搜档网
当前位置:搜档网 › Northern_Rock_Case_Study_v_1_1[1]

Northern_Rock_Case_Study_v_1_1[1]

Northern_Rock_Case_Study_v_1_1[1]
Northern_Rock_Case_Study_v_1_1[1]

THE NORTHERN ROCK CRISIS: A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PROBLEM WAITING TO

HAPPEN

David T Llewellyn1

BACKGROUND

For three days in August 2007, the UK experienced its first run on a bank since Overend

and Gurney, the London wholesale discount bank in 1866. Around £3 billion of deposits

were withdrawn (around 11 percent of the bank’s total retail deposits) from a medium

sized bank – Northern Rock (NR). The unedifying spectacle of widely-publicised long queues outside the bank’s branches testified to the bank’s serious problems. The NR

crisis was the first time the Bank of England (BOE), the UK’s central bank, had operated

its new money market regime in conditions of acute stress in financial markets, and it was the first time it had acted as a lender-of-last-resort for many years.

Northern Rock (previously a UK mutual building society) converted to bank status in 1997. Without the previous constraints on its operating permissions, it acquired legal powers to conduct the full range of banking business. However, it remained focussed predominantly on the residential mortgage market. From the outset, it adopted a securitisation and funding strategy which was increasingly based on secured wholesale money (by issuing mortgage-backed securities) and other capital market funding.

Before considering the nature of the NR crisis, several points of perspective are noted at

the outset: the bank remained legally solvent (the nominal value of assets exceeding liabilities), only months earlier the bank had reported record profits, the quality of its assets was never in question, its loan-loss record was good by industry standards, and for many years the bank was regarded as a star-performer in the financial markets.

Two problems emerged during the summer months of 2007: there was a generalised lack of confidence in a particular asset class (mortgage bank securities) associated in large part with developments in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States; and doubts emerged about the viability of the NR business model in particular.

In September 2007, NR was forced to seek substantial assistance from the BOE even

after the regulatory authorities, the UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Treasury (the UK government’s finance office), had given assurances that the bank was solvent, and all deposits at the bank would be guaranteed.

THE CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL MARKET TURMOIL

The NR episode needs to be set in the context of the global financial market turbulence experienced during the summer of 2007. Recent years have experienced an unprecedented wave of complex financial innovation with the creation of new financial instruments and vehicles. In the words of the BOE, this financial innovation had the effect of “creating often opaque and complex financial instruments with high embedded leverage” (BOE, 2007a). Two major instruments at the centre of the financial market turmoil were Securitisation and Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs – instruments created from a portfolio of asset-backed securities and then broken into tranches of varying default risk with resulting varied prices): in both cases issue volumes rose sharply in the years prior to the crisis. Figure 1 shows the sharp rise in European securitisations, and figure 2 indicates the volume of global CDO issues and particularly the sharp increase in 2006 and the first half of 2007, followed by an almost total collapse in the summer months of that year.

Securitisation involves a bank bringing together a large number of its loans (e.g.

mortgages) into a single package and selling the portfolio into the capital market. The portfolio might be bought by other financial institutions or by specially created Special Purpose Vehicles, Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), or Conduits established by the securitising bank itself. The buyer issues securities (e.g. FRNs, asset-backed commercial

1 Copyright David T Llewellwn

paper, longer-term paper) which are rated by a rating agency according to the quality of the underlying assets in the portfolio. In effect, the bank passes the loans to others, and the strategy is often referred to as originate-and-distribute even though the purchaser might be a specially-created bankruptcy-remote subsidiary of the bank itself. The bank may offer a line of credit to the purchaser to be activated in the event that the buyer encounters difficulty in renewing its short-term securities.

Figure 1

European securitisation (1998 -2005; € billions)

Figure 2

Global collateralised debt obligation issuance

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

19981999200020012002200320042005

The global market financial turmoil during the summer of 2007 was triggered by

developments in the rapidly growing sub-prime mortgage (SPM) market in the US. A high proportion of such mortgage loans were securitised and also combined into

instruments such as CDOs. These in turn were rated by rating agencies although, in hindsight, in a misleading way in that a CDO would be given a high rating based on only the small proportion of loans within it that was low risk.

The mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and CDOs were purchased by banks around the world, hedge funds, and conduits established by banks either for themselves or clients. Such purchases were funded in the main by the issue of short term securities (e.g. asset-backed commercial paper) and in some cases received lines of credit from banks including banks initiating securitisation programmes.

Problems emerged at various times during 2007 as a result of a combination of factors:

a decline in house prices in the US, the impact of the earlier rise in US interest rates,

large-scale defaults on SPMs (during 2007 repossession in the US reached a thirty-seven

year high), and a sharp decline in the prices of mortgage-backed securities.

Above all, both the primary and secondary markets in SPM securities effectively closed

and concern developed over the exposure of some banks in the market. There was uncertainty, for instance, about which banks were holding MBSs and CDOs. In particular, some banks who were dependent on securitisation programmes encountered serious funding problems because of all these uncertainties. Issuing banks and their conduits faced both a liquidity constraint and a rise in the cost of funding as it became increasingly difficult to roll-over short-term debt issues. Liquidity in the inter-bank markets also weakened and a tiering of interest rates emerged during the summer. Banks encountered funding difficulties because of their uncertain exposure to the weakening MBS market, or because of their commitment to provide lines of credit to MBS holders. There was also concern that some banks would be required to hold on their balance sheets mortgage assets they had originally intended to securitise and sell. Overall, there was a sharp movement away from the MBS market.

All of this created considerable market uncertainty in the summer months of 2007 which lead to a sharp fall in many asset classes, considerable uncertainty as to the risk exposure of banks, credit markets dried up and most especially those focussed on asset backed securities, and liquidity dried up in the markets for MBSs and CDOs. Overall, there was considerable uncertainty regarding the true value of credit instruments (partly because the market had virtually ceased to function effectively) and the risk exposure of banks. As a result, a loss of confidence developed in the value of all asset-backed securities on a global basis. This was the general context of some banks (and notably NR) facing funding problems.

The liquidity problem became serious because securitisation vehicles such as conduits and SIVs were funding the acquisition of long-term mortgages (and other loans) by issuing short-term debt instruments such as asset-backed commercial paper. As liquidity dried up, banks could not finance their off-balance-sheet vehicles and were forced to take assets back on to the balance sheet or hold on to assets they were planning to securitise. This effectively amounts to a process of re-intermediation.

Although NR was not exposed to the US SPM market, it became caught up in all this because of its business model: securitisation as a central strategy, and reliance on short-term money market funding. It faced several related problems: it could not securitise and sell new mortgage assets and hence needed to keep assets on the balance sheet that it had intended to sell, and it faced a sharp rise in interest rates in the money market with the result that borrowing costs (even in the event that it could borrow at all) rose above the yield on its mortgage assets.

The most serious dimension from a systemic point of view was the run on deposits at NR. Clearly, statements to the effect that the bank was solvent did not convince

depositors. In any case, a bank run can be rational if all depositors believe the bank is solvent but also believe that all other depositors believe it is not.

THE RESCUE OPERATION

A traditional role of a central bank is to act as a lender-of-last-resort (LLR) to illiquid solvent banks. In order to limit the moral hazard, this is done against good quality collateral and at a penalty rate of interest. In order not to aggravate a temporary liquidity problem of a bank by panicking depositors to withdraw funds, in the past in the UK this has been done on a covert basis and without publicity at the time. The BOE now judges (though this has been challenged by the European Commission) that current requirements of transparency mean that any such support must be public.

In the UK, the ultimate responsibility for authorisation of support operations by the BOE in a financial crisis rests with the Chancellor of the Exchequer (UK equivalent to the minister of finance). There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is a political decision whether or not a bank is to be supported. Secondly, any such support exposes the tax payer to a potential risk in the event that the institution proves not to be solvent.

In the event, NR received six forms of official support:

1)The BOE’s role of LLR was activated on September 14th 2007 at a penalty interest

rate of 1.5 pp above Bank Rate,

2)The government subsequently offered to guarantee all existing NR deposits,

3)The LLR role was subsequently extended in that NR was given an additional

unlimited facility at the BOE secured on the collateral of all NR assets,

4)On 9th October 2007 the government applied the guarantee not only to existing

deposits but to all new retail deposits,

5)The guarantee applied not only to retail deposits but to most other creditors,

6)The loan facility would remain available to any buyer of the bank.

Combined, this was an unprecedented package of official support and the first time ever that any British government had guaranteed bank deposits. Although, at the time the liquidity support was announced both the FSA and the BOE announced that the bank was solvent, depositors began to withdraw funds on a large scale. This could have been prevented had the government announced its full guarantee of deposits at the time assistance was sought rather than (in response to the run on deposits) several days later.

The qualification of support was that: “this liquidity facility will be available to help NR to fund its operations during the current period of turbulence in financial markets while NR works to secure an orderly resolution of its current liquidity problems.” At the time, the FSA judged that NR was solvent, exceeded its regulatory capital requirement, and had a good quality loan book.

NR was forced to seek such assistance because deposits had begun to be withdrawn, and it was unable to securitise its mortgage loans as had been planned because of funding problems in the wholesale markets and the virtual closure of the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market. This meant that it unexpectedly needed to hold the assets on its own balance sheet. In effect, the BOE was taking mortgage loans as collateral from a bank that could not fund its operations in the market. Irrespective of any penalty in the interest rate, this amounted to a big subsidy.

