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Unit 3 Lying全新版大学英语综合教程五课文翻译

Unit 3 Lying全新版大学英语综合教程五课文翻译
Unit 3 Lying全新版大学英语综合教程五课文翻译

Unit 3 Lying

Text A The Truth About Lying

1. I've been wanting to write on a subject that intrigues and challenges me: the subject of lying. I've found it very difficult to do. Everyone I've talked to has a quite intense and personal but often rather intolerant point of view about what we can —and can never never — tell lies about. I've finally reached the conclusion that I can't present any ultimate conclusions, for too many people would promptly disagree. Instead, I'd like to present a series of moral puzzles, all concerned with lying. I'll tell you what I think about them. Do you agree?

Social Lies

2. Most of the people I've talked with say that they find social lying acceptable and necessary. They think it's the civilized way for folks to behave. Without these little white lies, they say, our relationships would be short and brutish and nasty. It's arrogant, they say, to insist on being so incorruptible and so brave that you cause other people unnecessary embarrassment or pain by compulsively assailing them with your honesty. I basically agree. What about you?

3. Will you say to people, when it simply isn't true, "I like your new hairdo," "You're looking much better," "it's so nice to see you," "I had a wonderful time"?

4. Will you praise hideous presents and homely kids?

5. Will you decline invitations with "We're busy that night — so sorry we can't come," when the truth is you'd rather stay home than dine with the So-and-sos?

6. And even though, as I do, you may prefer the polite evasion of "You really cooked up a storm "instead of "The soup" —which tastes like warmed-over coffee —"is wonderful," will you, if you must, proclaim it wonderful?

7. There's one man I know who absolutely refuses to tell social lies. "I can't play that game," he says; "I'm simply not made that way." And his answer to the argument that saying nice things to someone doesn't cost anything is, "Yes, it does — it destroys your credibility." Now, he won't, unsolicited, offer his views on the painting you just bought, but you don't ask his frank opinion unless you want frank, and his silence at those moments when the rest of us liars are muttering, "Isn't it lovely?" is, for the most part, eloquent enough. My friend does not indulge in what he calls "flattery, false praise and mellifluous comments." When others tell fibs he will not go along. He says that social lying is lying, that little white lies are still lies. And he feels that telling lies is morally wrong. What about you?

Peace-Keeping Lies

8. Many people tell peace-keeping lies: lies designed to avoid irritation or argument, lies designed to shelter the liar from possible blame or pain; lies (or so it is rationalized) designed to keep trouble at bay without hurting anyone.

9. I tell these lies at times, and yet I always feel they're wrong. I understand why we tell them, but still they feel wrong. And whenever I lie so that someone won't disapprove of me or think less of me or holler at me, I feel I'm a bit of a coward, I feel I'm dodging responsibility, I feel...guilty. What about you?

10. Do you, when you're late for a date because you overslept, say that you're late because you got caught in a traffic jam?

11. Do you, when you forget to call a friend, say that you called several times but the line was busy?

12. Do you, when you didn't remember that it was your father's birthday, say that his present must be delayed in the mail?

13. And when you're planning a weekend in New York City and you're not in the mood to visit your mother, who lives there, do you conceal — with a lie, if you must — the fact that you'll be in New York? Or do you have the courage — or is it the cruelty? — to say, "I'll be in New York, but sorry — I don't plan on seeing you"?

14. (Dave and his wife Elaine have two quite different points of view on this very subject. He calls her a coward. She says she's being wise. He says she must assert her right to visit New York sometimes and not see her mother. To which she always patiently replies: "Why should we have useless fights? My mother's too old to change. We get along much better when I lie to her.")

15. Finally, do you keep the peace by telling your husband lies on the subject of money? Do you reduce what you really paid for your shoes? And in general do you find yourself ready, willing and able to lie to him when you make absurd mistakes or lose or break things?

16. "I used to have a romantic idea that part of intimacy was confessing every dumb thing that you did to your husband. But after a couple of years of that," says Laura, "have

I changed my mind!"

17. And having changed her mind, she finds herself telling peacekeeping lies. And yes, I tell them too. What about you?

Protective Lies

18. Protective lies are lies folks tell —often quite serious lies —because they're convinced that the truth would be too damaging. They lie because they feel there are certain human values that supersede the wrong of having lied. They lie, not for personal

gain, but because they believe it's for the good of the person they're lying to. They lie to those they love, to those who trust them most of all, on the grounds that breaking this trust is justified.

