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克鲁格曼国际经济学(第六版)的教师手册(含英文习题答案)imch19

克鲁格曼国际经济学(第六版)的教师手册(含英文习题答案)imch19
克鲁格曼国际经济学(第六版)的教师手册(含英文习题答案)imch19

CHAPTER 19

MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND COORDINATION UNDER FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES

Chapter Organization

The Case For Floating Exchange Rates

Monetary Policy Autonomy

Symmetry

Exchange Rates as Automatic Stabilizers

The Case Against Floating Exchange Rates

Discipline

Destabilizing Speculation and Money Market Disturbances

Injury to International Trade and Investment

Uncoordinated Economic Policies

The Illusion of Greater Autonomy

Case Study: Exchange Rate Experience Between the Oil Shocks, 1973 - 1980 The First Oil Shock and Its Effects, 1973 - 1975

Revising the IMF's Charter, 1975 - 1976

The Weak Dollar, 1976 - 1979

The Second Oil Shock, 1979 - 1980

Macroeconomic Interdependence Under a Floating Rate

Case Study: Disinflation, Growth, Crisis, and Recession 1980 - 2001

Disinflation and the 1981 - 1983 Recession

Fiscal Policies, the Current Account, and the Resurgence of Protectionism

From the Plaza to the Louvre and Beyond: Trying to Manage Exchange Rates Global Slump Once Again, Recovery, Crisis, and Slowdown

What Has Been Learned Since 1973?

Monetary Policy Autonomy

Symmetry

The Exchange Rate as an Automatic Stabilizer

Discipline

Destabilizing Speculation

International Trade and Investment

Policy Coordination

Are Fixed Exchange Rates Even an Option for Most Countries ?

Directions for Reform

Summary

Appendix: International Policy-Coordination Failures

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The floating exchange rate system in place since 1973 was not, in contrast with the Bretton Woods system, well planned before its inception. Instead, it has developed as an ad hoc system, muddling through the various shocks with which the world economy has had to contend. Disillusion with economic performance since 1973 has often fueled demands for alternative international monetary arrangements. This chapter sets forth the case for and against floating exchange rates and considers the evidence concerning the performance of the international exchange-rate system since 1973.

A set of theoretical arguments for and against floating exchange rates frame the discussion of this chapter. Proponents of a floating exchange rate regime cite as its advantages the autonomy it gives to monetary policy, the symmetry of adjustment under floating, and the automatic stabilization which floating rates provide when aggregate-demand shocks occur. Critics fault floating rates on the grounds that they do not impose enough discipline on governments or promote economic policy coordination, because of alleged detrimental effects on international trade and investment, and because floating exchange rates may be susceptible to harmful destabilizing speculation. The DD-AA model first presented in Chapter 16 is used to demonstrate that money-market shocks are less disruptive under a fixed exchange-rate regime than under a floating regime while output-market shocks are less disruptive under a floating exchange rate regime.

This result is important in considering the relative attractiveness of floating exchange rates in face of the first oil shock in 1973. This shock led to "stagflation," simultaneous recession and inflation. It is unlikely that a fixed-exchange-rate system would have survived without widespread realignments and speculative attacks. Industrial countries chose expansionary macro policies and recovery from the recession of 1974 was underway in most of these countries by the first half of 1975. The success with which the floating-exchange-rate regime allowed countries to adjust to the first oil shock prompted a call by the leaders of the main industrial countries for the IMF to formally recognize the new arrangement. The IMF

directors heeded this by amending the Fund's Articles of Agreement to recognize the new reality of floating rates.

Floating exchange rates enabled countries to pursue divergent expansionary policies after the first oil shock. This advantage of floating exchange rates proved to be a disadvantage as the recovery of 1974-1975 turned into the slowdown of 1976. American policies more expansionary than those pursued by Germany and Japan weakened the dollar, pushed the U.S. current account into deficit, and contributed to a resurgence of inflation in the United States. The second oil shock promoted fears of higher inflation, leading to restrictive monetary policies that plunged the world economy, in 1981, into the deepest recession since the Great Depression.

This chapter also discusses the way in which two large countries’ economies affect one another, examining the global effects of fiscal and monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s. This discussion incorporates feedback effects from policy in one economy to economic performance in the other. A fiscal expansion in either country increases output in both countries. A monetary expansion in the domestic country, however, raises domestic output but, by making the foreign currency more expensive, lowers foreign output. In the text, the ideas are used to analyze the effects of U.S. monetary and fiscal policy after 1980, particularly the Volcker disinflation and the Reagan fiscal expansion. The impact of the resulting dollar appreciation on world current accounts and on protectionist sentiment in the United States are also discussed.

