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agency theory代理理论粗略翻译

Agency theory has been used by scholars in accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science, organizational behavior, and sociology. Yet, it is still surrounded by controversy. Its proponents argue that a revolution is at hand and that "the foundation for a powerful theory of organizations is being put into place". Its detractors call it trivial, dehumanizing, and even "dangerous".

代理理论已被学者用于在会计,经济,金融,市场营销学,政治学,组织行为学和社会学。然而,它仍然被争议包围。它的支持者争辩说,革命就在眼前,而且“一个强大的组织理论的基础正在落实到位”(詹森,1983年,第324页)。它的批评者称之为琐碎,非人性化,甚至是“危险的”。

Which is it: grand theory or great sham? The purposes of this paper are to describe agency theory and to indicate ways in which organizational researchers can use its insights. The paper is organized around four questions that are germane to organizational research. The first asks the deceptively simple question, What is agency theory? Often, the technical style, mathematics, and tautological reasoning of the agency literature can obscure the theory. Moreover, the agency literature is split into two camps (Jensen, 1983), leading to differences in interpretation. For example, Barney and Ouchi (1986) argued that agency theory emphasizes how capital markets can affect the firm, whereas other authors made no reference to capital markets at all (Anderson, 1985; Demski & Feltham, 1978; Eccles, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985).

这是它:宏大理论或大假?本文的目的是描述代理理论,并指出如何使组织的研究人员可以使用它的见解。本文是围绕四个问题是有密切关系的组织研究。第一问的看似简单的问题,什么是代理理论?通常情况下,技术风格,数学和文学社的同义反复的推理可以掩盖的理论。此外,该机构的文献被分为两大阵营(詹森,1983),从而导致不同解释。例如,Barney和大内(1986)认为,代理理论强调怎样的资本市场能够影响企业,而其他作者所有(安德森,1985未提及资本市场; Demski&费尔塔姆,1978;埃克尔斯,1985;艾森哈特,1985)。

The second question is, What does agency theory contribute to organizational theory? Proponents such as Ross (1973, p. 134) argued that "examples of agency are universal." Yet other scholars such as Perrow (1986) claimed that agency theory addresses no clear problems, and Hirsch and Friedman (1986) called it excessively narrow, focusing only on stock price. For economists, long accustomed to treating the organization as a "black box" in the theory of the firm, agency theory may be revolutionary. Yet, for organizational scholars the worth of agency theory is not so obvious.

第二个问题是,什么是代理理论有助于组织理论?支持者如罗斯(1973年,第134页)认为,“代理的例子是通用的。”然而,其他学者如佩罗(1986)声称,代理理论的地址不明确的问题,赫希和Friedman(1986)称之为过于狭窄,只关注股票价格。对于经济学家,早就习惯了处理组织中的企业理论的“黑盒子”,代理理论可能是革命性的。然而,对于组织学者代理理论的价值就不那么明显了。

The third question is, Is agency theory empirically valid? The power of the empirical research on agency theory to explain organizational phenomena is important to assess, particularly in light of the criticism that agency theory is "hardly subject to empirical test since it rarely tries to explain actual events" (Perrow, 1986, p. 224). Perrow (1986) also criticized the theory for being unrealistically one-sided because of its neglect of potential exploitation of workers.

第三个问题是,是代理理论实证有效的?在代理理论的实证研究来解释组织现象的力量是重要的评估,特别是在光的批评,代理理论是“很难受实证检验,因为它很少试图解释实际事件”(佩罗,1986年,页。224)。佩罗(1986)也批评理论为是因为工人的潜在剥削其忽视不切实际的片面。

The final question is, What topics and contexts are fruitful for organizational researchers who use agency theory? Identifying how useful agency theory can be to organizational scholars requires

understanding the situations in which the agency perspective can provide theoretical leverage.

最后一个问题是,什么主题和上下文是富有成效的人谁使用代理理论组织研究人员?如何识别有用的代理理论可以是组织学者需要了解在该机构的角度可以提供理论上的杠杆作用的情况。

The principal contributions of the paper are to present testable propositions, identify contributions of the theory to organizational thinking, and evaluate the extant empirical literature. The overall conclusion is that agency theory is a useful addition to organizational theory. The agency theory ideas on risk, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and information systems are novel contributions to organizational thinking, and the empirical evidence is supportive of the theory, particularly when coupled with complementary theoretical perspectives.

本文的主要贡献是提出可检验的命题,找准理论来组织思想的贡献,并评估现存的实证研究。总的结论是,代理理论是一个有益的补充组织理论。代理理论观点上的风险,结果的不确定性,激励机制和信息系统对组织思维新颖的贡献,而经验证据支持的理论,加上互补的理论观点时尤为如此。

Origins of Agency Theory代理理论的起源

During the 1960s and early 1970s, economists explored risk sharing among individuals or groups (e.g., Arrow, 1971; Wilson, 1968). This literature described the risk-sharing problem as one that arises when cooperating parties have different attitudes toward risk. Agency theory broadened this risk-sharing literature to include the so-called agency problem that occurs when cooperating parties have different goals and division of labor (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). Specifically, agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the principal) delegates work to an- other (the agent), who performs that work. Agency theory attempts to describe this relationship using the metaphor of a contract (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 在20世纪60年代和70年代初,经济学家探讨个人或群体之间的风险分担(例如,箭头,1971年威尔逊,1968)。该文献中描述的风险分担问题,因为一个出现时合作方有对风险的不同态度。代理理论扩大了这种风险分担的文献,包括在合作各方有不同的目标和分工发生了所谓的代理问题(詹森和麦克林,1976;罗斯,1973)。具体来说,代理理论是冲着无处不在代理关系,其中一方(委托人)委托工作的,其他(代理),谁执行这项工作。代理理论试图使用合同(詹森和麦克林,1976)的比喻来形容这种关系。

Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences.

代理理论关注与解决,可以发生在代理关系的两个问题。首先是机构问题出现时,(一)委托人和代理人的冲突及(b)就很难或昂贵的主体来验证一下代理实际上是这样做的愿望或目标。这里的问题是,委托人不能确认代理已经表现得恰如其分。二是风险分担的出现时,委托人和代理人都对风险的不同态度的问题。这里的问题是,委托人和受托人可能更喜欢,因为不同风险偏好的不同的动作。

Because the unit of analysis is the contract governing the relationship between the principal and the agent, the focus of the theory is on determining the most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship given assumptions about people (e.g., self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion), organizations (e.g., goal conflict among members), and information (e.g., information is a commodity which can be purchased). Specifically, the question becomes, Is a behavior-oriented contract (e.g., salaries, hierarchical governance) more efficient than an outcome-oriented contract (e.g., commissions, stock options, transfer of property rights, market

governance)? An overview of agency theory is given in Table 1.

因为分析的单位是管理委托人和代理人之间的关系的合同,该理论的重点是确定监管提供了有关人士(如自身利益,有限理性假设的委托- 代理关系的最有效的合同,风险厌恶),组织(成员之间如目标冲突),信息(例如,信息是一种商品,可以购买)。具体来说,问题就变成,是一个行为导向的合同(例如,工资,分层治理)比以成果为导向的合同更有效率(如佣金,股票期权,产权转让,市场治理)?代理理论的概述示于表1。

The agency structure is applicable in a variety of settings, ranging from macrolevel issues such as regulatory policy to microlevel dyad phenomena such as blame, impression management, lying, and other expressions of self-interest. Most frequently, agency theory has been applied to organizational phenomena such as compensation (e.g., Conlon & Parks, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1985), acquisition and diversification strategies (e.g., Amihud & Lev, 1981), board relationships (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Kosnik, 1987), ownership and financing structures (e.g., Argawal & Mandelker, 1987; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), vertical integration (Ander- son, 1985; Eccles, 1985), and innovation (Bolton, 1988; Zenger, 1988). Overall, the domain of agency theory is relationships that mirror the basic agency structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative behavior, but have differing goals and differing attitudes toward risk.

该机构结构适用于各种环境,从宏观层面的问题,如监管政策,微观对子现象,如怪,印象管理,卧,和自身利益的其他表情。最常见的,代理理论已被应用到组织现象,如补偿(例如,康伦和公园,1988;艾森哈特,1985),收购和多元化战略(例如,Amihud&列弗,1981),董事会的关系(例如,法玛和詹森,1983; Kosnik,1987),所有权和融资结构(例如,Argawal&Mandelker,1987;詹森和麦克林,1976),垂直整合(安德儿子,1985;埃克尔斯,1985),创新(博尔顿,1988;曾格,1988)。总体而言,代理理论的域名是反映一个主体和一个代理谁从事合作行为的基本机构的结构,但具有不同的目标和对风险的不同态度的关系Agency Theory

From its roots in information economics, agency theory has developed along two lines: positivist and principal-agent (Jensen, 1983). The two streams share a common unit of analysis: the contract between the principal and the agent. They also share common assumptions about people, organizations, and information. However, they differ in their mathematical rigor, dependent variable, and style.