19. They may lie to their children on money or marital matters.

20. They may lie to the dying about the state of their health.

21. They may lie to their closest friend because the truth about her talents or son or psyche would be — or so they insist — utterly devastating.

22. I sometimes tell such lies, but I'm aware that it's quite presumptuous to claim I know what's best for others to know. That's called playing God . That's called manipulation and control. And we never can be sure, once we start to juggle lies, just where they'll land, exactly where they'll roll.

23. And furthermore, we may find ourselves lying in order to back up the lies that are backing up the lie we initially told.

24. And furthermore —let's be honest —if conditions were reversed, we certainly wouldn't want anyone lying to us.

25. Yet, having said all that, I still believe that there are times when protective lies must nonetheless be told. What about you?

Trust-Keeping Lies

26. Another group of lies are trust-keeping lies, lies that involve triangulation, with A (that's you) telling lies to B on behalf of C (whose trust you'd promised to keep). Most people concede that once you've agreed not to betray a friend's confidence, you can't betray it, even if you must lie. But I've talked with people who don't want you telling them anything that they might be called on to lie about.

27. "I don't tell lies for myself," says Fran, "and I don't want to have to tell them for other people." Which means, she agrees, that if her best friend is having an affair, she absolutely doesn't want to know about it.

28. "Are you saying," her best friend asks, "that you'd betray me?"

29. Fran is very pained but very adamant. "I wouldn't want to betray you, so…don't tell me anything about it."

30. Fran's best friend is shocked. What about you?

31. Do you believe you can have close friends if you're not prepared to receive their deepest secrets?

32. Do you believe you must always lie for your friends?

33. Do you believe, if your friend tells a secret that turns out to be quite immoral or illegal, that once you've promised to keep it, you must keep it?

34. And what if your friend were your boss — if you were perhaps one of the President's men — would you betray or lie for him over, say, Watergate?

35. As you can see, these issues get terribly sticky.

36. It's my belief that once we've promised to keep a trust, we must tell lies to keep it. I also believe that we can't tell Watergate lies. And if these two statements strike you as quite contradictory, you're right —they're quite contradictory. But for now they're the best I can do. What about you?

37. There are those who have no talent for lying.

38. "Over the years, I tried to lie," a friend of mine explained, "but I always got found out and I always got punished. I guess I gave myself away because I feel guilty about any kind of lying. It looks as if I'm stuck with telling the truth."

39. For those of us, however, who are good at telling lies, for those of us who lie and don't get caught, the question of whether or not to lie can be a hard and serious moral problem. I liked the remark of a friend of mine who said, "I'm willing to lie. But just as a last resort — the truth's always better."

40. "Because," he explained, "though others may completely accept the lie I'm telling, I don't."

41. I tend to feel that way too.

42. What about you?

关于说谎的真相

朱迪斯·维奥斯特

我一直想写一个令我深感兴趣的话题:关于说谎的问题。我觉得这个题目很难写。所有我交谈过的人都对什么事情可以说谎——什么事情绝对不可以说谎——持有强烈的、常常不容别人分说的个人意见。最后我得出结论,我不能下任何定论,因为这样做就会有太多的人立即反对。我想我还是提出若干都与说谎有关的道义上的难题吧。我将向读者阐明我对这些难题的个人看法。你们觉得对吗?

社交性谎言

和我交谈过的大多数人都说,他们认为旨在促进社会交际的谎言是可以接受的,也是必要的。他们认为这是一种文明的行为。他们说,要不是这类无关紧要的谎言,人与人之间的关系就会变得粗野不快,无法持久。他们说,如果你要做到十二分正直、十二分无畏,不由自主地用你的诚实使他人陷入不必要的窘境或痛苦之中,这只能说你是傲慢自大。对此,我基本赞同。你呢?

你会不会跟人说:“我喜欢你的新发型,”“你气色好多了,”“见到你真高兴,”“我玩得很

尽兴,”而实际上根本不是这么回事儿?

你会不会对令人憎厌的礼物,或相貌平平的孩子称赞有加?

你婉辞邀请时会不会说“那天晚上我们正好没空——真对不起,我们不能来,”而实际上你是宁肯呆在家里也不想跟某某夫妇一起进餐?

