish a business.Older co-operati v es may have di?culty in living up to their obligation to reduce transaction costs.*

In new unstructured industries there is a greater likelihood that economic actors perceive transaction costs in such a way that they want to operate within a co-operative,while mature industries are known more often for their well-functioning markets.*

If a group of economic actors is characterised by some sort of social cohesion such as class consciousness,professional status or ethnic a?liation,they are more likely to participate in a co-operative organisation.*

Members will be more inclined to participate in,and better skilled at evaluating activities related to their own operations,while there is less participation in activities further away in the processing chain.*

When co-operative ?rms are involved in lar g e-scale ,capital-intensi v e and complex operations ,their members will have di?culty in controlling the organisation as well as ?nancing it.The opposite is true of small co-operatives working with some basic technology.In the former,transaction costs will be high between members,while monitoring problems are sizeable.*

A lar g e membership is also likely to be heterogeneous.This raises members’internal transaction costs and reduces their ability to in?uence operations.*There appears to be a di?erence between co-operatives whose members are

business people and those consistin g of laymen.The latter have signi?cant problems in controlling the management.

According to this,the critique of co-operatives is certainly justi?ed as applied to a large proportion of today’s co-operatives.So the question arises:how should members and other stakeholders act in order to convert the co-operatives into viable

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J.Nilsson/Scand.J.Mgmt.17(2001)329–356347 organisations(as co-operatives or transformed into investor-owned?rms)?To answer this question,an analysis of di?erent types of co-operative organisations is appropriate.

5.2.Theoretical inte g ration

In principle,members have two roles in a co-operative business,as patrons and as investors.They can attach varying weight to these two roles(see Fig.1).The amelioration of market failures is sought in the patron role,i.e.buying from the co-operative,selling to it,working in it,borrowing from it,etc.As co-operative business is a form of vertical integration,the patron role dominates over the investor role.The purpose of investing in the co-operative is to be able to conduct trade with it.Hence, co-operatives have traditionally been organised in such a way as to enhance the patron role and to suppress that of the in v estor,often even to the extent that,in the minds of the members,the investor role vanishes altogether.The more the investor role is suppressed,the greater is the probability of serious monitoring problems. The two roles are associated with the point raised in the preceding section.The investor role is found mainly in the co-operatives that have tradable residual rights. The patron role is more important when the members regard the co-operative as able to correct market failures,or when there is su?cient trust and cohesion for the members to control the business.

When the two roles are combined,the following four extreme types emerge.It should be noted that there are naturally also intermediate forms,as the two variables do not represent sharply de?ned dichotomies.

Type I:Traditional co-operati v es.1As long as members perceive their patronage relations as very rewarding,they will probably see their patron role as over-shadowing their investor role.It may not even matter very much what is included in their role as investors.The?rm can be?nanced collectively without any problem, since members will e?ectively control it anyway from their patron position.In this context there are no problems in face of high member involvement,despite collective ownership and co-operative residual rights.

Traditional co-operatives are most likely to be found when the business operations are closely related to the members’own operations,for example the collection of milk,pigs,grain and other raw produce from farmers.Such operations are probably characterised by great size,as they are easily standardised,routinised and automated.If the co-operative deals only with the very?rst stage of the value chain,the size of the investment will be fairly small.Also,as the scale of operation rises,the investment per unit as well and per member will decline.Due to a falling curve for the average processing cost,the members are induced to promote an increase in volume by expanding their own operations and by inviting new 1Another catch-phrase for this is the counter v ailin g power co-operati v e model(van Bekkum&van Dijk, 1997,p.189).Various sub-categories can be identi?ed,among others business-at-cost co-operati v es,which due to hard price competition reject cross-subsidisation within the membership(Nilsson,1998b).

members.Moreover,the social conditions are bene?cial for co-operative businesses close to the members:the members may have similar characteristics,the operations are probably fairly homogeneous,the members are involved in the operations,etc.

Type II :Entrepreneurial co-operati v es .When the members are highly involved both in their patron role and their investor role,the co-operative is e?ective in strengthening the members’market position.The residual claims are tradable as equity shares.The members are willing to invest large amounts and they get remuneration for their capital.This situation was mentioned above }the new generation co-operative form and the co-maker co-operative models both belong here.

2

Fig.1.Types of co-operative in terms of members’perceived roles.