从它在信息经济学根源,代理理论是沿着两条线发展。实证主义和委托代理(詹森,1983)两个流共享分析的常用单位:委托人和代理人之间的合同。他们还共享关于个人,组织和信息共同假设。然而,他们在数学的严谨性,因变量和样式不同。

Positivist Agency Theory

Positivist researchers have focused on identifying situations in which the principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describing the governance mechanisms that limit the agent's self-serving behavior. Positivist re- search is less mathematical than principal-agent research. Also, positivist researchers have focused almost exclusively on the special case of the principal-agent relationship between owners and managers of large, public corporations (Berle & Means, 1932).

实证研究都集中在识别在哪些情况下委托人和代理人可能有相互冲突的目标,然后描述,限制了代理人的利己行为的治理机制。实证重新搜索比委托代理研究较少的数学。此外,实证研究人员已经几乎全部集中在大型,公共机构(伯利和米恩斯,1932)的所有者和经营者之间的委托代理关系的特殊情况。

Three articles have been particularly influential. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explored the ownership structure of the corporation, including how equity ownership by managers aligns managers' interests with those of owners. Fama (1980) discussed the role of efficient capital and

labor markets as information mechanisms that are used to control the self-serving behavior of top executives. Fama and Jensen (1983) described the role of the board of directors as an information system that the stockholders within large corporations could use to monitor the op- portunism of top executives. Jensen and his col- leagues (Jensen, 1984; Jensen & Roeback, 1983) extended these ideas to controversial practices, such as golden parachutes and corporate raiding.

三篇文章都特别有影响力。詹森和麦克林(1976)探讨了公司的所有权结构,包括如何拥有股权由经理对齐管理者与所有者的利益。法玛(1980)讨论了作为用于控制的高层管理人员的利己行为的信息机制,有效的资本和劳动力市场的作用。法玛和詹森(1983)描述为大型企业内部的股东可以用它来监测运算portunism的高管信息系统董事会的作用。Jensen和他的同事联赛(詹森,1984;詹森和Roeback,1983)扩展了这些想法有争议的做法,如金色降落伞和企业扫荡。

From a theoretical perspective, the positivist stream has been most concerned with describing the governance mechanisms that solve the agency problem. Jensen (1983, p. 326) described this interest as "why certain contractual relations arise." Two propositions capture the governance mechanisms which are identified in the positivist stream. One proposition is that outcome-based contracts are effective in curbing agent opportunism. The argument is that such contracts coalign the preferences of agents with those of the principal because the rewards for both depend on the same actions, and, there- fore, the conflicts of self-interest between principal and agent are reduced. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) described how increasing the firm ownership of the managers decreases managerial opportunism. In formal terms,

从理论的角度,实证流一直最关心的描述是解决代理问题的治理机制。詹森(1983年,第326页)这说明利益,“为什么某些合同关系产生的。”两个命题捕捉它们在实证数据流中确定的治理机制。一个命题是基于成果的合同是有效遏制代理人的机会主义。的说法是,这种合同coalign与这些主要代理的喜好,因为无论是奖励依赖于相同的动作,并有上脱颖而出,委托人与代理人之间的自我利益的冲突就会减少。例如,詹森和麦克林(1976)介绍了如何提高管理者的企业所有权降低管理机会主义。在正式条款Proposition 1: When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal.

命题1:当委托人与代理人之间的合同是一个基于成果,代理更可能表现在委托人的利益。

The second proposition is that information systems also curb agent opportunism. The argument here is that, since information systems inform the principal about what the agent is actually doing, they are likely to curb agent opportunism because the agent will realize that he or she cannot deceive the principal. For example, Fama (1980) described the information effects of efficient capital and labor markets on managerial opportunism, and Fama and Jensen (1983) described the information role that boards of directors play in controlling managerial behavior. In formal terms, 第二个命题是,信息系统也遏制代理人的机会主义。这里的论点是,由于信息系统的通知校长关于什么的代理实际上是干什么的,他们很可能会遏制代理人机会主义因为代理会意识到他或她不能欺骗主事人。例如,法玛(1980)描述了管理上的机会主义有效的资本市场和劳动力市场信息的影响,法玛和詹森(1983)描述的信息的作用是董事局的控制管理行为发挥。在正式条款,Proposition 2: When the principal has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the principal.

命题2:当主要有信息来验证代理行为,代理更可能表现在委托人的利益。

At its best, positivist agency theory can be regarded as enriching economics by offering a more complex view of organizations (Jensen, 1983). However, it has been criticized by organizational theorists as minimalist (Hirsch, Michaels, & Friedman, 1987; Perrow, 1986) and by microeconomists as tautological and lacking rigor (Jensen, 1983). Nonetheless, positivist agency

theory has ignited considerable research (Barney & Ouchi, 1986) and popular interest ("Meet Mike," 1988).

在其最好的,实证代理理论可以看作是通过提供组织(詹森,1983)更复杂的视图富民经济。然而,它已被批评组织理论家简约(赫希,迈克尔,与弗里德曼,1987;佩罗,1986)和微观经济学家的同义反复,缺乏严谨性(詹森,1983)。然而,实证代理理论闹得沸沸扬扬相当重新搜索(巴尼和藕池,1986)和流行的权益(“相约迈克,”1988)

Principal-Agent Research委托代理研究

Principal-agent researchers are concerned with a general theory of the principal-agent relationship, a theory that can be applied to employer-employee, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier, and other agency relationships (Harris & Raviv, 1978). Characteristic of formal theory, the principal-agent paradigm involves careful specification of assumptions, which are followed by logical deduction and mathematical proof.

委托代理的研究人员所关心的的委托- 代理关系的一般理论,可以应用于雇主与雇员,律师与委托人,买方与供应商理论,和其他机构的关系(哈里斯和拉维夫,1978)。形式理论的特征,委托代理模式包括仔细规范的假设,这之后是逻辑推理和数学证明

In comparison with the positivist stream, principal-agent theory is abstract and mathematical and, therefore, less accessible to organizational scholars. Indeed, the most vocal critics of the theory (Perrow, 1986; Hirsch et al., 1987) have focused their attacks primarily on the more widely known positivist stream. Also, the principal-agent stream has a broader focus and greater interest in general, theoretical implications. In contrast, the positivist writers have focused almost exclusively on the special case of the owner/CEO relationship in the large corporation. Finally, principal-agent research includes many more testable implications.

与实证流相比,委托代理理论是抽象的,数学的,因此,较少接触到组织的学者。事实上,这个理论的最强烈批评(佩罗,1986;。Hirsch等,1987)主要集中于更广为人知的实证流他们的攻击。此外,委托代理流具有更广泛的关注,并在一般情况下,理论意义更大的兴趣。与此相反,实证作家们几乎全部集中在大公司的老板/ CEO关系的特殊情况。最后,委托代理研究包括更多的可测试性的影响。

For organizational scholars, these differences provide background for understanding criticism of the theory. However, they are not crucial. Rather, the important point is that the two streams are complementary: Positivist theory identifies various contract alternatives, and principal-agent theory indicates which contract is the most efficient under varying levels of out-come uncertainty, risk aversion, information, and other variables described below.

对于组织的学者,这些差异对理解理论的批判提供了背景。然而,它们并不重要。相反,重要的一点是,这两个数据流是互补的:实证理论确定各种合同的替代品,并委托- 代理理论表明该合同是最有效的在不同的门诊来的不确定性,风险厌恶情绪,信息和描述的其他因素的水平下文。

The focus of the principal-agent literature is on determining the optimal contract, behavior versus outcome, between the principal and the agent. The simple model assumes goal conflict between principal and agent, an easily measured outcome, and an agent who is more risk averse than the principal. (Note: The argument behind a more risk averse agent is that agents, who are unable to diversify their employment, should be risk averse and principals, who are capable of diversifying their investments, should be risk neutral.) The approach of the simple model can be described in terms of cases (e.g., Demski & Feltham, 1978). The first case, a simple case of complete information, is when the principal knows what the agent has done. Given that the principal is buying the agent's behavior, then a contract that is based on be- havior is most efficient. An outcome-based contract would needlessly transfer risk to the agent, who is assumed to be more

risk averse than the principal.

