The Effects of Migration on Collective Action in the Commons- Evidence from Rural China
The E?ects of Migration on Collective Action in the
Commons:Evidence from Rural China q
YAHUA WANG a ,1,CHUNLIANG CHEN b and EDUARDO ARARAL c ,*
a
Tsinghua University,China
b
Development Research Center of the State Council,China
c
National University of Singapore,Singapore
Summary.—Over the past three decades,scholars have studied the e?ects of more than three dozen factors on collective action in the commons but little is known about the e?ects of rural to urban migration.We examine this question with the case of China,which has the world’s most extensive levels of rural to urban https://www.sodocs.net/doc/d217059341.html,ing OLS,Logit and Probit models and data from a survey of 1,780households from 18provinces,we ?nd that migration has a statistically signi?cant adverse e?ect on collective irrigation controlling for a large number of theoretically relevant variables.The e?ects of migration on collective action in the commons are possibly mediated by a number of factors frequently identi?ed in the literature,including leadership,social capital,sense of community,economic hetero-geneity,and dependence on resources.We speculate that massive out migration partly explains the signi?cant drop in the use of collec-tive canal irrigation and exacerbated the signi?cant increase in groundwater irrigation since the start of reforms in 1980s.These ?ndings have important policy implications for commons governance in China given that massive rural to urban migration will continue in the next decade.Because of the increasing rural to urban migration worldwide especially in developing countries,the ?ndings could also partly explain the deteriorating state of rural village infrastructure,natural common pool resources and ecological systems in many developing countries.
ó2016Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.
Key words —commons governance,collective action,labor migration,common pool resources,irrigation,China
1.INTRODUCTION
A longstanding academic challenge for scholars is to identify the factors that in?uence collective action in the commons.Over the past three decades,a signi?cant number of studies have been conducted to explore the e?ects of key factors on the performance of the commons,among which some early representative studies for example Wade (1987),Berkes (1989),Ostrom (1990),Tang (1992),and some recent works for example Fischer and Qaim (2012),Beitl (2014),Frey and Rusch (2014),Cox (2014).As a result,more than three dozen factors have been identi?ed in the literature as summarized in Agrawal (2001)and Ostrom (2009).These factors can be broadly categorized in terms of the physical characteristics of the goods (e.g.,excludability,rivalry in consumption,and scarcity),the attributes of the community (e.g.,group size,heterogeneity,and social capital),the institutional context (e.g.,communication,rules of use,monitoring and sanction-ing),and the broader external environment (e.g.,economic development,political stability,and technology),among others.
Despite this extensive literature,little is empirically known about the relationship between rural–urban migration and col-lective action in the commons.Does rural out-migration have an adverse e?ect on the ability of villagers to solve collective action problems in the commons?This question is important because rural–urban migration is an increasing global phe-nomenon especially among developing countries.
We examine this question using the case of irrigation sys-tems in China.Irrigation systems represent a logical unit of analysis in studying collective action in a common pool resource.This is because an irrigation system gives rise to various potential collective action problems such as appropri-ation,assignment,provision,and monitoring (Ostrom,Gardner,&Walker,1994;Suhardiman &Giordano,2014).
Irrigation systems in China have played a vital role in feed-ing the country and reducing vulnerability to uncertain rain-fall.Irrigated lands occupy half of China’s farmland but produce three-quarters of its grain and more than 90%of its cash crops.Historically,surface irrigation systems were dom-inant,but their use declined during the modern era,and they were gradually replaced by the growth of groundwater-based,smallholder irrigation,especially in northern China (Calow,Howarth,&Wang,2009).
In the 1950s,groundwater irrigation was virtually non-existent in northern China.In the mid-1970s,groundwater likely provided approximately 10–15%of the irrigation supply to the water-short provinces of the north.By the mid-1990s,however,this ?gure had risen to approximately 40%,and in some downstream provinces,such as Hebei,Shanxi,Henan and Shandong,the share of groundwater-irrigated areas increased to approximately 70%(Wang,Huang,Rozelle,Huang,&Blanke,2007;Wang,Huang,Rozelle,Huang,&Zhang,2009).
As a result,the prevalence of groundwater water pumps dra-matically increased over the past half-century.According to o?cial estimates,the number of wells in China was 138,300
*This work is jointly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71573151,71303132),the Major Program of the National Social Sciences Foundation of China (15ZDB164)and Tsinghua University Initiative Scienti?c Research Program (2014z04083).We are grateful for the comments from three anonymous reviewers and the editor.Also we thank Ms.Ye Tao and Mr.Li He for their research assistance.Any errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.Final revision accepted:July 15,2016.q
An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the Fifth Workshop on the Ostrom Workshop (WOW5)Conference held at Indiana University Bloomington on June 18–21,2014.
World Development Vol.88,pp.79–93,2016
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79
in1964,2.7million in1980,4.45million in2000,and by2011, the number had risen to approximately5.08million.In con-trast,according to the Chinese Rural Survey conducted by the China Institute for Rural Studies(CIRS)in2012,the pro-portion of households relying on canal irrigation has declined to one-third.
In the past three decades,China has experienced a rapid expansion of urbanization.In1982,21.13%of the population lived in urban areas;by2015this percentage had increased to 56.1%.This urbanization process was accompanied by massive migration.According to data provided by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics,in2014,the number of labor migrants from rural areas exceeded278million, which is nearly one-?fth of the total population in China and equivalent to three-quarters of the total population of the United States.Because the majority of rural–urban migrants are younger and more skilled workers,this massive migration has led to a major transformation in rural China, including,we speculate,the rapid decline of collective irrigation and a dramatic increase in the use of groundwater irrigation.
We make several contributions to the literature.First,China is an attractive case study because it has the world’s most extensive levels of rural to urban migration,but little is known about how migration a?ects collective action in the commons. Based on econometric analysis employing data from rural China,we?nd that out-migration has a statistically signi?cant adverse e?ect on collective action.Based on the literature,we explain the mechanisms through which out-migration a?ects collective action in the commons,i.e.,out-migration has neg-ative e?ects on village leadership,social capital and sense of community,economic heterogeneity,and dependency on a resource and how these factors in turn decrease the likelihood of collective action in the commons.
Second,our study is based on a survey of1780irrigation households in74villages from18provinces throughout China. In contrast,the empirical literature on China is limited to speci?c provincial/regional data,i.e.,Inner Mongolia(Qiao, Zhao,&Klein,2009),Yunnan(Ito,2012),and Northern China(Wang,Otto,&Yu,2013).Much of the literature on collective action in China examines environmental governance (Yee,Lo,&Tang,2013)and collective action among migrant workers in cities(Chan&Ngai,2009).Furthermore, much of the empirical literature on rural–urban migration in China has focused on patterns of migration(Wu,1994), impediments to migration(Scott,Guo,Shen,Hughart,& Giles,1999)and the consequences of the Hukou system (Chan&Zhang,1999;Cheng&Selden,1994),among other topics.To the best of our knowledge,this is the?rst study on collective action in the commons in China using large-N survey data.
Third,we also control for a variety of theoretically relevant factors that the literature cites as in?uencing collective action, namely,community attributes(household size,inequality, education of household head),physical attributes(proximity of villages to urban areas),geography(hilly areas,?ood plains),and water scarcity,among other factors.We speculate that these factors associated with out-migration jointly explain the signi?cant drop in the use of collective canal irrigation and exacerbated the signi?cant increase in groundwater irrigation since the start of reforms in1980s.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.In the next section,we discuss the literature about migration and collective action,and the conceptual framework of the in?uence of out-migration on collective action in the commons.In Section3,our survey methods and data,the construction and measurement of our dependent and indepen-dent variables,the descriptive statistics analysis,are discussed. In Section4,the econometric analysis results are presented and discussed,while conclusions and implications follow in Section5.
2.MIGRATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE
COMMONS
Rudel(2011)suggests three possible mechanisms through which out-migration a?ects collective action in the commons and the development of durable common pool institutions (CPIs).First,the prospect of higher wages elsewhere would raise the discount rates of participants in CPIs and reduce the salience of the commons with respect to their livelihoods. Alternatively,individuals considering long distance migration, such as unattached young men or women,might be reluctant to join a CPI because they will feel the opportunity cost of joining a local CPI.Second,accelerated rates of labor migra-tion,by increasing the mobility of capital and labor,present challenges to CPI participants committed to the long-term sus-tainability of the commons.Third,labor migration creates social pressures that shape organizations,preventing the cre-ation of new CPIs and undermining or destroying existing CPIs.
Although Rudel’s explanation of the e?ect of labor migration on CPIs provides valuable clues,we believe that the actual mechanisms operative in the real world are more complicated.According to the previous studies about migration and collective action,we speculate that out-migration a?ects collective action in the commons through?ve mechanisms,namely,leadership,social capital, sense of community,economic heterogeneity and resource dependency.
The?rst mechanism is leadership.It is widely believed that leadership exerts a considerable in?uence on the results of col-lective action(Meinzen-Dick,Raju,&Gulati,2002).The involvement of a charismatic or trusted individual reduces the transaction costs of organizing and provides assurance that makes individuals more willing to participate in collective action(Baland&Platteau,1999;Kolavalli,1995).For instance,the presence of college graduates and in?uential elders had a strong positive e?ect on the establishment of irrigation organizations in a strati?ed sample of48irrigation systems in India(Meinzen-Dick,2007).The increased rate of rural–urban migration causes a massive brain drain,leading to decreased rural human capital and a lack of rural elite talents.The loss of leadership resources thus reduces the likelihood of organizing successful collective action.