虽然像我那样,你也想用“太丰盛了”这种委婉的托辞,而不是盛赞“那汤味道好极了”(其实味同重新热过的咖啡),但如果你必须赞美那汤,你会说它鲜美吗?

我认识一个人,他完全拒绝说这类社交性谎言。“我不会那一套,”他说,“我生来就不会那一套。”讲到对人家说几句好听的话并不失去什么,他的回答是:“不对,当然有损失——那会损害你的诚信度。”因此你不问他,他不会对你刚买来的画发表意见,但除非你想听老实话,否则你也不会去问他的真实想法。当我们这些说谎者轻声称赞着“多美啊”的时候,他的沉默往往是极能说明问题的。我的这位朋友从来不讲他所说的“奉承话、虚假的赞美话和动听话”。别人说些无伤大雅的谎言,他则不。他说社交性谎言还是谎言,无关紧要的小小谎言还是谎言。他认为说谎不合道德。你呢?

息事宁人的谎言

不少人为了息事宁人而说谎:那种意在避免生气或争吵的谎言,意在使说谎者免受可能的责备或烦恼的谎言;意在(或据认为理应)不伤害他人而又能帮助避免麻烦的谎言。

我有时也说这种谎,不过我总觉得不该说。我知道为什么要说这种谎,但说这种谎终究不对。每当我为了不让别人讨厌自己、看轻自己、或冲着自己嚷嚷而说谎时,我总觉得自己有点像个懦夫,觉得自己是在逃避责任,觉得……愧疚。你呢?

你由于睡过头赴约会迟到了,会不会说是因为碰上堵车才晚到的?

你忘了给朋友打电话,会不会谎称打过好几次,可电话老占线?

你忘了父亲的生日,会不会说寄给他的礼物准是给耽搁了?

你打算去纽约市度周末,但又不想去看望住在那里的母亲,你会——必要的话用谎言——隐瞒你将到纽约的事实,还是会勇敢地——或者说狠心地——说:“我要来纽约,可是抱歉,我不打算来看望你”?

(戴夫和妻子伊莱恩正是在这个问题上有两种颇不相同的观点。他称她为懦夫。她说自己处理这事是明智的。他说她应该维护自己有的时候去纽约但不去看望母亲的权利。对此她总是耐心地回答说:“我们何必无谓地争吵呢?我母亲年纪大了,不会改了。我对她说个谎,我们相处得就更好。”)

最后一点,你会不会在钱的问题上对丈夫说谎,以求太平?你会不会少报买鞋子的钱?你出了什么荒唐的错误或丢失了物品打碎了器皿时是不是常常想对他撒谎,而且会对他撒谎?

“过去我往往不切实际地以为亲密关系的一个组成部分就是把自己做的每件蠢事都如实告诉丈夫。可这么过了几年之后,”劳拉说,“我就改了主意!”

改主意后,她在不知不觉中说谎话求太平了。没错,我也说这种谎。你呢?

保护性谎言

保护性谎言就是因为人们认为事实真相危害性太大而说的谎言,这类谎言通常事关重大。他们说谎,因为他们认为,人的某些价值观念压倒了说谎这一错误行为本身。他们说谎不是为个人私利,而是因为他们相信,那是为他们对之说谎的人好。他们对自己所爱的人撒谎,对最信任自己的人撒谎,就是因为他们认为这样做是有正当理由的。

他们会在金钱或婚姻问题上对子女说谎。

他们会对垂死者隐瞒真实病情。

他们会对密友说谎,因为关于其才能、其爱子或其精神状态的实话会——不妨说他们坚持这么认为——使其身心受到极大伤害。

有时我也说这种谎,可我明白,声称自己懂得什么事他人应该知道,这未免太自以为是了。这无异于充当上帝。这无异于操纵和控制他人。而我们一旦开始玩起谎言戏法,就再也无法知道谎言何时会收场,究竟会滑向何方。

而且,我们会不知不觉地为了圆先前说的谎言而说谎。

而且——我们不妨直说——如果情形倒过来,我们当然不愿意别人对自己说谎。

不过,话虽如此,我还是觉得有时保护性谎言还非说不可。你呢?

