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Jensen,1976 企业理论、代理成本及所有权结构

Jensen,1976 企业理论、代理成本及所有权结构
Jensen,1976 企业理论、代理成本及所有权结构

Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,

Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

Michael C. Jensen

Harvard Business School

and

William H. Meckling

University of Rochester

Abstract

This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the ‘separation and control’issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new definition of the firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of markets problem.

The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of

other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should

watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private

copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt

to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must

always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.

—Adam Smith (1776) Keywords: Agency costs and theory, itnernal control systems, conflicts of interest, capital structure, internal equity, outside equity, demand for security analysis, completeness of markets, supply of claims, limited liability

?1976 Jensen and Meckling

Journal of Financial Economics, October, 1976, V.3, No. 4, pp. 305-360.

Reprinted in Michael C. Jensen, A Theory of the Firm: Governance,

Also published in Foundations of Organizational Strategy,

Michael C. Jensen, Harvard University Press, 1998.

This document is available on the

Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,

Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

Michael C. Jensen

Harvard Business School

and

William H. Meckling*

University of Rochester

1. Introduction

1.1.Motivation of the Paper

In this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure1 for the firm. In addition to tying together elements of the theory of each of these three areas, our analysis casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature including the definition of the firm, the “separation of ownership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an optimal capital structure, the specification of the content of credit agreements, the theory of organizations, and the supply side of the completeness of markets problems.

1 We do not use the term ‘capital structure’ because that term usually denotes the relative quantities of bonds, equity, warrants, trade credit, etc., which represent the liabilities of a firm. Our theory implies there is another important dimension to this problem—namely the relative amount of ownership claims held by insiders (management) and outsiders (investors with no direct role in the management of the firm).

* Associate Professor and Dean, respectively, Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Analysis and Ideology, Interlaken, Switzerland, June 1974, sponsored by the Center for Research in Government Policy and Business at the University of Rochester, Graduate School of Management. We are indebted to F. Black, E. Fama, R. Ibbotson, W. Klein, M. Rozeff, R. Weil, O. Williamson, an anonymous referee, and to our colleagues and members of the Finance Workshop at the University of Rochester for their comments and criticisms, in particular G. Benston, M. Canes, D. Henderson, K. Leffler, J. Long, C. Smith, R. Thompson, R. Watts, and J. Zimmerman.

Our theory helps explain:

1.why an entrepreneur or manager in a firm which has a mixed financial structure

(containing both debt and outside equity claims) will choose a set of activities for the firm such that the total value of the firm is less than it would be if he were the sole owner and why this result is independent of whether the firm operates in monopolistic or competitive product or factor markets;

2.why his failure to maximize the value of the firm is perfectly consistent with

efficiency;

3.why the sale of common stock is a viable source of capital even though managers do

not literally maximize the value of the firm;

4.why debt was relied upon as a source of capital before debt financing offered any tax

advantage relative to equity;

5.why preferred stock would be issued;

6.why accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders,

and why independent auditors would be engaged by management to testify to the accuracy and correctness of such reports;

7.why lenders often place restrictions on the activities of firms to whom they lend, and

why firms would themselves be led to suggest the imposition of such restrictions;

8.why some industries are characterized by owner-operated firms whose sole outside

source of capital is borrowing;

9.why highly regulated industries such as public utilities or banks will have higher debt

equity ratios for equivalent levels of risk than the average nonregulated firm;

10.why security analysis can be socially productive even if it does not increase portfolio

returns to investors.

1.2Theory of the Firm: An Empty Box?

While the literature of economics is replete with references to the “theory of the firm,”the material generally subsumed under that heading is not actually a theory of the firm but rather a theory of markets in which firms are important actors. The firm is a “black box” operated so as to meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby maximizing profits, or more accurately, present value. Except for a few recent and tentative steps, however, we have no theory which explains how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought into equilibrium so as to yield this result. The limitations of this black box view of the firm have been cited by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, among others. More recently, popular and professional debates over the “social responsibility” of corporations, the separation of ownership and control, and the rash of reviews of the literature on the “theory of the firm” have evidenced continuing concern with these issues.2

A number of major attempts have been made during recent years to construct a theory of the firm by substituting other models for profit or value maximization, with each attempt motivated by a conviction that the latter is inadequate to explain managerial behavior in large corporations.3 Some of these reformulation attempts have rejected the fundamental principle of maximizing

2 Reviews of this literature are given by Peterson (1965), Alchian (1965, 1968), Machlup (1967), Shubik (1970), Cyert and Hedrick (1972), Branch (1973), Preston (1975).

3 See Williamson (1964, 1970, 1975), Marris (1964), Baumol (1959), Penrose (1958), and Cyert and March (1963). Thorough reviews of these and other contributions are given by Machlup (1967) and Alchian (1965).

Simon (1955) developed a model of human choice incorporating information (search) and computational costs which also has important implications for the behavior of managers. Unfortunately, Simon’s work has often been misinterpreted as a denial of maximizing behavior, and misused, especially in the marketing and behavioral science literature. His later use of the term “satisficing” (Simon, 1959) has undoubtedly contributed to this confusion because it suggests rejection of maximizing behavior rather than maximization subject to costs of information and of decision making.

behavior as well as rejecting the more specific profit-maximizing model. We retain the notion of maximizing behavior on the part of all individuals in the analysis that follows.4

1.3Property Rights

An independent stream of research with important implications for the theory of the firm has been stimulated by the pioneering work of Coase, and extended by Alchian, Demsetz, and others.5 A comprehensive survey of this literature is given by Furubotn and Pejovich (1972). While the focus of this research has been “property rights”,6 the subject matter encompassed is far broader than that term suggests. What is important for the problems addressed here is that specification of individual rights determines how costs and rewards will be allocated among the participants in any organization. Since the specification of rights is generally affected through contracting (implicit as well as explicit), individual behavior in organizations, including the behavior of managers, will depend upon the nature of these contracts. We focus in this paper on the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in the contracts between the owners and managers of the firm.

1.4Agency Costs

Many problems associated with the inadequacy of the current theory of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of agency relationships in which there is a growing

4 See Meckling (1976) for a discussion of the fundamental importance of the assumption of resourceful, evaluative, maximizing behavior on the part of individuals in the development of theory. Klein (1976) takes an approach similar to the one we embark on in this paper in his review of the theory of the firm and the law.

5 See Coase (1937, 1959, 1960), Alchian (1965, 1968), Alchian and Kessel (1962), Demsetz (1967), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Monson and Downs (1965), Silver and Auster (1969), and McManus (1975).

6 Property rights are of course human rights, i.e., rights which are possessed by human beings. The introduction of the wholly false distinction between property rights and human rights in many policy discussions is surely one of the all time great semantic flimflams.

literature.7 This literature has developed independently of the property rights literature even though the problems with which it is concerned are similar; the approaches are in fact highly complementary to each other.

We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint. In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions8 and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal. The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal as a result of this divergence is also a cost of the agency relationship, and we refer to this latter cost as the “residual loss.” We define agency costs as the sum of:

7 Cf. Berhold (1971), Ross (1973, 1974a), Wilson (1968, 1969), and Heckerman (1975).

8 Given the optimal monitoring and bonding activities by the principal and agent.

1.the monitoring expenditures by the principal,9

2.the bonding expenditures by the agent,

3.the residual loss.