The second is social capital.In situations in which the social capital of formalized groups is high,individuals have the con-?dence to invest in collective activities,knowing that others will also do so(Pretty,2003).Similarly,in communities char-acterized by close social proximity(with low transaction costs and frequent communication),where community members place a greater premium on the importance of social norms, collective action in common property resource management is likely to succeed(Runge,1986).Studies also show that a lar-ger number of exit options reduces cooperative capacity,as it weakens social cohesion(Bardhan,1993)and increases the costs of enforcing rules,thereby exerting further negative impacts on collective resource management(Stern,Dietz,& Ostrom,2002).Labor migration weakens local social connec-tions and attenuates social capital in rural villages,which
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reduces individuals’con?dence and incentive to invest in col-lective activities.
The third,sense of community,is closely related with the con-cept of social capital,which fundamentally refers to an individ-ual’s experience of community life(Hyde&Chavis,2007; Mannarini&Fedi,2009).In terms of its motivating power,a sense of community is considered a catalyst for social involve-ment and participation in the community(Chavis& Wandersman,1990;Davidson&Cotter,1986),and evidence of the connection between a sense of community and participa-tion is generally consistent across cultures and social groups (Albanesi,Cicognani,&Zani,2007;Cicognani et al.,2008; Prezza&Costantini,1998).As Klandermans(2002)demon-strates,a positive relationship with the community could strengthen group identi?cation,which reinforces collective action.
In this regard,labor migration exerts a signi?cantly negative impact on rural residents’sense of community,as the number of persons who remain in the village all year has dramatically declined,leading to decreased time for individuals to partici-pate in community life and interact with other rural residents. This undermines the shared emotional connection with other members and reduces the bene?ts that individuals derive from their participation in rural community activities or collective action.
The fourth factor is economic heterogeneity.Poteete and Ostrom(2008)argue that the relationship between heterogeneity and collective action is nonlinear and contingent upon many factors.Among the various forms of heterogeneity,we focus on economic heterogeneity or inequality.Many studies con?rm that farmer groups that are internally di?erentiated on the basis of income or resources are not as successful at collective action as groups that are more homogeneous(Harris,2008;Naidu,2009; Ruttan,2008).
For instance,Easter and Palanisami(1986)?nd that the smaller the variances in farm size among farmers,the more likely they are to form water user associations.Tang(1992) reports a negative relationship between variance in average family income among irrigators and the degree of rule confor-mance and maintenance activity.Because rural migrant wages are signi?cantly higher than those of rural residents(Taylor, Rozelle,&de Brauw,2003),labor migration would increase inequality and thereby produce negative e?ects on farmer par-ticipation.
The?nal mechanism is resource dependency.Runge(1986) and Ostrom(2000)contend that greater dependence on a resource creates incentives for cooperation.Transitioning out of rural areas to urban cities and from the agricultural sec-tor to the industrial and service sectors would reduce migrants’dependence on rural resources and their willingness to invest in rural infrastructure such as irrigation.An empirical study in Gansu Province of China?nds that out-migration is nega-tively associated with water use per unit planting area(Castro, Heerink,Shi,&Qu,2010).Another empirical study in Wes-tern China con?rms that migration has a signi?cant negative in?uence on physical and natural capital(Li,Li,Feldman, Daily,&Li,2012).As a result,the weaker dependence on resources associated with labor migration could,in turn, weaken the motivation to engage in collective action such as irrigation system maintenance.
Based on the above discussion,we hypothesize that out-migration has an adverse e?ect on collective action in the commons through its e?ects on leadership,social capital, sense of community,economic heterogeneity,and resource dependence.3.DATA,VARIABLES,AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
(a)Survey methods and data
The survey data used in the current study constitute a subset of a comprehensive,large-scale survey organized by the China Institute for Rural Studies(CIRS)at Tsinghua University in 2012.The aim of this survey was to collect information on the production and living situations,especially migration and irrigation,of rural households.Approximately600uni-versity students,the majority of whom were majoring in agriculture-related subjects at various prominent universities in Beijing,including Tsinghua University and China Agricul-tural University,were recruited and trained at Tsinghua University in basic survey and interview techniques by two survey experts from CIRS.
These trained surveyors were divided into97groups and sent to17provinces and5autonomous regions to conduct the survey.For convenience,most surveyors worked in their home province.In general,purposive sampling was required and implemented both at the village and household levels. That is,in each province or autonomous regions,with the assistance of local o?cers and cadres,we chose5–15represen-tative villages according to the economic development level; and in each village,our interviewers asked local cadres to choose20–30representative village households from each the upper,middle,and lower income levels.In total,5165 completed household survey questionnaires and205village-level questionnaires from22provinces were returned.
The questionnaire covered seven major topics:land trading and transfers,irrigation,education,health and rural hygiene, rural?nance,cooperatives,and other organizations in rural areas,and the well-being of the elderly and children in rural villages.In short,the survey provides a comprehensive picture of rural China.
One of the most noteworthy characteristics of the survey design in the current study is that it contained related informa-tion at both the village and household levels.To the best of our knowledge,few studies have been designed to analyze col-lective irrigation at both levels.However,it must also be noted that this design was not implemented without di?culty.For example,in certain regions,the completeness and quality of responses varied signi?cantly at both the household and vil-lage levels.Moreover,for those villages with fewer than10 valid households,it is conceivable that the quality of the sur-vey may be less than satisfactory.
With these two considerations in mind and matching village data to household data,the subsample we included in the cur-rent study was signi?cantly reduced to1780households in74 villages from18provinces2of China.This subsample is nev-ertheless much larger than those typically reported in the empirical literature and is overall regionally representative. Moreover,the test for attrition bias has been done,and fortu-nately there is no sample selection bias.
(b)Framework and variables
(i)Conceptual framework
Ostrom et al.(1994),Araral(2008)and many others sug-gests that collective action in the commons can be explained by three general factors,namely the physical attributes of the common pool resource,the attributes of the community and households as well as the institutional context.Following the extensive literature on governance of the commons and what we know about the e?ects of rural–urban migration, we propose a conceptual framework adapted from the
THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE COMMONS:EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA81
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)framework (Ostrom,2005)in Figure 1,to show the relationships among our dependent,independent,and control variables.
In this framework,the physical attributes of the resource—for example,scarcity—a?ects the attributes of the community (e.g.size of the village,likelihood of migration),which in turn a?ects and is a?ected by the institutional context.For exam-ple,water scarcity can leave to the adoption of water sharing rules in the village,which can a?ect the farm sizes.Below we discuss in more depth the theoretical relevance and challenges of measuring our variables.
In summary,our dependent variable is the likelihood of col-lective action.Our independent variable is the extent of out migration.Our control variables include the physical attri-butes of irrigation (topography,village location relative to urban areas,and water scarcity),community and household characteristics (village size,wealth inequality)and micro-institutional context (monitoring and enforcement,village governance).The hypothesized e?ects of these variables on collective action are summarized in Table 1below.
(ii)Dependent variable
A widely acknowledged challenge in empirically studying the determinants of collective action in irrigation is identifying the appropriate measurement of the dependent variable or the degree of collective action.Thus far,two main approaches to measuring collective action have been suggested.
The ?rst approach is to assess the outcome of successful col-lective action using indicators,e.g.,maintenance status of irri-gation facilities,where the relative absence of con?icts or rule violations in rural or community irrigation systems is de?ned as good maintenance and active participation (Bardhan,2001);the magnitude of free riding includes both monetary and labor free riding among users of an irrigation system (Araral,2009).The second approach is the direct measurement of collective action.For instance,Fujiie,Hayami,and Kikuchi (2005)proxy for collective action by counting successfully organized collective activities,such as collective lobbies,and joint main-tenance of canals and tanks.Some studies such as Meinzen-Dick et al.(2002)employ both approaches,i.e.,a direct indi-cator of irrigation organization and an outcome indicator of collective action.
This study introduces a somewhat di?erent but also illumi-nating indicator to denote di?erent levels of collective action.Speci?cally,we assign an ordered dummy variable for di?erent types of irrigation arrangements,with 3being the highest score and assigned to open canal irrigation,2to well irrigation,1to lift irrigation and 0to relying exclusively on rain-fed irriga-tion.
These rankings were based on the widely recognized facts that the coordination and cooperation required for maintain-ing open canal irrigation are the highest,that intensive coordi-nation is not particularly essential to the maintenance of well and lift irrigation,and that rain-fed irrigation has the lowest cooperation requirements.Although somewhat subtle and indirect,an obvious advantage of this form of measurement is that only the more objective or observable information regarding the irrigation type in use needs to be taken into con-sideration.In contrast,ex-ante self-reported maintenance e?orts or inputs from households might su?er from exaggera-tion bias in certain circumstances or from the subjective appraisal of maintenance status as recalled by interviewees.Nevertheless,to maintain comparability with the existing liter-ature,we repeat key regressions for collective action with tra-ditional dependent variables such as the frequency of participation in collective irrigation maintenance or village irrigation meetings at the household level and use them as robustness checks for our baseline regressions that use this novel collective action
measurement.
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(iii)Independent variables
Largely consistent with the empirical commons literature,we include four sets of variables to classify the determinants of col-lective irrigation:natural conditions,community attributes, institutional arrangements and household characteristics.The variable we emphasize in this study is labor migration in the subset of community attributes,one of the most important facets of the urbanization process in developing economies, which is highly stressed in development models but has surpris-ingly been less explored in the commons literature
Labor migration
Development economists have long noted labor migration from rural to urban areas as a key factor for boosting eco-nomic development in developing countries.It revitalizes con-siderable residual laborers in rural areas and raises the marginal productivity of rural land production on the one hand and lowers wage costs for the urban service and manu-facturing sectors on the other hand.However,labor migration is also associated with side e?ects and new challenges for tra-ditional villages.From the discussion in Section2,we expect that labor migration would have a negative e?ect on collective irrigation.We use three indicators measuring labor migration: (1)LMIGRATION is the share of households with out-migrants in the total number of village households;(2)LMI-GRATION2is the share of out-migrants in the village total population;and(3)LMIGRATION3is the share of out-migrants in the total village labor force.We use LMIGRA-TION to estimate a baseline regression and leave the other two indicators for a robustness check.