2

This category includes among others the PLC co-operati v e model as well as co-operati v es with proportional tradable shares (van Bekkum &van Dijk,1997,p.171)(PLC:public limited company).J.Nilsson /Scand.J.Mgmt.17(2001)329–356

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九年级课文翻译完整版

九年级课文翻译 Document serial number【NL89WT-NY98YT-NC8CB-NNUUT-NUT108】

人教版初中英语九年级U n i t3课文翻译 SectionA2d 何伟：这是欢乐时光公园——我所在城市最大的游乐园！ 艾丽斯：要尝试一些乘骑项目，我好兴奋呀！ 何伟：我们应该从哪里开始玩呢？有太空世界、水上世界、动物世界…… 艾丽斯：哦，你能先告诉我哪儿有洗手间吗？ 何伟：什么休息室你想要休息吗但是我们还没有开始玩呢！ 艾丽斯：哦，不是，我的意思不是休息间。我的意思是……你知道的，卫生间或盥洗室。何伟：嗯……那么你是指……厕所？ 艾丽斯：正是！对不起，也许“洗手间”一词在中国不常用。 何伟：对，我们通常说“厕所”或“卫生间”。就在那边。 艾丽斯：好的，我会很快的！我想知道公园今天何时关门。 何伟：九点三十，你不必着急！ SectionA3a 欢乐时光公园——永远快乐的时光 [艾丽斯和何伟在太空世界。] 艾丽斯：我想知道我们接下来应该去哪里？ 何伟：那边那个新项目怎么样？ 艾丽斯：好吧……看起来蛮吓人的。 何伟：快来吧！我保证它将激动人心！如果你害怕，只要大叫或者抓住我的手。 [云霄飞车之后……] 艾丽斯：你是对的！太有趣了！起初我好害怕，但大声喊叫还蛮管用的。 何伟：瞧，那玩意并不糟糕，对吧？某些东西你不去尝试，就绝不会知道。 艾丽斯：对，我很高兴我试过了！ 何伟：你现在想去水上世界么？ 艾丽斯：好，但我很饿。你知道我们在哪里能吃到好的快餐？ 何伟：当然！我建议在水上世界的水城餐馆，那里有美味可口的食物。 艾丽斯：好极了！我们走！ [在前往水城餐馆途中，艾丽斯和何伟经过鲍勃叔叔餐馆。] 艾丽斯：看！这家餐馆看起来蛮有趣的。这招牌上说这儿每晚有摇滚乐队演出。

招投标评标原则

招投标评标原则 （1）公平、公正、科学、择优 《招标投标法》第5条规定：“招标投标活动应当遵循公开、公平、公正和诚实信用的原则。”《评标委员会和评标方法暂行规定》第3条规定：“评标活动遵循公平、公正、科学、择优的原则。”第17条规定：“招标文件中规定的评标标准和评标方法应当合理，不得含有倾向或者排斥潜在投标人的内容，不得妨碍或者限制投标人之间的竞争。”为了体现“公平”和“公正”的原则，招标人和招标代理机构应在制作招标文件时，依法选择科学的评标方法和标准；招标人应依法组建合格的评标委员会；评标委员会应依法评审所有投标文件，择优推荐为中标候选人。 （2）严格保密 严格保密的措施涉及多方面，包括：评标地点保密；评标委员会成员的名单在中标结果确定之前保密；评标委员会成员在封闭状态下开展评标工作，评标期间不得与外界有任何接触，对评标情况承担保密义务；招标人、招标代理机构或相关主管部门等参与评标现场工作的人员，均应承担保密义务。 （3）独立评审 评标是评标委员会受招标人委托，由评标委员会成员依法运用其知识和技能，根据法律规定和招标文件的要求，独立对所有投标文件进行评审和比较，以评标委员会的名义出具评标报告，推荐中标候选人的活动。评标委员会虽然由招标人组建并受其委托评标，但是，

一经组建并开始评标工作，评标委员会即应依法独立开展评审工作。不论是招标人，还是有关主管部门，均不得非法干预、影响或改变评标过程和结果。 （4）严格遵守评标方法 《招标投标法》第40条规定：“评标委员会应当按照招标文件确定的评标标准和方法，对投标文件进行评审和比较；设有标底的，应当参考标底。”《评标委员会和评标方法暂行规定》第17条规定：“评标委员会应当根据招标文件规定的评标标准和方法，对投标文件进行系统地评审和比较。招标文件中没有规定的标准和方法不得作为评标的依据。”评标工作虽然在严格保密的情况下，由评标委员会独立评审，但是，评标委员会应严格遵守招标文件中确定的评标标准和方法。

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