Note also that agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort (such as the co-authoring of this paper) by two or more people even though there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship. Viewed in this light it is clear that our definition of agency costs and their importance to the theory of the firm bears a close relationship to the problem of shirking and monitoring of team production which Alchian and Demsetz (1972) raise in their paper on the theory of the firm.

Since the relationship between the stockholders and the managers of a corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship, it should come as no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the “separation of ownership and control” in the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency. We show below that an explanation of why and how the agency costs generated by the corporate form are born leads to a theory of the ownership (or capital) structure of the firm.

Before moving on, however, it is worthwhile to point out the generality of the agency problem. The problem of inducing an “agent” to behave as if he were maximizing the “principal’s” welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts—at every level of management in firms,10 in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in

9 As it is used in this paper the term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing the behavior of the agent. It includes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, etc.

10 As we show below the existence of positive monitoring and bonding costs will result in the manager of a corporation possessing control over some resources which he can allocate (within certain constraints) to satisfy his own preferences. However, to the extent that he must obtain the cooperation of others in order to carry out his tasks (such as divisional vice presidents) and to the extent that he cannot control their behavior perfectly and costlessly they will be able to appropriate some of these resources for their own ends. In short, there are agency costs generated at every level of the organization. Unfortunately, the analysis of these more general organizational issues is even more difficult than that of the ‘ownership and

governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as those common in the performing arts and the market for real estate. The development of theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how and why they are born will lead to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social sciences generally. We confine our attention in this paper to only a small part of this general problem—the analysis of agency costs generated by the contractual arrangements between the owners and top management of the corporation.

Our approach to the agency problem here differs fundamentally from most of the existing literature. That literature focuses almost exclusively on the normative aspects of the agency relationship; that is, how to structure the contractual relation (including compensation incentives) between the principal and agent to provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare, given that uncertainty and imperfect monitoring exist. We focus almost entirely on the positive aspects of the theory. That is, we assume individuals solve these normative problems, and given that only stocks and bonds can be issued as claims, we investigate the incentives faced by each of the parties and the elements entering into the determination of the equilibrium contractual form characterizing the relationship between the manager (i.e., agent) of the firm and the outside equity and debt holders (i.e., principals).

1.5General Comments on the Definition of the firm

Ronald Coase in his seminal paper entitled “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) pointed out that economics had no positive theory to determine the bounds of the firm. He characterized the

control’ issue because the nature of the contractual obligations and rights of the parties are much more varied and generally not as well specified in explicit contractual arrangements. Nevertheless, they exist and we believe that extensions of our analysis in these directions show promise of producing insights into a viable theory of organization.

bounds of the firm as that range of exchanges over which the market system was suppressed and where resource allocation was accomplished instead by authority and direction. He focused on the cost of using markets to effect contracts and exchanges and argued that activities would be included within the firm whenever the costs of using markets were greater than the costs of using direct authority. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) object to the notion that activities within the firm are governed by authority, and correctly emphasize the role of contracts as a vehicle for voluntary exchange. They emphasize the role of monitoring in situations in which there is joint input or team production.11 We are sympathetic to with the importance they attach to monitoring, but we believe the emphasis that Alchian and Demsetz place on joint input production is too narrow and therefore misleading. Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, and so on. The problem of agency costs and monitoring exists for all of these contracts, independent of whether there is joint production in their sense; i.e., joint production can explain only a small fraction of the behavior of individuals associated with a firm.

It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions12 which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals. This includes firms, non-profit institutions such as universities, hospitals, and foundations, mutual organizations such as mutual savings banks and insurance companies and co-operatives, some private clubs, and even governmental bodies such as cities, states, and the federal government, government enterprises such as TVA, the Post Office, transit systems, and so forth.

11 They define the classical capitalist firm as a contractual organization of inputs in which there is ‘(a) joint input production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs, (d) who has rights to renegotiate any input’s contract independently of contracts with other input owners, (e) who holds the residual claim, and (f) who has the right to sell his contractual residual status.’

12 By legal fiction we mean the artificial construct under the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as individuals.

The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of the other contracting individuals. Although this definition of the firm has little substantive content, emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations focuses attention on a crucial set of questions—why particular sets of contractual relations arise for various types of organizations, what the consequences of these contractual relations are, and how they are affected by changes exogenous to the organization. Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are “inside” the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it. There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.13

Viewing the firm as the nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals also serves to make it clear that the personalization of the firm implied by asking questions such as “what should be the objective function of the firm?” or “does the firm have a social responsibility?” is seriously misleading. The firm is not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may “represent” other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations. In this sense the “behavior” of the firm is like the behavior of a market, that is, the outcome of a complex equilibrium process. We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing

13 For example, we ordinarily think of a product as leaving the firm at the time it is sold, but implicitly or explicitly such sales generally carry with them continuing contracts between the firm and the buyer. If the product does not perform as expected the buyer often can and does have a right to satisfaction. Explicit evidence that such implicit contracts do exist is the practice we occasionally observe of specific provision that ‘all sales are final.’

the wheat or stock market as an individual, but we often make this error by thinking about organizations as if they were persons with motivations and intentions.14

1.6 Overview of the Paper

We develop our theory in stages. Sections 2 and 4 provide analyses of the agency costs of equity and debt respectively. These form the major foundation of the theory. In Section 3, we pose some questions regarding the existence of the corporate form of organization and examines the role of limited liability. Section 5 provides a synthesis of the basic concepts derived in sections 2-4 into a theory of the corporate ownership structure which takes account of the trade-offs available to the entrepreneur-manager between inside and outside equity and debt. Some qualifications and extensions of the analysis are discussed in section 6, and section 7 contains a brief summary and conclusions.

2. The Agency Costs of Outside Equity

2.1Overview

In this section we analyze the effect of outside equity on agency costs by comparing the behavior of a manager when he owns 100 percent of the residual claims on a firm with his behavior when he sells off a portion of those claims to outsiders. If a wholly-owned firm is managed by the owner, he will make operating decisions that maximize his utility. These decisions

14 This view of the firm points up the important role which the legal system and the law play in social organizations, especially, the organization of economic activity. Statutory laws sets bounds on the kinds of contracts into which individuals and organizations may enter without risking criminal prosecution. The police powers of the state are available and used to enforce performance of contracts or to enforce the collection of damages for non-performance. The courts adjudicate conflicts between contracting parties and establish precedents which form the body of common law. All of these government activities affect both the kinds of contracts executed and the extent to which contracting is relied upon. This in turn determines the usefulness, productivity, profitability and viability of various forms of organization. Moreover, new laws as well as court decisions often can and do change the rights of contracting parties ex post, and they can and do serve as a vehicle for redistribution of wealth. An analysis of some of the implications of these facts is contained in Jensen and Meckling (1978) and we shall not pursue them here.

will involve not only the benefits he derives from pecuniary returns but also the utility generated by various non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial activities such as the physical appointments of the office, the attractiveness of the office staff, the level of employee discipline, the kind and amount of charitable contributions, personal relations (“friendship,” “respect,” and so on) with employees, a larger than optimal computer to play with, or purchase of production inputs from friends. The optimum mix (in the absence of taxes) of the various pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits is achieved when the marginal utility derived from an additional dollar of expenditure (measured net of any productive effects) is equal for each non-pecuniary item and equal to the marginal utility derived from an additional dollar of after-tax purchasing power (wealth).