Other community attributes
In addition to labor migration,we employ two other vari-ables to account for socioeconomic di?erences at the village level,namely,village size and income heterogeneity,denoted by the Gini coe?cient,which may in?uence the collective irri-gation preference at the household level.
Village size:The e?ect of the size of user groups on col-lective action remains a complex and controversial issue (Poteete&Ostrom,2004).As Meinzen-Dick,Brown, Feldstein,and Quisumbing(1997)argue,group size repre-sents a tradeo?between potential economies of scale and an increase in transaction costs.On the one hand,the larger the community,the more di?cult it will be to main-tain the institutions and rules governing local collective resources or commons due to mounting coordination costs and free rider problems associated with increasing numbers of participants.As collective irrigation frequently exhibits characteristics of an economy of scale,in communities and villages with larger populations,it may be increasingly preferred or bene?t more individuals while featuring decreasing unit costs.In this sense,the impact of village size on collective irrigation is uncertain and contingent upon the relative forces of mounting coordination costs and bene?ts from economies of scale(Araral,2009).We use the total number of households in a village as a measurement of village size.
Income heterogeneity:According to Agrawal and Gibson (1999),heterogeneity a?ects the prospects for developing trust among participants,and thus the likelihood of successful collective action,because of its e?ect on the divergence of interests.Income heterogeneity among farmers,as discussed in the summary in Section2,is more likely to be a critical fac-tor that hinders successful collective action.In line with con-vention,we calculate income inequality measures to capture heterogeneity at the village level based on corresponding household income data.A Gini index measuring village-level family income inequality is used to estimate the baseline regressions.
Table1.Variables de?nition and expected impact on collective irrigation
Dependent variables De?nition Expected sign ODCA Irrigation types:0=rain-fed;1=lift;2=well;3=open cannel n
CLTMTN Frequency of participation in collective maintenance:2=often;1=normal;0=seldom or never n
CLTMET Frequency of attending village meetings related to irrigation:2=often;1=normal;0=seldom or never n Independent variables
Community attributes
LMIGRATION The share of households with out-migrants in total village householdsàLMIGRATION2The share of out-migrants as proportion of village total populationàLMIGRATION3The share of out-migrants as proportion of total village labor sizeà
GINI Gini index:village level family income inequality measureàTOTALHOUSE Village size:the number of total households Uncertain Natural conditions
TOPOGRAPHY Plain=1and0otherwise+
LOCATION Non-suburban village=1and0otherwise+ MIRRIGTSCAR Moderate water scarcity at village level=1and0otherwise+ SIRRIGTSCAR Severe water scarcity at village level=1and0otherwiseà
Institutional arrangements
VPAFAILURE Village governance failure:1for petitions and con?icts,0otherwiseàVSANCTION Monitoring&sanctioning rules:1for imposing rules against free riders,0otherwise+
Household characteristics
HLABOR Household labor:percentage of labors in household+ IGTSHORTAGE Irrigation shortage history:1=never;5=frequentàIMPTSHORTAGE Impact of insu?cient irrigation:1=bad impact and0otherwise+ MDISTANCE Middle distance to public irrigation+ LGDISTANCE Long distance of village to public irrigation+/à
AGE Age of household head Uncertain
EDU Education of household head Uncertain THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE COMMONS:EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA83
Natural conditions
We include three variables,namely,topography,location, and water scarcity,to control for the geographic heterogeneity a?ecting collective irrigation arrangements.
Topography:We use a simple0–1dummy to denote topo-graphical di?erences,with1indicating plains and0indicating hilly or mountainous areas.The cost of the construction and maintenance of collective irrigation systems is obviously con-siderably lower in areas with plain topography,as there is less need to dig channels through hills and mountains.In addi-tional,economies of scale are more likely to be realized for a large irrigation system located on a plain than in hilly or mountainous areas.Hence,we expect that residents living on plains would prefer collective irrigation systems such as open canals to well irrigation.
Location:Studies suggest that greater access to market opportunities encourages participants to engage in collective actions(Meinzen-Dick et al.,2002).The distance to the near-est market is normally used as a proxy for access to market opportunities(Agrawal&Yadama,1997;Araral,2009).In this study,however,we do not have an exact distance mea-surement of this type.Instead,we introduce a related indicator as a substitute,i.e.,a dummy denoting the village location type,1for a non-suburban village and0otherwise.Consistent with the existing literature,we expect that proximity to a town would increase the tendency for collective irrigation,ceteris paribus.
Water scarcity:There is general agreement that collective action among resource users is unlikely unless they perceive that the resource is moderately scarce.In the case of irrigation systems,Agrawal(2002)and Bardhan(1993)suggest that resource scarcity and collective action are related in a curvilin-ear manner,that is,farmers are more willing to manage and maintain systems when water is neither extremely scarce nor extremely abundant but is only moderately scarce.A subse-quent study by Araral(2009)also contends that water scarcity has a curvilinear e?ect on collective action.Thus,we expect that water scarcity will have a curvilinear e?ect on the adop-tion of collective irrigation.For this study,we introduce two dummy variables to denote the relative water scarcity of farm-land,with MIRRIGTSCARE equaling1for moderate water scarcity and0otherwise and SIRRIGTSCARE equaling1 for severe water scarcity and0otherwise.Consistent with the curvilinear e?ect hypothesis,we expect that in the case of moderate water scarcity,the incentive for participating in collective action is greatest compared with severe and minimal water scarcity,meaning that the sign of MIRRIGTSCARE would be positive with minimal or severe water scarcity as the reference point.
Institutional arrangements
There is rich evidence in the empirical literature that the governance structure of an irrigation system a?ects the likeli-hood of collective action(Araral,2009;Lam,1998;Ostrom, 1990).In this study,we expect that the governance at the vil-lage level would in?uence the preference for collective irriga-tion.According to the data accessible in this survey,we construct two variables denoting the institutional arrange-ments at the village level.
The?rst is a dummy variable VPAFAILURE to denote the village governance level,with1denoting villages that had peti-tions in the last three years over land circulation and0other-wise.The need for a petition indicates that there have been con?icts that could be resolved at the village or local level, which re?ects a governance failure in the village that may jeop-ardize collective irrigation.
The second dummy variable VSANCTION denotes moni-toring and sanctioning rules,with1indicating the imposition of sanctions against privately cutting channels or evading irri-gation fees and0otherwise.We expect VPAFAILURE to take a negative sign in the regressions,while the sign of VSANC-TION is expected to be positive.
Household characteristics
Household-level heterogeneities also in?uence the prefer-ence for collective action,as noted in the literature.In this study,we include?ve variables to account for heterogeneity at the household level.
Household labor:The empirical literature reports that family size has positive e?ects on a farmer’s participation in irrigation (Khalkheili&Zamani,2009).Family size is generally associ-ated with shares of land and natural resources in villages,thus with larger family size,collective irrigation is more attractive at the household level because it improves resource manage-ment.Moreover,larger family size may also improve the labor supply available for collective irrigation.In this study,we use the percentage of laborers in a household to measure family size and expect that increasing this percentage will have a pos-itive e?ect on the preference for collective irrigation.
Distance to irrigation system:The distance from a house-hold’s land to the irrigation system is a variable commonly employed in the existing literature.There are two typical ways to measure distance,one is relative location to the irrigation system,such as upstream or downstream,and the second is absolute distance.In this survey,we adopt the?rst approach, using the two separate dummies of MDISTANCE and LGDISTANCE that denote the relative distance to the public irrigation system,namely,middle distance or long distance. According to the empirical literature,we expect that the incen-tive for collective irrigation is the highest for households at the middle distance,while for households at a long distance or located nearby,the incentive is diminished due to the decreas-ing bene?ts or relative water abundance.
Irrigation shortage history:Irrigation water scarcity may dis-courage a household from playing an active role in collective irrigation and encourage it to return to private watering (Kajisa,Palanisami,&Sakurai,2007).We use a simple evalu-ation variable IGTSHORTAGE with an integral value rang-ing from1to5to denote the relative historical irrigation shortage,with1representing never and5representing fre-quent.We expect that this variable will have a negative e?ect on the collective irrigation preference.
Impact of insu?cient irrigation:Dependence on resources has commonly been considered a positive factor for collective action in the literature,as per the discussion in Section2.The more important irrigation is to farmers,the more likely they will be to choose collective irrigation.In this study,we intro-duce a variable IMPTSHORTAGE for the impact of insu?-cient irrigation to denote the dependence on resources,with 1representing a negative impact and0representing no impact. It can be argued that the more in?uential irrigation scarcity is on household living conditions,the more proactive the house-hold will be in acquiring more reliable and e?ective irrigation. Thus,we expect that this variable for irrigation in?uence will have a positive sign in our regression.
Others:education and age:Finally,we also include the edu-cation and age of the head of household in our baseline regres-sion as control variables to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the household level.Unlike the previous sets of controls considering the household level,there is no consen-sus in the empirical literature on the signs of these two vari-ables(Huang,Rozelle,Wang,&Huang,2009;Khalkheili& Zamani,2009;Kiumars,Alibaygi,&Nasrin,2008).
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(c)Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics of the fundamental variables are presented in Table2.As shown in Table2,for the independent variables,on average,approximately45%of the sample households include out-migrants,Gini index on village level is0.39.In addition,21%of the villages are located in plains areas,87%of villages are non-suburban villages and nearly 43%and23%of households live and produce with modest water scarcity and severe water scarcity,respectively.
