毕业论文外文翻译--上市公司的股权结构与公司治理完善 适用于毕业论文外文翻译+中英文

原文题目：《上市公司的股权结构与公司治理完善》

作者：Shanthy Rachagan

原文出处: Journal of Financial Crime Vol. 17 No. 4, 2010 pp. 430-440

上市公司的股权结构与公司治理完善

公司治理是经常被用来解释一个公司的管理，审议并追究其责任。公司治理已成功地得到了市民的关注，因为这对企业和整个社会的经济健康是非常重要的。比较1997/1998年亚洲金融危机和最近的全球金融危机，这可以观察到最近企业和社会的利益已经得到明显的好转。

企业管治问题迈向更大改善依然依赖于全球资本市场的全球化。我们普遍认为，全球移动通信公司将资金投入，这是有利于企业管理和促使股东权益最大化，同时时公司治理最佳做法。此外，公司治理中，重要的是增强投资者的信心，特别是在新兴经济体里。这必须通过适当的监测保证，才能将这个过程做到位。

在公司发展中，治理过应有较高信心，对未来有所期望，努力在上市公司的投资界（PLC）公开自己发展，以确保企业行为适当。重点是更多地自我调节，而不是制度。

公司治理机制的管理要有监督机构，以产生更有效的管理，并提高股东价值的目的。它也是在提高经济效率的关键因素，涉及一间公司的管理层，董事会，股东关系的集合，其他利益相关者。

公司治理机制的成功实施，需要公司以平衡管理的冒险性和商业能力来负责监测和制定政策的程序，使管理的行动配合股东和社会的利益。

大股东或控股股东对公司业务具有一定控制力和影响对，并有强大的动力，因为公司的资源使用他们只承担总成本的一小部分。有人说，如果不警惕监督，大股东很容易利用少数股东财富（Faccio和Lang，2002）。曾经有大型集中的股东通过特别分红中提取私人租金（DeAngelo等，2000），而Claessens等人（2000）指出：大股东可以集中征收少数股东财富通过过度补偿方案及与相关方进行交易（RPTs）。

本文的重点是在多种所有制结构看，尤其是控股股东的系统，其对公司治理的影响。本文将继续集中审议股东PLC的代理问题结合马来西亚的PLC具体情况。该文件将总结建议解决办法，克服集中股权公开上市公司这些机构的问题。

从最近的研究可以看出，保护少数股东在发达国家和新兴市场的水平是不同的，这取决于它是否是分散或集中所有权股份。

Coffee(2001)所界定的股权分散和集中的所有权如下：分散的股权制度，强劲的证券市场，严格的信息披露标准，高度透明的市场，其中公司控股市场构成了最终的纪律处分机制；

集中股权制度，其特点通过控制块持有人，疲软的证券市场，控股收益高的个人，低披露和市场透明度的标准表现出，只有市场对公司控制权发挥适度的作用，但大银行有可能扮演代替性的监察角色。

伯利和米恩斯理论中（1932年），美国呼吁关注企业的广泛持有率，但这种资本所有权是分散的小股东之间，其主要控制权集中在经理手中（鲍莫尔，1959;彭罗斯，1959；马里斯，1964）。然而，近年来，一些研究已经开始质疑这个理论。Shleifer和Vishny（1986）和德姆塞茨（1983）显示，即使在美国最大的公司，依然需要有一个适度集中的股权结构。Thillainathan（1999）指出，在发展中国家如马来西亚的经济，股权是也高度集中的。

Claessens等人在他们的研究（2002年）发现，在马来西亚，十大家族控制占总市值的百分之25。Zulkafli等（2005年）发现，1998年12月，在布尔萨马来西亚五大股东持股总额为百分之58.84，而这已在近期略有下降。进行这项研究在2006年和2007年报告的谭谈（2007年）发现，在马来西亚150强上市公司的五大股东的平均浓度为百分之54.85。

如前所述，马来西亚是集中的股权结构。因此，本文将在集中审议股权。当有一个大股东持有的股份谁大块，第三人可以选择做，才考虑作出的要约，非控股股东与该公司的大股东协议。这将导致第三人之间的非控股股东，因为控股股东将出售该公司的控制权交给第三方，让第三方“利益”的公司或可能会选择谁不承认代理问题少数股东权（Hannsmann和卡拉克曼，2004）。