If the owner-manager sells equity claims on the corporation which are identical to his own (i.e., which share proportionately in the profits of the firm and have limited liability), agency costs will be generated by the divergence between his interest and those of the outside shareholders, since he will then bear only a fraction of the costs of any non-pecuniary benefits he takes out in maximizing his own utility. If the manager owns only 95 percent of the stock, he will expend resources to the point where the marginal utility derived from a dollar’s expenditure of the firm’s resources on such items equals the marginal utility of an additional 95 cents in general purchasing power (i.e., his share of the wealth reduction) and not one dollar. Such activities, on his part, can be limited (but probably not eliminated) by the expenditure of resources on monitoring activities by the outside stockholders. But as we show below, the owner will bear the entire wealth effects of these expected costs so long as the equity market anticipates these effects. Prospective minority shareholders will realize that the owner-manager’s interests will diverge somewhat from theirs; hence the price which they will pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of the divergence between the manager’s interest and theirs. Nevertheless, ignoring for the moment the possibility of borrowing against his wealth, the owner will find it desirable to bear these costs

as long as the welfare increment he experiences from converting his claims on the firm into general purchasing power15 is large enough to offset them.

As the owner-manager’s fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on the outcomes falls and this will tend to encourage him to appropriate larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites. This also makes it desirable for the minority shareholders to expend more resources in monitoring his behavior. Thus, the wealth costs to the owner of obtaining additional cash in the equity markets rise as his fractional ownership falls.

We shall continue to characterize the agency conflict between the owner-manager and outside shareholders as deriving from the manager’s tendency to appropriate perquisites out of the firm’s resources for his own consumption. However, we do not mean to leave the impression that this is the only or even the most important source of conflict. Indeed, it is likely that the most important conflict arises from the fact that as the manager’s ownership claim falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such as searching out new profitable ventures falls. He may in fact avoid such ventures simply because it requires too much trouble or effort on his part to manage or to learn about new technologies. Avoidance of these personal costs and the anxieties that go with them also represent a source of on-the-job utility to him and it can result in the value of the firm being substantially lower than it otherwise could be.

2.2A Simple Formal Analysis of the Sources of Agency Costs of Equity and Who Bears Them

In order to develop some structure for the analysis to follow we make two sets of assumptions. The first set (permanent assumptions) are those which will carry through almost all of the analysis in sections 2-5. The effects of relaxing some of these are discussed in section 6.

15 For use in consumption, for the diversification of his wealth, or more importantly, for the financing of ‘profitable’ projects which he could not otherwise finance out of his personal wealth. We deal with these issues below after having developed some of the elementary analytical tools necessary to their solution.

The second set (temporary assumptions) are made only for expositional purposes and are relaxed as soon as the basic points have been clarified.

Permanent assumptions

(P.1)All taxes are zero.

(P.2)No trade credit is available.

(P.3)All outside equity shares are non-voting.

(P.4)No complex financial claims such as convertible bonds or preferred stock or warrants can be issued.

(P.5)No outside owner gains utility from ownership in a firm in any way other than through its effect on his wealth or cash flows.

(P.6)All dynamic aspects of the multiperiod nature of the problem are ignored by assuming there is only one production-financing decision to be made by the

entrepreneur.

(P.7)The entrepreneur-manager’s money wages are held constant throughout the analysis.

(P.8)There exists a single manager (the peak coordinator) with ownership interest in the firm.

Temporary assumptions

(T.1)The size of the firm is fixed.

(T.2)No monitoring or bonding activities are possible.

(T.3)No debt financing through bonds, preferred stock, or personal borrowing (secured or unsecured) is possible.

(T.4)All elements of the owner-manager’s decision problem involving portfolio considerations induced by the presence of uncertainty and the existence of diversifiable risk are ignored.

Define:

X={x1, x2, . . .,x n} = vector of quantities of all factors and activities within the firm from which the manager derives non-pecuniary benefits;16 the x i are defined such that his marginal utility is positive for each of them;

C(X)=total dollar cost of providing any given amount of these items;

P(X)=total dollar value to the firm of the productive benefits of X;

B(X)=P(X)-C(X) = net dollar benefit to the firm of X ignoring any effects of X on the equilibrium wage of the manager.

Ignoring the effects of X on the manager’s utility and therefore on his equilibrium wage rate, the optimum levels of the factors and activities X are defined by X* such that

?B(X*)?X*=

?P(X*)

?X*

?

?C(X*)

?X*

=0.

Thus for any vector X≥X* (i.e., where at least one element of X is greater than its corresponding element of X*), F≡B(X*) - B(X) > 0 measures the dollar cost to the firm (net of any productive effects) of providing the increment X - X* of the factors and activities which generate utility to the manager. We assume henceforth that for any given level of cost to the firm, F, the vector of factors and activities on which F is spent on those, ? X , which yield the manager maximum utility. Thus F≡B(X*) - B(? X ).

16 Such as office space, air conditioning, thickness of the carpets, friendliness of employee relations, etc.

We have thus far ignored in our discussion the fact that these expenditures on X occur through time and therefore there are trade-offs to be made across time as well as between alternative elements of X. Furthermore, we have ignored the fact that the future expenditures are likely to involve uncertainty (i.e., they are subject to probability distributions) and therefore some allowance must be made for their riskiness. We resolve both of these issues by defining C, P, B, and F to be the current market values of the sequence of probability distributions on the period-by-period cash flows involved.17

Given the definition of F as the current market value of the stream of manager’s expenditures on non-pecuniary benefits, we represent the constraint which a single owner-manager faces in deciding how much non-pecuniary income he will extract from the firm by the line V F in fig. 1. This is analogous to a budget constraint. The market value of the firm is measured along the vertical axis and the market value of the manager’s stream of expenditures on non-pecuniary benefits, F, is measured along the horizontal axis. OV is the value of the firm when the amount of non-pecuniary income consumed is zero. By definition is the maximum market value of the cash flows generated by the firm for a given money wage for the manager when the manager’s consumption of non-pecuniary benefits are zero. At this point all the factors and activities within the firm which generate utility for the manager are at the level X* defined above. There is a different budget constraint for each possible scale of the firm (i.e., level of investment, I) and for alternative levels of money wage, W, for the manager. For the moment we pick an arbitrary level of investment (which we assume has already been made) and hold the scale of the firm constant at this level. We also assume that the manager’s money wage is fixed

17 And again we assume that for any given market value of these costs, F, to the firm the allocation across time and across alternative probability distributions is such that the manager’s current expected utility is at a maximum.

at the level W* which represents the current market value of his wage contract18 in the optimal compensation package which consists of both wages, W*, and non-pecuniary benefits, F*. Since one dollar of current value of non-pecuniary benefits withdrawn from the firm by the manager reduces the market value of the firm by $1, by definition, the slope of is -1.

The owner-manager’s tastes for wealth and non-pecuniary benefits is represented in fig.