In the face of growing protectionist pressure in the United States, economic officials of the Group of Five (G-5) countries met at the Plaza Hotel in New York in September 1985 where they agreed to intervene jointly in the foreign-exchange market to bring about a dollar depreciation. This marked a reversal from the United States' laissez-faire approach to dollar management in the first half of the 1980s. The dollar depreciated throughout 1986. In February 1987, at a meeting at the Louvre, finance ministers and central bankers from the G-5 countries plus Canada set up (unpublished) target zones to stabilize exchange rates around their then-current level. Currencies stabilized for several months thereafter, but this period of quiescence ended with the October 1987 stock market crash which began a period of further dollar depreciation. Despite a brief theoretical maintenance of zones, by the early 1990s, zones had been abandoned. After a period of slow growth in many nations around 1990, the United States has experienced a long expansion. Alternatively, by 1999, Japan had not fully

recovered from the end of its asset bubble in the early 1990s. This has affected the other Asian countries, a topic returned to in Chapter 22.

Conclusions concerning the advantages of floating exchange rates are not unambiguous. The insulation of economies from inflation, while important in the long run, may not hold in the short run. The exchange rate's role as a macroeconomic target also reduces the autonomy central banks actually enjoy under floating rates. Evidence does not support the "vicious circle" theory that, in the absence of accommodating monetary policy, currency depreciation leads to inflation, leading to further depreciation, and so on. Nor is there convincing evidence that floating rates have hindered international trade and investment. Lack of policy coordination has been a particularly disappointing feature of the system, but this problem is not unique to floating rates. The chapter also considers the emerging view that durable fixed exchange rates may not be possible, even if they were more desirable than floating rates, unless a single currency is created. These arguments rest on theories of speculative attacks, the problems of the policy trilemma, and the recent experiences in developing countries.

A lesson that emerges from this chapter is that no exchange rate system works well when countries act on the basis of narrowly-perceived self interest. The chapter appendix illustrates this point, using a simple game-theoretic example to show how the beggar-thy-neighbor effects of monetary restriction can lead to uncoordinated macroeconomic policies that make two countries worse off than they would be if they cooperated.

ANSWERS TO TEXTBOOK PROBLEMS

1. A rise in the foreign price level leads to a real domestic currency depreciation for a

given domestic price level and nominal exchange rate; thus, as shown in the following diagram, the output market curve shifts from DD to D'D' moving the equilibrium from point 0 to point 1. This shift causes an appreciation of the home currency and a rise in home output. If the expected future exchange rate falls in proportion to the rise in P*, then the asset market curve shifts down as well, from AA to A'A' with the equilibrium at point 2.

Notice that the economy remains in equilibrium in this case, at the initial output level, if the current exchange rate also falls in proportion to the rise in P*. Why? The goods market is in equilibrium because the real exchange rate has not changed; the foreign-exchange market is in equilibrium if the domestic interest rate does not change (there has been no change in the expected rate of future currency depreciation); and with

output and the interest rate the same, the money market is still in equilibrium. The economy thus remains in internal and external balance if these conditions held initially.

E

2. A transitory increase in the foreign interest rate shifts the asset market curve up and to

the right from AA to A'A', as shown in the figure 19-2 (there is no change in the expected exchange rate since this is a temporary rise). Under a floating exchange rate there is thus a depreciation of the home currency and an increase in output. (The effect could differ in the IS-LM model, where the real interest rate influences aggregate demand directly; the DD curve would shift up and to the right as well.) Under a fixed exchange rate, however, the monetary authority must intervene to prevent the depreciation, so it contracts the home money supply by selling foreign exchange and drives the home interest rate to the new higher world level. This causes AA to return to its original position, leaving output unaffected. (Once again, the result would differ in the IS-LM model since foreign interest-rate shocks are not pure money-market disturbances in that model.)

3. The effect of a permanent rise in the foreign nominal interest rate depends upon

whether that rise is due to an increase in inflationary expectations abroad or a rise in the foreign real interest rate. If the foreign real interest rate rises because of monetary contraction abroad, there is a long-run depreciation of the domestic currency which reinforces the depreciation that occurs in problem 2. The expansionary effect on home output is thus greater than in the transitory case. If the foreign nominal interest rate

rises only because foreign inflationary expectations rise, however, the expectations effect goes the other way and the long-run expected price of foreign currency falls, shifting AA to the left. Domestic output need not rise in this case. Under a fixed exchange rate there is still no short run effect on the economy in the DD-AA model, but as P* starts to rise the home country will have to import foreign inflation. Under a floating rate the home economy can be completely insulated from the subsequent foreign inflation.