委托代理文学的重点是确定最优契约,行为与结果,委托人和代理人之间。简单的模型假定委托人和代理人,一个容易测量结果,并代理谁更厌恶风险比委托人之间的目标冲突。(注:后面更多的风险规避者的论点是,代理人,谁不能分散他们的就业,应该是风险规避和校长,谁能够分散他们的投资,应该是风险中性的)的简单模型的方法可以的情况下(例如,Demski&费尔塔姆,1978)来描述。第一种情况下,完整的信息,一个简单的例子,就是当校长知道代理人已经完成。鉴于主要是购买代理的行为,则是基于行为的一个合同是最有效的。以结果为基础的合同将不必要的风险转移给代理,谁被认为是更厌恶风险比本金。

The second case is when the principal does not know exactly what the agent has done. Given the self-interest of the agent, the agent may or may not have behaved as agreed. The agency problem arises because (a) the principal and the agent have different goals and (b) the principal cannot determine if the agent has behaved appropriately. In the formal literature, two aspects of the agency problem are cited. Moral hazard refers to lack of effort on the part of the agent. The argument here is that the agent may simply not put forth the agreed-upon effort. That is, the agent is shirking. For example, moral hazard occurs when a research scientist works on a personal research project on company time, but the research is so complex that corporate management cannot detect what the scientist is actually doing. Adverse selection refers to the misrepresentation of ability by the agent. The argument here is that the agent may claim to have certain skills or abilities when he or she is hired. Adverse selection arises because the principal cannot completely verify these skills or abilities either at the time of hiring or while the agent is working. For example, adverse selection occurs when a research scientist claims to have experience in a scientific specialty and the employer cannot judge whether this is the case.

第二种情况是当校长不知道到底是什么代理做了。由于代理的自身利益,代理人可能会或可能不会表现为一致。代理问题的产生是因为(一)委托人和代理人具有不同的目标和(二)委托人不能确定是否代理已表现得恰如其分。在正式文献,代理问题的两个方面的引用。道德风险是指缺乏对代理的部分努力。这里的论点是,代理可能根本就没有提出商定的努力。也就是说,代理人是在推卸。例如,发生道德风险,当一个科学家工作在公司的时间是个人研究项目,但研究是如此复杂,企业管理无法检测哪些科学家正在做。逆向选择是指由代理能力的失实陈述。这里的论点是,代理人可以要求有一定的技能或能力时,他或她被雇佣。逆向选择的产生是由于委托人不能完全证实这些技能或能力无论是在招聘时或代理人工作时。例如,逆向选择当一名研究科学家声称在科学的专业和用人单位的经验无法判断这是否是这种情况发生。

In the case of unobservable behavior (due to moral hazard or adverse selection), the principal has two options. One is to discover the agent's behavior by investing in information systems such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures, boards of directors, and additional layers of management. Such investments reveal the agent's behavior to the principal, and the situation reverts to the complete information case. In formal terms,

Proposition 3: Information systems are positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts.

在无法观察的行为(由于道德风险和逆向选择)的情况下,主要有两种选择。一是通过投资,如预算编制制度,报告程序,董事会,管理层和其他层面的信息系统来发现代理的行为。这样的投资显示了代理的行为本金,情况恢复到完整的信息的情况下。在正式条款,

命题3:信息系统是正相关的行为为基础的合同,并以成果为基础的合同负相关。

The other option is to contract on the outcomes of the agent's behavior. Such an outcome-based contract motivates behavior by coalignment of the agent's preferences with those of the principal, but at the price of transferring risk to the agent. The issue of risk arises because outcomes are only

partly a function of behaviors. Government policies, economic climate, competitor actions, technological change, and so on, may cause uncontrollable variations in outcomes. The resulting outcome uncertainty introduces not only the inability to preplan, but also risk that must be borne by someone. When outcome uncertainty is low, the costs of shifting risk to the agent are low and outcome-based contracts are attractive. However, as uncertainty increases, it becomes increasingly expensive to shift risk despite the motivational benefits of outcome-based contracts. In formal terms,

Proposition 4: Outcome uncertainty is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts.

另一种选择是合同上的代理行为的结果。这样的结果,基于合同行为的动机被代理人的喜好与那些主要的coalignment ,但在把风险转移给代理的价格。风险的问题的产生是因为结果是只有部分的行为的函数。政府的政策,经济环境,竞争对手的行动,技术变革,等等,可能会导致结果的不可控的变化。由此产生的结果的不确定性引入不仅无法预案,但风险也必须由人来承担。当结果的不确定性低,转移风险的代理成本低,成果为基础的合同是有吸引力的。然而,由于不确定性的增加,它变得越来越昂贵,尽管成果为基础的合同的激励效益转移风险。在正式条款,

命题4 :结果不确定度是正相关,基于行为的合同和以成果为基础的合同负相关

This simple agency model has been described in varying ways by many authors (e.g., Demski & Feltham, 1978; Harris & Raviv, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 1979). However, the heart of principal-agent theory is the trade-off between (a) the cost of measuring behavior and (b) the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent.

这个简单的代理模式已经以不同的方式被描述的许多学者(例如,Demski &费尔塔姆,1978 ;哈里斯和拉维夫,1979;霍姆斯特罗姆,1979;沙维尔,1979)。然而,委托- 代理理论的心脏是衡量行为(一)成本和测量结果,并把风险转移给代理(二)成本之间的权衡。

A number of extensions to this simple model are possible. One is to relax the assumption of a risk-averse agent (e.g., Harris & Raviv, 1979). Research (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986) indicates that individuals vary widely in their risk attitudes. As the agent becomes increasingly less risk averse (e.g., a wealthy agent), it becomes more attractive to pass risk to the agent using an outcome-based contract. Conversely, as the agent becomes more risk averse, it is increasingly expensive to pass risk to the agent. In formal terms,

Proposition 5: The risk aversion of the agent is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts.

许多扩展到这个简单的模型是可能的。一是放宽规避风险的代理人(例如,哈里斯和拉维夫,1979)的假设。研究(MacCrimmon &Wehrung ,1986)表明,个体差异很大风险的态度。为展开剂变得越来越少风险规避(例如,一个富裕剂),它变得更具吸引力使用基于结果的合同风险传递给代理。相反,随着代理变得更厌恶风险,这是越来越昂贵传递风险的代理权。在正式条款,

命题5 :代理的风险厌恶情绪正相关,基于行为的合同和以成果为基础的合同负相关。

Similarly, as the principal becomes more risk averse, it is increasingly attractive to pass risk to

the agent. In formal terms,

Proposition 6: The risk aversion of the principal is negatively related to behavior-based contracts and positively related to outcome- based contracts.

同样,作为主要变得更加厌恶风险,这是越来越有吸引力的传递风险

该代理。在正式条款,

命题6 :主要的避险情绪负相关行为为基础的合同,并正相关成果为基础的合同。

Another extension is to relax the assumption of goal conflict between the principal and agent (e.g.,

Demski, 1980). This might occur either in a highly socialized or clan-oriented firm (Ouchi, 1979) or in situations in which self-interest gives way to selfless behavior (Perrow, 1986). If there is no goal conflict, the agent will behave as the principal would like, regardless of whether his or her behavior is monitored. As goal conflict decreases, there is a decreasing motivational imperative for outcome-based contracting, and the issue reduces to risk-sharing considerations. Under the assumption of a risk-averse agent, behavior-based contracts become more attractive. In formal terms,

Proposition 7: The goal conflict between principal and agent is negatively related to behavior- based contracts and positively related to out- come-based contracts.

另一个扩展是放松的委托人和代理人(如Demski,1980)之间的目标冲突的假设。这可能发生在任何一个高度社会或氏族为导向的公司(大内,1979)或在哪些情况下的自我利益让位给无私行为(佩罗,1986)。如果不存在目标冲突,则代理将表现为主要想,不管他或她的行为是否受到监督。由于目标冲突减少,有降低激励当务之急成果为基础的合同,并且问题减少了风险分担的考虑。下一个规避风险代理的假设下,基于行为的合同变得更具吸引力。在正式条款,

命题7:委托人与代理人之间的目标冲突负相关行为为基础的合同,并正相关外前来为基础的合同。Another set of extensions relates to the task performed by the agent. For example, the progammability of the task is likely to influence the ease of measuring behavior (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1988). Programmability is defined as the degree to which appropriate behavior by the agent can be specified in advance. For example, the job of a retail sales cashier is much more programmed than that of a high-technology entrepreneur. The argument is that the behavior of agents engaged in more programmed jobs is easier to observe and evaluate. Therefore, the more programmed the task, the more attractive are behavior-based contracts because information about the agent's behavior is more readily determined. Very programmed tasks readily reveal agent behavior, and the situation reverts to the complete information case. Thus, retail sales clerks are more likely to be paid via behavior-based contracting (e.g., hourly wages), whereas entrepreneurs are more likely to be compensated with outcome-based contracts (e.g., stock ownership). In formal terms,

Proposition 8: Task programmability is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome-based contracts.