1 by a system of indifference curves, U1, U2, and so on.19 The indifference curves will be convex as drawn as long as the owner-manager’s marginal rate of substitution between non-pecuniary benefits and wealth diminishes with increasing levels of the benefits. For the 100 percent owner-manager, this presumes that there are not perfect substitutes for these benefits available on the outside, that is, to some extent they are job-specific. For the fractional owner-manager this presumes that the benefits cannot be turned into general purchasing power at a constant price.20 When the owner has 100 percent of the equity, the value of the firm will be V* where indifference curve U

2 is tangent to VF, and the level of non-pecuniary benefits consumed is F*. If the owner sells the entire equity but remains as manager, and if the equity buyer can, at zero

18 At this stage when we are considering a 100% owner-managed firm the notion of a ‘wage contract’ with himself has no content. However, the 100% owner-managed case is only an expositional device used in passing to illustrate a number of points in the analysis, and we ask the reader to bear with us briefly while we lay out the structure for the more interesting partial ownership case where such a contract does have substance.

19 The manager’s utility function is actually defined over wealth and the future time sequence of vectors of quantities of non-pecuniary benefits, X t. Although the setting of his problem is somewhat different, Fama (1970b, 1972) analyzes the conditions under which these preferences can be represented as a derived utility function defined as a function of the money value of the expenditures (in our notation F) on these goods conditional on the prices of goods. Such a utility function incorporates the optimization going on in the background which define ? X discussed above for a given F. In the more general case where we allow a time series of consumption, ? X t, the optimization is being carried out across both time and the components of X t for fixed F.

20 This excludes, for instance, (a) the case where the manager is allowed to expend corporate resources on anything he pleases in which case F would be a perfect substitute for wealth, or (b) the case where he can ‘steal’ cash (or other marketable assets) with constant returns to scale—if he could the indifference curves would be straight lines with slope determined by the fence commission.

cost, force the old owner (as manager) to take the same level of non-pecuniary benefits as he did as owner, then V* is the price the new owner will be willing to pay for the entire equity.21

Fig. 1.The value of the firm (V) and the level of non-pecuniary benefits consumed (F) when the fraction of outside equity is (1-α)V, and U j(j = 1,2,3) represents owner’s indifference curves between wealth and non-pecuniary benefits.

21 Point D defines the fringe benefits in the optimal pay package since the value to the manager of the fringe benefits F* is greater than the cost of providing them as is evidenced by the fact that U2 is steeper to the left of D than the budget constraint with slope equal to -1.

That D is indeed the optimal pay package can easily be seen in this situation since if the conditions of the sale to a new owner specified that the manager would receive no fringe benefits after the sale he would require a payment equal to V3 to compensate him for the sacrifice of his claims to V* and fringe benefits amounting to F* (the latter with total value to him of V3-V*). But if F = 0, the value of the firm is only V . Therefore, if monitoring costs were zero the sale would take place at V* with provision for a pay package which included fringe benefits of F* for the manager.

This discussion seems to indicate there are two values for the ‘firm’, V3 and V*. This is not the case if we realize that V* is the value of the right to be the residual claimant on the cash flows of the firm and V3-V* is the value of the managerial rights, i.e., the right to make the operating decisions which include access to F*. There is at least one other right which has value which plays no formal role in the analysis as yet—the value of the control right. By control right we mean the right to hire and fire the manager and we leave this issue to a future paper.

In general, however, we could not expect the new owner to be able to enforce identical behavior on the old owner at zero costs. If the old owner sells a fraction of the firm to an outsider, he, as manager, will no longer bear the full cost of any non-pecuniary benefits he consumes. Suppose the owner sells a share of the firm, 1-α, (0 < α < 1) and retains for himself a share, α. If the prospective buyer believes that the owner-manager will consume the same level of non-pecuniary benefits as he did as full owner, the buyer will be willing to pay (1-α)V* for a fraction (1-α) of the equity. Given that an outsider now holds a claim to (1-α) of the equity, however, the cost to the owner-manager of consuming $1 of non-pecuniary benefits in the firm will no longer be $1. Instead, it will be α x $1. If the prospective buyer actually paid (1-α)V* for his share of the equity, and if thereafter the manager could choose whatever level of non-pecuniary benefits he liked, his budget constraint would be V1P1 in fig. 1 and has a slope equal to -α, Including the payment the owner receives from the buyer as part of the owner’s post-sale wealth, his budget constraint, V1P1, must pass through D, since he can if he wishes have the same wealth and level of non-pecuniary consumption he enjoyed as full owner.

But if the owner-manager is free to choose the level of perquisites, F, subject only to the loss in wealth he incurs as a part owner, his welfare will be maximized by increasing his consumption of non-pecuniary benefits. He will move to point A where V1P1 is tangent to U1 representing a higher level of utility. The value of the firm falls from V*, to V0, that is, by the amount of the cost to the firm of the increased non-pecuniary expenditures, and the owner-manager’s consumption of non-pecuniary benefits rises from F* to F0.

If the equity market is characterized by rational expectations the buyers will be aware that the owner will increase his non-pecuniary consumption when his ownership share is reduced. If the owner’s response function is known or if the equity market makes unbiased estimates of the

owner’s response to the changed incentives, the buyer will not pay (1-α)V* for (1-α) of the equity.

Theorem. For a claim on the firm of (1-α) the outsider will pay only (1-α) times the value he expects the firm to have given the induced change in the behavior of the owner-manager.

Proof. For simplicity we ignore any element of uncertainty introduced by the lack of perfect knowledge of the owner-manager’s response function. Such uncertainty will not affect the final solution if the equity market is large as long as the estimates are rational (i.e., unbiased) and the errors are independent across firms. The latter condition assures that this risk is diversifiable and therefore that equilibrium prices will equal the expected values.

Let W represent the owner’s total wealth after he has sold a claim equal to 1-α of the equity to an outsider. W has two components. One is the payment, S o, made by the outsider for 1-α of the equity; the rest, S i, is the value of the owner’s (i.e., insider’s) share of the firm, so that W, the owner’s wealth, is given by

W = S o+ S i= S o+ αV(F, α),

where V(F, α) represents the value of the firm given that the manager’s fractional ownership share is α and that he consumes perquisites with current market value of F. Let V2P2, with a slope of -α represent the trade-off the owner-manager faces between non-pecuniary benefits and his wealth after the sale. Given that the owner has decided to sell a claim 1-α of the firm, his welfare will be maximized when V2P2is tangent to some indifference curve such as U3 in fig. 1. A price for a claim of (1-α) on the firm that is satisfactory to both the buyer and the seller will require that this tangency occur along V F, that is, that the value of the firm must be V’. To show this, assume that such is not the case—that the tangency occurs to the left of the point B on the line V F. Then, since the slope of V2P2 is negative, the value of the firm will be larger than V’.