One of the issues that has arisen, and related to the question of whether central bank support can be offered on a covert basis, is the question of any stigma attached to borrowing from the lender of last resort. There is clearly some merit in this argument in that for three days after the announcement of the support operation retail depositors withdrew funds from NR on a large scale: they were clearly not assuaged by the

statements (including from regulators) that the bank was solvent. It was only after the government announced a full guarantee of all deposits that the drain ended.

A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL RISK PROBLEM

The particularly significant aspect of the NR episode is that it was multi-dimensional in that several issues came together in a single case study. Several key dimensions are identified:

1.The low-probability-high-impact (LPHI) risk. As has been argued, the NR

had a particular business model that exposed it to a low-probability risk (that liquidity would dry-up in the inter-bank and commercial paper market) but one that would have a high-impact (inability to continue to fund its business operations).

2.The Business Model. NR had a particularly hazardous business model which

seems not to have been sufficiently monitored by the supervisory authority.

Northern Rock was the only major UK bank to have securitisation as the centre-piece of its business strategy.

3.Solvency v. Liquidity. A distinction is conventionally made between the

solvency and liquidity of a bank. This distinction is more difficult to make in practice than in theory. At the time of writing (October, 2007) NR remained legally solvent and yet was dependent on BOE funding because it could not fund its operations in the markets. However, there must be a question about this concept of solvency when applied to a bank which: (1) has serious funding problems in the open market, (2) where the cost of funding exceeds the average rate of interest on the bank’s assets, and (3) when it is dependent on support from the BOE.

4.Deposit Protection. Major fault-lines were revealed in the British deposit

protection scheme.

5.Role of Government. The government intervened in an ad hoc manner by

arbitrarily guaranteeing all deposits held at NR (and, by implication, all banks in similar circumstances) which was contrary to the well-established deposit protection scheme. This raises issues of credibility regarding whatever deposit guarantee system is in place.

6.Moral hazard. Serious moral hazard issues have been created with respect to

depositor protection and the role of the BOE’s money market operations.

7.Corporate Governance. The NR episode raises important issues regarding

corporate governance. In particular, did the Board of the bank exercise due care with respect to the risk profile of the bank? What is the responsibility of the Board of a bank in this crucially important dimension? This raises the question of the practical ability of a Board (most especially the non-executive directors) to monitor the risk-taking activities of the management of a bank and, by extension, the interests of the depositors.

The significance of the NR affair is, therefore, that it is multi-dimensional in nature. Virtually everything that could go wrong did go wrong. This is the ultimate significance of the NR case and why it is such an important case study.

We now consider each of these dimensions in turn.

RISK MATRIX: LPHI RISKS

Risk analysis always needs to consider the probability of an event occurring and the impact (or seriousness) in the event that it does occur. LPHI risks are amongst the most difficult to manage, and the history of banking crises around the world (both individual and systemic) indicates that a high proportion occur when a bank (banks) finds itself operating in this area of the matrix. This is partly because it tends to induce disaster myopia where low-probability risks (even if they have high impacts) are discounted

altogether and behaviour is implicitly based on the assumption that the probability is

zero. These are difficult risks to handle also because it is not realistic to price for them: this might, for instance, involve an attempt to price a risk that could destroy the bank!

The only realistic option is to limit the bank’s exposure to such risks.

Although the FSA adopts a similar methodology in its risk-based approach to

supervision, supervisors can also be subject to the same disaster myopia in the case when LPHI risks emerge. It may also be difficult for a supervisor to intervene when detecting a LPHI risk most especially if, to date, the bank’s behaviour has yielded good results, and no obvious problem has yet emerged.

Our central thesis is that NR’s highly focussed business strategy involving a high and

unusual dependency on securitisation and short-term wholesale market funding exposed it to such a LPHI risk. The drying up of liquidity in the relevant London and international markets was a very low probability event (it is difficult to recall when it last occurred) and yet would have a large impact and be serious for banks with business models that relied heavily on securitisation and short-term funding through these markets. It would also appear that, while some generalised warnings about liquidity risks had been made from time to time, supervisors did not take action in the case of NR which suggests that they may have been subject to disaster myopia.

THE NR BUSINESS MODEL

A central theme has been that the central problem for NR was its particular business model that exposed itself to a LPHI risk. The particular business model of NR was that it pursued a strategy of fast growth in mortgage lending based on a high proportion of wholesale market funding together with planned securitisations of its mortgages.

There were, however, two particular features of NR’s business model: (1) the relative importance of wholesale funding compared with other banks, and (2) the fact that securitisation was an integral and dominant part of the bank’s strategy and business model. Furthermore, it would appear that the bank did not take out any form of liquidity insurance through, for instance, agreed lines of credit with other banks. Table 1 shows the significantly higher proportion of wholesale funding in the case of NR (62 percent) compared with the average of 45 percent for other UK banks in the sample.

Table 1

Source of Funding (%)

_______________________________________________________________

Retail W holesale Ratio

Deposits Funding

_______________________________________________________________

Leicester 44 48 0.92

&

Alliance

Barclays Bank 58 42 1.38

Bradford & Bingley 48 52 0.92

HBOS 50 50 1.00 LloydsTSB 61 39 1.56 Northern Rock 30 62 0.48

Royal Bank of Scotland 62 38 1.63

_______________________________________________________________

This model proved to be viable for several years as short-term funding could be rolled-

over on normal terms. However, the LPHI risk in this strategy was a combination of

three particular risks: (1) the bank or its conduits would be unable to roll-over maturing funding, (2) the cost of such funding would rise relative to the yield on mortgage loans

that it kept on the balance sheet and not securitised, i.e. it would be forced to pay some

form of “penalty” interest rate, and (3) that it would be unable to securitise those mortgage assets that it intended to. The LPHI risk was, therefore, that it would be either

unable to roll-over its short-term funding in the event of a serious liquidity squeeze or that the necessary roll-over funding could only be secured at high interest rates. SOLVENCY V. LIQUIDITY

One central issue that arose in the NR affair was the question of insolvency v. illiquidity.

The traditional view is well established: that it is the role of a central bank to lend to, and support, banks which are solvent (assets exceeding liabilities) but illiquid (not having the immediate liquidity to repay depositors on demand). The conditions for central bank support are well established and go back to Bagehot’s (1873) famous dictum: the bank should be solvent, the support should be at a penalty interest rate, it should be against good collateral, and it should be temporary. The danger of not offering support in these conditions is that a solvent but illiquid bank may be forced to sell assets in a fire-sale at a discount to the nominal value. Dependent on the size of the discount, this could turn an otherwise solvent bank into insolvency. Secondly, a forced insolvency of a solvent bank would involve unnecessary economic and social costs.

The question arises as to what the precise meaning of insolvency is for these purposes.

This can be viewed at three levels:

1.Legal insolvency: the bank is insolvent in that the current value of its assets

(measured at book value) is less than the value of liabilities. Thus, even if the

bank were to liquidate all of its assets it would not be able to repay all depositors and other creditors.

2.Forced insolvency: the bank is legally solvent (as 1 above) but if, because it

cannot fund its operations, it is forced to liquidate assets it could do so only at

less than nominal values (fire-sale) and this would make it legally insolvent (value of assets falls below those of liabilities).

3.Business insolvency: the bank is legally solvent (as 1 above) but its current

funding costs (which are likely to continue) exceed the average rate of return on its assets and hence it would soon become insolvent as it would be making losses and would eventually exhaust its equity capital.

The distinction between illiquidity and insolvency is, therefore, not always clear cut and,

under some circumstances, illiquidity can force a solvent institution to become insolvent. Furthermore, if depositors know that the bank is illiquid, they may be induced to withdraw deposits which in turn forces the bank to sell assets at a discount in order to pay out depositors. Given that banks operate with a relatively low equity capital ratio, the fire-sale discount does not need to be very large to exhaust the bank’s capital and force it into legal insolvency.

In the case of NR, at the time the crisis emerged it was not legally insolvent. But it

certainly faced an acute liquidity squeeze which forced it to borrow from the BOE as an alternative to asset sales. Furthermore, it was also “insolvent” (at least at the time) on a business basis in that its borrowing from the BOE (at the penalty rate of at least 6.36 percent) exceeded the bank’s average rate of interest on assets of around 6 percent. Northern Rock had operated on a very fine interest margin for some time which meant that, while it was successful in generating business in the short-term, it was vulnerable to either a liquidity squeeze or being forced to borrow at penalty rates either in the market or through the BOE. On the other hand, there was always a possibility that the liquidity squeeze would end and the bank could again be able to fund at normal market interest rates, most especially if the general level of interest rates were to decline. DEPOSIT PROTECTION

The NR affair brought to the surface underling weaknesses and inconsistencies in the UK’s deposit protection scheme (DPS) designed to compensate depositors in the event of

a bank’s insolvency. Deposit protection serves three main purposes: (1) to offer a

degree of social protection to holders of small bank deposits, (2) to remove the incentive for contagious bank runs, and (3) to make it easier and, to some extent, less costly to

allow banks to fail. The original purpose when it was first introduced in the US in the 1930s was to remove the incentive to withdraw deposits from solvent banks when other banks were failing: in this sense, it was designed more as an instrument of financial stability than consumer protection.