另一组扩展涉及到由代理执行的任务。例如,任务的progammability可能影响易于测量的行为(艾森哈特,1985年,1988年)。可编程定义为它的代理人适当的行为可以事先指定的程度。例如,零售销售点收银员的工作比一个高科技企业家更编程。的说法是代理商的行为从事更多的编程工作更容易观察和评价。因此,更多的编程任务,更吸引人的是基于行为的合同,因为对代理人的行为的信息更容易确定。非常程式化的任务正揭示代理行为,情况恢复到完整的信息的情况下。因此,零售销售业务员更容易通过基于行为的合同(例如,每小时工资)支付,而企业家更可能与基于结果的合同(如股权)进行补偿。在正式条款,8号提案:任务的可编程性是正相关的基于行为的合同和以成果为基础的合同负相关。

Another task characteristic is the measurability of the outcome (Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985). The simple model assumes that outcomes are easily measured. However, some tasks require a long time to complete, involve joint or team effort, or produce soft outcomes. In these

circumstances, outcomes are either difficult to measure or difficult to measure within a practical amount of time. When outcomes are measured with difficulty, outcome-based contracts are less attractive. In contrast, when outcomes are readily measured, outcome-based contracts are more attractive. In formal terms,

Proposition 9: Outcome measurability is negatively related to behavior-based contracts and positively related to outcome-based contracts.

另一项任务的特点是结局(安德森,1985;艾森哈特,1985)的可测性。简单的模型假设的结果是容易衡量。然而,有些任务需要很长的时间才能完成,涉及关节或团队的努力,或产生软的结果。在这些情况下,结

果是要么难以衡量或难以在规定时间内的实际金额来衡量。当结果是衡量困难,以成果为基础的合同是不具备吸引力。相反,当结果很容易测量,以成果为基础的合同更有吸引力。在正式条款,

命题9:结果可测性是负相关的行为为基础的合同,并正相关成果为基础的合同。

Finally, it seems reasonable that when principals and agents engage in a long-term relationship, it is likely that the principal will learn about the agent (e.g., Lambert, 1983) and so will be able to assess behavior more readily. Conversely, in short-term agency relationships, the information asymmetry between principal and agent is likely to be greater, thus making outcome-based contracts more attractive. In formal terms,

Proposition 10: The length of the agency relationship is positively related to behavior-based contracts and negatively related to outcome- based contracts.

最后,它似乎是合理的,当委托人与代理人搞了长期合作关系,很可能主要将了解剂(例如,兰伯特,1983),因此将能更准确地评估行为。相反,在短期代理关系,委托人和代理人之间的信息不对称很可能是更大,从而使以成果为基础的合同更有吸引力。在正式条款,

命题10:委托代理关系的长度正相关行为为基础的合同,并以成果为基础的合同负相关。

Agency Theory and the Organizational Literature代理理论和组织文学

Despite Perrow's (1986) assertion that agency theory is very different from organization theory, agency theory has several links to mainstream organization perspectives (see Table 2). At its roots, agency theory is consistent with the classic works of Barnard (1938) on the nature of co- operative behavior and March and Simon (1958) on the inducements and contributions of the employment relationship. As in this earlier work, the heart of agency theory is the goal conflict inherent when individuals with differing preferences engage in cooperative effort, and the essential metaphor is that of the contract.

尽管佩罗(1986)断言,代理理论是从组织理论有很大不同,代理理论有几个链接,主流机构的观点(见表2)。在它的根,代理理论与巴纳德(1938)对合作行为的性质上的雇佣关系的利诱和贡献的经典作品和March和Simon(1958)是一致的。在这个早期的工作,代理理论的心脏是目标冲突时,固有具有不同的偏好个人从事合作努力,以及必要的比喻是,该合同的。

Agency theory is also similar to political models of organizations. Both agency and political perspectives assume the pursuit of self-interest at the individual level and goal conflict at the organizational level (e.g., March, 1962; Pfeffer, 1981). Also, in both perspectives, information asymmetry is linked to the power of lower order participants (e.g., Pettigrew, 1973). The difference is that in political models goal conflicts are resolved through bargaining, negotiation, and coalitions-the power mechanism of political science. In agency theory they are resolved through the coalignment of incentives-the price mechanism of economics.

代理理论也是类似的组织政治模式。这两个机构的政治观点在假设在组织层面个人层面和目标冲突,追求自我利益(例如,三月,1962 ;普费弗,1981)。此外,在这两个角度来看,信息不对称是与较低阶的参与者(例如,佩蒂格鲁,1973)的功率。所不同的是,在政治模式的目标冲突通过谈判,协商和政治学的联盟,动力机制解决。在代理理论,他们是通过激励机制的最经济的价格机制的coalignment解决。Agency theory also is similar to the information processing approaches to contingency theory (Chandler, 1962; Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Both perspectives are information theories. They assume that individuals are boundedly rational and that information is distributed asymmetrically throughout the organization. They also are efficiency theories; that is, they use efficient processing of information as a criterion for choosing among various organizing forms (Galbraith, 1973). The difference between the two is their focus: In contingency theory researchers are concerned with the optimal structuring of reporting relationships and decision-making responsibilities (e.g., Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), whereas in agency theory they are concerned with the optimal structuring of control relationships resulting from these reporting and decision-making patterns. For example, using contingency theory, we would be concerned with whether a firm is organized in a divisional or matrix https://www.sodocs.net/doc/6118830251.html,ing agency theory, we would be concerned with whether managers within the chosen structure

are compensated by performance incentives.

代理理论也类似,信息处理方法,以权变理论(钱德勒,1962;加尔布雷思,1973;劳伦斯和洛尔施,1967)。这两种观点是信息理论。他们认为个体是有限理性和信息在整个组织不对称分布。他们也有效率的理论,也就是说,他们使用高效的信息处理为标准来各种组织形式(加尔布雷思,1973)中进行选择。两者之间的区别是他们的重点:在权变理论研究者所关注的报告关系和决策责任的最佳结构(如加尔布雷思,1973;劳伦斯和洛尔施,1967),而在代理理论,他们关心的是从这些报告和决策模式产生的控制关系,优化结构。例如,使用权变理论,我们将关注企业是否组织在一个部门或矩阵结构。使用代理理论,我们将关注是否与所选择的结构中经理通过绩效激励补偿。

The most obvious tie is with the organizational control literature (e.g., Dornbusch & Scott, 1974). For example, Thompson's (1967) and later Ouchi's (1979) linking of known means/ends relationships and crystallized goals to behavior versus outcome control is very similar to agency theory's linking task programmability and measurability of outcomes to contract form (Eisen- hardt, 1985). That is, known means/ends relationships (task programmability) lead to behavior control, and crystallized goals (measurable outcomes) lead to outcome control. Similarly, Ouchi's (1979) extension of Thompson's (1967) framework to include clan control is similar to assuming low goal conflict (Proposition 7) in agency theory. Clan control implies goal congruence between people and, therefore, the reduced need to monitor behavior or outcomes. Motivation issues disappear. The major differences between agency theory and the organizational control literature are the risk implications of principal and agent risk aversion and outcome uncertainty (Propositions 4, 5, 6).

最明显的领带与组织控制的文献(例如,多恩布什和斯科特,1974)。例如,汤普森(1967 ),后来大内(1979)的连接称为手段/目的关系及结晶目标,行为与结果的控制是非常相似的代理理论的连接任务的可编程性和结果的可衡量性,以契约形式(艾森- 哈特,1985 )。也就是说,已知的手段/目的关系(任务可编程)导致行为控制,和结晶的目标(可衡量的结果)导致结果的控制。同样,汤普森的大内(1979)的扩展名(1967年)框架,包括氏族控件类似于假设低目标冲突(命题7)代理理论。家族控制意味着人与人之间的目标一致性,因此,减少需要监测的行为或结果。动机问题消失。代理理论与组织控制文学之间的主要区别是委托人与代理人的风险规避和结果的不确定性风险的影响(命题4 ,5 , 6 )。

Not surprisingly, agency theory has similarities with the transaction cost perspective (Williamson, 1975). As noted by Barney and Ouchi (1986), the theories share assumptions of self- interest and bounded rationality. They also have similar dependent variables; that is, hierarchies roughly correspond to behavior-based contracts, and markets correspond to outcome- based contracts. However, the two theories arise from different traditions in economics (Spence, 1975): In transaction cost theorizing we are concerned with organizational boundaries, whereas in agency theorizing the contract between cooperating parties, regardless of boundary, is highlighted. However, the most important difference is that each theory includes unique independent variables. In transaction cost theory these are asset specificity and small numbers bargaining. In agency theory there are the risk attitudes of the principal and agent, outcome uncertainty, and information systems. Thus, the two theories share a parentage in economics, but each has its own focus and several unique independent variables.