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交易成本理论

议价成本:针对契约、价格、品质讨价还价的成本。 决策成本:进行相关决策与签订契约所需的内部成本。 监督成本:监督交易对象是否依照契约内容进行交易的成本,例如追踪产品、监督、验货等。 违约成本:违约时所需付出的事后成本。 Williamson(1985)进一步将交易成本加以整理区分为事前与事后两大类。 事前的交易成本:签约、谈判、保障契约等成本。 事后的交易成本:契约不能适应所导致的成本;讨价还价的成本─指两方调整适应不良的谈判成本;建构及营运的成本;为解决双方的纠纷与争执而必须设置的相关成本;约束成本─为取信于对方所需之成本。 Dahlman(1979)则将交易活动的内容加以类别化处理,认为交易成本包含:搜寻信息的成本、协商与决策成本、契约成本、监督成本、执行成本与转换成本,说明了交易成本的型态及基本内涵。简言之,所谓交易成本就是指当交易行为发生时,所随同产生的信息搜寻、条件谈判与交易实施等的各项成本。 成本原因 编辑 交易成本发生的原因,来自于人性因素与交易环境因素交互影响下所产生的市场失灵现象,造成交易困难所致(Williamson, 1975)。Williamson 指出六项交易成本了来源: 1. 有限理性(Bounded Rationality):指交易进行参与的人,因为身心、智能、情绪等限制,在追求效益极大化时所产生的限制约束。 2. 投机主义(Opportunism):指参与交易进行的各方,为寻求自我利益而采取的欺诈手法,同时增加彼此不信任与怀疑,因而导致交易过程监督成本的增加而降低经济效率。 3. 不确定性与复杂性(Uncertainty and Complexity):由于环境因素中充满不可预期性和各种变化,交易双方均将未来的不确定性及复杂性纳入契约中,使得交易过程增加不少订定契约时的议价成本,并使交易困难度上升。 4. 专用性投资(Small Numbers):某些交易过程过于专属性Proprietary),或因为异质性(Idiosyncratic)信息与资源无法流通,使得交易对象减少及造成市场被少数人把持,使得市场运作失灵。 5. 信息不对称(Information Asymmetric):因为环境的不确定性和自利行为产生的机会主义,交易双方往往握有不同程度的信息,使得市场的先占者(First Mover)拥有较多的有利信息而获益,并形成少数交易。 6. 气氛(Atmosphere):指交易双方若互不信任,且又处于对立立场,无法赢造一个令人满意的交易关系,将使得交易过程过于重视形式,徒增不必要的交易困难及成本。成本特性 编辑 而上述交易成本的发生原因,进一步追根究底可发现源自于交易本身的三项特征。这三项特征形成三个构面影响交易成本的高低。(Williamson, 1985)

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一、交易费用的涵义 交易费用概念是由科斯创立的。他在1937年发表的《企业的性质》一文,标志着交易费用范畴的创立和交易费用理论的初步形成。之后,该理论迅速发展,其中,威廉姆森的贡献最大。 1、科斯以前的交易理论 (1)亚里士多德对交易的论述 商业交易;贷钱交易;雇佣交易。从事这三种交易活动都可以带来财富或致富。 他提出了交易的概念,并将交易与生产区被开来,为后来的经济学家所肯定。 (2)康芒斯对交易的论述 在1934年出版的《制度经济学》一书中,他以法律的观点来解释社会经济关系,认为经济关系的本质是交易,整个社会是由无数种交易组成的一种有机的组织。 康芒斯的交易是在一定的秩序或集体行动中的规则中发生的、在利益彼此冲突的个人之间的所有权的转移。他将交易的具体类型分为三种:第一,买卖的交易,即法律上平等和自由的人们之间自愿的买卖关系。其一般原则是稀少性。

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《代理问题与企业理论》读书笔记 碎碎片片 文章题目:代理问题与企业理论(Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm) 作者:尤金·法玛(Eugene F.Fama) 尤金·法玛教授可以称得上是金融经济学领域的思想家。法玛教授1939年2月14日出生于美国马萨储塞州波士顿,是意大利裔移民的第三代。1960年毕业于马萨储塞州Tufts大学,主修法文,获得学士学位,这就是一个看起来不像是日后会成为财金学界大师的开始。1960-1963年在芝加哥大学商学院研究生院攻读MBA,1963年开始攻读博士学位,1964年获得博士学位,其博士论文为“股票市场价格走势”。1995年,比利时鲁文大学授予法玛荣誉博士学位。尤金·法玛在就读Tufts大学与芝加哥大学时参加了诸多的学术团体。 法玛教授的研究兴趣十分广泛,包括投资学理论与经验分析、资本市场中的价格形成、公司财务、组织形式生存的经济学。他在经济学科的若干领域都作出了重要的贡献,在金融学独立为一个学科以及成为经济学中一个独立领域的进程中,是当之无愧的先驱。 出处:本文原载于[美]《政治经济学杂志》第88卷第2期(1980年),第288-307页。 一、写作动机 长期以来,经济学家们一直关注着企业中的决策是由非股东的管理者的行为而产生的激励问题,导致企业“行为”理论和“管理”理论的发展。但这些理论舍弃了古典的企业模型——经营企业仅仅是为了利润最大化的企业所有者与管理者是统一的,而赞成集中研究控制企业但不拥有企业并与古典的“经济人”相去甚远的管理者的动力问题。代表有,鲍莫尔(1959)、西蒙(1959)、西尔特和马奇(1963)以及威廉姆森(1964)。 最近,经济学文献倾向于舍弃古典的企业模型但接受古典的经济行为形式,企业被认为是生产要素间的一系列契约,每一种要素为其自我利益所驱使。因此,强调在组织中通过契约来界定产权的重要性。代表有,阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨(1972)与詹森和梅克林(1976)。 作者认为,阿尔奇安和德姆塞斯,詹森和梅克林的见解——将企业看作是生产要素间的一系列契约——是远远不够的。在古典理论中,代理者是企业的化身,既是管理者又是剩余风险的承受者。但,这种见解不能解释,现代大公司里企业的控制权和证券所有权是分离的。 二、主要观点 在企业是“一系列契约”的观点中,证券所有权和控制权的分离可以解释为经济组织的有效形式。作者放弃了公司在任何意义上都是所有者的假定,并把企业家的概念搁在一边。取而代之的是,将管理与承担风险两种职能归给企业家,而着两种职能在将企业称为是一系列契约时,自然被作为分离的要素来处理。企业为来自其他企业的竞争所约束,被迫改进有效监督整个队伍及其个别成员业绩的手段。另外,企业的个体参与者,尤其是企业管理者,在企业内外部都要正确面对市场为他们的服务所提供的准则和机会。 三、分析框架 1、企业所有权概念的不相干性 管理是一种有特殊作用的劳动——协调投入活动和贯彻投入要素间达成的契约,都有“决策”的特性。风险承担者的作用,即接受不确定性和在每一个生产期结束时总收益与总成本间可能为负的结果。通常,风险承担者通过事先提供财富来保证契约的业绩。以这种方法,承担风险的职能和资本与技术的所有权就被结合起来。然而,资本所有权不应与企业所有权混为一谈。因此,理解控制企业决策并不必然是证券持有者的天职第一步是,消除企业由证劵持有者拥有的这一根深蒂固的观念。第二步,摒弃企业家这一角色的观念。 2、管理和承受风险:更仔细的考察