Two central issues, both of which emerged in the debate about NR’s predicament, relate to coverage (what limit should be placed on the size of deposits protected, and whether, for instance, inter-bank deposits should be included), and the element of co-insurance (i.e. whether, as in most insurance, cover within the limit is to be less than total). Herein lies the central dilemma of deposit protection. If coverage is total (there is no co-insurance) a serious moral hazard risk arises in four respects. Firstly, depositors have no incentive to consider the risk characteristics of their banks. Secondly, they might have incentives (as was allegedly the case in the US Savings and Loans crisis) to deliberately seek out high-risk banks because, if the banks did not fail depositors would retain the generally higher interest rates being offered, whereas if they were to fail depositors would be fully compensated. This amounts to a one-way put option in favour of choosing high-risk banks. Thirdly, banks might also have incentives to adopt high-risk profiles because they know their depositors will be protected in the event of failure. Fourthly, if protection is total the pricing of risk is distorted as it is no longer necessary to offer depositors a risk premium in the rate of interest which effectively subsidises risk and causes it to be under-priced. The existence of deposit protection represents a powerful case for the regulation of banks: to avoid the moral hazard being exploited.

The other part of the dilemma, however, is that if coverage is less than complete, and

there is an element of co-insurance, depositors will withdraw deposits in the event that doubts arise about the solvency of a bank. Depositors are likely to withdraw funds in the event that they are exposed to any risk of losing any amount (even small) of their deposits. In which case, partial insurance is likely to be ineffective. The dilemma, therefore, is that deposit protection is likely to be either ineffective if it is partial, or subject to moral hazard in the event that it is complete.

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT

A unique feature of the NR affair was the role of the government. When the supervisory authorities’ announcement that the bank was solvent and safe failed to abate the run on deposits, the government took the unprecedented move of guaranteeing all deposits at NR irrespective of size. This latter requirement was also to be extended to all new deposits and customers although a fee would be charged to NR plus a percentage of any new deposit inflows. This was presumably to allow the bank to offer services to customers while at the same time preventing the bank (shareholders) benefiting from the BOE’s support.

In effect, the tax-payer absorbed the risk of NR becoming insolvent. In this event, the

government would effectively have claim over NR assets. It also implied that the tax-payer took the risk of a fall in house prices which, in the event of insolvency, could mean that, in the case of borrowers defaulting on high loan-value ratios, the value of some of the houses taken into government possession would be less than the defaulted mortgage. This difference would be a cost to the tax-payer.

There are substantial implications of this unprecedented intervention by the government. Firstly, it will have created a clear perception that depositors in any bank subject to a run of deposits will be protected in full. In effect, depositor risk has effectively been socialised and the DPS has been made redundant. Secondly, it undermines the credibility of the formal DPS. Thirdly, it is likely to undermine the credibility of any subsequent scheme that is likely to emerge. Fourthly, with de facto total protection cover, the standard moral hazard has been intensified. For all these reasons, the long-run implications of the unprecedented guarantee of the government are substantial.

An important precedent has been created in that, under some unspecified circumstances,

the government will step in to guarantee bank deposits over and above whatever the DPS specifies. What does this imply for caveat emptor (“let the buyer beware”)? It must

be an open question in depositors’ minds what future circumstances will call forth such a guarantee. The moral hazard is that, once the principle of such guarantees has been established, it is difficult to limit its applicability in depositors’ perceptions. Is it, for instance, reasonable to assume that such a guarantee would be forthcoming in all future “unusual circumstances”? Furthermore, what would define such circumstances? The government has uncovered a minefield of potential moral hazard because it is unknown what the circumstances would be where the government would not offer a similar guarantee to that in the NR case.

MONITORING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

In the final analysis, all aspects of risk management in a financial firm are corporate

governance issues in that the Board has ultimate responsibility for the fortunes of a

company. The NR episode raises several questions regarding the role of the Board of NR, and most especially the role of the non-executive Directors. In particular, to what extent did the Board understand the implications of the bank’s strategy, and especially the risk characteristics?

It is instructive to distinguish between formal, informal and market monitors of banks.

Formal monitors are those agencies which are given explicit responsibility for supervision: in the case of the UK this includes the FSA, the BOE and bank Boards. Informal monitors, on the other hand, include the media, consumers’ associations, academic analysts, etc. Market monitors include rating agencies, other banks, bank analysts, etc. While each group has a different focus, and may represent different interests, they all in their own way perform monitoring or supervisory roles.

The wider question is two-fold: (1) whether the various supervisors/monitors of the bank were conducting their formal or informal supervisory roles effectively, and (2) whether they had sufficient information about the risk characteristics of the bank to make informed judgements. The central point is that, while criticisms may focus on official agencies (the FSA in particular), it is evident that there was a generalised failure of monitoring and appreciation of the risks that NR was taking. In terms of the LPHI risk, there seems to have been a collective disaster myopia.

POSITIVE OUTCOMES

There are some positive features to the NR affair. Firstly, it demonstrated the

importance of both banks and their supervisors considering the risk characteristics of business models and undertaking robust stress-tests. Some business models are clearly more vulnerable than others and most especially to some LPHI risks. Secondly, reform of the DPS was needed because of its internal inconsistencies, and the NR affair performed the useful role of bring this to the fore and to the public’s consciousness. Thirdly, it has emphasised the importance of effective governance arrangements within financial firms. Furthermore, the episode has brought two other central issues to the attention of the public: the role of government and the possible underwriting of risks by the tax-payer, and the general question of moral hazard.

CONCLUSIONS

Our central theme has been that the NR episode is a multi-dimensional problem, and

reflects a complex set of inter-related problems. Bringing together some of the strands

of the analysis, several lessons can be learned and need to be addressed: ?There needs to be a greater focus on liquidity management,

?Business models of banks need to be subject to more rigorous stress tests,

?There needs to be greater transparency in financial instruments,

?Equally, there needs to be greater transparency with regard to banks’ risk exposures including their off-balance-sheet vehicles,

?Deposit protection arrangements need to be reviewed and made more credible, ? A review is needed of the role and operation of rating agencies.

?LPHI risks need to be more explicitly considered and managed,

?Pricing of risk,

?Governance arrangements within banks need to be considered most especially with respect to the role of the Board in monitoring risk models.

Several important moral hazard issues have also been identified associated with the BOE’s money market operations, its LLR role, and the deposit protection arrangements. This paper is an abbreviated form of a longer paper which includes extended reference to the part played by the UK regulators and supervisors, the activities of the Central Bank and the government and the impact on the UK deposit protection scheme.

REFERENCES

Bagehot, W (1873), Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market, Henry S King, London.

BOE, (2007), “Turmoil in Financial Markets: What Can Central Banks Do?” Evidence to House of Commons Treasury Committee, London, 12th September.

BOE, (2007a), Financial Stability Report, London, October.

British Bankers Association, (2007), The Credit Crunch: Implications and Changes Required, London, October

Carmichael, J, Alexander Fleming, and David T Llewellyn, (2004), Aligning Financial Supervisory Structures with Country Needs, World Bank Institute, Washington.

Financial Services Authority, (2007), Evidence on Northern Rock to the House of Commons Treasury Committee, October.

Goodhart, C A E (2007), “Liquidity Risk Management”, unpublished.

Goodhart, C A E, Philip Hartmann, David Llewellyn, Liliana Rojas-Suarez, and Steven Leisured (1999), Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now? London, Routledge. Healey, J (2001), “Financial Stability and the Central Bank: International Evidence”, in Richard Brealey, et. al. eds, Financial Stability and Central Banks, London, Routledge.

H M Treasury, (2007), Banking Reform- Protecting Depositors: A discussion paper, London, October.

Llewellyn, D T (2004), “Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation ad Supervision: The Basic Issues”, chapter 2 in, eds. Carmichael, J, Alexander Fleming, and David Llewellyn, Aligning Financial Supervisory Structures with Country Needs, World Bank Institute, Washington.

Luna-Martinez. J and Thomas A Rose, (2003), “International Survey of Integrated Financial Services Supervisors”, Policy Research Working Paper, 3096, World Bank, Washington, July.

Masciandaro, D (2003), “Central Banks and Single Authorities: A Delegation Puzzle”, Bocconi University, Milan.