毫不奇怪,代理理论与交易成本的角度来看(威廉姆森,1975)相似。正如Barney和大内(1986),自身利益和有限理性理论份额的假设。他们也有类似的因变量,也就是说,层次结构大致对应于基于行为的合同,以及市场对应的结果为基础的合同。然而,这两种理论产生于经济学(斯宾塞,1975)不同的传统:在交易成本的理论,我们所关心的是组织边界,而在代理理论化合作双方之间的合同,不管边界,被高亮显示。然而,最重要的区别是,每个理论包括独特的独立变量。在交易成本理论这些资产专用性和小的数字讨价还价。在代理理论存在的委托代理,结果的不确定性,以及信息系统的风险态度。因此,这两种理论共享经济学出身,但每个人都有自己的侧重点和一些独特的独立变量。

Contributions of Agency Theory

Agency theory reestablishes the importance of incentives and self-interest in organizational thinking (Perrow,

1986). Agency theory reminds us that much of organizational life, whether we like it or not, is based on self-interest. Agency theory also emphasizes the importance of a common problem structure across research topics. As Barney and Ouchi (1986) described it, organization research has become increasingly topic, rather than theory, centered. Agency theory reminds us that common problem structures do exist across research domains. Therefore, results from one research area (e.g., vertical integration) may be germane to others with a common problem structure (e.g., compensation).

代理理论的重新建立激励和自我利益的组织思维(佩罗,1986)的重要性。代理理论提醒我们,很多组织生活,不管我们喜欢与否,是基于自身利益。代理理论也强调整个研究课题的通病结构的重要性。正如Barney 和大内(1986)描述的那样,组织的研究已经越来越话题,而不是理论,居中。代理理论提醒我们,常见问题的结构做跨研究领域存在的。因此,从一个研究领域(例如,垂直整合)的结果,可有密切关系的人具有共同的结构问题(如赔偿)。

Agency theory also makes two specific contributions to organizational thinking. The first is the treatment of information. In agency theory, in-formation is regarded as a commodity: It has a cost, and it can be purchased. This gives an important role to formal information systems, such as budgeting, MBO, and boards of directors, and informal ones, such as managerial supervision, which is unique in organizational research. The implication is that organizations can invest in information systems in order to control agent opportunism.

代理理论也对组织思维两个具体的贡献。第一是信息的处理。在代理理论,在形成被视为品名:它具有成本,而且可以买到。这给出了一个重要的角色,以正式的信息系统,如预算编制,MBO ,以及董事会,和非正式的,如管理监督,这是独特的组织研究。言下之意是,企业可以在信息系统进行投资,以控制代理人的机会主义。

An illustration of this is executive compensation. A number of authors in this literature have expressed surprise at the lack of performance-based executive compensation (e.g., Pearce, Stevenson, & Perry, 1985; Ungson & Steers, 1984). However, from an agency perspective, it is not surprising since such compensation should be contingent upon a variety of factors including information systems. Specifically, richer information systems control managerial opportunism and, therefore, lead to less performance-contingent pay.

这方面的一个例证是高管薪酬。一些在这个文学作家在缺乏业绩为基础的高管薪酬都表示惊讶(例如,皮尔斯,史蒂文森和佩里,1985; Ungson和肉牛,1984)。然而,从机构的角度来看,这并不奇怪,因为这种补偿应于多种因素,包括信息系统仍会继续。具体来说,更丰富的信息系统控制管理机会主义,因此,导致性能较差,或有工资。

One particularly relevant information system for monitoring executive behaviors is the board of directors. From an agency perspective, boards can be used as monitoring devices for share-holder interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). When boards provide richer information, compensation is less likely to be based on firm performance. Rather, because the behaviors of top executives are better known, compensation based on knowledge of executive behaviors is more likely. Executives would then be rewarded for taking well-conceived actions (e.g., high risk/high potential R&D) whose outcomes may be unsuccessful. Also, when boards provide richer information, top executives are more likely to engage in behaviors that are consistent with stockholders' interests. For example, from an agency viewpoint, behaviors such as using greenmail and golden parachutes, which tend to benefit the manager more than the stockholders, are less likely when boards are better monitors of stockholders' interests. Operationally, the richness of board information can be measured in terms of characteristics such as frequency of board meetings, number of board subcommittees, number of board members with long tenure, number of board members with managerial and industry experience, and number of board members representing specific ownership groups.

一个用于监测执行行为的特别相关的信息系统是董事会成员。从机构的角度来看,板可以用作份额持有人的利益(法玛和詹森,1983)监控设备。当板提供更丰富的信息,补偿是不太可能是基于企业绩效。相反,

因为高层管理人员的行为是更好地了解,基于行政行为的知识赔偿的可能性更大。高管然后将奖励采取周密的措施(例如,高风险/高潜在R&D),其结果可能是不成功的。此外,当板提供更丰富的信息,高管更有可能从事的行为是与股东利益相一致。例如,从机构的观点,行为,如使用讹诈和金色降落伞,这往往有利于经理以上的股东,不太可能在议会是更好的显示器股东的利益。操作上,主板信息的丰富性可以在特性,如董事会会议,董事会辖下小组委员会的数目,董事会成员与长任期的次数,董事会成员与管理层及行业经验的数量,并代表董事会成员人数的频率来衡量具体的所有权组。

A second contribution of agency theory is its risk implications. Organizations are assumed to have uncertain futures. The future may bring prosperity, bankruptcy, or some intermediate outcome, and that future is only partly controlled by organization members. Environmental effects such as government regulation, emergence of new competitors, and technical innovation can affect outcomes. Agency theory extends organizational thinking by pushing the ramifications of outcome uncertainty to their implications for creating risk. Uncertainty is viewed in terms of risk/reward trade-offs, not just in terms of inability to preplan. The implication is that outcome uncertainty coupled with differences in willingness to accept risk should influence contracts between principal and agent.

代理理论的第二个贡献是它的风险的影响。组织被假定为有不确定的未来。未来可能会带来繁荣,破产,或一些中间结果,并且未来只是部分地组织成员控制。环境的影响,如政府管制,新的竞争者出现,以及技术创新可以影响结果。代理理论扩展了组织的思想推结果的不确定性所带来的后果对他们的影响,建立风险。不确定性被认为在风险/回报权衡而言,不只是在无法预先计划的条款。其含义是,结果的不确定性再加上愿意接受风险应影响委托人和代理人之间的合同差异。

Vertical integration provides an illustration. For example, Walker and Weber (1984) found that technological and demand uncertainty did not affect the "make or buy" decision for components in a large automobile manufacturer (principal in this case). The authors were unable to explain their results using a transaction cost framework. However, their results are consistent with agency thinking if the managers of the automobile firm are risk neutral (a reasonable assumption given the size of the automobile firm relative to the importance of any single component). According to agency theory, we would predict that such a risk-neutral principal is relatively uninfluenced by outcome uncertainty, which was Walker and Weber's result.

垂直整合提供了一个例证。例如,沃克和Weber (1984)发现,技术和需求的不确定性并没有影响大的汽车制造商(主要在这种情况下)“制造或购买”决策的组成部分。作者无法使用交易成本的框架来解释他们的结果。然而,他们的结果与机构的想法一致,如果汽车公司的经理是风险中性的(鉴于汽车公司相对规模对任何单一成分的重要性,一个合理的假设)。根据代理理论,我们就预测到了风险中性主要是由比较结果的不确定性,这是沃克和韦伯的结果不受影响。

Conversely, according to agency theory, the reverse prediction is true for a new venture. In this case, the firm is small and new, and it has limited resources available to it for weathering uncertainty: The likelihood of failure looms large. In this case, the managers of the venture may be risk-averse principals. If so, according to agency theory we would predict that such man- agers will be very sensitive to outcome uncertainty. In particular, the managers would be more likely to choose the "buy" option, thereby transferring risk to the supplying firm. Overall, agency theory predicts that risk-neutral managers are likely to choose the "make" option (behavior-based contract), whereas risk-averse executives are likely to choose "buy" (outcome-based contract).

Empirical Results

Researchers in several disciplines have undertaken empirical studies of agency theory. These studies, mirroring the two streams of theoretical agency research, are in Table 3.

相反,根据代理理论,反向预测是真实的一个新的合资公司。在这种情况下,企业小而新,它限制了提供给它的资源风化的不确定性:失败的可能性赫然耸现。在这种情况下,企业的管理者可能是规避风险的原则。如果是这样,根据代理理论,我们可以预测,这种男人管理者将是结果的不确定性非常敏感。特别是,经理会更倾向于选择“购买”选项,从而把风险转移给供应坚定。总体而言,代理理论预测,风险中性的

经理很可能会选择“做”选项(基于行为的合同),而规避风险的高管很可能会选择“买入”(结果为基础的合同)。

实证结果

在多学科研究人员开展代理理论的实证研究。这些研究中,镜像理论研究机构的两个流,在表3中。Results of the Positivist Stream实证流的结果

In the positivist stream, the common approach is to identify a policy or behavior in which stock- holder and management interests diverge and then to demonstrate that information systems or outcome-based incentives solve the agency problem. That is, these mechanisms coalign managerial behaviors with owner preferences. Consistent with the positivist tradition, most of these studies concern the separation of owner- ship from management in large corporations, and they use secondary source data that are available for large firms.