当第三方作出的要约收购一家公司，有一个控股股东，小股东和管理层将无法实行的决定权，因为大股东将决定是否出售该公司或没有。如果在一个公平的退出战略是要为所有股东提供更多的专门规则，因为公司将需要法律并不包括这些事宜，以及一般公司法律并没有作出大股东强制分享决策权当有与非少数人控制销售销售。该法律还没有使其成为控股股东在收购少数股权以同样的速度由第

三方（Hannsmann和卡拉克曼，2004，[4]）提供强制性的。

在PLC的大量涌入，机构投资者，基金经理，保险公司和其他非投资者股票投资组合管理的储户代表。关于透明度的建议和股东的权力，从根本上控制其权力负责，勤奋，积极地行使这些信托投资依赖。新的规则，以加强对权力的机构投资者应引入。

更强的企业经营者报酬与业绩之间的联系出现问题，因为对股东利益的调整和管理的缺乏。为了使这些利益更加一致，有相当一部分企业经营者报酬应与所创造的价值管理。此外，对管理者的奖励，可能是基于相对业绩，而不是绝对的。

最后，我想重申，良好的公司治理是实现经济稳定和在发达国家和发展中经济体增长：最重要的一点是，良好的企业管治是一个实效的援助。它不存在束缚，而是利用企业在其目标（阿德里安吉百利）实现它。

马来西亚似乎专门对促进良好的公司治理制度和实践的发展。事实上，相当大的进展已经取得的成果。然而，正如所见，即使是在最先进的经济体系，有迹象表明，一些市场的发展已超过了公司治理制度和实践的发展。在一个不断变化的世界，已经不是什么新鲜事，金融决策者，监事和监管机构一直试图追赶市场的演变注册。

公司治理制度和做法，应不断开发出跟上市场的变化了。经合组织于1999年纸（特设工作组的企业管治，1999年）恰当地说，它是这样的：如果一些国家要获得全球资本市场充分受益，如果他们要吸引长期的资本，公司治理安排必须是可信的和跨越国界的良好理解。即使企业不依赖外国资本来源，坚持良好的公司治理做法严重将有助于改善国内投资者的信心，可降低资金成本，并最终导致更稳定的资金来源。

Enhancing corporate governance in listed companies with

concentrated shareholdings

Shanthy Rachagan (2010)

Originally Published in Journal of Financial Crime Vol. 17 No. 4, 2010 pp. 430-440

III. corporate governance concentrated shareholdings

Corporate governance is a term often used to explain the way a company is

managed, scrutinised and held accountable. Corporate governance has succeeded in attracting a good deal of public interest in the recent past because of its apparent importance for the economic health of corporations and society in general. This can be observed from the 1997/1998 Asian financial crises and the more recent global financial crises.

The movement towards greater scrutiny of corporate governance issues has also been developed worldwide in response to the globalisation of capital markets. It is widely believed that mobile global capital will be invested in corporations, which are well managed and best maximise long-term shareholder interests while following corporate governance best practices. Further, it is important that corporate governance processes are revealed so that investor confidence is enhanced, especially in emerging economies. This has to be done by assurance that appropriate monitoring occurs and procedures are in place

The development of increased interest in corporate governance reflects higher expectations by the investment community for greater effort by public-listed companies (PLCs) to develop their own procedures to ensure appropriate standards of corporate behaviour. The emphasis seems to be more to self-regulation rather than legislation..

Corporate governance mechanisms have the purpose of monitoring the management of corporations so as to result in more effective management and to enhance shareholder value. It is also said to be a key element in improving economic efficiency and involves a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders

The successful implementation of corporate governance mechanisms enables a corporation to balance the need for managerial risk-taking and commercial abilities with procedures for monitoring and setting policy so that the actions of management match with the interests of shareholders and the community.

Large or controlling shareholders generally have substantial control and influence over company matters and have powerful incentives to use company resources since they bear only a fraction of the total cost. It has been suggested that without vigilant oversight, large shareholders are prone to exploit minority shareholders wealth (Faccio and Lang, 2002). It has also been documented that large concentrated shareholders extract private rents through special dividends (DeAngelo et al., 2000), while Claessens et al. (2000) note that large concentrated shareholders can expropriate minority shareholders wealth through excessive compensation

schemes and related party transactions (RPTs).

The focus of this paper is to look at diverse ownership structures, especially the controlling shareholder system, and their impact on corporate governance. The paper will then go on to deliberate the agency problems in concentrated shareholder PLCs in general and Malaysian PLCs specifically. The paper will then conclude by suggesting solutions to overcome these agency problems in concentrated shareholding public-listed

companies.