We also?nd that the percentage of labors in household is nearly two thirds;most farmers heavily reliant on irrigation; households face middle frequency of irrigation shortage in his-tory;approximately32%and15%of households,respectively, have farmland at a moderate or long distance to an irrigation system.Respondents also report village governance failure is measured to0.49,which means nearly half villages su?ered petitions over land circulation;monitoring and sanctioning rules is measured0.24,which means only one-quarter of vil-lages imposed sanctions for non-compliance.Regarding per-sonal characteristics,our sample interviewees are aged approximately47,and they generally have fewer than8years of schooling,that is,below middle school.These two indica-tors are quite comparable to the results of most rural surveys in China.
To present the relationship between labor migration and irrigation type,we conduct further descriptive statistics of group analysis as shown in Table3.The village with high out-migration rate(more than30%)has a much lower propor-tion of households choosing canal irrigation and well irriga-tion than the village with low out-migration rate.In contrast,the proportion of households choosing rain-fed irri-gation and lift irrigation is obvious higher in high out-migration village than in low out-migration village.These statistics are consistent with the exception that labor migration has a negative e?ect on collective irrigation.However,the other variables in the categories of natural conditions,institu-tional arrangements and household characteristics are related with irrigation type choice in group analysis.For example,the households living in plain area,moderate water scarcity condi-tion and villages with better governance,are more likely to choose collective irrigation;and the same for the households with the characteristics of locating in middle distance to irriga-tion system and seldom su?ering irrigation shortage.Although the above descriptive statistics support our hypnosis,multi-variate regression analysis is necessary to be developed to explore the mechanism of irrigation type choice,for many variables jointly a?ect the household behaviors of irrigation participation.
4.ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND RESULTS
(a)Regression methodology
We use an ordered probit model to empirically test the impacts of labor migration combined with the other factors on farmer preferences for collective irrigation in rural areas. The dependent variable is an ordered dummy denoting di?er-ent degrees of collective irrigation.Thus,the ordered probit model is an appropriate choice for performing the economet-ric analysis.The model can reveal the in?uence of each vari-able in determining the probability of choosing collective irrigation.
In general,typical challenges in obtaining a consistent esti-mate include unobserved heterogeneity,omitted variable bias, and measurement error in both the dependent and control variables.Unobserved heterogeneity denotes that although some unobserved factors might a?ect irrigation arrangements in speci?c places,information on these factors could not be obtained through questionnaires.We trigger or minimize this type of bias in the following two ways.
First,we include sets of all common indicators believed to be important factors in explaining collective irrigation to absorb the observed heterogeneity at both the village and household levels.Second,for?xed factors such as the climate, cultural features and water abundance of a certain region, which may also in?uence irrigation arrangements in speci?c areas but could not be taken into account in the model,we added province dummies to the model.
Table2.Variables descriptive statistics
Variables Description Mean Std.Dev.Min.Max.
Dependent variable N=1780
ODCA Di?erent irrigation types(3=open canal) 1.79 1.2103 Independent variables
LMIGRATION Percentage of households with out-migrants0.450.8901 GINI Gini index on village level0.390.120.110.75 TOTALHOUSE Ln(number of total households) 5.83 1.05 2.307.56 TOPOGRAPHY1=plain;0otherwise0.210.4101 LOCATION1=non-suburban village;0otherwise0.870.3401 MIRRIGTSCAR1=modest water scarcity;0otherwise0.430.4901 SIRRIGTSCAR1=severe water scarcity;0otherwise0.230.4201 VPAFAILURE1=petitions and con?icts;0otherwise0.490.5001 VSANCTION1=rules existence;0otherwise0.240.4301 HLABOR Percentage of labors in household0.620.2501 IGTSHORTAGE1=never;5=frequent 2.24 1.1815 IMPTSHORTAGE1=bad impact;0otherwise0.780.4201 MDISTANCE1=middle distance;0otherwise0.320.4701 LGDISTANCE1=long distance;0otherwise0.150.360.001 AGE Age of household head(years)47.4112.921588 EDU Years of education of household head7.41 3.42015 Note:Please refer to Table1and Section3.2for more detailed description of the variables.
THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE COMMONS:EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA85
Provided that these factors are constant at the provincial level,our provincial?xed e?ect framework would signi?cantly reduce the bias caused by this type of unobserved heterogene-ity and omitted variable bias.With regard to possible mea-surement error for both the dependent and control variables, we use di?erent measures for those likely su?ering from mea-surement errors or simply dropped the unsatisfactory mea-surements and observed whether our main estimates remained comparable.
(b)Baseline regression
In this subsection,we report the results of the baseline regression with and without provincial?xed e?ects,taking into account the impacts of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
The?rst part of the results concerning baseline regression are presented in Table4,in which columns(1)and(2)are exact pair-wise estimates and those in column(2)further con-trol for provincial?xed e?ects to address unobserved hetero-geneity or omitted bias at the provincial level.The di?erence between columns(3)and(4)and column(2)is that we add controls for a long distance to the irrigation system in column (3)and a severe water scarcity indicator in column(4)to more precisely assess the curvilinear e?ects of distance and water scarcity on collective irrigation.
Overall,the estimates from columns(1)to(4)show the goodness of?t of our regression models.Most variables have the expected signs and are signi?cant in most speci?cations. Labor migration has a signi?cantly negative impact on collec-tive irrigation,consistent with our expectations.Moving from column(1)to columns(2)–(4),which include provincial?xed e?ect controls,the coe?cients of labor migration are uni-formly larger,which indicates that the omission of unobserved heterogeneity may cause an underestimate of the impact of labor migration on collective irrigation.The estimates of labor migration from columns(2)to(4)are relatively comparable in magnitude,thereby improving our con?dence that the esti-mates are to some extent robust and less likely to su?er from speci?cation bias.
For other community attributes,increasing heterogeneity as captured by the village Gini coe?cient has a consistently neg-ative e?ect,which is consistent with studies by Chambers and Conway(1992)and Stern et al.(2002)while contradicting other studies(Bardhan,1999).The result here shows that increasing the village size has a positive impact,indicating that the bene?ts of economies of scale in an irrigation system over-ride the e?ect of increased coordination costs.
In natural conditions,it is less costly both to build and maintain collective irrigation facilities such as channels in plains than in hilly mountains,and thus residents of plains areas had a signi?cantly greater preference for collective irri-gation,as shown in Table4,which is highly consistent with the empirical literature(Agrawal,2002;Araral,2009; Bardhan,1993;Ito,2012).
Consistent with the hypothesis regarding the curvilinear e?ect of water scarcity,both in the?rst three columns using severe and minimal water scarcity as reference points and in the fourth column using solely the minimal water scarcity indi-cator as a baseline,the estimates for the indicator of moderate scarcity are unanimously positive and signi?cant.This indi-cates that the incentive for participating in collective irrigation is greatest in this case compared with those of severe or min-imal water scarcity.The signi?cantly positive estimates of the proximity to town from columns(1)to(4)show that non-suburban villages prefer collective irrigation more than suburban ones,which means that for villagers located far from a town or county seat,the incentive for collective irrigation is
Table3.Irrigation type distribution of di?erent group
Rain-fed Lift Well Canal Migration
LMIGRATION=HIGH40.9222.997.3728.74 LMIGRATION=LOW16.3917.0220.4546.14 Natural conditions
TOPOGRAPHY=1 6.2313.0339.3841.36 TOPOGRAPHY=026.8519.9611.3741.82
MIRRIGTSCAR=114.8121.7413.7249.73 SIRRIGTSCAR=131.0121.8818.7528.37 Institution arrangements
VPAFAILURE=127.1917.9617.7237.13 VPAFAILURE=018.2719.0716.5746.08
VSANCTION=114.4621.3219.8544.36 VSANCTION=025.1517.6616.2840.9 Household characteristics
IGTSHORTAGE=SELDOM15.9219.4215.7348.93 IGTSHORTAGE=OFTEN32.6517.219.2430.9
IMPTSHORTAGE=123.3717.9817.4541.2 IMPTSHORTAGE=019.9520.4716.0143.57
MDISTANCE=027.7318.2617.2336.78 MDISTANCE=111.8919.116.9452.07 LGDISTANCE=115.6925.499.849.02 86WORLD DEVELOPMENT
greater,consistent with the prevailing hypothesis that market opportunity may encourage villagers to opt out of non-agricultural opportunities,thereby discouraging collective action(Agrawal&Yadama,1997;Bardhan,1999;Dillon, 2011;Meinzen-Dick et al.,1997).
The results regarding the impact of institutional arrange-ments at the village level generally meet our expectations.Less satisfactory governance,represented by more petitions and con?icts in villages,tends to reduce the incentives for collective irrigation,while when there are monitoring and sanctioning rules against free riders and rule violators,collective irrigation is preferable,which is consistent with the broader literature (Araral,2011;Gibson,Williams,&Ostrom,2005).