信守承诺的谎言

另一类谎言是信守承诺的谎言,涉及三方的谎言,即A(你)为了C(你答应为其信守承诺者)而对B说谎。大多数人承认,一旦你答应不背叛朋友的信任,你就不能背叛,哪怕你必须说谎。但我与之交谈过的人中也有人不想听那些他们也许得为之说谎的事。

“我不为自己说谎,”弗兰说,“我也不愿为别人说谎。”她承认,这就意味着如果她最好的朋友有风流韵事的话,她绝对不想知道。

“你是说,”她最好的朋友问,“你会出卖我?”

弗兰心里很为难,但态度十分坚决。“我不想出卖你,所以……别跟我说这事。”

弗兰最好的朋友深感震惊。你呢?

你是不是认为,如果你不愿意了解朋友最深的隐密,你仍会有好朋友?

你是不是认为你必须一直为朋友说谎?

你是不是认为,如果朋友透露的一个秘密是违反道德或法律的,而一旦你答应保密,你就得真的保密?

如果你的朋友正好是你的上司——如果你恰好就是总统班底的人——比如说在水门事件这个问题上,你是背叛他还是为他说谎?

可以想见这些问题非常棘手。

我以为,一旦我们答应信守承诺,我们就是说谎也得信守承诺。同时我也认为,在水门

事件这类事情上我们不能说谎。如果你觉得这两点自相矛盾,那你就对了——这两者的确自相矛盾。但目前我只能如此。你呢?

有些人不擅说谎。

“许多年来,我一直试图说谎,”一位朋友解释说,“可我总是露馅,总是为此受罚。我想人家看出我说谎是因为我一说谎就觉得内疚。看来我只能说真话了。”

可是,对我们这种擅于说谎的人来说,对我们这种说谎又不露馅的人来说,说谎还是不说谎会成为一个严肃的道德难题。我颇为赞同一位朋友的话,他说,“我愿意说谎。但只把这作为最后一手——真话总比谎话好。”

“因为,”他解释说,“哪怕别人对我的谎话完全信以为真,我自己可无法相信。”

本人也有同感。

你呢?

Text B White Lies

Sissela Bok

1 White lies are at the other end of the spectrum of deception from lies in a serious crisis. They are the most common and the most trivial forms that duplicity can take. The fact that they are so common provides their protective coloring. And their very triviality, when compared to more threatening lies, makes it seem unnecessary or even absurd to condemn them. Some consider all well-intentioned lies, however momentous, to be white; in this book, I shall adhere to the narrower usage: a white lie, in this sense, is a falsehood not meant to injure anyone, and of little moral import. I want to ask whether there are such lies; and if there are, whether their cumulative consequences are still without harm; and, finally, whether many lies are not defended as “white” which are in fact harmful in their own right.

2 Many small subterfuges may not even be intended to mislead. They are only “white lies” in the most marginal sense. Take, for example, the many social exchanges: “How nice to see you!” or “Cordially yours.” These and a thousand other polite expressions are so much taken for granted that if someone decided, in the name of total honesty, not to employ them, he might well give the impression of an indifference he did not possess. The justification for continuing to use such accepted formulations is that they deceive no one, except possibly those unfamiliar with the language.

3 A social practice more clearly deceptive is that of giving a false excuse so as not to hurt the feelings of someone making an invitation or request: to say one “can’t” do what

in reality one may not want to do. Once again, the false excuse may prevent unwarranted inferences of greater hostility to the undertaking than one may well feel. Merely to say that one can’t do something, moreover, is not deceptive in the sense that an elaborately concocted story can be.

4 Still other white lies are told in an effort to flatter, to throw a cheerful interpretation on depressing circumstances, or to show gratitude for unwanted gifts. In the eyes of many, such white lies do no harm, provide needed support and cheer, and help dispel gloom and boredom. They preserve the equilibrium and often the humaneness of social relationships, and are usually accepted as excusable so long as they do not become excessive. Many argue, moreover, that such deception is so helpful and at times so necessary that it must be tolerated as an exception to a general policy against lying. Thus Bacon observed: Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men’s minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves?

5 Another kind of lie may actually be advocated as bringing a more substantial benefit, or avoiding a real harm, while seeming quite innocuous to those who tell the lies. Such are the placebos given for innumerable common ailments, and the pervasive use of inflated grades and recommendations for employment and promotion.