在实证流中,常用的方法是确定一个政策或行为,其中股票持有人及管理层的利益分歧,然后以证明信息系统或基于结果的激励机制解决代理问题。也就是说,这些机制coalign的管理行为与业主的喜好。一致与实证主义传统,这些研究大多关注的业主船舶从管理大型企业的分离,以及他们使用了可用于大型企业二次源数据。

One of the earliest studies of this type was conducted by Amihud and Lev (1981). These re- searchers explored why firms engage in conglomerate mergers. In general, conglomerate mergers are not in the interests of the stockholders because, typically, stockholders can diversify directly through their stock portfolio. In contrast, conglomerate mergers may be attractive to managers who have fewer avenues available to diversify their own risk. Hence, conglomerate mergers are an arena in which owner and manager interests diverge. Specifically, these authors linked merger and diversification behaviors to whether the firm was owner controlled (i.e., had a major stockholder) or manager controlled (i.e., had no major stockholder). Consistent with agency theory arguments (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), manager-controlled firms engaged in significantly more conglomerate (but not more related) acquisitions and were more diversified.

一个这种类型的最早的研究是由Amihud和列夫(1981)进行的。这些研究者,探讨企业为什么搞企业集团兼并。一般来说,混合兼并不在股东的利益,因为,通常情况下,股东可以直接通过他们的股票投资组合多样化。相比之下,混合兼并可能是谁拥有较少的可用来分散自己的风险管理途径的吸引力。因此,混合合并是一个竞技场中,所有者和经营者的利益分歧。具体来说,这些作者联系兼并和多样化的行为对公司是否拥有控制(即,有一个大股东)或管理员控制(即,没有大股东)。符合代理理论的论据(詹森和麦克林,1976),经理控制的公司从事显著更多的企业集团(但不相关)的收购,也更多元化。

Along the same lines, Walking and Long (1984) studied managers' resistance to takeover bids. Their sample included 105 large U.S. corporations that were targets of takeover attempts between 1972 and 1977. In general, resistance to takeover bids is not in the stockholders' interests, but it may be in the interests of managers be-cause they can lose their jobs during a takeover. Consistent with agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the authors found that managers who have substantial equity positions within their firms (outcome-based contracts) were less likely to resist takeover bids.

按照同样的思路,散步和龙(1984 )研究了经理人对收购要约的阻力。他们的样本包括105大型美国公司的是1972年和1977年之间的收购企图的目标。一般情况下,耐收购要约是不是在股东利益,但也可能是在管理者的利益的结果,因为他们可以接管期间失去工作。符合代理理论(詹森和麦克林,1976)中,作者发现,谁都有自己的企业内大量的股票仓位(以成果为基础的合同)管理人员是不太可能抵制收购要约。The effects of market discipline on agency relationships were examined in Wolfson's (1985) study of the relationship between the limited (principals) and general (agent) partners in oil and gas tax shelter programs. In this study, both tax and agency effects were combined in order to assess why the limited partnership governance form survived in this setting despite extensive information advantages and divergent incentives for the limited partner. Consistent with agency arguments (Fama, 1980), Wolfson found that long-run reputation effects of the

market coaligned the short-run behaviors of the general partner with the limited partners' welfare.

市场纪律对代理关系的影响,探讨在有限的(校长),并在石油和天然气避税计划一般(代理)伙伴之间的关系,欧胜(1985 )的研究。在这项研究中,税收和机构的影响相结合,以评估尽管进行了广泛的信息优势和不同的奖励为有限合伙人在此设置为什么有限合伙治理形式存活。符合机构参数(法玛,1980),欧胜发现,市场的长期口碑效果coaligned与有限合伙人的福利的一般合伙人的短期行为。

Kosnik (1987) examined another information mechanism for managerial opportunism, the board of directors. Kosnik studied 110 large U. S. corporations that were greenmail targets between 1979 and 1983. Using both hegemony and agency theories, she related board characteristics to whether greenmail was actually paid (paying greenmail is considered not in the stock- holders' interests). As predicted by agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983), boards of companies that resisted greenmail had a higher proportion of outside directors and a higher proportion of outside director executives.

Kosnik (1987 )研究了另一种信息机制,管理机会主义,董事会。Kosnik研究110大型美国公司的是1979年至1983年间讹诈的目标。同时使用的霸权主义和代理理论,她与董事会特征来讹诈是否实际支付(支付讹诈被认为没有在股票持有人的利益)。所预测的代理理论(法玛和詹森,1983),该公司抵制讹诈的板有较高比例的外部董事和外部董事高管的比例较高。

In a similar vein, Argawal and Mandelker (1987) examined whether executive holdings of firm securities reduced agency problems between stockholders and management. Specifically, they studied the relationship between stock and stock option holdings of executives and whether acquisition and financing decisions were made consistent with the interests of stockholders. In general, managers prefer lower risk acquisitions and lower debt financing (see Argawal & Mandelker, 1987, for a review). Their sample included 209 firms that participated in acquisitions and divestitures between 1974 and 1982. Consistent with agency ideas (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976), executive security holdings (outcome-based contract) were related to acquisition and financing decisions that were more consistent with stockholder interest. That is, executive stock holdings appeared to coalign managerial preferences with those of stockholders.

与此类似,Argawal和Mandelker (1987 )研究了高管增持的公司证券是否降低了股东与管理层之间的代理问题。具体来说,他们研究股票和股票期权持股高管之间是否收购和融资决策进行了与股东的利益一致的关系。一般来说,管理者更喜欢低风险的收购和较低的债务融资(见Argawal &Mandelker ,1987年,复审)。他们的样本包括209公司是参与收购和资产剥离1974年和1982年间。符合机构的想法(例如,詹森和麦克林,1976),高管增持的安全性(结果为基础的合同)的有关收购和同着股东利益更加一致的融资决策。也就是说,执行持股似乎coalign与股东的管理偏好。

Singh and Harianto (in press) studied golden parachutes in a matched sample of 84 Fortune 500 firms. Their study included variables from both agency and managerialist perspectives. Consistent with agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983), the authors found that golden parachutes are used to coalign executive interests with those of stockholders in takeover situations, and they are seen as an alternative outcome-based contract to executive stock ownership. Specifically, the authors found that golden parachutes were positively associated with a higher probability of a takeover attempt and negatively associated with executive stock holdings. Finally, Barney (1988) explored whether employee stock ownership reduces a firm's cost of equity capital. Consistent with agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), Barney argued that employee stock ownership (outcome-based contract) would coalign the interests of employees with stockholders. Using efficient capital market assumptions, he further argued that this coalignment would be reflected in the market through a lower cost of equity. Although Barney did not directly test the agency argument, the results are consistent with an agency view.

辛格和Harianto (印刷中)84财富500强企业匹配的样本中研究金色降落伞。他们的研究包括来自机构和managerialist观点变数。符合代理理论(詹森和麦克林,1976;法玛和詹森,1983)中,作者发现,金

色降落伞用于coalign与那些在收购的情况下股东的行政利益,它们被视为一种替代的结果为基础的合同,高管持股。具体来说,研究人员发现,金色降落伞是用收购企图的可能性较高正相关,与高管持股呈负相关。

最后,巴尼(1988)探讨员工持股是否会降低股权资本企业的成本。符合代理理论(詹森和麦克林,1976),巴尼认为,员工持股(以成果为基础的合同)将coalign员工与股东的利益。使用有效的资本市场假设,他进一步指出,这coalignment将通过股权的成本较低反映在市场上。虽然巴尼并没有直接测试机构的说法,结果与一个机构观点一致。

In summary, there is support for the existence of agency problems between shareholders and top executives across situations in which their interests diverge-that is, takeover attempts, debt versus equity financing, acquisitions, and divestitures, and for the mitigation of agency problems (a) through outcome-based contracts such as golden parachutes (Singh & Harianto, in press) and executive stock holdings (Argawal & Mandelker, 1987; Walking & Long, 1984) and (b) through information systems such as boards (Kosnik, 1987) and efficient markets (Barney, 1988; Wolfson, 1985). Overall, these studies support the positivist propositions described earlier. Similarly, laboratory studies by Dejong and colleagues (1985), which are not reviewed here, are also supportive.