公司金融 委托代理理论

第五专题资本结构:代理成本理论 20世纪70年代以来,随着企业理论的发展以及不确定性经济学、信息经济学、委托代理理论和契约理论等新的经济学研究方法在资本结构理论中的应用,以探讨MM定理是否存在的资本结构理论受到众多经济学家的挑战,资本结构理论获得了较大发展,步入新资本结构理论时期。新资本结构理论主要以资本结构委托代理论、资本结构信息经济学理论和资本结构证券设计理论的等构成。 新资本结构理论的最突出特征是认识到了信息不对称在资本结构决定中的主导作用。所谓信息不对称是指市场参与者占有的信息是不同的。在信息不对称分布下,拥有较少信息的一方希望通过各种手段去获取信息,而拥有信息优势的一方则通过输出对自己有利的信息获利。金融市场的买卖双方就存在着典型的信息不对称。比如,借方比贷方更清楚借贷抵押品的可靠性、管理层的勤俭程度和道德水准;对于外部投资者和债权人来说,企业家总是拥有一些不为他人所知的有关企业内部经营活动的内幕信息,这就使企业家在与外部投资者和债权人的抗争博弈中占有优势。 资本结构委托代理理论和资本结构信息经济学理论都是从信息不对称的角度来研究资本结构问题,但两种理论研究的问题是不同的,体现在:资本结构委托代理论研究的是金融契约事后信息不对称(即隐藏行动)导致的道德风险问题,分析企业融资方式选择和最优资本结构决定等问题;资本结构信息经济学理论研究的是金融契约事前信息不对称(即隐藏信息)导致的逆向选择问题,探讨企业资本结构、融资方式选择在克服逆向选择问题方面的信息传递功能以及对经济主体投资决策的影响。 本专题首先研究建立在委托代理理论基础上的资本结构委托代理理论。 一、企业融资中的委托代理关系 (一)企业理论中的委托代理理论 科斯(Coase,1937)在其著名的论文《企业的本质》中提出,“企业是生产要素的一组契约,其中每一种要素都以自我利益为驱动力”,这即是所谓的科斯的“企业是一种契约”的企业契约理论。围绕科斯 的“企业是一种契约”的思想,众多的经济学家从不同的角度发展了科斯的企业契约理论,形成了完整的企业委托代理论。 企业委托代理理论认为,企业是由构成企业的各利益相关主体(stakeholder)(包括外部的债权人、关联交易商、客户、内部股东、经营管理者和员工等)组成的共同组织,是这些利益相关主体之间缔结的

交易成本理论

交易成本理论 根据科斯于1937年发表的《企业的性质》中提出的交易成本理论,企业和市场是两种不同而且又是可以相互替代的机制。15与企业通过契约形式完成交易不同,市场通过价格机制实现资源的优化配置从而达成交易。企业有时可以依靠运用行政命令的方式来配置资源,将原木属于市场的交易内部化。 而选择用市场方式还是企业方式进行资源配置的关键取决于交易费用的大小。企业通过内化的市场交易来减少交易费用。随着企业的扩大,管理费用随之扩大,当两者相抵时,企业停止增长。企业规模的极限限定了单个企业规模的有限性。因此,面对市场需求的复杂多变,单个企业无能为力,为提升企业竞争优势,许多单个企业结成战略联盟。这样就在一定程度上减少了交易费用,而且协同的管理费用相对于单个企业的管理费用为低。这样参与联盟的个业都能获得较同行业同类个业自主生产更大的利润,因此,个业愿意参与协同工作,服从核心企业的任务分配与调控,以实现自身利益的最大化。在创意产业演化过程中,企业与个业之间是一种动态的联盟,每一个企业都有自己的行为动机。为在新的市场竞争中获得竞争优势,创意产业内的成员企业加强彼此合作,优化白身所在的协同绩效,往往会通过签订有效的契约来激励彼此之间达成更为密切的合作,避免成员企业的投机行为,节省交易成本。 运用交易成木理论,可以较好地解释创意产业的演化。创意产业演化是建立在各个节点企业高质量的信息传递与信息共亨的基础之

上的。因此,信息共享是实现创意产业演化的基础。创意产业演化中的每个节点企业都需要作出各种决策,这些决策并不是相互独立的,因为创意产业演化中节点企业的生产运作相互依赖。获得的信息的多少和质量与决策质量密切相关。因此,创意产业演化中信息的共享对创意产业演化中每一个节点企业的决策有着非常重要的意义。在创意产业的形成与发展过程有很多战略都涉及信息的交换与共亨。同样信息共享在给创意户业演化带来利益的同时,也增加了创意户业成员企业的风险。信息共享的程度是创意产业演化需要解决的难点问题。 信息技术的应用有效地推动了创意产业的演化与发展,它可以大大地节省时间和提高企业信息交换的准确性,减少在复杂、重复工作中的人为失误,因而减少由于失误而导致的时间浪费和经济损失,提高创意产业演化的运行效率。

委托代理理论案例

委托与代理理论 中国市场企业发展作为背景 、背景 农村孩子要想有出息,只有两条路:读书和打工。阿科选择了第 二条路,因为他的成绩不好,在这15 年里,他先是跟一个师傅学做木工3 年,出师后做了几年小木匠,再到江浙地区的家具厂做木工,后来在一个家具厂里学会了电脑绘图和设计欧式家具,并且从一个普通木工变成班长。去年年底,老板提拔他为经理,让他春节后招聘一批木工到厂里,同时设计一套管理体系。 从一个小学文化的小木匠,变身为管理十几个人的企业经理,阿 科的年收入大大增加了(应该比理论多),但是他也发现自己的知识远远不够了。企业理论与现实相结合,围绕企业的招聘、薪酬和管理等问题进行了多次对话。在理论和实践的交相辉映中,送给小木匠套有趣且有用的企业理论。 二、招聘 对话从招人开始。合格的员工能使管理事半功倍,因为只有好的 投入才有好的产出,更何况春节后是工人供给的高峰期。如果春节后招不到合适的工人,那么平时再去农村集中招人几乎不可能。

阿科:现在社会上很看重一个人的文凭。你说理论是不是应该尽可能招文凭高一点的,比如高中毕业生? 理论:未必。根据信号发射理论,文凭是显示能力的一种信号, 但未必适合于所有行业。你自己也是小学毕业,今天不是干得挺好吗?关键是,你们这个行业怎么判断一个人的专业水平呢? 阿科:哦,这个简单。就是问他有几年的木工经验。 理论:如果经验多的机会就多,那人家撒谎怎么办?比如,明明只干过一年木工活,但可能骗你说干了三年。你们这行也没有实习经 历证明啊。这样会导致你招到的人反而是没有足够工作经验的人,理论们把这种现象称为“逆向选择”。 阿科:但有一样东西是骗不了人的,就是工人手掌上的老茧。干活年份越久,肯定老茧越厚。同样是木工,拿刨子的和拿打孔机的又不同。而且木工的老茧长在手上的位置和其他行业的也不同。 理论:那就是理论们要的信号啊。如果是招干体力活的木工,那么看老茧肯定比看文凭更管用。好,现在理论们得到了企业理论的第一个原则。 原则一:看文凭不如看老茧