With respect to the impacts of household characteristics on collective irrigation,the estimates in Table4show that a larger share of laborers in a given household signi?cantly increases the incentives for collective irrigation,a history of water short-ages has a signi?cant adverse e?ect on the preference for col-lective irrigation,and the impact of insu?cient irrigation on family living has a positive e?ect but one that is insigni?cant in columns(1)–(4).Concerning the impact of the distance from farmland to the irrigation system,the estimates in
Table4.The determinants of participation in collective irrigation
Variables Dep.=ordered collective irrigation(odca)
(1)(2)(3)(4) LMIGRATIONà0.133***à0.191***à0.187***à0.188***
(0.041)(0.049)(0.049)(0.050)
Other community attributes
GINIà1.493***à1.516***à1.489***à1.566***
(0.233)(0.269)(0.270)(0.275) TOTALHOUSE0.163***0.182***0.180***0.171***
(0.029)(0.033)(0.033)(0.034)
Natural conditions
TOPOLOGY0.420***0.601***0.599***0.613***
(0.071)(0.101)(0.101)(0.102) LOCATION0.0670.1600.167*0.196*
(0.087)(0.100)(0.100)(0.102) MIRRIGTSCAR0.352***0.236***0.221***0.146*
(0.058)(0.070)(0.071)(0.087) SIRRIGTSCARà0.137
(0.092)
Institution arrangements
VPAFAILUREà0.256***à0.157**à0.152**à0.140**
(0.056)(0.063)(0.063)(0.064) VSANCTION0.167**0.171**0.160**0.170**
(0.065)(0.077)(0.077)(0.077)
Household characteristics
HLABOR0.410***0.196*0.206*0.207*
(0.108)(0.113)(0.114)(0.114) IGTSHORTAGEà0.190***à0.140***à0.143***à0.138***
(0.024)(0.026)(0.026)(0.027) IMPTSHORTAGE0.0680.0940.0960.092
(0.067)(0.074)(0.074)(0.074) MDISTANCE0.447***0.386***0.448***0.451***
(0.060)(0.063)(0.066)(0.066) AGE0.002à0.005**à0.005**à0.006**
(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)(0.002) EDUà0.010à0.017*à0.017*à0.018*
(0.009)(0.009)(0.009)(0.009) LGDISTANCE0.244***0.246***
(0.084)(0.084) Province?x No Yes Yes Yes Observations1,7801,7801,7801,780
chi2357.4636.9645.5647.7
r2_p0.07630.1360.1380.138 Standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01.
**p<0.05.
*p<0.1.
THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE COMMONS:EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA87
columns(1)to(4)show that farmland at a middle distance is associated with the largest incentive to join collective irriga-tion,while for those at a long distance,the incentive to join is also positive and signi?cant but slightly smaller,as shown in columns(3)and(4).Note that in columns(1)and(2),the reference point for the distance dummy is the non-middle dis-tance location including both the upper stream and the lower stream,while in columns(3)and(4),the upper stream serves as a reference point.Thus,the coe?cient of middle distance increased slightly from column(2)(0.386)to column(3) (0.448),providing additional indirect evidence consistent with the prevailing observation that the middle location has the lar-gest incentive for collective irrigation.
Age and education present negative signs and are signi?cant in the last three columns.This implies that the elder group may have less interest in participating in collective irrigation, which is consistent with the empirical result of Li et al. (2012)in China.Moreover,a farmer with higher education may also exhibit a lower level of participation,which is consis-tent with the empirical result of Agrawal and Gupta(2005)in Nepal.However,the e?ects of age and education do not always hold in the following robustness check.Therefore we speculate that the e?ects of age and education on choosing an irrigation organization method are,to a large extent, context-dependent.
(c)Robustness check
To test the possible impacts of endogeneity and self-selection bias,the robustness check of the baseline regression has been reported in this subsection.We address the issues of unobserved heterogeneity,omitted variables and measure-ment error as follows.But there still remained a possible endo-geneity issue,i.e.,the reverse causality between dependent variable and independent variables,which cannot be examined completely for this study employs a single period dataset. However,we think the endogeneity issue caused by reverse causality is not a major problem,for migration is more in?u-enced by the rural–urban wage di?erentials,which is discussed brie?y as follows.
The above econometric analysis has reported a statistically signi?cant adverse e?ect of out-migration on collective irriga-tion.In theory,decline of collective irrigation may in?uence the households’decision to migrate.The possible mechanism is that lack of irrigation may reduce households’income from agricultural production and thus increase the incentive to migrate for higher income.However,such a possibility is very small in real China.According to the statistics of China in 2015,the income from agricultural production in annual income of farmers has dropped to one-quarter,less than aver-age monthly wages of out-migrant labors.Therefore,for the possible issue of reverse causality in this case,the overwhelm-ing mechanism is the out-migration explains the decline of col-lective irrigation,not vice versa.
(i)Accounting for measurement errors on the control side Table5reports the impact of possible measurement error in the labor migration indicator and income inequality measure on our baseline regression,with columns(1)–(2)using slightly di?erent measurements of labor migration and columns(3)–(5)replacing the Gini coe?cient with two other income inequality measures,MLD&LINCMSD.Due to the larger denominator used in constructing LMIGRATION2and LMI-GRATION3,the coe?cients rose slightly compared with those used in Table4for LMIGRATION.However,overall, the coe?cients of labor migration remain negative and signif-icant in columns(1)–(2)of Table5,and the estimates for the other control variables are generally comparable to or the same as their counterparts in Table4.These comparisons assure us that the baseline regressions are robust to possible measurement errors in the labor migration indicators. Roughly the same applies to the assessment of the measure-ment error of the income inequality measure,in that although there are di?erences in the magnitudes of the estimates,their
Table5.Accounting for measurement error of control variables
Variables Dep.=ordered collective irrigation(odca)
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5) LMIGRATION2à0.468*
(0.272)
LMIGRATION3à0.329***
(0.090)
LIMIGRATIONà0.239***à0.267***à0.244***
(0.050)(0.049)(0.047) MLDà0.854***
(0.150)
LINCMSDà0.210***
(0.044)
GINIà1.549***à1.697***à1.336***
(0.276)(0.281)(0.279)
(other controls omitted)
Province?x Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations1,7691,7351,7161,7161,770 chi2586.4622.6639.0629.1647.8 r2_p0.1260.1370.1420.1390.139 Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:(1)MLD=mean log deviation family income;(2)LINCMSD=the standard deviation of logs family income.
***p<0.01.
*p<0.1.
88WORLD DEVELOPMENT
signs and signi?cance in determining the preference for collec-tive irrigation are the same.Finally,in column(5),we elimi-nated water scarcity variables out of a concern that some variables at the village level may be closely correlated with similar controls at the household level.Similar coe?cients for the labor migration indicators in columns(3)–(5)indicate that our results in the baseline regression are less likely to be challenged by measurement errors in the other control vari-ables or speci?cations.
(ii)Repeating baseline regressions using traditional measures of collective irrigation
To maintain comparability with the existing literature,we use two other two traditional indicators,namely,the self-reported frequency of participation in maintaining a collec-tive irrigation system(CLTMTN)and the self-reported fre-quency of attending village irrigation-related meetings (CLTMET).Both of these are constructed as ordered dum-mies with2denoting frequent participation,1normal partic-ipation and0for the lowest frequency and serve as substitutes for our ordered collective irrigation measure to determine whether our key hypothesis that labor migration has a negative e?ect on participation in collective irrigation still holds.The results of this robustness check are presented in Table6.
In columns(1)and(2),we repeat the baseline speci?cation in Table4with provincial?xed e?ects using an ordered fre-quency indicator of participation in collective irrigation main-tenance and irrigation-related meetings as the dependent variables,respectively.In column(3)and column(4),we add a further control denoting who is responsible for irriga-tion maintenance,constructed as1for an irrigation unit o?ce, 2for a village committee and3for a water user association, duplicating the estimates in columns(1)and(2).Because this information is available only for a limited subsample,the sam-ple sizes are further reduced to1153and1167,respectively,as shown in Table6.Consistent with the?ndings in the baseline regressions,columns(1)–(4)show that labor migration uni-formly and signi?cantly discourages participation in collective irrigation,whether it be the maintenance of irrigation systems or attending irrigation-related meetings.In line with the liter-ature,the estimate for CANALMATAIN is positive,indicat-ing that more formal and bureaucratic control may hinder or substitute for the need and urge for self-coordination and cooperation among villagers in common pools.Finally,in Table6,the other control variables are generally of similar
Table6.Duplicating baseline regressions with traditional measure for collective irrigation
Variables CLTMTN CLTMET CLTMTN CLTMET
(1)(2)(3)(4) LMIGRATIONà0.588**à0.946***à1.106**à1.417***
(0.292)(0.284)(0.449)(0.453) GINIà1.142***à0.125à0.5180.199
(0.298)(0.303)(0.399)(0.395) TOTALHOUSE0.173***0.172***0.185***0.204***
(0.036)(0.037)(0.051)(0.052) TOPOGRAPHY0.408***0.252**0.177à0.001
(0.116)(0.121)(0.139)(0.135) LOCATION0.299***0.226**à0.144à0.048
(0.104)(0.106)(0.140)(0.143) MWATSCAR0.326***0.287***0.848***0.321***
(0.073)(0.075)(0.105)(0.100) VPAFAILUREà0.039à0.054à0.483***à0.224**
(0.067)(0.068)(0.092)(0.091) VSANCTIONà0.0130.109à0.193*0.079
(0.077)(0.078)(0.100)(0.101) HLABORà0.179à0.329***à0.332**à0.282*
(0.124)(0.126)(0.148)(0.150) IGTSHORTAGE0.003à0.0180.066*à0.004
(0.030)(0.031)(0.037)(0.038) IMPTSHORTAGE0.0090.138*à0.0630.067
(0.080)(0.081)(0.098)(0.099) MDISTANCE0.194***0.178***0.1010.240***
(0.066)(0.068)(0.079)(0.081) AGEà0.006**à0.007**à0.006*à0.010***
(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)(0.004) EDU0.031***0.0100.028**à0.005
(0.011)(0.011)(0.013)(0.013) CANALMATAIN0.251***0.062
(0.051)(0.049) Observations1,8631,8911,1531,167
chi2415.6323.4292.0162.4
r2_p0.1310.1140.1320.0837 Standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01,
**p<0.05,
*p<0.1.
THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE COMMONS:EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA89
sign,although in some circumstances of less signi?cance. Therefore,to save space,we do not proceed to discuss these ?ndings in further detail.In summary,these?ndings justify the rationale underlying our ordered collective irrigation mea-sure.