Oosterloo, S and Jacob de Haan, (2003), A Survey of International Frameworks for Financial Stability, Occasional Studies, Vol. 1, No., 3, Amsterdam, De Nederlandsche Bank

The Economist, (2007), “Credit Markets”, August 4th

公共管理学作业homework答案

《公共管理学》homework(1) 一、名词解释 1.公共管理: 公共管理是指公公组织为解决公共问题,追求公共利益,运用公共权力,通过制定公共政策、有效地实行与监督等,提供公共物品和公共服务,维护公共秩序,对公共事务进行管理的社会活动。 2.公共选择理论公共选择理论是一门介于经济学和政治学之间的新兴交叉学科,它是运用经济学的分析方法来研究政治决策机制如何运作的理论。 3. 公共管理协调指协商、调整公共组织系统与其外部环境之间和系统内部的各种关系,使之权责清晰,分工合作,相互配合,有效地实现公共管理目标和提高整体效能的行为。 4. 公共管理监督是指依法对政府和公共事业组织等公共组织及其工作人员的监察和督导活动。 二、单项选择 1.1926年在美国出版两本权威的行政学教科书《行政学研究导论》《公共行政学原理》的两位学者分别是( B ) 25 A.泰勒和法约尔 B.怀特和威洛比 C.威尔逊和古德诺 D.马克斯?韦伯和赫伯特?西蒙 2.公共选择理论理论对政府的本质和行为的基本假设是( B)

A.社会人 B.经济人 C.自动人 D.复杂人 3.大萧条以后,为资本主义的稳定和发展起到了积极的作用的经济理论是( A ) A.凯恩斯的政府干预理论 B.新自由主义取消政府干预理论 C.亚当?斯密的“小政府”理论 D.古典经济学派的限制政府干预理论 4. 最早建立了比较规范的文官制度的国家是( A ) A.英国 B.法国 C.德国 D.美国 5. 18世纪英国著名经济学家________,在他著名的经济学著作《国富论》中对政府财政的管理范围和职能进行了限定。( C ) A.威廉?配第 B.马歇尔

公共管理学作业册答案

电大《公共管理学概论》(教育管理本科)形成性考核册参考参考答案(2010) 案例分析答案在最后一页 一、填空 1、公共管理活动公共行政学 2、公共组织社会公共事务公共利益公共权力 3、罗伯特达尔赫伯特西蒙新公共行政学 4、限制政府干预主张政府干预 5、非政府性公益性正规性 6、公共权力公共社会 7、政治实体行动方案和行动准则 8、调节性自我调节性 9、政策宣传政策分解物质和组织准备 10、事实价值 二、选择题 1C 2D 3C 4A 5B 6B 7A 8D 9B 10D 三、简答题 1、什么是公共管理的内涵?P2 所谓公共管理,就是公共组织运用所拥有的公共权力,为有效地实现公共利益,对社会公共事务进行管理的社会活动。主要包括以下几点: (1)公共管理的主体是公共组织 (2)公共管理的客体是社会公共事务 (3)公共管理的目的是实现公共利益 (4)公共管理的过程是公共权利的运作过程 2、政府职能演变经过那几个阶段?P34 (1)限制政府干预 (2)主张政府干预 (3)对政府职能的重新思考 3、简述政府失效理论的基本观点及政府失效的几点表现?P45 政府失效理论的基本观点是对人的“经济人”的假设。即认为人是自利的、理性的,而且每个人都在追求个人利益的最大化,政府公务员也不例外。由此看来,在政治决策过程中,人的一切行为都可看成是经济行为,而使“政府政治过程的目的肯定是增进公共利益的假设”受到质疑而不得不被放弃。 (1)公共政策失效 (2)公共产品供给的低效率 (3)内部性与政府扩张 (4)“寻租”及腐败 4、简述非政府公共组织的基本特征。P49 (1)非政府性 (2)公益性 (3)正规性 (4)专门性 (5)志愿性

公共管理学作业答案

公共管理学作业1 一、简答题 1、简述公共管理模式得基本特征 (1)公共利益与个人利益相统一,重在公共利益上。 (2)政府组织与其她公共组织相统一,重在政府组织上。 (3)社会问题管理与资源管理相统一,重在问题解决上。 (4)结果管理与过程管理相统一,重在结果管理上。 (5)管理所追求得公平与效率相统一,重在公平上。 (6)公共组织得外部管理与内部管理相统一,重在外部管理上。 (7)服务管理与管制管理相统一,重在服务上。 (8)管理制度与技术相统一,重在制度创新上。 2、简要说明市场经济国家政府得主要职能。 第一,建立并维护社会与市场秩序。 第二,提供公共物品及基础服务。 第三,调控宏观经济并保持稳定。 第四,进行收入与财产得再分配。 第五,保护自然资源与环境。 3、非政府公共组织得基本特征与作用就是什么? 非政府公共组织得基本特征就是(1)非政府性(2)公益性(3)正规性(4)专门性(5)志愿性。作用:由于非政府公共组织沟通了政府与社会各方面得联系,架起了政府与社会之间联系得桥梁与纽带,因此非政府公共组织发挥着双重性、广泛性、针对性、中介性、公益性得作用。 二、论述题 1、论述政府失效理论得主要内容及其给我们得启示。 答:政府失效理论得主要内容:政府失效也称政府失灵,就是指政府主体机制等方面有在本质上得缺陷,而无法使资源配置得效率达到最佳得情景。这一理论对人得假设,包括政府公务员,都就是经济人假设。由此,这一理论认为在政治决策过程中,人得一切行为都可以瞧成就是经济行为。政府行政过程中得目得肯定就是

增进公共利益得判断得到质疑。政府失效主要就是现在公共政策得失效;公共物品供给得低效率;内部性与政府扩张性; “寻租”及腐败。 政府失效理论给我们得启示主要有以下三点: 1)单纯依靠市场与过多依靠市场政府干预都就是行不通得,必须两者互相制约、协调才能促进市场得健康发展。 2)必须明确界定政府管理得范围、权限,同时积极培育建立社会主义市场,并不断完善社会主义市场经济体制,使市场自身而不就是靠政府去发挥作用。 3) 在进行经济改革得同时也必须进行政治体制改革,只有这样才能保证济体制改革得顺利进行。 4) 加强各项法律、法规得建设,使政府得决策过程与管理过程都能纳入正常得监督系统或机制之中。 2、结合实际谈谈转型时期我国政府得职能应如何转变。 答:所谓政府职能转换并不就是简单得加强或削减政府得干预范围或力度,而就是指在市场经济体制下政府得工作内容、工作重点、工作方式要有重要得改变。转型期我国政府职能得转换主要表现在以下几个方面:1、改变管理念,为全社会提供服务。2、改革企业制度,实现政企分开。3、加强法制建设,形成公平竞争得市场经济体系。4、实行宏观调控,稳定经济发展。5、加强政府自身建设,提高工作效率。 综合以上政府工作内容、重心得转移,我们可以用简单得四句话概括政府职能转化得特点,即:政府工作由全面转向适度;由微观转向宏观;由直接转向间接;由人治转向法治。例如:多年来,在计划经济得影响下,无论就是各级政府机关、企事业单位、还就是平民百姓都以文件为依据,即所谓得红头文件。在今天发展社会主义市场经济得条件下,就显现出不稳定、随意性等一系列得问题与局限性。我们过去曾经将市场经济与计划经济严重对立起来,否定了市场经济对促进生产力所起得重要作用,阻碍了社会经济得发展,因此我们必须大力发展市场经济,尤其在竞争充分得领域更要充分发挥市场经济得调节作用,积极利用这支“瞧不见得手”,与此同时也要大力加强法制建设,以保证市场经济得健康发展。 公共管理学作业2 一、简答题:

公共管理学作业答案

. 公共管理学 作业1 1、公共管理的主体是公共组织,客体是公共事务,目的是实现公共利益, 公共管理过程是公共权力的运作过程。 2、公共物品或服务是指具有效用的不可分割性、消费的非竞争性和受益的 非排他性等特性的产品。 3、公共管理学是一门研究公共管理活动规律的学科,它是在公共行政学的 基础上发展起来的。 4、一般来讲,政府的职能应分为两部分:政治职能和管理职能。 5、政府职能的演变大致经历了限制政府干预、主张政府干预和对政府职能 的重新思考三个阶段。 6、非政府公共组织的基本特征是:非政府性、公益性、正规性、专门性和 志愿性。 7、我国非政府公共组织的构成主要包括:社会团体和民办非企业单位。 8、目前我国非政府公共组织的主要活动领域有:环境保护、扶贫救困、社会公益等方面。其具有双重性、广泛性、针对性、中介性的公益性特点。 9、公共管理者主要是指政府官员、政府公职人员和非政府公共组织的管理 人员。其职业具有鲜明的特点,主

要表现在执行公共权力、服务公共社会两个方面。 10、当代公共管理者必备的职业能力主要包括管理认知能力、管理诊断能专业资料. . 力、管理决策能力和人际沟通能力四个方面。 二简答题 1、公共管理与企业管理有何区别?、1⑴目的不同,公共管理是公益性的,企业管理的目的是盈利; ⑵限制因素不同,公共管理整个过程受到法律的限制,企业管理的根本原动力是追求高额利润,经济气候是企业管理的主要影响因素,法律在其活动中仅是一个外部制约因素; ⑶物质基础不同,公共管理所需要的各种物质资源主要来自于税收和发行债券,其经费预算属于公共财政支出,必须公开化,接受纳税人的监督,企业所需的各种物质资源主要来自投资的回报即利润,其管理所需的物质资源是自主的,不需要公开化; ⑷管理人员选拔方式不同,公共管理人员是由专门的部门或机构相对独立地考核、评估,主要考虑其政治才干和倾向,公共管理人员有职业化、终身化的趋向,企业管理人员根据其处理特定事务的能力被聘用; ⑸绩效评估的指标不同,评估公共管理成效的主要指标是行为的合法性、公众舆论的好坏、各种冲突的减少程度、公共项目的实施与效果、公共产品的数量及消耗程度,偏重于社会效益,企业管理绩效的主要指标是销售额、净收益率、生产