总之,是针对不同情况股东和高管之间的代理问题,其中他们的利益分歧,也就是说,收购企图,债务与股权融资,收购和资产剥离,以及代理问题的缓解(是否存在支持),通过成果为基础的合约,如黄金降落伞(辛格与Harianto,出版中)和执行股票增持(Argawal&Mandelker,1987;散步和龙,1984)和(b)通过诸如板卡信息系统(Kosnik,1987)高效的市场(巴尼,1988;欧胜,1985)。总的来说,这些研究支持了前面描述的实证命题。同样,实验室研究由德琼和他的同事(1985),这是不审查这里,也支持。Results of the Principal-Agent Stream委托代理流的结果

The principal-agent stream is more directly focused on the contract between the principal and the agent. Whereas the positivist stream lays the foundation (that is, that agency problems exist and that various contract alternatives are available), the principal-agent stream indicates the most efficient contract alternative in a given situation. The common approach in these studies is to use a subset of agency variables such as task programmability, information systems, and outcome uncertainty to predict whether the contract is behavior- or outcome-based. The underlying assumption is that principals and agents will choose the most efficient contract, although efficiency is not directly tested.

委托代理流更直接地集中在委托人和代理人之间的合同。而实证流奠定了基础(也就是存在的代理问题,而不同的合同选择的情况),委托代理流表示最高效的替代合同在特定情况下。在这些研究中常用的方法是使用代理变量,如任务的可编程性,信息系统,以及结果的不确定性的一个子集来预测合同是否是行为或结果为基础的。的基本假设是委托人与代理人会选择最有效的合同,虽然效率没有直接测试。

In one study, Anderson (1985) probed vertical integration using a transaction cost perspective with agency variables. Specifically, she examined the choice between a manufacturer's representative (outcome-based) and a corporate sales force (behavior-based) among a sample of electronics firms. The most powerful explanatory variable was from agency theory: the diffi-culty of measuring outcomes (measured by amount of nonselling tasks and joint team sales). Consistent with agency predictions, this variable was positively related to using a corporate sales force (behavior-based contract).

在一项研究中,安德森(1985)探讨垂直整合使用的是交易成本的角度与代理变量。具体来说,她检查了电子公司的样本中制造商的代表(以成果为基础的)和一个企业的销售力(基于行为)之间的选择。最有力的解释变量是从代理理论:对的困难,因测量结果(由nonselling任务和联合团队的销售金额计算)。符合机构的预测,这个变量呈正相关,使用公司的销售队伍(基于行为的合同)。

In other studies, Eisenhardt (1985, 1988) examined the choice between commission (outcome- based) and salary (behavior-based) compensation of salespeople in retailing. The original study (1985) included only agency variables, while a later study (1988) added additional agency variables and institutional theory predictions. The

results supported agency theory predictions that task programmability, information systems (measured by the span of control), and outcome uncertainty variables (measured by number of competitors and failure rates) sig-nificantly predict the salary versus commission choice. Institutional variables were significant as well.

在其他研究中,艾森哈特(1985 ,1988 )研究了佣金的销售人员在零售(结果为基础)和工资(基于行为的)赔偿之间的选择。最初的研究(1985)只包括代理变量,而后来的研究(1988)增加了额外的代理变量和制度理论的预测。该结果支持了代理理论预言任务的可编程性,信息系统(通过控制标准来衡量),和结果的不确定性变量(由竞争对手和故障率数来衡量)SIG- nificantly预测工资与佣金的选择。制度变量均显著为好。

Conlon and Parks (1988) replicated and extended Eisenhardt's work in a laboratory setting. They used a multiperiod design to test both agency and institutional predictions. Consistent with agency theory (Harris & Raviv, 1978), they found that information systems (manipulated by whether or not the principal could monitor the agent's behavior) were negatively related to performance-contingent (outcome-based) pay. They also found support for the institutional predictions.

康伦和Parks (1988)复制和扩展艾森哈特的工作在实验室环境中。他们用一个多阶段的设计来测试机构和机构的预测。符合代理理论(哈里斯和拉维夫,1978),他们发现信息系统(由校长是否能监督代理人的行为操纵),以绩效为然(结果为基础)的支付呈负相关。他们还发现了机构预测的支持。Finally, Eccles (1985) used agency theory to develop a framework for understanding transfer pricing. Using interviews with 150 executives in 13 large corporations, he developed a framework based on notions of agency and fairness to prescribe the conditions under which various sourcing and transfer pricing alternatives are both efficient and equitable. Prominent in his framework is the link between decentralization (arguably a measure of task programmability) and the choice between cost (behavior-based contract) and market (outcome-based contract) transfer pricing mechanisms.

最后,埃克尔斯(1985)用代理理论发展的理解转让定价的框架。通过采访150的高管中13大公司,他开发了一种基于代理和公平的概念来规定,据此,各采购及转让定价的替代品都是有效和公平的条件提供一个框架。突出在他的框架是分权之间(任务的可编程性可以说是衡量)和成本(基于行为的合同)和市场(以成果为基础的合同)转让定价机制之间的选择链接。

In summary, there is support for the principal- agent hypotheses linking contract form with (a) information systems (Conlon & Parks, 1988; Eccles, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985), (b) outcome uncertainty (Eisenhardt, 1985), (c) outcome measur- ability (Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985), (d) time (Conlon & Parks, 1988), and (e) task pro- grammability (Eccles, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985). Moreover, this support rests on research using a variety of methods including questionnaires,

secondary sources, laboratory experiments, and interviews.

总之,对于委托代理假说联的合同形式与(一)信息系统(康伦和公园,1988;埃克尔斯,1985;艾森哈特,1985)的支持,(二)结果的不确定性(艾森哈特,1985),(三)结果测量电能力(安德森,1985;艾森哈特,1985),(四)时间(康伦和公园,1988),以及(e )任务亲可编程性(埃克尔斯,1985;艾森哈特,1985)。此外,该支撑搁置在研究使用各种方法,包括调查表,

次要来源,实验室实验和面试。

Recommendations for Agency Theory Research对于代理理论研究的建议

As argued above, agency theory makes contributions to organization theory, is testable, and has empirical support. Overall, it seems reason- able to urge the adoption of an agency theory perspective when investigating the many problems that have a principal-agent structure. Five specific recommendations are outlined below for using agency theory in organizational research.

正如上文指出,代理理论,以使组织理论的贡献,是可测试的,并有实证支持。总体而言,似乎理由,能够敦促通过一项代理理论视角的研究具有委托代理结构中的诸多问题时。五点具体建议概述如下使用代理

理论在组织研究。

Focus on Information Systems, Outcome Uncertainty, and Risk专注于信息系统,结果的不确定性与风险McGrath, Martin, and Kukla (1981) argued that research is a knowledge accrual process. Using this accrual criterion, next steps for agency theory research are clear: Researchers should focus on information systems, outcome uncertainty, and risk. These agency variables make the most unique contribution to organizational research, yet they have received little empirical attention (Table 3). It is important that researchers place emphasis on these variables in order to advance agency theory and to provide new concepts in the study of familiar topics such as impression management, innovation, vertical integration, compensation, strategic alliances, and board relationships.

麦格拉思,马丁和库克拉(1981)认为,研究是一个知识累积的过程。使用这种计提标准,对代理理论研究的下一个步骤是明确的:研究人员应侧重于信息系统,结果的不确定性和风险。这些代理变量作出组织研究的最独特的贡献,但他们很少得到实证的关注(表3)。重要的是,研究人员把重点放在这些变量,以推进代理理论,并提供在熟悉的主题,如印象管理,创新,垂直整合,薪酬,战略联盟和董事会的关系的研究新概念是很重要的。

Studying risk and outcome uncertainty is particularly opportune because of recent advances in measuring risk preferences. By relying on the works of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Mac- Crimmon and Wehrung (1986), and March and Shapira (1987), the organizational researcher can measure risk preference more easily and realistically. These techniques include direct measures of risk preference such as lotteries and indirect measures using demographic charac- teristics such as age and wealth and payoff characteristics such as gain versus loss. (See March and Shapira, 1987, for a review.)

研究风险和结果的不确定性是因为在衡量风险偏好的最新进展,特别是天时地利人和。依靠卡尼曼和特沃斯基(1979),Mac的Crimmon和Wehrung (1986)的作品,在3月和夏皮拉(1987),组织研究人员可以更容易地,实事求是地衡量风险偏好。这些技术包括风险偏好,例如彩票和使用人口统计字符,地球化学特征,如年龄,财富和收益特性,如收益与损失的间接措施的直接措施。(见三月夏皮拉,1987年,为进行审查。)

Key on Theory-Relevant Contexts在理论相关的上下文关键

Organizational theory usually is explored in settings in which the theory appears to have greatest relevance. For example, institutional and resource dependence theories were developed primarily in large, public bureaucracies in which efficiency may not have been a pressing 70 concern. The recommendation here is to take the same approach with agency theory: Key on theory-relevant contexts.

