博弈论精品课件(13)

博弈论课件 3

Game Theory 1 Spring2015 1

1 Lecture 3 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 2

Readings ?Watson: Strategy_ An introduction to game theory –1rd ed: Ch7pp.56-63; 3rd ed: Ch7pp.67-77. 2?Exercises: 3

2Outline ?Iterated Dominance. ?Rationalizable Strategies. ?Relationship between Iterated Dominance and Rationalizable Strategies. ?First Two Strategic Tensions. 4

2 ?For the submissive pig(S): –W S dominates P S.A rational S will never play P S. ?The dominant pig(D)doesn’t have a dominant strategy. –What should D do if it knows S is rational? –u D(P D,W S)=2>u D(W D,W S)=0?Play P D. 5

2 ?Our simple theory from last time was that no rational player would play a (strictly)dominated strategy.–If a rational player knows she’s playing a game with another rational player it makes sense that she won’t expect the other player to play a dominated strategy.–Her knowledge of the other player’s rationality helps her to refine her beliefs about the other player’s strategy.–If the other player has similar knowledge about her, the other player may refine his beliefs. 6