詹森及其代理成本理论

经济学家向来推崇劳动分工促进效率的准则,在做学问时通常比较强调“专”。因此,经济学家大多是在某一领域钻研很深“专家”,而不是涉猎广博的“通才”。不过,也有例外。有一些经济学家,既能在某些领域深入钻研,又能在多个领域触类旁通,兼专家和通才于一身,迈克尔·詹森教授就是其中一位。 詹森生于1939年,1962年,他获得马卡莱斯特学院经济学学士学位。此后,他就读于芝加哥大学,并于1964年获得金融方向MBA学位,1968年获芝经济学、金融学、会计学博士学位。此外,詹森教授还拥有比利时鲁汶大学、瑞士波恩大学、罗切斯特西蒙商学院等多所名校的名誉博士学位。 在芝加哥大学攻读博士期间,詹森已在西北大学和罗切斯特大学担任讲师和助理教授。此后,詹森在罗切斯特大学执教了21年,期间为研究生开设了经济学、会计学、公司理财、资本市尝组织管理和公司政策等课程。1988年以后,他执教于哈佛大学商学院,讲授组织管理学。2000年从哈佛大学荣休后,詹森教授开始把工作阵地从学界转向了业界,接受了著名的摩立特集团的聘请,担任执行董事至今。 除了在学界、业界的工作外,詹森教授还广泛从事其他社会工作。最值得一提的是,他于1973年创办了《金融经济学期刊》。目前,该杂志被认为是金融学领域最重要的两份学术期刊之一。 代理成本 詹森教授在学术上的最重要贡献是提出了“代理成本理论”,并应用这一理论对信息不对称条件下的组织结构问题和资本结构进行了系统的分析。 “代理成本理论”的学术源头,可以归结为两个在当时已经比较流行的理论:产权理论和委托亅代理理论。 首先是产权理论。从科斯开始,经济学家们开始对企业的边界以及企业的内部组织问题产生了兴趣。沿着科斯的研究轨迹,阿尔钦、德姆塞茨、哈特等一大批经济学家进行了丰富而有益的探索,这些理论成果总结在一起,就形成了所谓的产权理论。产权理论的关注点是产权分配对于经济效率的影响,具体来说就是考察契约对于权利的配置怎样影响契约双方的成本、收益。 其次是委托亅代理理论。在产权理论研究契约对于权利分配所产生影响的同时,另外一些经济学家则在关心契约本身的设计问题,大名鼎鼎的莫里斯、马斯金、霍姆斯特朗等都是委托亅代理理论的代表人物。和研究产权学派的学者惯用文字逻辑的论述不同,这一学派的经济学家更习惯于运用高深的数学。通过求解复杂的数学规划,他们试图告诉人们,对于委托人而言,究竟应该怎样设计和委托人的契约,才能使自己获益最大。 在詹森教授看来,契约理论虽然研究了各种契约构成带来的可能影响,而对现实中会出现怎样的契约并没有进行探究,而委托亅代理理论则正好相反。如果将两个理论结合起来,就既能找到现实中可能出现的契约,又能研究其经济影响。本着这种思想,在1976年的一篇重要论文中,詹森及其合作者麦克林一起提出了“代理成本理论”。 要理解这个理论,首先要明白什么是代理关系。在詹森和麦克林看来代理关系被定义为由委托人与代表委托人进行工作的代理人订立的契约,这种契约可以是明的,也可以是暗的。需要指出的是,在詹森他们的语境中,代理关系比我们通常理解的要宽泛。只要有多人之间的合作,就存在着代理关系,委托人和代理人之间并不存在人们通常理解的不对等关系。例如,两位作者合写文章,合作的一方就和另一方就构成代理关系。 如果委托人和代理人都是效用最大化的追求者,那么就有理由相信代理人不会总按委托人的利益而行事。为了保证委代双方的利益一致,委托人就需要订立适当的契约来限制代理人利益上和行为上的偏差,这种契约的设计,就是委托亅代理理论研究的范畴,而这种契约的决定显然就需要承担一定的成本,这种成本就是“代理成本”。 比较正式地,詹森和麦克林将“代理成本”定义为:为设计、监督和约束利益冲突的代理人之间的一组契约所必须付出的成本,加上执行契约时成本超过利益所造成的剩余损失。具体来说,“代理成本”分为三个部分:①监督成本,顾名思义,即委托人用于管理代理人行为的费用。②担保成本,即代理人保证不采取损害委托人行为的费用,以及如果采取了那种活动,代理人将赔偿委托人的费用。③剩余成本,即由于代理人的决策和使委托人的利益最大的决策之间存在着偏差

交易成本理论在企业供应链方面的应用

物流0741班曾明金 070700404621 论文题目:交易成本理论在企业供应链方面地应用 论文目录: 一、从交易成本经济学看交易成本 <一)交易成本经济学概述与其意义介绍 1、交易成本经济学概述 2、交易成本理论提出地现实意义 <二)交易成本地分类及其相关内容 1搜寻和信息成本 2监督和执行成本 3讨价还价和决策成本 <三)产生交易成本地原因及其相关内容 二、从交易成本理论看供应链地产生、发展与其管理控制 <一)供应链地概述及供应链地产生与发展 1 供应链地概述 2 供应链地产生与发展 <二)影响供应链节点企业间交易成本地因素 1 交易地频率 2 交易地不确定性 3 资产地专用性 <三)供应链管理减少节点企业间交易成本地过程分析. 三、香港利丰集团地实践与应用 <一)香港利丰集团地简介 <二)利丰集团地供应链管理与交易成本控制 四、结语 五、参考文献 概述:2008年世界性金融危机爆发,随之垄断世界第一汽车制造商上百年历史地通用宣告破产重组,再到丰田<通用之后地世界第一汽车制造商)地严重全球召回事件,我们可以清楚地看到供应链上地企业是一荣俱荣,一损俱损.由此可见如何提高整条供应链地整体质量与整体竞争力是现代企业急需解决地问题.供应链上地各企业除了追求自身利益外,还应不断减少各环节地交易成本包括企业内部交易成本和企业外部交易成本一同去追求供应链整体长期地竞争力和盈利能力. 关键词:交易成本供应链管理交易成本控制利丰集团

一从交易成本经济学看交易成本 <一)交易成本经济学概述与其意义介绍 1、交易成本经济学概述 交易成本经济学,是新制度经济学当中惟一在实证检验方面成功地领域.交易成本经济学是融法学、经济学和组织学为一体地、新颖地边缘学科. 以威廉姆森为代表地交易成本经济学.他们认为,市场运行及资源配置有效与否,关键取决于两个因素:一是交易地自由度大小,二是交易成本地高低. 在一定地社会关系中,人们自愿交往、彼此合作达成交易所支付地成本,也即人—人关系成本.它与一般地生产成本<人—自然界关系成本)是对应概念.交易成本指达成一笔交 易所要花费地成本,也指买卖过程中所花费地全部时间和货币成本.包括传播信息、广告、与市场有关地运输以及谈判、协商、签约、合约执行地监督等活动所费地成本.交 易成本理论是由科斯(Coase, R.H., 1937>所提出.他在《企业地性质》一文中认为交 易成本是“通过价格机制组织生产地,最明显地成本,就是所有发现相对价格地成本”、“市场上发生地每一笔交易地谈判和签约地费用”及利用价格机制存在地其他方面地成本. 2、交易成本理论提出地现实意义 从本质上说,有人类交往互换活动,就会有交易成本,它是人类社会生活中一个不可分割地组成部分.社会交易成本越小则社会交易活动就越是活跃,社会商业活动才会越发达.因为人们在进行经济活动时,总是面临着有限理性和信息不完全,这就使人们不可能在无交易成本地情况下进行决策.为此人们为实现商业交易地扩大而不断寻求交易成本地降低.企业供应链管理就是其中最有效地策略之一.企业在管理上要求紧密合作,共担风险,更要共享利益才能够打造一条强有竞争力地供应链;供应链上地各企业除了追求自身利益外,还应不断减少各环节地交易成本一同去追求供应链整体长期地竞争力和盈利能力;从技术上要求企业不断地运用新技术成果包括新地通讯工具,发展电子商务以更快更好地发 现交易对象促成交易,要求我国要加快三网合一战略不断完善信息流通平台 <二)交易成本地分类及其相关内容 本处主要分析市场交易成本,其主要可分为以下四类: 1搜寻和信息成本:商品信息与交易对象信息地搜集及取得交易对象信息与和交易对象进行信息交换所需地成本 2监督和执行成本:监督交易对象是否依照契约内容进行交易地成本,例如追踪产品、监督、验货等. 3讨价还价和决策成本:针对契约、价格、品质讨价还价地成本.进行相关决策与签订契约所需地内部成本. 4违约成本:违约时所需付出地事后成本.