Y

Figure 19-2

4. A rise in foreign inflation could arise from a permanent increase in foreign monetary

growth. This causes the home currency to appreciate against the foreign currency, implying also a real appreciation (since P and P* are fixed in the short run). Domestic output therefore falls as foreign output rises. In the long run, relative PPP implies that the rate of domestic currency appreciation rises to offset the higher foreign inflation.

The foreign nominal interest rate rises by the increase in expected inflation (the Fisher effect); the domestic nominal interest rate is the same as its initial long-run value; and by relative PPP, interest parity continues to hold. Notice that in this case, the expected future exchange rate moves over time to reflect the trend inflation differential.

5. We can include the aspect of imperfect asset substitutability in the DD-AA model by

recognizing that the AA schedule now must equate M/P=L(R*+ expected depreciation + risk premium, Y). An increase in the risk premium shifts out the AA curve, leading to a currency depreciation and an increase in output. Output will not change under a

fixed-exchange-rate regime: since the exchange rate parity must be preserved, there will be no depreciation and no effect on output.

6. In Chapter 18 there is an analysis of internal and external balance for fixed exchange

rates. It is possible to construct a corresponding diagram for floating exchange rates.

In figure 19-4, the vertical axis measures expansion of the money supply and the horizontal axis measures fiscal ease. The internal balance curve II has a negative slope since monetary restraint must be met by greater fiscal expansion to preserve internal balance. The external balance curve XX has a positive slope since monetary expansion, which depreciates the exchange rate and improves the current account, must be matched by fiscal expansion to preserve external balance. The "four zones of economic discomfort" are :

Zone 1 -- overemployment and excessive current account surplus;

Zone 2 -- overemployment and current account deficit;

Zone 3 -- underemployment and current account deficit;

Zone 4 -- underemployment and current account surplus.

Money

Supply

Growth

Figure 19-4

7. The diagram described in the answer to question 6 can be used to answer this question.

The United States begins at point 0 after 1985, where it is in internal balance but there is a large current account deficit. In the short run, monetary expansion (an upward shift in the point) moves the economy toward the goal of a greater current account surplus, but also moves the economy out of internal balance toward overemployment. The

expenditure-reducing policy of reducing the budget deficit (represented by a leftward shift in the point), used in tandem with an expenditure-switching monetary expansion, can restore external balance while maintaining internal balance. Moving the economy into a zone of overemployment puts pressure on the price level which ultimately reverses the short-run effect of monetary expansion on the real exchange rate.

8. Fiscal expansion in Germany and Japan would have appreciated the currencies of those

countries and diminished the bilateral U.S. trade deficits with them, as desired by American officials. On the other hand, monetary expansion in these countries would have worsened the U.S. current account since the dollar would have appreciated relative to the deutschemark and the yen. Our two-country models suggests that U.S.

output would have fallen as a result. These effects would differ, of course, if the United States altered its policies in response to policy changes in Germany or Japan.

For example, if the United States expanded its money supply with the expansion in either Germany or Japan there would be no bilateral effects. If the United States contracted fiscal policy as Germany or Japan expanded fiscal policy there would less of an effect on output in each country.

9. Sterilized intervention has no effect on the supply of high-powered money. A way to

check whether the intervention in connection with the Louvre accord in February 1987 was sterilized is to see if there are unusual movements in German or Japanese stocks of high-powered money around that time. The International Financial Statistics, published by the IMF, includes measures of reserve money (line 14). These data, for Germany (in billions of DM at end of month) and Japan (in billions of yen at end of month), are as follows:

Month/Yr. 10/86 11/86 12/86 1/87 2/87 3/87 4/87 5/87

Japan 26,318 27,772 32,119 27,844 29,016 30,146 29,998 29,379

Germany 169.6 179.3 182.9 169.8 178.3 193.3 180.5 192.8

These data for Japan reflect a more-or-less steady trend in high-powered money. The largest deviations from this trend do not occur around February 1987. The high-powered money series for Germany appears less stable. There is a substantial increase between the end of January 1987 and the end of March 1987, an increase that was somewhat reversed by the end of April, but rose again by the end of May 1987.