公共管理学作业

《公共管理学》形成性考核作业 《公共管理学》作业一 简答题 1、简述构成公共组织的基本要素。 构成公共组织的基本要素就是:组织人员、物质因素、组织目标、职能范围、机构设置、职位设置、权责分配、规章制度、 2、简述公共组织设计的原则。 答:(1)职能目标原则;(2)完整统一原则;(3)精干效能原则;(4)法制原则;(5)职、权、责一致原则;(6)人本原则、 3、简述人力资源管理的基本职能。 答:人力资源管理的基本职能就是:(1)人力资源的获取(规划、录用与选拔);(2)人力资源的发展(整合培训、职业发展、管理发展、组织发展);(3)人力资源的激励(联结报酬与绩效、工作再设计、提升工作的满足感、绩效评估);(4)人力资源的维持(人际关系与沟通问题、员工福利问题、工作环境问题、职业安全问题);(5)人力资源的研究(政策、规则、技术、方法)、 《公共管理学》作业二 简答题 1、简述公共财政的职能。 答:(一)资源配置的职能:1、为全社会提供公共物品与公共服务; 2、矫正外部效应;3、对不完全竞争的干预;(二)调节收入分配的职能:1、经济公平:强调投入与收入的对称(等价交换、按劳分配);2、社会公平:将收入差距维持在现阶段社会各个阶层居民所能接受的合理范围内(调节贫富差距);(三)稳定经济职能:1、充分就业;2、物价稳定;3、国际收支平衡、 2、简述现代公共部门人力资源管理制度的基本精神。 答:人力资源管理理论的基本精神就是:第一,确定以人为中心的管理思想;第二,把组织瞧作整体,不仅开发“力的资源”,而且开始走向开发组织、整体的“心的资源”,注重整体效益、群体目标、团队精神;第三,在管理原则上既强调个人又强调集体;第四,在管理方法上既强调理性又强调情感;第五,在领导方式上既强调权威又强调民主;第六,在管理实践中既强调能力也重视资历。 《公共管理学》作业三 论述题 1、谈谈您对组织变革的动力与阻力的认识。 组织改革的动力 (一)组织改革的外部动力 首先,适应市场经济体制就是组织改革最深层的动力。改革的本质动力就是经济体制的改革与市场化的驱动,改革的目的与任务就是适应经济发展的需求与要求。目前我国正处于市场经济体制逐步完善,市场经济迅速发展的关键时期,政府作为市场宏观调控的主体,为了更好地履行宏观调配职能,促进经济的平稳快速发展,必然要先对自身的职能与机构进行改革。其次,政治体制改革就是行政改革的直接动力。中国的战略改革系统不仅包括经济体制改革也包括政治体制改革,作为上层建筑的政治体制必须与经济体制改革的深入同时展开。目前,我国的政治体制改革还处于观念与理论研讨阶段,并没有与经济体制改革相适应,可以说就是暂落后于经济体制改革。行政改革作为政治体制改革的重要方面,其改革必将带动政治体制改革的发展,这对我国的政治改革的深入起到积极的促进作用。

公共管理学作业

1.第1题 新公共管理范式建立的学科基础为()。 A.政治学 B.行政学 C.经济学 D.行政法学 您的答案:C 2.第2题 1、新公共管理范式产生于()。 A.19世纪60年代末70年代初 B.19世纪70年代末80年代初 C.20世纪60年代末70年代初 D.20世纪70年代末80年代初 您的答案:D 3.第3题 新公共管理运动肇始于()。 A.英国 B.美国 C.德国 D.新西兰 您的答案:A 4.第4题 在交易费用、产权契约安排和资源配置效率之间建立起内在的联系,从而成为沟通交易费用理论与产权理论桥梁的是()。 A.彼德原理 B.科斯定理 C.阿罗不可能性定理 D.墨菲法则 您的答案:B 5.第5题 新公共管理运动肇始于()。 A.英国 B.美国 C.德国 D.新西兰 您的答案:A 6.第6题 公共选择理论实际上提出的是一种()。 A.政府万能理论 B.政府失败理论 C.市场万能理论 D.市场失败理论 您的答案:B 7.第7题 在私人部门里,战略思想演变阶段中的战略规划阶段的特征为 A.通过努力做到与预算相符,寻求更好的运营控制 B.通过预测下一年度以后的情况,寻求更有效的成长规划 C.通过战略性思考,寻求对市场和竞争能力作出更快反应 D.管理所有资源,寻求竞争优势,取得未来的成功 您的答案:A 此题得分:0.0

8.第8题 目标管理的理论和方法的创立者是美国管理学家()。 A.彼得?杜拉克C.泰勒 B.帕金森D.法约尔 您的答案:C 此题得分:0.0 9.第9题 政府运用供应这个手段,所针对的对象是 A.公共产品 B.私人产品 C.半公共产品 D.半私人产品 您的答案:A 10.第10题 在交易费用、产权契约安排和资源配置效率之间建立起内在的联系,从而成为沟通交易费用理论与产权理论桥梁的是 A.彼德原理 B.科斯定理 C.阿罗不可能性定理 D.墨菲法则 您的答案:B 11.第11题在私人部门中,组织的最终目标为()。 A.追求可持续经济利润的最大化 B.追求可持续政治利益的最大化 C.追求社会公平 D.追求公众的满意度 您的答案:A 12.第12题 1、新公共管理范式产生于()。 A.19世纪60年代末70年代初 B.19世纪70年代末80年代初 C.20世纪60年代末70年代初 D.20世纪70年代末80年代初 您的答案:D 13.第13题 对非政府公共组织也可称作()。 A.第一部门 B.第二部门 C.第三部门 D.公共组织 您的答案:C 14.第14题 关于绩效管理对于新公共管理范式的价值,以下说法不正确的是()。 A.绩效管理与市场模式相统一 B.绩效评价与管理是分权化改革的迫切要求

电大公共管理学作业2答案

单选题:(共7道试题,每题3分) 1.公用事业组织属于【】 A.基本非盈利型服务 B.基本盈利型服务 C.选择非盈利型服务 D.选择盈利型服务 2.不属于非政府公共组织所有具有的特点的是() A.民间性 B.营利性 C.自治性 D.自愿性 3.在我国,非政府组织不包括()。 A.事业单位法人 B.社会团体法人 C.私营企业

D.民办非企业单位 4.按照计划的期限不同,公共部门的计划可以划分为()。 A.战略计划和作业计划 B.长期计划和短期计划 C.上层计划和基层计划 D.单一计划和常规计划 5.()是为完成某一特定计划而规定的一系列步骤。 A.规则 B.程序 C.规划 D.预算 6.凡事要以大局为重,以公共利益和总体目标为基本准则,这是()。 A.整体原则 B.自觉原则

C.动态原则 D.周密原则 7.公共决策应该对整体与局部、当前利益与长远利益、主要目标和次要目标等关系,加以综合分析,然后进行决策,这是()。 A.目标性原则 B.信息原则 C.优选原则 D.系统原则 多选题:(共8题每题5分) 1.非政府组织的发展动因包括()。 A.市场失灵 B.契约失效 C.价值取向的多元化 D.政府失灵 E.历史的自然演进 2.非营利组织区别于政府组织的主要特征是()。

A.民间性 B.志愿性 C.组织性 D.非营利性 E.自治性 3.我国非政府组织存在的主要问题包括()。 A.管理体制混乱,发展处于无序状态 B.行为不规范,服务意识差 C.缺乏公共意识和国际意识 D.依附性强,“非政府性”弱。 E.法律法规不健全,对非政府监管不力 4.公共管理伦理与责任控制机制包括()。 A.行政控制 B.立法控制 C.司法控制

电大公共管理学作业及答案

公共管理学习题 一、简答题 1、公共管理的内涵: 所谓公共管理, 就是公共组织运用所拥有的公共权力, 为有效地实现公共利益, 对社会公共事务进行管理的社会活动。主要包括以下几点: ( 1) 公共管理的主体是公共组织( 2) 公共管理的客体是社会公共事务( 3) 公共管理的目的是实现公共利益( 4) 公共管理的过程是公共权利的运作过程 2、政府职能演变经过的阶段: ( 1) 限制政府干预( 2) 主张政府干预( 3) 对政府职能的重新思考 3、简述政府失效理论的基本观点及政府失效的表现: 政府失效理论的基本观点是对人的”经济人”的假设。即认为人是自利的、理性的, 而且每个人都在追求个人利益的最大化, 政府公务员也不例外。由此看来, 在政治决策过程中, 人的一切行为都可看成是经济行为, 而使”政府政治过程的目的肯定是增进公共利益的假设”受到质疑而不得不被放弃。( 1) 公共政策失效 ( 2) 公共产品供给的低效率( 3) 内部性与政府扩张( 4) ”寻租”及腐败 4、简述非政府公共组织的基本特征: ( 1) 非政府性( 2) 公益性( 3) 正规性( 4) 专门性( 5) 志愿性 5、公共政策的特征表现在哪些方面: ( 1) 公共性( 2) 利益选择性( 3) 目标指向性( 4) 权威约束性 ( 5) 功能多极性( 6) 动态稳定性 6、简述公共政策规划的主体和基本原则: 公共政策规划的主体是指参与政策方案设计与研究的所有机构和人员。 ( 1) 执政党( 2) 立法机关( 3) 行政机关( 4) 利益集团( 5) 大众传媒 政策规划的原则是指政策规划需要遵循的基本准则: ( 1) 公正原则( 2) 受益原则