6 A large number of lies without such redeeming features are nevertheless often regarded as so trivial that they should be grouped with white lies. They are the lies told on the spur of the moment, for want of reflection, or to get out of a scrape, or even simply to pass the time. Such are the lies told to boast or exaggerate, or on the contrary to deprecate and un derstate; the many lies told or repeated in gossip; Rousseau’s lies. In Reveries of the Solitary Stroller, Jean Jacques Rousseau says: “Never have I lied in my own interest; but often I have lied through shame in order to draw myself from embarrassment in indifferent matters…when, having to sustain discussion, the slowness of my ideas and the dryness of my conversation forced me to have recourse to fictions in order to say something.”]1 told simply “in order to say something”; the embroidering on facts that seem too tedious in their own right; and the substitution of a quick lie for the lengthy explanations one might otherwise have to provide for something not worth spending time on.

7 Utilitarians often cite white lies as the kind of deception where their theory shows the benefits of common sense and clear thinking. A white lie, they hold, is trivial; it is either completely harmless, or so marginally harmful that the cost of detecting and

evaluating the harm is much greater than the minute harm itself. In addition, the white lie can often actually be beneficial, thus further tipping the scales of utility. In a world with so many difficult problems, utilitarians might ask: Why take the time to weigh the minute pros and cons in telling someone that his tie is attractive when it is an abomination, or of saying to a guest that a broken vase was worthless? Why bother even to define such insignificant distortions or make mountains out of molehills by seeking to justify them?

8 Triviality surely does set limits to when moral inquiry is reasonable. But when we look more closely at practices such as placebo-giving, it becomes clear that all lies defended as “white” cannot be so easily dismissed. In the first place, the harmlessness of lies is notoriously disputable. What the liar perceives as harmless or even beneficial may not be so in the eyes of the deceived. Second, the failure to look at an entire practice rather than at their own isolated case often blinds liars to cumulative harm and expanding deceptive activities. Those who begin with white lies can come to resort to more frequent and more serious ones. Where some tell a few white lies, others may tell more. Because lines are so hard to draw, the indiscriminate use of such lies can lead to other deceptive practices. The aggregate harm from a large number of marginally harmful instances may, therefore, be highly undesirable in the end—for liars, those deceived, and honesty and trust more generally.

9 In the post-Watergate period, no one need regard a concern with the combined and long-term effects of deception as far-fetched. But even apart from political life, with its peculiar and engrossing temptations, lies tend to spread. Disagreeable facts come to be sugar-coated, and sad news softened or denied altogether. Many lie to children and to those who are ill about matters no longer peripheral but quite central, such as birth, adoption, divorce, and death. Deceptive propaganda and misleading advertising abound. All these lies are often dismissed on the same grounds of harmlessness and triviality used for white lies in general.

10 It is worth taking a close look at practices where lies believed trivial are common. Triviality in an isolated lie can then be more clearly seen to differ markedly from the costs of an entire practice—both to individuals and to communities.

无伤大雅的小谎

西塞拉·博克

无伤大雅的小谎处于欺骗这个范畴的另一端,与重大时刻撒谎大不一样。它们是最常见的、最轻微的欺骗行为。这类小谎经常听到,这一事实本身就使之披上一层保护色。相比那

些更具危害性的谎言,小谎的无关紧要使得对其进行谴责都显得没有必要甚至荒唐。有人把所有用心良善的谎言,无论多么事关重大,都看作是无伤大雅的小谎。在本书中,笔者取的是较为狭窄的意义:在这一意义上,无伤大雅的小谎指的是无意伤害他人的、没有道德含义的谎言。我想问, 是否真有这类谎言;如果有的话,其日积月累的最终结果是否果然不具有伤害性;最后,许多实际上原本就具有伤害性的谎言是否没有被说成“无伤大雅”。

许多无关紧要的遁词也许根本就无意误导他人。它们不过勉强算是无伤大雅的小谎。如许多客套话:“见到你真高兴!”或信末写的“你至诚的”。这些和许许多多其他礼貌用语并无不妥,理当使用。要是有人为了要绝对诚实决定不用的话,他很可能给人一种为人冷漠的印象,而实际上此人并非如此。一直使用这些公众认可的套语的理由是它们骗不了人,那些并不通晓这一语言的人或许是例外。

一种显然更具有欺骗性质的社会惯例是假造一个理由,以便不伤害邀请人或请求者的感情:对自己其实不欲为的事推托说“不能为”。同样的,这一假造的理由或许会防止他人莫须有地推断自己对所说之事抵触多多。再者,仅仅说一句自己不能做某事,不像煞费苦心编造的一通谎话那样带有欺骗性。