(iii)Repeating regressions with a village level sample Besides the biases related to unobserved heterogeneity, omitted variables and measurement error discussed above, there is still the risk that the subsample we used is not repre-sentative of the whole survey.We address this concern by repeating key regressions with a subsample covering more vil-lages,and restrict our empirical analysis of collective action in irrigation at the village level rather than at the household level. Notably,the collective irrigation variable we used for the vil-lage level regression is another ordered dummy constructed using evaluation points ranging from0to2such that2points denoted good maintenance and0denoted poor maintenance of irrigation facility,as maintenance outcome is commonly used as a measurement of level of participation,which could then also be viewed as providing a second opportunity to check whether our?ndings remain robust for di?erent collec-tive action measurements.
In addition to the control variables at the household level, we include similar control variables for the village regressions, and the results are presented in Table7.From columns(1)to (3),we used water endowment at the provincial level to account for provincial level heterogeneity.And in column (4)we control provincial?xed e?ects.In column(5)we calcu-lated marginal e?ect based on the setup of column(4).It is noteworthy that the coe?cients before the labor migration are all negative and signi?cant in columns(1)–(4),and are comparable in terms of magnitude,which means that our key hypothesis which argues that labor migration would dis-courage participation in collective irrigation can also be justi-?ed in a sample covering many more villages,and is less likely to be su?ering from sample selection bias.
(iv)Using di?erent models and marginal e?ects
To assess the impact of using di?erent estimation models on our results,the baseline regression in Table4is further
Table7.Repeating key regressions with village level data
Variables Dep.=ordered collective irrigation maintenance
(1)(2)(3)(4)Margins LMIGRATION3à0.228**à0.218**à0.264**à0.261*0.055*
(0.104)(0.100)(0.117)(0.139)(0.028)
Other community attributes
TOTALHOUSEà0.123à0.157à0.187à0.253*0.053*
(0.103)(0.106)(0.118)(0.144)(0.030) ECONOMYPOWERà0.395**à0.415**à0.388**à0.397*0.083*
(0.174)(0.177)(0.187)(0.221)(0.046)
Natural conditions
TOPOGRAPHY0.1540.3520.1980.143à0.030
(0.244)(0.277)(0.319)(0.368)(0.077) LOCATIONà1.231***à1.277***à1.368***à1.183***0.249***
(0.388)(0.390)(0.398)(0.431)(0.091) DISTOTOWN0.2750.3320.3900.189à0.040
(0.299)(0.302)(0.313)(0.371)(0.078)
Institution arrangements
VPAFAILUREà0.506**à0.520**à0.578**à0.483*0.102*
(0.213)(0.214)(0.226)(0.256)(0.053) VSANCTIONà0.353à0.347à0.335à0.0510.011
(0.244)(0.244)(0.254)(0.306)(0.064)
Provincial water endowment
WATERENDOW0.1650.352*14.594à3.068
(0.107)(0.180)(9.527)(1.977) RIVEREWATà0.606à20.175* 4.241**
(0.552)(10.295)(2.095) Province?x No No No Yes Yes Observations148148140140140
chi237.9240.3043.9879.54
r2_p0.1230.1310.1520.275
Standard errors in parentheses.
Notes:ECONOMYPOWER is village collective income,with1representing high income village,2representing middle and3representing low.DIS-TOTOWN is log(distance between village and the closet township).WATERENDOW is log(water endowment per capita for each province in2010). RIVEREWAT is the ratio of III class and above river length,which indicates river water quality for each province in2010.
***p<0.01.
**p<0.05.
*p<0.1.
90WORLD DEVELOPMENT
adjusted and estimated using na?¨ve OLS and the ordered logit model,and the results are presented in columns(1)and(2), respectively,of https://www.sodocs.net/doc/d217059341.html,pared with their counterparts in columns(2)and(3)of Table4,the estimates from the ordered logit model are similar or comparable,while the OLS results are slightly smaller for our key variable,labor migration,con?rming that the baseline regressions are better estimated using the ordered probit model rather than the OLS model.For column(4)in Table8,we calculate the mar-ginal e?ect of each variable based on estimates in column(3), duplicating the baseline speci?cation in column(3)in Table4. Consistent with previous regression?ndings,the impact of labor migration on choosing collective irrigation is underesti-mated in speci?cations lacking controls for provincial?xed e?ects.The calculation in column(4)tentatively suggests that
a one-percent rise in the labor migration rate will lead to a
4.5%increase in the probability of choosing private irrigation. Being located at a middle distance from an irrigation system tends to incentivize collective irrigation the most,increasing the probability of collective irrigation by10.7%compared with the upper or lower stream.Because the rural–urban migration rate has been very high in the past three decades, we can expect that the e?ect of labor migration on collective action is generally destructive in China.
5.CONCLUSIONS
The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the e?ects of labor migration on collective action in the commons litera-ture.Based on a survey of1780households from18provinces throughout China,we?nd that labor migration has a statisti-cally signi?cant adverse e?ect on participation in collective irrigation,controlling for the type of irrigation and a host of theoretically relevant variables.We speculate that the prob-lems of collective irrigation resulting from out-migration can partly explain,perhaps indirectly,the signi?cant decline in sur-face irrigation in China,and conversely,the signi?cant increase of groundwater irrigation since the1980s. However,we also speculate that labor migration is a critical but an intermediate variable a?ecting collective action through the other‘‘direct”factors frequently identi?ed in the literature,
https://www.sodocs.net/doc/d217059341.html,ing di?erent model and marginal e?ect
Variables(1)(2)(3)(4)
OLS Ologit Oprobit Margins LMIGRATIONà0.100***à0.373***à0.189***0.045***
(0.023)(0.096)(0.049)(0.011) GINIà1.175***à2.262***à1.464***0.345***
(0.216)(0.446)(0.269)(0.064) TOTALHOUSE0.125***0.322***0.180***à0.042***
(0.026)(0.057)(0.033)(0.008) TOPOGRAPHY0.461***0.951***0.595***à0.140***
(0.058)(0.168)(0.101)(0.024) LOCATION0.0100.309*0.156à0.037
(0.081)(0.168)(0.100)(0.024) MIRRIGTSCAR0.298***0.366***0.221***à0.052***
(0.056)(0.120)(0.071)(0.017) VPAFAILUREà0.240***à0.259**à0.153**0.036**
(0.055)(0.108)(0.063)(0.015) VSANCTION0.132**0.214*0.141*à0.033*
(0.060)(0.130)(0.076)(0.018) HLABOR0.384***0.350*0.207*à0.049*
(0.103)(0.191)(0.114)(0.027) IGTSHORTAGEà0.181***à0.229***à0.143***0.034***
(0.023)(0.044)(0.026)(0.006) IMPTSHORTAGE0.0610.1610.095à0.022
(0.066)(0.125)(0.074)(0.017) MDISTANCE0.505***0.796***0.452***à0.107***
(0.060)(0.113)(0.066)(0.016) LGDISTANCE0.325***0.391***0.249***à0.059***
(0.077)(0.141)(0.084)(0.020) AGE0.002à0.009**à0.006**0.001**
(0.002)(0.004)(0.002)(0.001) EDUà0.007à0.031*à0.017*0.004*
(0.008)(0.016)(0.009)(0.002) Province?x No Yes Yes n Observations1,7801,7801,7801,780
R-squared0.1820.1360.137
chi2638.7642.3
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01.
**p<0.05.
*p<0.1.
THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE COMMONS:EVIDENCE FROM RURAL CHINA91
including leadership,social capital,sense of community,eco-nomic heterogeneity,and dependence on resources.This sug-gests that the e?ects of migration on collective action in the commons are possibly mediated by a number of mechanisms. Similarly with the e?ect of labor migration,and consistent with the literature,we also?nd that collective action in irriga-tion is a?ected by proximity to urban centers or towns, increased inequality,lower levels of household labor,and in hilly areas,non-suburban villages and areas with a history of water shortages.Both water scarcity and distance to the irrigation system have a curvilinear e?ect on collective action, i.e.,farmers are more likely to participate in collective irriga-tion when water is moderately scarce and their farmland is located at a middle distance to water sources.Meanwhile,bet-ter village governance,and more monitoring and sanctioning rules would increase the likelihood to participate in collective irrigation as our expectations.Based on these?ndings,the pol-icy alternative to save the decline of collective irrigation is to improve the rural governance and institutional arrangements, for the certain biophysical and socioeconomic conditions are di?cult to change in the short term.
Although our econometric results are robust,there are nev-ertheless some limitations of this study.First,the sample size could be further enlarged to test the robustness of the?ndings, and the accumulation of time series dataset will provide more convincing evidence for the e?ects of labor migration and completely address the endogeneity concern.Second,some positive e?ects of migration on collective action have been omitted in the survey,e.g.remittances could be used to sup-port local schools,culture,infrastructure,or in general human capital,which could be explored in another survey.Third, more types of commons in China remain to be examined to enrich the theory of collective action in the commons. Although there is growing consensus regarding the critical fac-tors that in?uence collective action in the commons,the com-plex interactions among the factors remain to be studied to deepen the understanding of complex institutional arrange-ments in diverse socio-ecological settings.
Nevertheless,if con?rmed by further studies,our?ndings have important implications for the governance of the com-mons in the face of rising pressures for rural–urban migration. Because labor migration is a widespread phenomenon world-wide,especially in developing economies,the?ndings could perhaps partly explain the deteriorating state of rural village infrastructure,natural common pool resources and ecological systems in many developing countries.
NOTES
1.A visiting scholar2009–10at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis of Indiana University,Bloomington,USA.
2.There are22provinces,5autonomous regions and4direct munic-ipalities in China.Our sampling approach includes the provinces of Anhui,Chongqing,Fujian,Gansu,Guangxi,Guizhou,Hebei,Henan, Hubei,Hunan,Jiangsu,Jiangxi,Inner Mongolia,Ningxia,Shandong, Sichuan,Yunnan,and Zhejiang.