公共管理学作业参考答案

政策评估的( B )反映的是政策的效率和效能标准。 A.稳定标准 B.事实标准 C.价值标准 D.成本标准 公共政策的权威性来源于它的(B )。 A.合理性 B.合法性 C.操作性 D.强制性 以下哪项不是常见的政策手段?( D )。 A.行政手段 B.经济手段 C.思想政治手段 D.文化手段 我国的社会团体具有“半官半民”的特点,说的是其组织的( B )。 A.广泛性 B.双重性 C.针对性 D.中介性 非政府公共组织的基本特征有( CD )。 A.公益性 B.正规性 C.专门性 D.志愿性 公共管理者的职业能力主要包括( ABCD )方面的能力。 A.管理认知能力 B.管理诊断能力 C.管理决策能力 D.人际沟通能力 )( A 。,在1776年撰写《国富论》论述了对政府角色理解的学者是 A.亚当·斯密 B.凯恩斯胡德C. D.史蒂文·科恩 )界定政府职能的主要依据是( 3 A.财政赤字商品服务质量下降 B. 市场失灵 C. D.政府干预 公共管理学是一门研究( C )的学科 A.公共决策 B.公共组织维护 C.公共管理活动规律

D.公共环境 ( C )是由公共政策制定主体的本质特点决定,也是其阶级性的反映。 A.目标指向性 B.权威约束性 C.功能多极性 D.利益选择性 公共政策具有( ABCD )等特征。 A.公共性 B.利益的选择性 C.权威的约束性 D.功能的多极性 本来应当由政府承担的职能,却因没有尽到职责而出现了“真空”现象,我们称其为政府职能的( A )。 A.缺位 B.越位 C.错位 D.不到位 公共管理者主要是指( ACD )。 A.政府官员 B.企业领导 C.政府公职人员 D.非政府公共组织的管理人员 我国在计划经济体制下,政府对社会和经济实施全面的干预,是一个(B )。 A.小政府 B.全能的政府 C.间接的政府 D.恰当的政府 政府失效的主要表现及原因有(ABCD )。 A.公共政策失效 B.公共物品供给的低效率 C.内部性与政府扩张 寻租及腐败D. 现代公共管理是以( B )为核心的、多元化的开放主体体系。 A.企业 B.政府 C.文化团体 D.研究机构

公共管理学作业

公共管理学作业 选择题 1 . (3分) 下面哪一项不是西方新公共治理的差不多理念?(C) A.政府的职能是“掌舵”而不“划浆” B.引进私营部门的治理手段和体会 C.公务员保持政治中立 D.公共服务以顾客为导向 2 . (3分) 公共治理与企业治理有(ABCD)等方面的差别。 A.限制因素不同 B.物质基础不同 C.治理人员选拔方式不同 D.绩效评估不同 3 . (3分) 在进行政策规划时,具体问题具体分析,实事求是地认识阻碍政策规划的环境因素,灵活客观地选择规划方案,是(C)原则的表达。 A.优化原则 B.变化原则 C.权变原则 D.系统原则 4 . (3分) 依照公共政策对社会有关群体的阻碍来分,公共政策可分为(AB)等 A.分配性政策 B.调剂性政策 C.元政策 D.差不多政策 5 . (3分)

以下属于公共政策制定的间接主体的是(B)。 A.政党 B.智囊专家 C.立法机关 D.行政机关 6 . (3分) 公共治理者要紧是指(ACD)。 A.政府官员 B.企业领导 C.政府公职人员 D.非政府公共组织的治理人员 7 . (3分) 界定政府职能的要紧依据是(C) A.财政赤字 B.商品服务质量下降 C.市场失灵 D.政府干预 8 . (3分) 公共治理者的职业能力要紧包括(ABC)方面的能力。 A.治理认知能力 B.治理诊断能力 C.治理决策能力 D.人际沟通能力 9 . (3分) 目前我国非政府公共组织的要紧活动领域有(ABD)等方面。 A.环境爱护 B.扶贫救困 C.公共基础设施的提供 D.社会公益 10 . (3分)

非政府公共组织的差不多特点有(ABCD)。 A.公益性 B.正规性 C.专门性 D.理想性 第2 大题 简答题 1 . (10分) 转型期我国政府职能的定位表达在哪些方面?答:转型期我国政府职能的定位表达在以下几方面: 1、强化公共服务,保证公共产品的供给。 2、强化社会治理,保证社会公平、公平。 3、实现宏观调控,稳固经济进展。 4、加强政府自身建设,提高公共服务质量。 2 . (10分) 公共政策规划的差不多程序包括哪几个步骤?答:公共政策规划的差不多程序包括以下几个步骤: 1、确立政策目标。 2、拟订政策方案。 3、评估政策方案。

少数民族传统节日表汇编

中国少数民族主要节日 民族主要节日时间 阿昌族火把节农历六月二十五日会街节农历九月初十 泼水节农历二月二十九日撒神农历七月初一 尝新节农历八月十五日 白族三月街农历三月十五日火把节农历六月二十四日渔潭会农历八月十五日 保安族圣纪节伊斯兰教历三月十二日开斋节伊斯兰教历九月三十日古尔邦节伊斯兰教历十二月十日 布郎族开门节傣历十二月十五日关门节傣历九月十五日泼火节农历二月十九日 布依族 六月六农历六月初六 三月三农历三月初三朝鲜族 元日农历正月初一 上元节农历正月初五 寒食节农历四月初五 端午农历五月初五 哈尼族 十月节农历十月初一 六月节农历六月二十四日 哈萨克族 圣纪节伊斯兰教历三月十二日 开斋节伊斯兰教历九月三十日 古尔邦节伊斯兰教历十二月十日赫哲族赫哲年农历正月初一 回族 圣纪节伊斯兰教历三月十二日 开斋节伊斯兰教历九月三十日 古尔邦节伊斯兰教历十二月十日基诺族 打铁节农历一月 火把节农历六月 京族哈节农历六月初十 德昂族泼水节农历四月十五日 东乡族 圣纪节伊斯兰教历三月十二日 开斋节伊斯兰教历九月三十日 古尔邦节伊斯兰教历十二月十日

四月八农历四月初八 朝鲜族元日农历正月初一上元节农历正月初五寒食节农历四月初五端午农历五月初五 哈尼族 十月节农历十月初一 六月节农历六月二十四日 哈萨克族圣纪节伊斯兰教历三月十二日开斋节伊斯兰教历九月三十日古尔邦节伊斯兰教历十二月十日 赫哲族赫哲年农历正月初一 回族圣纪节伊斯兰教历三月十二日开斋节伊斯兰教历九月三十日古尔邦节伊斯兰教历十二月十日 基诺族 打铁节农历一月 火把节农历六月 京族哈节农历六月初十 德昂族泼水节农历四月十五日 东乡族圣纪节伊斯兰教历三月十二日

公共管理学案例

公共管理学案例及案例分析 2004-12-13 案例一 温州市政府的“无为与有为” 保护民营经济发展的无为温州民营经济的发展,有着自身的动力和内因,而政府的“无为”为之提供了重要的外部环境。温州市市长曾说:“在温州,凡理论和实践发生矛盾时,先服从于实践。”于是个体工商业、服务业、家庭工厂、挂户经营、雇工经营、买卖合同、长途运输等,只要上面不管,就都让它发展。 1984年在平阳县钱库镇出现了私人钱庄。当时中国人民银行要求坚决取缔,而温州各级政府因为考虑到钱库镇当时经济发展的需要,并没有强制取缔,而是在争取钱库镇的银行和信用社率先实行利率浮动改革的试点后,最后钱庄于1989年在无证经营了五年后自行关闭。 在温州人民群众自发发展民营经济的推动下,温州政府顺经济改革的需求,先后出台了许多突破当时政策或在全国率先改革的法规和措施,如中国首份个体工商执照、首个关于私营企业的地方法规、首家实行利率改革的信用社等。 强化市场和质量管理的有为八十年代末,温州的形象和声誉曾一度出现空前的危机。如温州低质皮鞋在杭州武林广场被焚;永嘉的虚假广告;仓南的假商标等。温州的信誉危机强烈震撼着温州政府。为此温州政府转变强化管理职能,严厉打击假冒伪劣,开始全面整顿。并加强质量管理,在外出水陆交通要道设立检查站,对皮鞋、低压电器等产品的出境实行“准运证制度”,严堵假冒伪劣产品的外流。在此基础上温州政府提出“质量立市”的口号,在全国率先制定“质量立市”的地方法规。1992年温州政府继而提出以质量和品牌为核心的二次创业的战略目标。 总之,温州政府按照市场经济发展的需要,大力加强和改善基础设施建设,降低人、物、信息、资金流通的成本。同时减少政府对经济的主体干预,简化和减少行政审批手续,全面推进政务公开和限时办理制度,提高政府办事效率。 请结合本章政府基本职能的有关理论分析此案例,对温州市政府的“有为”与“无为”,你是如何认识和理解的? 案例二 改革开放以来我国政府机构改革的简要回顾 党的十一届三中全会以后,我国进入经济体制改革和对外开放的新时期,与此相适应,政府机构的改革也随之展开。自20世纪80年代以来,我国政府机构分别在1982年、1988年、1993年和1998年进行了四次较大规模的改革。 1982年的政府机构改革,明确规定了各级各部门领导班子的职数、年龄和文化结构,要求减少副职,提高素质。通过这次改革,国务院工作部门由100个减少到61个,同时也精简了大量的领导职数。此次改革加快了干部队伍的年轻化,但没有摆脱就机构论机构,就编制论编制的老框框,没有触动高度集中的计划经济体制,没有实现政府职能的转变。因此,改革后在机构和人员数量上有回潮的现象发生。 1988年的政府机构改革首次提出了转变政府职能的要求,强调政府的经济管理部门要从直接管理为主转变为间接管理为主,强化宏观管理职能,淡化微观管理职能。改革的重点是那些与经济体制改革关系密切的经济管理部门。通过改