还有一些无伤大雅的小谎旨在讨好他人、对令人沮丧的境况做出使人高兴的解释,或者对别人赠送的无用礼物表示感谢。在许多人看来,这类无伤大雅的小谎没有害处,给人以必要的支持和安慰,有助于驱除忧郁和厌烦。它们保障人际关系的平衡,而且常常帮助人们在交往中保住人情味。只要不过分,这类谎话一般被看作是可以原谅的。更有甚者,许多人认为,这类欺骗行为裨益良多,有时还必不可少,故应作为反对撒谎这一总原则的例外加以容忍。培根曾这样说:如果把自视过高的看法、奢望、不实的评价、一厢情愿的想法等等都从人们的脑海里赶走,那会使一些人感到空虚、悲哀、不舒服、讨厌自己,对此有人怀疑过吗?

另一种谎言,实际上人们也许认为,既能带来更为实在的好处,或能避免真正的伤害,而对那些撒谎者又看似无害。比如对无数常见疾病开的并无药效的安慰剂,以及为了求职或提升而普遍拔高的成绩和多有溢美之词的推荐信。

然而,许多谎言并不像上述那样尚有好处可言,但人们常常认为它们无关紧要,所以应归为无伤大雅的谎言一类。那都是些脱口而出、不假思索的谎言,或是为了摆脱窘境、甚或仅仅是为了打发时间而说的谎言。这类谎言有的出于溢美夸大,有的则相反,出于有意贬低或缩小事态;许多来自流言蜚语;而卢梭式的谎言仅仅是“为有话可说”;有的则是对本身太乏味的事实添油加醋;还有的则是因为与其为了不足道的事情费过多口舌还不如找个简短的托词了事。

功利主义者常称,说无伤大雅的小谎说明你思维清晰、明白事理,他们的理论表明,这样的欺骗有好处。他们认为,无伤大雅的小谎无关紧要;这种谎言没有丝毫害处,即使有也是微乎其微,若去探究、估计它的害处,其代价比微小的害处本身要大得多。再者,无伤大雅的小谎其实常常会有助益,这就使它的实用性显得更加突出。尘世间本已烦恼多多,功利

主义者或许会问:在恭维一个人领带很漂亮其实很难看时,或宽慰客人说那个打破的花瓶并不值钱时,又何苦去耗费时间衡量这样做的微不足道的得失?何苦为了试图证明说无伤大雅的小谎是合理的就费心去解释这类无关紧要的失实,去使并不重要的事显得那么重要?

事物的琐碎性质的确限制了什么时候作道德质询是理智的。但如果我们仔细观察说安慰话这样的行为,很显然,不是所有被辩解为无伤大雅的小谎都能轻易开脱的。首先,众所周知,谎言的无害性大可商榷。说谎者认为无害甚或有益的在被欺骗者看来未必如此。第二,对某种行为不看整体效果,只看孤立的个案常常使说谎者对日积月累的伤害、日渐加剧的欺骗行为视而不见。那些起初撒些无伤大雅的小谎的人渐渐地可能会经常说谎,谎言越发出格。只要有人撒几个无伤大雅的小谎,其他人就可能说更多这类谎。由于界限如此难以划分,随意撒这类谎能导致其他的欺骗行为。最终,大量微小伤害合在一起形成的总的伤害会招致相当大的麻烦——对说谎者、被欺骗者是如此,更笼统地说,对诚实、信任也是如此。

在水门事件之后的年代里,谁也不会对欺骗行为造成的多方面的、长远的影响表示忧虑看作很离奇。可是即使不把政治生活考虑在内,由于说谎具有独特的诱惑力,谎言也呈现蔓延之势。令人不快的事实被裹上了糖衣,使人伤心的消息被粉饰,或干脆被掩盖。许多人对孩子撒谎,对那些有疑难问题的人撒谎,且涉及的问题已并非无关紧要,而是关系到出生、收养孩子、离婚等大事。骗人的宣传以及误导的广告比比皆是。所有这些谎言,如同普通无伤大雅的小谎一样,往往以无害和不值一提为理由而听之任之了。

被认为无关紧要的谎言时常能够听到,这种说谎行为值得仔细研究一下。一经研究,我们就可以更加清楚地看到,在一个孤立的谎话中看到的极轻微伤害,与整个欺骗行为付出的代价之间有着明显的差异——对个人和对社会都如此。

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