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93
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英语造句
一般过去式 时间状语：yesterday just now (刚刚) the day before three days ag0 a week ago in 1880 last month last year 1. I was in the classroom yesterday. I was not in the classroom yesterday. Were you in the classroom yesterday. 2. They went to see the film the day before. Did they go to see the film the day before. They did go to see the film the day before. 3. The man beat his wife yesterday. The man didn’t beat his wife yesterday. 4. I was a high student three years ago. 5. She became a teacher in 2009. 6. They began to study english a week ago 7. My mother brought a book from Canada last year. 8.My parents build a house to me four years ago . 9.He was husband ago. She was a cooker last mouth. My father was in the Xinjiang half a year ago. 10.My grandfather was a famer six years ago. 11.He burned in 1991
学生造句--Unit 1
●I wonder if it’s because I have been at school for so long that I’ve grown so crazy about going home. ●It is because she wasn’t well that she fell far behind her classmates this semester. ●I can well remember that there was a time when I took it for granted that friends should do everything for me. ●In order to make a difference to society, they spent almost all of their spare time in raising money for the charity. ●It’s no pleasure eating at school any longer because the food is not so tasty as that at home. ●He happened to be hit by a new idea when he was walking along the riverbank. ●I wonder if I can cope with stressful situations in life independently. ●It is because I take things for granted that I make so many mistakes. ●The treasure is so rare that a growing number of people are looking for it. ●He picks on the weak mn in order that we may pay attention to him. ●It’s no pleasure being disturbed whena I settle down to my work. ●I can well remember that when I was a child, I always made mistakes on purpose for fun. ●It’s no pleasure accompany her hanging out on the street on such a rainy day. ●I can well remember that there was a time when I threw my whole self into study in order to live up to my parents’ expectation and enter my dream university. ●I can well remember that she stuck with me all the time and helped me regain my confidence during my tough time five years ago. ●It is because he makes it a priority to study that he always gets good grades. ●I wonder if we should abandon this idea because there is no point in doing so. ●I wonder if it was because I ate ice-cream that I had an upset student this morning. ●It is because she refused to die that she became incredibly successful. ●She is so considerate that many of us turn to her for comfort. ●I can well remember that once I underestimated the power of words and hurt my friend. ●He works extremely hard in order to live up to his expectations. ●I happened to see a butterfly settle on the beautiful flower. ●It’s no pleasure making fun of others. ●It was the first time in the new semester that I had burned the midnight oil to study. ●It’s no pleasure taking everything into account when you long to have the relaxing life. ●I wonder if it was because he abandoned himself to despair that he was killed in a car accident when he was driving. ●Jack is always picking on younger children in order to show off his power. ●It is because he always burns the midnight oil that he oversleeps sometimes. ●I happened to find some pictures to do with my grandfather when I was going through the drawer. ●It was because I didn’t dare look at the failure face to face that I failed again. ●I tell my friend that failure is not scary in order that she can rebound from failure. ●I throw my whole self to study in order to pass the final exam. ●It was the first time that I had made a speech in public and enjoyed the thunder of applause. ●Alice happened to be on the street when a UFO landed right in front of her. ●It was the first time that I had kept myself open and talked sincerely with my parents. ●It was a beautiful sunny day. The weather was so comfortable that I settled myself into the
英语句子结构和造句
高中英语~词性~句子成分~语法构成 第一章节：英语句子中的词性 1.名词：n. 名词是指事物的名称，在句子中主要作主语.宾语.表语.同位语。 2.形容词;adj. 形容词是指对名词进行修饰~限定~描述~的成份，主要作定语.表语.。形容词在汉语中是（的）.其标志是: ous. Al .ful .ive。. 3.动词：vt. 动词是指主语发出的一个动作，一般用来作谓语。 4.副词：adv. 副词是指表示动作发生的地点. 时间. 条件. 方式. 原因. 目的. 结果.伴随让步. 一般用来修饰动词. 形容词。副词在汉语中是（地）.其标志是：ly。 5.代词：pron. 代词是指用来代替名词的词，名词所能担任的作用，代词也同样.代词主要用来作主语. 宾语. 表语. 同位语。 6.介词：prep.介词是指表示动词和名次关系的词，例如：in on at of about with for to。其特征：
介词后的动词要用—ing形式。介词加代词时，代词要用宾格。例如：give up her（him）这种形式是正确的，而give up she（he）这种形式是错误的。 7.冠词：冠词是指修饰名词，表名词泛指或特指。冠词有a an the 。 8.叹词：叹词表示一种语气。例如：OH. Ya 等 9.连词：连词是指连接两个并列的成分，这两个并列的成分可以是两个词也可以是两个句子。例如：and but or so 。 10.数词：数词是指表示数量关系词，一般分为基数词和序数词 第二章节：英语句子成分 主语：动作的发出者，一般放在动词前或句首。由名词. 代词. 数词. 不定时. 动名词. 或从句充当。 谓语：指主语发出来的动作，只能由动词充当，一般紧跟在主语后面。 宾语：指动作的承受着，一般由代词. 名词. 数词. 不定时. 动名词. 或从句充当. 介词后面的成分也叫介词宾语。 定语：只对名词起限定修饰的成分，一般由形容
六级单词解析造句记忆MNO
M A: Has the case been closed yet? B: No, the magistrate still needs to decide the outcome. magistrate n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 A: I am unable to read the small print in the book. B: It seems you need to magnify it. magnify vt.１．放大，扩大；２．夸大，夸张 A: That was a terrible storm. B: Indeed, but it is too early to determine the magnitude of the damage. magnitude n.１．重要性，重大；２．巨大，广大 A: A young fair maiden like you shouldn’t be single. B: That is because I am a young fair independent maiden. maiden n.少女，年轻姑娘，未婚女子 a.首次的，初次的 A: You look majestic sitting on that high chair. B: Yes, I am pretending to be the king! majestic a.雄伟的，壮丽的，庄严的，高贵的 A: Please cook me dinner now. B: Yes, your majesty, I’m at your service. majesty n.１．［Ｍ－］陛下（对帝王，王后的尊称）；２．雄伟，壮丽，庄严 A: Doctor, I traveled to Africa and I think I caught malaria. B: Did you take any medicine as a precaution? malaria n.疟疾 A: I hate you! B: Why are you so full of malice? malice n.恶意，怨恨 A: I’m afraid that the test results have come back and your lump is malignant. B: That means it’s serious, doesn’t it, doctor? malignant a.１．恶性的，致命的；２．恶意的，恶毒的 A: I’m going shopping in the mall this afternoon, want to join me? B: No, thanks, I have plans already. mall n.（由许多商店组成的）购物中心 A: That child looks very unhealthy. B: Yes, he does not have enough to eat. He is suffering from malnutrition.
base on的例句
意见应以事实为根据. 3 来自辞典例句 192. The bombers swooped ( down ) onthe air base. 轰炸机 突袭 空军基地. 来自辞典例句 193. He mounted their engines on a rubber base. 他把他们的发动机装在一个橡胶垫座上. 14 来自辞典例句 194. The column stands on a narrow base. 柱子竖立在狭窄的地基上. 14 来自辞典例句 195. When one stretched it, it looked like grey flakes on the carvas base. 你要是把它摊直, 看上去就象好一些灰色的粉片落在帆布底子上. 18 来自辞典例句 196. Economic growth and human well - being depend on the natural resource base that supports all living systems. 经济增长和人类的福利依赖于支持所有生命系统的自然资源. 12 1 来自辞典例句 197. The base was just a smudge onthe untouched hundred - mile coast of Manila Bay. 那基地只是马尼拉湾一百英里长安然无恙的海岸线上一个硝烟滚滚的污点. 6 来自辞典例句 198. You can't base an operation on the presumption that miracles are going to happen. 你不能把行动计划建筑在可能出现奇迹的假想基础上.
英语造句大全
英语造句大全English sentence 在句子中，更好的记忆单词！ 1、(1)、able adj. 能 句子：We are able to live under the sea in the future. (2)、ability n. 能力 句子：Most school care for children of different abilities. (3)、enable v. 使。。。能句子：This pass enables me to travel half-price on trains. 2、(1)、accurate adj. 精确的句子：We must have the accurate calculation. (2)、accurately adv. 精确地 句子：His calculation is accurately. 3、(1)、act v. 扮演 句子：He act the interesting character. （2）、actor n. 演员 句子：He was a famous actor. (3)、actress n. 女演员 句子：She was a famous actress. (4)、active adj. 积极的 句子：He is an active boy. 4、add v. 加 句子：He adds a little sugar in the milk. 5、advantage n. 优势 句子：His advantage is fight. 6、age 年龄n. 句子：His age is 15. 7、amusing 娱人的adj. 句子：This story is amusing. 8、angry 生气的adj. 句子：He is angry. 9、America 美国n.