第三类代理成本及其度量研究

第三类代理成本及其度量研究 作者:李虹段华友 财务与会计 2019年08期 一、代理成本及其分类 1976年,詹森(Jensen)和麦克林(Meckling)在《企业理论:管理行为、代理成本与所有权结构》一文中正式提出了代理成本理论。所谓代理成本,是指由于两权分离,代理人有机会损害委托人的经济利益而产生的相关成本。根据Jensen & Meckling(1976)的研究,代理成本的总和由委托人的监督成本、代理人的担保成本和剩余损失三部分组成。其中,委托人的监督成本是指委托人计量或观察代理人行为的成本,以及对代理人实施控 制的成本;代理人的担保成本是指代理人实施自我约束,以保证为委托人利益尽职勤勉的 成本;剩余损失是指委托人因代理人代行决策而产生的一种价值损失,等于代理人决策和 委托人在同等条件下采取的效用最大化决策之间的企业价值差异。 从代理成本的最初含义看,它关注的是委托代理中的成本。在西方发达资本市场中,由于保护投资者的法律比较健全,股权比较分散,关注职业经理人对股东利益的侵犯 是代理成本的主要方面,笔者称之为第一类代理成本(代理成本I)。在发展中国家,由于 投资者权益保护还不到位,内幕交易盛行,中小股东权益还可能被大股东、实际控制人等 盘剥,所以还存在第二类、第三类代理成本。第二类代理成本(代理成本II)是指因控股股东盘剥而造成的中小股东经济利益受损引发的相关成本。从某种意义上说,第二类代理 成本是股东之间的零和博弈,似乎不能称为代理成本。但由于控股股东是借助经理层之手,通过显失公允的价格进行关联交易、代垫费用、占用资金、帮忙担保等方式来实现盘剥的,其在损害中小股东经济利益的同时,也最终导致企业陷入财务困境,可以说是另一种代理 成本。第三类代理成本(代理成本III)是指股东利益被员工侵犯而造成的相关成本。这 种情形经济学上一般称为“工资侵蚀利润”。由于第三类代理成本主要存在于国有企业, 具有一定的代表性,笔者在此对第三类代理成本进行分析和探讨。 二、第三类代理成本的度量方法及研究的现实意义 第三类代理成本的度量主要采用间接方法,即按照拉克尔法则通过拉克尔系数来 度量。拉克尔法则是一个衡量职工收入水平是否合理、是否存在“工资侵蚀利润”或“利 润侵蚀工资”问题的准则。拉克尔(R.W.Rucker)在分析了美国50年的有关统计资料之后,发现工人工资与增值额是两个极为相关的经济变量,即工资应占全部增值额的 39.395%。如果某个企业的工资高于这一比例,应采取措施提高劳动生产率;若低于这个 比例,则应增加工人工资,否则企业不会达到“最佳经营”。由拉克尔法则引申出来的指 标称为“拉克尔系数”(Rucker coefficient)。也就是说,39.395%是拉克尔系数的黄金值,也是衡量企业工资水平是否合理的标杆。

代理理论与公司治理

委托代理理论出现的时代背景: 进入20世纪70年代后期到80年代,西方国家出现了新一轮的经济衰退,产品市场严重过剩,各国公司的管理重点从先前的生产控制转向风险控制,公司规模大大缩小甚至倒闭,从而引发了西方各国对公司治理问代理理论题的热烈讨论。 1、传统委托-代理理论与公司治理研究。 Jensen(1976)等人发表《企业理论:管理行为、代理成本与所有权结构》构建建立委托代理理论分析公司治理的基本框架。代理关系定义为一种契约,在这种契约下,一个人或更多的人(即委托人)聘用另一人(即代理人)代表他们来履行某些服务,包括把若干决策权委托给代理人。当股东与经理人员都是效用最大化者时,就有充分的理由相信,经理人员不会总以股东的最大利益行动,为了解决这个问题,股东必须给予经理人员适当的激励,以及通过提高约束代理人越轨活动监督费用,可使得双方利益偏差有限。另外,在某些情形下,为确保经理人员不采取某种危及股东的行动,由经理人员支付一笔费用(保证金)确保股东可以得到补偿。代理人的决策与使委托人福利最大化的决策之间会存在某些偏差,这种偏差是一种剩余损失。Jensen给出了代理成本的内容:(1)委托人的监督支出; (2)代理人的保证支付; (3)剩余损失。 委托—代理问题以及代理成本的出现来源于委托人与代理人之间的信息不完备和不对称,而这种不完备的信息导致双方无法签订完全契约,同时信息不对称迫使委托人向代理人支付租金(或进行转移支付),这些使得双方无法实现最优契约,最终选择次优契约均衡点(甚至是无效率契约均衡)。 2、传统委托—代理理论中的公司治理机制 1.内部控制机制对代理成本的降低 无法直接观察和判断经理人的努力程度和真实水平,这时所导致的双方信息差距就严重影响了契约均衡点的形成,解决这一问题的思路:一是让经理人自发的传递信息,二是通过内部控制机制的监督,股东通过观察来获取经理人的信息。 激励:在现代公司中,解决经理人在事后偷懒、内部交易等道德风险的重要机制设计是,在事前与经理人签订一份建立在可观测变量上的激励合约。所谓激励合约是通过在投资者(或董事会)与经理人之间订立隐性或显性合约,来实现把对经理人努力的补偿(年薪、股权或期权等)建立在企业业绩等可证实的指标上,从而使经理人在一定程度上,按照投资者的利益行事的一种激励手段。 监督:利用公司董事会与外部董事来监督经营者。由于在分散股权结构下,股东仅作为出资人不可能经常参与公司的经营活动和对经理人进行监督,所以股东将自身的权利赋予一个公司常设机构———董事会来代理他们对经理的经营活动进行监督,从而降低股东与经理人之间的信息不对称。有两个原因导致了董事会不能尽职:首先,事实上在股东与经理人员之间存在的信息不对称问题同样存在于股东与董事之间,董事很少拥有太多的公司股份,董事能否为股东利益着想很难得到保证;其次,在股权分散的情况下,往往经理人员对董事会成员的选举具有极强的影响力,董事会很容易被经理人员操纵。 2.外部控制机制对代理成本的降低。 通过市场竞争传递信号,从而能够对经理人员的效率和信息进行甄别。这种解决思路与80年代末发展起来的竞争理论相关联。竞争激励理论指的是竞争能产生一种非合同式的“隐含激励”( implicit incentives),这种隐含激励来自于三个方面的动力: (1)信息比较动力。竞争可以让企业经理人员的能力和努力程度更加充分公开,从而做到更有效的监督与激励经理人员。(2)生存动力。充分的竞争导致企业在市场中生存或死亡,经理

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