It can be seen from recent research that minority shareholder protection is at different levels in developed and emerging markets and depending on whether it is dispersed or concentrated ownership of shares.

Coffee (2001) defined dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership as follows:

A dispersed ownership system, characterized by strong securities markets,rigorous disclosure standards, and high market transparency, in which the market for corporate control constitutes the ultimate disciplinary mechanism;and

A concentrated ownership system, characterized by controlling block holders, weak securities markets, high private benefits of control, and low disclosure and market transparency standards, with only a modest role played by the market for corporate control, but with a possibly substitutionary monitoring role played by large banks.

In Berle and Means (1932), called attention to the prevalence of widely held corporations in the USA, in which ownership of capital was dispersed between small shareholders, yet control was concentrated in the hands of managers (Baumol, 1959; Penrose, 1959; Marris, 1964). However, in recent years, several studies have begun to question this theory. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Demsetz (1983) have shown that even in the largest American companies, there is a modest concentration of ownership. Thillainathan (1999) says that in developing economies like Malaysia, ownership is also heavily concentrated.

Claessens et al. (2002) in their research found that in Malaysia, the top ten families control about 25 percent of the total market capitalization. Zulkafli et al. (2005) found that total shareholding of the five largest shareholders in Bursa Malaysia at December 1998 was 58.84 percent, a figure which has decreased slightly in recent times. The study conducted in 2006 and reported in 2007 by Tam and Tan (2007) found the average concentration of the five largest shareholders in the top 150

Malaysian-listed companies is 54.85 percent.

As stated earlier, Malaysia has concentrated shareholding. Therefore, the deliberation in this paper will be on concentrated shareholding. When there is a majority shareholder who holds a large block of shares, the third party may choose to make an agreement with that majority shareholder before considering making an offer to the non-controlling shareholders. This would cause agency problems between the third party and the non-controlling shareholders because the controlling shareholders would be selling control of the company to the third party, allowing the third party to “benefit” from the company or who may choose not to recognize the rights of the minority shareholders (Hannsmann and Kraakman, 2004).

When a third party makes an offer to acquire a company that has a controlling shareholder, the minority shareholders and the management would not be able to practice its decision rights because the majority shareholder would decide whether to sell the company or not. In the event that a fair exit strategy is to be provided for all shareholders, more specialized rules would be required because company law does not encompass these matters, and the general company law does not make it compulsory for the majority shareholders to share the decision rights when there is a sale of control with the non-selling minority. The law also does not make it mandatory for controlling shareholders to buy out minority shareholdings at the same rate as offered by the third party (Hannsmann and Kraakman, 2004).

The large number of PLCs has institutional investors, fund managers, insurance companies, and other discretionary investors managing portfolios of shares on behalf of savers. The proposals on transparency and the controlling powers of shareholders are fundamentally dependent on the responsible, diligent, and active exercise of their powers by these fiduciary investors. New rules to strengthen the powers of institutional investors should be introduced.

Stronger link between managerial compensation to performance Problems arise because of lack of alignment of the interests of shareholders and management. To make these interests more congruent, a significant portion of managerial compensation should be linked to the value created by the management. Further, the rewards to the managers may be based on relative performance, rather than absolute performance.

In conclusion, I would like to restate that good corporate governance is essential to economic stability and growth in developed and developing economies: The essential point is that good corporate governance is an aid to effectiveness. It is not

there to shackle enterprise but to harness it in the achievement of its goals (Adrian Cadbury).

Malaysia seems dedicated towards promoting the development of sound corporate governance systems and practices. Indeed, considerable progress already has been achieved. Yet, as seen, even in the most advanced economies, there have been signs that some developments in markets have outpaced the development of corporate governance systems and practices. In an ever-changing world, this is nothing new, financial policy makers, supervisors, and regulators are always trying to catch up with the evolution of markets.

Malaysia’s corporate governance systems and practices should be constantly developed to keep up with the evolution of markets. The OECD paper in 1999 (Ad Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance, 1999) aptly stated it this way: If countries are to reap the full benefit of the global capital market, and if they are to attract long-term “patient” capital, corporate governance arrangements must be credible and well understood across borders. Even if corporations do not rely heavily on foreign sources of capital, adherence to good corporate governance practices will help improve the confidence of domestic investors, may reduce the cost of capital and ultimately induce more stable sources of financing.