(完整版)主谓造句
主语+谓语 1. 理解主谓结构 1) The students arrived. The students arrived at the park. 2) They are listening. They are listening to the music. 3) The disaster happened. 2．体会状语的位置 1) Tom always works hard. 2) Sometimes I go to the park at weekends.. 3) The girl cries very often. 4) We seldom come here. The disaster happened to the poor family. 3. 多个状语的排列次序 1) He works. 2) He works hard. 3) He always works hard. 4) He always works hard in the company. 5) He always works hard in the company recently. 6) He always works hard in the company recently because he wants to get promoted. 4. 写作常用不及物动词 1. ache My head aches. I’m aching all over. 2. agree agree with sb. about sth. agree to do sth. 3. apologize to sb. for sth. 4. appear (at the meeting, on the screen) 5. arrive at / in 6. belong to 7. chat with sb. about sth. 8. come (to …) 9. cry 10. dance 11. depend on /upon 12. die 13. fall 14. go to … 15. graduate from 16. … happen 17. laugh 18. listen to... 19. live 20. rise 21. sit 22. smile 23. swim 24. stay (at home / in a hotel) 25. work 26. wait for 汉译英： 1.昨天我去了电影院。 2.我能用英语跟外国人自由交谈。 3.晚上7点我们到达了机场。 4.暑假就要到了。 5.现在很多老人独自居住。 6.老师同意了。 7.刚才发生了一场车祸。 8.课上我们应该认真听讲。9. 我们的态度很重要。 10. 能否成功取决于你的态度。 11. 能取得多大进步取决于你付出多少努力。 12. 这个木桶能盛多少水取决于最短的一块板子的长度。
初中英语造句
【it's time to和it's time for】 ——————这其实是一个句型,只不过后面要跟不同的东西. ——————It's time to跟的是不定式（to do）.也就是说,要跟一个动词,意思是“到做某事的时候了”.如： It's time to go home. It's time to tell him the truth. ——————It's time for 跟的是名词.也就是说,不能跟动词.如： It's time for lunch.(没必要说It's time to have lunch) It's time for class.(没必要说It's time to begin the class.) They can't wait to see you Please ask liming to study tonight. Please ask liming not to play computer games tonight. Don’t make/let me to smoke I can hear/see you dance at the stage You had better go to bed early. You had better not watch tv It’s better to go to bed early It’s best to run in the morning I am enjoy running with music. With 表伴随听音乐 I already finish studying You should keep working. You should keep on studying English Keep calm and carry on 保持冷静继续前行二战开始前英国皇家政府制造的海报名字 I have to go on studying I feel like I am flying I have to stop playing computer games and stop to go home now I forget/remember to finish my homework. I forget/remember cleaning the classroom We keep/percent/stop him from eating more chips I prefer orange to apple I prefer to walk rather than run I used to sing when I was young What’s wrong with you There have nothing to do with you I am so busy studying You are too young to na?ve I am so tired that I have to go to bed early
The Kite Runner-美句摘抄及造句
《The Kite Runner》追风筝的人--------------------------------美句摘抄 1.I can still see Hassan up on that tree, sunlight flickering through the leaves on his almost perfectly round face, a face like a Chinese doll chiseled from hardwood: his flat, broad nose and slanting, narrow eyes like bamboo leaves, eyes that looked, depending on the light, gold, green even sapphire 翻译：我依然能记得哈桑坐在树上的样子，阳光穿过叶子，照着他那浑圆的脸庞。他的脸很像木头刻成的中国娃娃，鼻子大而扁平，双眼眯斜如同竹叶，在不同光线下会显现出金色、绿色，甚至是宝石蓝。 E.g.: A shadow of disquiet flickering over his face. 2.Never told that the mirror, like shooting walnuts at the neighbor's dog, was always my idea. 翻译：从来不提镜子、用胡桃射狗其实都是我的鬼主意。E.g.:His secret died with him, for he never told anyone. 3.We would sit across from each other on a pair of high
翻译加造句
一、翻译 1. The idea of consciously seeking out a special title was new to me., but not without appeal. 让我自己挑选自己最喜欢的书籍这个有意思的想法真的对我具有吸引力。 2.I was plunged into the aching tragedy of the Holocaust, the extraordinary clash of good, represented by the one decent man, and evil. 我陷入到大屠杀悲剧的痛苦之中，一个体面的人所代表的善与恶的猛烈冲击之中。 3.I was astonished by the the great power a novel could contain. I lacked the vocabulary to translate my feelings into words. 我被这部小说所包含的巨大能量感到震惊。我无法用语言来表达我的感情（心情）。 4，make sth. long to short长话短说 5.I learned that summer that reading was not the innocent(简单的) pastime(消遣) I have assumed it to be., not a breezy, instantly forgettable escape in the hammock(吊床)，( though I’ ve enjoyed many of those too ). I discovered that a book, if it arrives at the right moment, in the proper season, will change the course of all that follows. 那年夏天，我懂得了读书不是我认为的简单的娱乐消遣，也不只是躺在吊床上，一阵风吹过就忘记的消遣。我发现如果在适宜的时间、合适的季节读一本书的话，他将能改变一个人以后的人生道路。 二、词组造句 1. on purpose 特意，故意 This is especially true here, and it was ~. (这一点在这里尤其准确，并且他是故意的) 2.think up 虚构，编造，想出 She has thought up a good idea. 她想出了一个好的主意。 His story was thought up. 他的故事是编出来的。 3. in the meantime 与此同时 助记：in advance 事前in the meantime 与此同时in place 适当地... In the meantime, what can you do? 在这期间您能做什么呢？ In the meantime, we may not know how it works, but we know that it works. 在此期间，我们不知道它是如何工作的，但我们知道，它的确在发挥作用。 4.as though 好像，仿佛 It sounds as though you enjoyed Great wall. 这听起来好像你喜欢长城。 5. plunge into 使陷入 He plunged the room into darkness by switching off the light. 他把灯一关，房
改写句子练习2标准答案
The effective sentences:(improve the sentences!) 1.She hopes to spend this holiday either in Shanghai or in Suzhou. 2.Showing/to show sincerity and to keep/keeping promises are the basic requirements of a real friend. 3.I want to know the space of this house and when it was built. I want to know how big this house is and when it was built. I want to know the space of this house and the building time of the house. 4.In the past ten years,Mr.Smith has been a waiter,a tour guide,and taught English. In the past ten years,Mr.Smith has been a waiter,a tour guide,and an English teacher. 5.They are sweeping the floor wearing masks. They are sweeping the floor by wearing masks. wearing masks,They are sweeping the floor. 6.the drivers are told to drive carefully on the radio. the drivers are told on the radio to drive carefully 7.I almost spent two hours on this exercises. I spent almost two hours on this exercises. 8.Checking carefully,a serious mistake was found in the design. Checking carefully,I found a serious mistake in the design.
用以下短语造句
M1 U1 一. 把下列短语填入每个句子的空白处（注意所填短语的形式变化）： add up (to) be concerned about go through set down a series of on purpose in order to according to get along with fall in love (with) join in have got to hide away face to face 1 We’ve chatted online for some time but we have never met ___________. 2 It is nearly 11 o’clock yet he is not back. His mother ____________ him. 3 The Lius ___________ hard times before liberation. 4 ____________ get a good mark I worked very hard before the exam. 5 I think the window was broken ___________ by someone. 6 You should ___________ the language points on the blackboard. They are useful. 7 They met at Tom’s party and later on ____________ with each other. 8 You can find ____________ English reading materials in the school library. 9 I am easy to be with and _____________my classmates pretty well. 10 They __________ in a small village so that they might not be found. 11 Which of the following statements is not right ____________ the above passage? 12 It’s getting dark. I ___________ be off now. 13 More than 1,000 workers ___________ the general strike last week. 14 All her earnings _____________ about 3,000 yuan per month. 二.用以下短语造句： 1.go through 2. no longer/ not… any longer 3. on purpose 4. calm… down 5. happen to 6. set down 7. wonder if 三. 翻译： 1.曾经有段时间，我对学习丧失了兴趣。（there was a time when…） 2. 这是我第一次和她交流。（It is/was the first time that …注意时态） 3.他昨天公园里遇到的是他的一个老朋友。（强调句） 4. 他是在知道真相之后才意识到错怪女儿了。（强调句） M 1 U 2 一. 把下列短语填入每个句子的空白处（注意所填短语的形式变化）： play a …role (in) because of come up such as even if play a …part (in) 1 Dujiangyan(都江堰) is still ___________in irrigation(灌溉) today. 2 That question ___________ at yesterday’s meeting. 3 Karl Marx could speak a few foreign languages, _________Russian and English. 4 You must ask for leave first __________ you have something very important. 5 The media _________ major ________ in influencing people’s opinion s. 6 _________ years of hard work she looked like a woman in her fifties. 二.用以下短语造句： 1.make (good/full) use of 2. play a(n) important role in 3. even if 4. believe it or not 5. such as 6. because of
英语造句
English sentence 1、(1)、able adj. 能 句子：We are able to live under the sea in the future. (2)、ability n. 能力 句子：Most school care for children of different abilities. (3)、enable v. 使。。。能 句子：This pass enables me to travel half-price on trains. 2、(1)、accurate adj. 精确的 句子：We must have the accurate calculation. (2)、accurately adv. 精确地 句子：His calculation is accurately. 3、(1)、act v. 扮演 句子：He act the interesting character.（2）、actor n. 演员 句子：He was a famous actor. (3)、actress n. 女演员 句子：She was a famous actress. (4)、active adj. 积极的 句子：He is an active boy. 4、add v. 加 句子：He adds a little sugar in the milk. 5、advantage n. 优势 句子：His advantage is fight. 6、age 年龄n. 句子：His age is 15. 7、amusing 娱人的adj. 句子：This story is amusing. 8、angry 生气的adj. 句子：He is angry. 9、America 美国n. 句子：He is in America. 10、appear 出现v. He appears in this place. 11. artist 艺术家n. He is an artist. 12. attract 吸引 He attracts the dog. 13. Australia 澳大利亚 He is in Australia. 14.base 基地 She is in the base now. 15.basket 篮子 His basket is nice. 16.beautiful 美丽的 She is very beautiful. 17.begin 开始 He begins writing. 18.black 黑色的 He is black. 19.bright 明亮的 His eyes are bright. 20.good 好的 He is good at basketball. 21.British 英国人 He is British. 22.building 建造物 The building is highest in this city 23.busy 忙的 He is busy now. 24.calculate 计算 He calculates this test well. 25.Canada 加拿大 He borns in Canada. 26.care 照顾 He cared she yesterday. 27.certain 无疑的 They are certain to succeed. 28.change 改变 He changes the system. 29.chemical 化学药品