《公共管理学原理》作业参考答案

《公共管理学》作业参考答案 一、名词解释 1.治理:治理就是对合作网络的管理,又可称为网络管理或网络治理,指的是为了实现与增进公共利益,政府部门与非政府部门(私营部门、第三部门或公民个人)等众多公共行动主体彼此合作,在相互依存的环境中分享公共权力,共同管理公共事务的过程。 2.公共物品:公共物品指具有消费的非竞争性和非排他性、自然垄断性以及收费困难等特征的物品,公共物品可以从不同角度划分为准公共物品和纯公共物品、全国性的公共物品和地方性公共物品。 3.公共政策:公共政策是由政府或其他权威人士所制定的计划、规划或所采取的行动;公共政策不只是一种孤立的决定,而且是由一系列的活动所构成的过程;公共政策具有明确的目的、目标或方向,并以一定的价值观为基础;公共政策是对全社会的有价值之物所作的权威性分配,即涉及人们的利益关系。 4.公共部门人力资源开发:是指为充分、科学、合理和有效发挥公共部门人力资源,在行使国家行政权力、管理国家和社会公共事务过程中,发挥对社会进步和经济发展的积极作用而进行的资源配置、素质提高、能量利用、开发规划及效益优先等一系列活动相结合的有机整体。 5.管理幅度:指一名上级管理者或一个组织有效管理的下级人员或单位、部门的数目,它是衡量管理工作复杂性的重要标志。 6.组织:指一定的社会环境中,人们通过相互交往而形成的具有共同心理意识,并为了实现某一特定目标而按一定的方式联合起来的有机整体。 7.绩效管理:是利用绩效信息协助设定统一的绩效目标,进行资源配置与优先顺序的安排,以告知管理者维持或改变既定目标计划,并且报告成功符合目标的管理过程。 8.第三部门:指介于政府部门和营利部门之间,依靠会员缴纳的会费、民间捐款或政府财政拨款等非营利性收入从事前两者无力、无法或无意作为的社会公益事业,从而实现服务社会公众、促进社会稳定与发展的宗旨的社会公共部门。 二、填空题 1.(雪城会议)(政策)(商业) 2.(有差异或不同) 3.(公共组织) 4.(结果或产出)(外部取向) 5.(公共组织)(私人组织)(第三部门组织)。 6.(共同目标)(协作愿望)(沟通)。 7.(政府失败或政府失灵)(市场失灵) 8.(等级控制)(网络) 9.(公正)(他律)(自律) 三、简答题 1.简述现代市场经济中的政府行为模式:综观现代市场经济国家在处理政府与市场、企业和社会的关系的实践,可以将政府的行为模式概括为以下五种角色:公共物品的提供者;宏观经济的调控者;外在效应的消除者;收入及财产的再分配者;市场秩序的维护者。 2.试述网络治理的特征:(1)多中心的公共行动体系;(2)反思理性的“复杂人”;(3)合作互惠的行动策

公共管理学作业一

1 . 在1776年撰写《国富论》,论述了对政府角色理解的学者是( A )。 A . 亚当·斯密 B . 凯恩斯 C . 胡德 D . 史蒂文·科恩 2 . 目前我国非政府公共组织的主要活动领域有( ABD )等方面。 A . 环境保护 B . 扶贫救困 C . 公共基础设施的提供

D . 社会公益 3 . 以下哪项不是常见的政策手段?()。 A . 行政手段 B . 经济手段 C . 思想政治手段 D . 文化手段 4 .公共管理者主要是指( ACD )。 A . 政府官员 B . 企业领导

C . 政府公职人员 D . 非政府公共组织的管理人员 5 . 公共管理者的职业能力主要包括( ABCD )方面的能力。 A . 管理认知能力 B . 管理诊断能力 C . 管理决策能力 D . 人际沟通能力 6 .政策的合法化包括政策的( BC )层面的问题。 A . 合理性

B . 合法性 C . 法律化 D . 制度化 7 . 公共管理学是一门研究( C )的学科 A . 公共决策 B . 公共组织维护 C . 公共管理活动规律 D . 公共环境

8 . ( C )是由公共政策制定主体的本质特点决定,也是其阶级性的反映。 A . 目标指向性 B . 权威约束性 C . 功能多极性 D . 利益选择性 9 . ()年,法国科学家()提出建立一门管理国家的科学设想,被认为是行政学产生的胚胎。B A . 1865,斯坦因 B . 1845,安培 C .

1916年,法约尔 D . 1917,卢梭 10 . 本来应当由政府承担的职能,却因没有尽到职责而出现了“真空”现象,我们称其为政府职能的( A )。 A . 缺位 B . 越位 C . 错位 D . 不到位 第 2 大题:简答题 1 . 转型期我国政府职能的定位体现在哪些方面? 转型期我国政府职能的定位是加快转变政府职能,健全政府职责体系,全面正确履行政府职能,努力建设服务型政府。从以下方面转变政府职能:⑴强化公共服务,保证公共产品的供给;⑵强化社会管理,保证社会公平、公正;⑶实行宏观调控,稳定经济发展;⑷加强政府自身建设,提高公共服务质量。

公共管理学作业答案

公共管理学作业1 、简答题 1. 简述公共管理模式的基本特征 社会问题管理与资源管理相统一,重在问题解决上。 结果管理与过程管理相统一,重在结果管理上。 管理所追求的公平与效率相统一,重在公平上。 公共组织的外部管理与内部管理相统一,重在外部管理上。 管理制度与技术相统一,重在制度创新上。 2. 简要说明市场经济国家政府的主要职能。 第一,建立并维护社会和市场秩序。 第二,提供公共物品及基础服务。 第三,调控宏观经济并保持稳定。 第四,进行收入和财产的再分配。 第五,保护自然资源和环境。 3. 非政府公共组织的基本特征和作用是什么? 非政府公共组织的基本特征是(1)非政府性(2)公益性(3)正规性(4)专门 性(5)志愿性。作用:由于非政府公共组织沟通了政府与社会各方面的联系, 架起了政府与社会之间联系的桥梁与纽带,因此非政府公共组织发挥着双重性、 广泛性、针对性、中介性、公益性的作用。 、论述题 1. 论述政府失效理论的主要内容及其给我们的启示。 (1) 公共利益与个人利益相统一,重在公共利益上。 (2) 政府组织与其他公共组织相统一,重在政府组织上。 (6) (7) 服务管理与管制管理相统一,重在服务上。

答:政府失效理论的主要内容:政府失效也称政府失灵,是指政府主体机制等方面有在本质上的缺陷,而无法使资源配置的效率达到最佳的情景。这一理论对人的假设,包括政府公务员,都是经济人假设。由此,这一理论认为在政治决策过程中,人的一切行为都可以看成是经济行为。政府行政过程中的目的肯定是增进公共利益的判断得到质疑。政府失效主要是现在公共政策的失效;公共物品供给 的低效率;内部性和政府扩张性;“寻租”及腐败。 政府失效理论给我们的启示主要有以下三点: 1)单纯依靠市场和过多依靠市场政府干预都是行不通的,必须两者互相制约、协调才能促进市场的健康发展。 2)必须明确界定政府管理的范围、权限,同时积极培育建立社会主义市场,并不断完善社会主义市场经济体制,使市场自身而不是靠政府去发挥作用。 3)在进行经济改革的同时也必须进行政治体制改革,只有这样才能保证济体制改革的顺利进行。 4)加强各项法律、法规的建设,使政府的决策过程和管理过程都能纳入正常的监督系统或机制之中。 2.结合实际谈谈转型时期我国政府的职能应如何转变。 答:所谓政府职能转换并不是简单的加强或削减政府的干预范围或力度,而是指在市场经济体制下政府的工作内容、工作重点、工作方式要有重要的改变。转型 期我国政府职能的转换主要表现在以下几个方面:1、改变管理念,为全社会提供服务。2、改革企业制度,实现政企分开。3、加强法制建设,形成公平竞争的

公共管理学(第2版)_在线作业_1

公共管理学(第2版)_在线作业_1 交卷时间:2016-02-18 16:19:23 一、单选题 1. (5分) ? A. 国企 ? B. 政府 ? C. 事业单位 ? D. 管理机关 得分: 5 知识点: 公共管理学(第2版) 展开解析 答案 B 解析 2. (5分) ? A. 《行 政之研 究》 ? B. 《政治与行政》 ? C. 《行政学导论》 ? D. 《经济与社会》 得分: 5 知识点: 公共管理学(第2版) 展开解析 答案 A 解析 公共管理是以( )为核心的公共部门为实现公共福祉和公共利益而依法运用多种手段对社会公共事务进行有效管理的活动。 从1887年威尔逊发表论文发表( )之后,公共行政学便成为一门独立的学科。