组织理论通常被探索于该理论似乎具有最大的相关设置。例如,体制和资源依赖理论是在大型的公共官僚机构中,效率可能不是一个紧迫的70关注主要是发达国家。这里的建议是采取同样的做法与代理理论:关键理论相关的情境。

Agency theory is most relevant in situations in which contracting problems are difficult. These include situations in which there is (a) substantial goal conflict between principals and agents, such that agent opportunism is likely (e.g., own- ers and managers, managers and professionals, suppliers and buyers); (b) sufficient outcome uncertainty to trigger the risk implications of the theory (e.g., new product innovation, young and small firms, recently deregulated industries); and (c) unprogrammed or team-oriented jobs in which evaluation of behaviors is difficult. By emphasizing these contexts, researchers can use agency theory where it can provide the most leverage and where it can be most rigorously tested. Topics such as innovation and settings such as technology-based firms are particularly attractive because they combine goal conflict between professionals and managers, risk, and jobs in which performance evaluation is difficult.

代理理论是最相关的,其中承包问题都是困难的情况。这些措施包括在哪些情况下有委托人和代理人之间(一)重大目标冲突,使得代理人机会主义是可能的(例如,自有ERS和管理人员,管理人员和专业人士,

供应商和买家),(二)充分的结果的不确定性,以触发理论(例如,新产品的创新,年轻,小公司,最近放松管制的行业)的风险影响;及(c )编程或面向团队的工作中哪些行为的评价是困难的。通过强调这些背景下,研究人员可以利用代理理论,它可以提供最大的自由和在那里可以最严格的测试。主题,如创新和设置,如技术为基础的企业特别有吸引力,因为它们结合了专业人士和管理人员,风险和工作中,绩效考核是很难之间的目标冲突。

Expand to Richer Contexts扩展到更丰富的上下文

Perrow (1986) and others have criticized agency theory for being excessively narrow and having

few testable implications. Although these criticisms may be extreme, they do suggest that research should be undertaken in new areas. Thus, the recommendation is to expand to a richer and more complex range of contexts. 佩罗(1986 )等人都批评代理理论的过分狭窄,有一些可测试的影响。尽管这些批评可能是极端的,他们建议说,应当在新的领域进行。因此,我们的建议是扩展到更丰富,更复杂的各种情境。

Two areas are particularly appropriate. One is to apply the agency structure to organizational behavior topics that relate to information asymmetry (or deception) in cooperative situations. Examples of such topics are impression management (Gardner & Martinko, 1988), lying and other forms of secrecy (Sitkin, 1987), and blame (Leatherwood & Conlon, 1987). Agency theory might contribute an overall framework in which to place these various forms of self- interest, leading to a better understanding of when such behaviors will be likely and when they will be effective.

两个领域是特别合适。其一是该机构的结构适用于涉及到的合作情况下的信息不对称(或欺骗)组织行为学的话题。这样的题目的例子是印象管理(加德纳&Martinko ,1988),说谎和其他形式的秘密(锡特金,1987),和怪(小树&康伦,1987)。代理理论可能有助于一个总体框架,在其中放置这些不同形式的自我利益,从而更好地理解当这样的行为将有可能,当他们将是有效的。

The second area is expansion beyond the pure forms of behavior and outcome contracts as described in this article to a broader range of contract altematives. Most research (e.g., Anderson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985, 1988) treats contracts as a dichotomy: behavior versus outcome. However, contracts can vary on a continuum between behavior and outcome contracts. Also, current research focuses on a single reward, neglecting many situations in which there are multiple rewards, differing by time frame and contract basis. For example, upper level managers usually are compensated through multiple rewards such as promotions, stock options, and salary. Both multiple and mixed rewards (behavior and outcome) present empirical difficulties, but they also mirror real life. The richness and complexity of agency theory would be enhanced if researchers would consider this broader spectrum of possible contracts.

第二个方面是扩大超出了行为,如本文中所描述的更广泛的合同altematives的纯形式和结果的合同。大多数的研究(例如,Anderson ,1985;艾森哈特,1985 ,1988)把合同作为一种二分法:行为与结果。然而,合同可以对行为和结果之间的合约的连续变化。另外,目前的研究主要集中在一个单一的奖励,而忽略许多情况下,有多个奖励,按时间框架和合同的基础不同。例如,高层管理人员通常是通过多种奖励,如促销,股票期权和工资补偿。两个多和回报混合(行为及结果)目前实证的困难,但他们也反映现实生活。代理理论的丰富性和复杂性将得到加强,如果研究人员将考虑可能的合同这个范围更广。

Use Multiple Theories使用多个理论

A recent article by Hirsch et al. (1987) eloquently compared economics with sociology. They argued that economics is dominated by a single paradigm, price theory, and a single view of human nature, self-interest. In contrast, the authors maintained that a strength of organizational research is its polyglot of theories that yields a more realistic view of organizations.

最近的一篇文章由Hirsch等。(1987)雄辩地比较经济学与社会学。他们认为,经济学是由一个单一的模式,价格理论,和人性,自我利益的单一视图为主。与此相反,作者认为,组织研究的力量是理论及其通晓数种语言的产生组织一个更为现实的观点。

Consistent with the Hirsch et al. arguments, the recommendation here is to use agency theory with complementary theories. Agency theory presents a partial view of the world that, although it is valid, also ignores a good bit of the complexity of organizations. Additional perspectives can help to capture the greater complexity.

一致与Hirsch等。的论点,这里的建议是使用代理理论与互补性的理论。代理理论提出了世界的局部视图,虽然它是有效的,也忽略了组织的复杂性好位。其他的观点可以帮助捕捉更大的复杂性。

This point is demonstrated by many of the empirical studies reviewed above. For example, the Singh and Harianto (in press) and Kosnik (1987) studies support agency theory hypotheses, but they also use the complementary perspectives of hegemony and managerialism. These perspectives emphasize the power and political aspects of golden parachutes and green mail, respectively. Similarly, the studies by Eisenhardt (1988) and Conlon and Parks (1988) combine institutional and agency theories. The institutional emphasis on tradition complements the efficiency emphasis of agency theory, and the result is a better understanding of compensation. Other examples include Anderson (1985), who coupled agency and transaction cost, and Eccles (1985), who combined agency with equity theory.

这一点表现在许多上述审查的实证研究。例如,辛格和Harianto (出版中)和Kosnik (1987)的研究支持代理理论的假设,但他们也用霸权和管理主义的互补视角。这些观点强调黄金降落伞和绿色邮件的权力和政治方面,分别。同样,研究通过艾森哈特(1988)和康伦和公园(1988 )相结合的体制和代理理论。该机构强调补充传统代理理论的效率重视,其结果是更好地了解赔偿。其他例子包括安德森(1985),谁加上代理和交易成本,埃克尔斯(1985),谁结合机构与公平理论。

Look Beyond Economics超越经济学

The final recommendation is that organizational researchers should look beyond the economics literature. The advantages of economics are careful development of assumptions and logical propositions (Hirsch et al., 1987). How- ever, much of this careful theoretical development has already been accomplished for agency theory. For organizational researchers, the pay- off now is in empirical research, where organizational researchers have comparative advantage (Hirsch et al., 1987). To rely too heavily on economics with its restrictive assumptions such as efficient markets and its single-perspective style is to risk doing second-rate economics with- out contributing first-rate organizational research. Therefore, although it is appropriate to monitor developments in economics, it is more useful to treat economics as an adjunct to more mainstream empirical work by organizational scholars.

最后的建议是,组织研究者应该超越经济学文献。经济学的优点是精心开发的假设和逻辑命题(Hirsch等,1987)。操作方法以往,这得多仔细理论的发展已经完成了对代理理论。对于组织的研究人员,放线现在是在实证研究中,在那里组织的研究人员具有比较优势(Hirsch等,1987)。太依赖于与其严格的假设,如有效市场和单一视角的风格经济学是冒险做二流经济带出贡献一流组织研究。因此,尽管它是适当的留意事态发展经济学,它更适用于治疗经济学作为一种辅助由组织学者更主流的实证研究。

Conclusion

This paper began with two extreme positions on agency theory-one arguing that agency theory is revolutionary and a powerful foundation (Jensen, 1983) and the other arguing that the theory addresses no clear problem, is narrow, lacks testable implications, and is dangerous (Perrow, 1986). A more valid perspective lies in the middle. Agency theory provides a unique, realistic, and empirically testable perspective on problems of cooperative effort. The intent of this paper is to clarify some of the confusion surrounding agency theory and to lead organizational scholars to use agency theory in their study of the broad range of principal-agent issues facing firms.

本文开始与代理理论一主张代理理论是革命性的,一个强大的基础(詹森,1983),另辩称理论地址没有明确的问题,很窄,缺乏可测试的意义,并且是危险的两个极限位置(佩罗,1986)。一个更有效的观点在于在中间。代理理论提供了关于合作努力的问题一个独特的,现实的和实证检验的角度。本文的目的是澄清一些混乱周围代理理论,引导组织学者使用代理理论在广泛的企业面临着委托- 代理问题的研究。

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