3. (5分) ? A. 《政治科学与公共政策》 ? B. 《政治、经济与社会:美国的政策成果》 ? C. 《政治科学中的政策分析》 ? D. 《政策科学百科全书》 得分: 5 知识点: 公共管理学(第2版) 展开解析 答案 D 解析 4. (5分) ? A. 政府工作的目标 ? B. 教育因素 ? C. 人口因素 ? D. 文化因素 得分: 5 知识点: 公共管理学(第2版) 展开解析 答案 A 解析 5. (5分) ? A. 政策检查评估 ? B. 政策过程评估 ? C. 政策制定评估 ( )为政策科学作为一门相对独立的学科领域奠定了基础。 影响公共部门人力资源管理的内部因素有( )。 政策评估的主要类型有政策效果评估、( )、政策效率评估。

? D. 政策执行评估 得分: 5 知识点: 公共管理学(第2版) 展开解析 答案 D 解析 6. (5分) ? A. 计划性 ? B. 战略性 ? C. 分配性 ? D. 组织性 得分: 5 知识点: 公共管理学(第2版) 展开解析 答案 C 解析 7. (5分) ? A. 特格韦尔(R.G.Tmg well ) ? B. 托马斯·戴伊(Thamas Dye ) ? C. 哈罗德·D·拉斯韦尔(H. https://www.sodocs.net/doc/564442929.html,sswall ) ? D. 艾拉·夏康斯基(Ira Shar kansky) 得分: 5 知识点: 公共管理学(第2版) 展开解析 答案 C 解析 公共政策的功能有导向性功能、调控性功能及( )功能。 1951年,美国政治学家( )主编出版了《政策科学:近来的范畴与方法上的进展》,第一次提出了政策科学的的概念。

公共管理学作业答案

作业一: 1.PDCA循环中P阶段是指(A) A)计划制定阶段B)计划执行阶段C)执行结果检查阶段D)处理阶段 2.与经济手段相比较,行政手段具有的特征是(B ) A)利益性B)无偿性C)间接性D)多样性 3.从历史的观点来分析,公共管理的主要研究途径不包括(C ) A)管理途径B)政治途径C)经济途径D)法律途径 4.公共政策与公共管理的基本属性是(A ) A)公共性B)历史性C)政策引导性D)管理参与性 5.公共政策在现代公共管理中发挥的主要功能不包括(C ) A)行为引导功能B)利益协调与分配功能C)行为限制功能D)调控和规 6.公共管理与工商企业管理的相同之处是(A) A)管理的一般职能B)管理的性质C)管理的使命D)责任的性质 7.公共管理学是公共行政学中的一个分支学科,研究者们由于学科背景等方面的差异,在研究取向上展现出不同的风貌,从而显现出不同的研究途径。美国著名学者波齐曼主张的研究途径是(A) A)公共政策途径和企业管理途径B)管理途径C)政治途径D)法律途径 8.公共管理的核心主体是(B) A)政府组织B)非营利组织C)准政府组织D)事业单位 9.公共组织的本质特征是(D) A)权威性B)独占性C)政治性D)公共性 10.在下列选项中,不属于公共政策问题特征的是(D) A)选择性B)动态性C)时效性D)静态性 11.在消费上,公共物品区别于私人物品的特征的是(C) A)竞争性B)排他性C)自然垄断性D)顾客导向性 12.当事情已经按照它固有的规律运行的时候,领导者就不要再左右它,而是让它按自己的方式进行,这种领导方式属于(D) A)集权型领导方式B)民主型领导方式C)参与型领导方式D)放任型领导方式 13.提出公民的需要就像“顾客”的需要的公共管理理论是( B )

传统节日的调查报告

关于家乡传统节日的调查报告 不同的地方的风俗特色不同,以下是关于我的家乡吉林省辽源市的传统节日——春节的详细调查报告。 春节是我国传统节日,辽源人在庆贺这个节日时,形成了一些较为固定的风俗习惯。春节前夕,始兴人家家户户都忙于打扫环境,清洗器具,拆洗被褥,洒扫庭院,疏浚沟渠,辽源人谓之“除尘”。因“尘”与“陈”谐音,新春扫尘有“除尘布新”的涵义,其用意是要把一切穷运、晦气统统扫出门。过年了,大家都将精选的春联和福字年画张贴在门框、门楣和门板上,将节日装点得红火富丽,寄托人们喜庆祈年的美好愿望。 除夕之夜,各家的老老小小都团聚在一起吃着丰盛的年夜饭,说着一年来的趣事,可谓是其乐融融。有些家庭在除夕之夜还会通宵守夜,以待天明,这叫“守岁”。年初一零时起,家家户户开始鸣响“开门爆竹”,焚香烛祀神,喜迎新年的到来。那天人们早早地起来,穿上漂漂亮亮的新衣服,走亲访友相互拜年。晚辈们祝长辈们长寿安康,长辈们将压岁钱分给晚辈,因“岁”与“祟”谐音,压岁钱可以压住邪祟,晚辈们得到压岁钱就可以平平安安地度过一岁,并以互送年料小叙为乐。 年初二时,如亲戚家去岁有亡者,则要前往拜祭亡灵,谓之“拜新台”。年初三是个特别的日子,谓之“穷鬼日”,是要将初一、初二忌扫之地清扫干净,把垃圾送去郊外焚烧,届时烧香鸣爆竹,谓之“送穷鬼”。年初四是各家宴请亲朋好友,并约请已嫁的姐妹、大姑回娘

家小住。 当然,春节也有严忌的事情,如正月初一不向屋外倒垃圾、泼水,忌进菜园摘菜,这天忌开口骂人,要尽量说吉利话;除夕、春节及大的节日和喜庆日,都忌碗筷掉地;正月初一至十五,忌向他人借款或催贷;新年“出行”,忌有女人在场;正月初五是“五谷神”生日,这天家家不能煮生米,只在前晚煮好夹生饭,第二天早晨蒸熟,黎明时,家家烧香迎接“五谷神”上谷仓,祈求保佑“五谷丰登”。 以上是我的家乡的传统节日——春节的调查报告,体现了我们辽源人的满腔热情与地道的风俗特色。

公共管理学基础必备知识

公共管理学基础必备知识 第一章 1.何谓公共管理?公共管理具有哪些基本特质? 答:公共管理是以政府为核心的公共部门整合社会的各种力量,广泛运用政治的、管理的、法律的方法,强化政府的治理能力,从而达到提升政府绩效和服务品质的目的。 公共管理具有公共性、社会性、管理性。 2.新公共管理的基本内涵及其特征。 答:新公共管理的内涵包括七个要点:①即时的专业管理。②标准明确与绩效衡量。③强调产出控制。④转向部门分权。⑤转向竞争机制。⑥强调运用私营部门的管理风格、方法和实践。⑦强调资源的有效利用。 新公共管理的特征:①采取理性途径的方式处理问题。②重新设计组织结构。 ③改变组织结构。④依据经济、效率、效能等标准来衡量组织成就。⑤改变现行的政策。⑥运用人力资源管理技术。⑦试图建立一种弹性、回应性以及学习的公共组织。⑧以契约关系来取代传统的信托关系。 3.公共管理者应该具备哪些基本的管理技能? 答:①技术性技能。②人际关系技能。③概念化技能。④诊断技能。⑤沟通技能。 4.有效公共管理者应具有哪些基本的特质? 答:①有效的公共管理者必须是一个良好的自我评估者。②有效的公共管理者必须是不令人讨厌的。③有效的公共管理者必须追求美好的意志与周全的政治感觉。④有效的公共管理者必须具有耐心。⑤有效的公共管理者必须具有多样化

的工作经验。⑥有效的公共管理者必须以民众为导向。⑦有效的公共管理者必须擅长于分析与思考。 第二章 1.什么是公共组织?公共组织具有哪些基本的特点? 答:所谓公共组织,从广义上而言,凡是不以盈利为目的,而是以服务社会大众,以提高公共利益为宗旨的组织都可以成为公共组织。从狭义上来看,乃是指行使行政权,达成公共目的的组织。 公共组织的基本特征:①公共组织是以追求公共利益为价值取向。②公共组织的活动受法律法规的限制并具有法律的权威。③公共组织权威的割裂。④公共组织受到高度的公共监督。⑤公共组织间的相互依存性。⑥公共组织的政治因素的考虑。⑦公共组织的目标大多模糊不清且不易测量。⑧公共组织的独占性。⑨公共组织行为具有强制性。 2.什么是公共组织的层级化?层级化的优点是什么? 答:公共组织结构的层级化,即纵向结构。它是指公共组织内部,按上下层级关系有序构成形式。公共组织结构层级化的优点:权力直线分布,权力链清楚,利于政令统一和指挥统一;权力集中,层层节制、上下隶属关系清楚,有利于信息传递和监督;在层级化下,组织目标明确,分工明确,工作程序明确,有利于调动下属和工作人员的积极性。层级化是公共管理效率化的有力保证。 第三章 1.什么是战略管理?战略管理有哪些基本的特征? 答:战略管理可视为管理者有意识的政策选择、发展能力、解释环境,以集中组织的努力,达成目标之行为。也可以被界定为:制定、实施和评价使组织能够达到目标的、跨功能决策的艺术或科学。 战略公理的基本特征:①战略管理是未来导向的。②战略管理着重于较长远的、总体的谋略。③战略管理是一个组织寻求成长和发展机会及识别威胁的过程。

相关主题