10. One can construct a matrix analogous to figure 19A-1 in the text to show the change in

inflation and the change in exports for each country in response to monetary policy choices by that country and by the other country. Export growth in a country will be greater, but inflation will be higher, if that country undertakes a more expansionary monetary policy, given the other country's policy choice. There is, however, a beggar-thy- neighbor effect because one country's greater export growth implies lower export growth for the other. Without policy coordination, the two countries will adopt over- expansionary monetary policies to improve their competitive positions, but these policies will offset each other and result simply in higher inflation everywhere. With coordination, the countries will realize that they can both enjoy lower inflation if they agree not to engage in competitive currency depreciation.

FURTHER READINGS

Ralph C. Bryant International Coordination of National Stabilization Policies. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995.

Richard H. Clarida. G-3 Exchange-Rate Relationships: A Review of the Record and Proposals for Change. Princeton Essays in International Economics 219. International Economics Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University. September 2000. Martin S. Feldstein. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Thinking about International Economic Coordination." Journal of Economic Perspectives2 (Spring 1989), pp. 3 - 13.

Milton Friedman. "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates," in Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, pp. 157-203.

Morris Goldstein. The Exchange Rate System and the IMF: A Modest Agenda. Policy Analyses in International Economics 39. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1995.

Harry G. Johnson. "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 51 (June 1969), pp. 12-24.

Charles P. Kindleberger. "The Case for Fixed Exchange Rates, 1969," in The International Adjustment Mechanism, Conference Series 2. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1970, pp. 93-108.

Michael Mussa. "Macroeconomic Interdependence and the Exchange Rate Regime," in Rudiger Dornbusch and Jacob A. Frenkel, eds., International Economic Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, pp. 160-204.

Maurice Obstfeld. "International Currency Experience: New Lessons and Lessons Relearned." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1:1995), pp. 119-220.

Robert Solomon. The International Monetary System, 1945-1981. New York: Harper & Row, 1982.

Robert Solomon. Money on the Move: The Revolution in International Finance since 1980. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

John Williamson. The Exchange Rate System, 2nd edition. Policy Analyses in International Economics 5. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1985.

克鲁格曼《国际经济学》(第8版)笔记和课后习题详解 第2章~第4章【圣才出品】

第1篇国际贸易理论 第2章世界贸易概览 2.1复习笔记 1.经济规模与进出口总额之间的关系 (1)规模问题:引力模型 现实证明一国的经济规模与其进出口总额息息相关。把整个世界贸易看成整体,可利用引力模型(gravity model)来预测任意两国之间的贸易规模。引力模型方程式如下: 其中, T是i国与j国的贸易额,A为常量,i Y是i国的国内生产总值,j Y是j国的国 ij 内生产总值, D是两国的距离。引力模型方程式表明:其他条件不变的情况下,两国间的 ij 贸易规模与两国的GDP成正比,与两国间的距离成反比。 (2)引力模型的内在逻辑 引力模型之所以能较好地拟合两国之间的实际贸易现状,其原因在于:大的经济体收入高,因而大量进口产品;大的经济体能生产更多品种的系列产品,因而更能满足其他国家的需求,进而大量出口产品。在两国贸易中,任一方的经济规模越大,则双方的贸易量就越大。 (3)引力模型的应用:寻找反例 当两国之间的贸易量与依照引力模型计算得出的结果相差较大时,就需要从其他因素进行分析,如文化的亲和性、地理位置、运输成本等因素。事实上,这也是引力模型的重要用

途之一,即有助于明确国际贸易中的异常现象。 (4)贸易障碍:距离、壁垒和疆界 距离、壁垒和疆界对国际贸易有负面作用,会使得两国之间的贸易额大大小于根据引力模型所计算出的结果。另外,在各国GDP和距离给定的情况下,有效贸易协定(trade agreement)比无效的贸易协定更能显著增加成员国的贸易量,这也是美国与其邻国的贸易量明显大于其和相同大小的欧盟的贸易量的原因之一。 2.正在演变的世界贸易模式 (1)世界变小了吗? 人们认为,现代化的运输和通讯可以超越空间距离的束缚,世界因此成了小“村落”。事实的确如此。但是,有时候政治的力量可以超过技术进步的作用,两次世界大战、20世纪30年代的大萧条及战后全世界范围内的贸易保护主义等都严重制约着国际贸易的发展,使得国际贸易大幅萎缩,并且用了几十年才得以恢复。 (2)交易内容 从全世界范围来看,工业制成品是主要的交换产品,所占比重最大。矿产品特别是现代世界不可或缺的石油依旧是世界贸易的主要部分。引人注目的是发展中国家已经从初级产品出口国转变为主要的制成品出口国。另外,服务贸易在国际贸易中凸显重要,并且其重要性越来越突出。 (3)服务外包 随着现代信息技术的发展和应用,一种新的贸易形式——服务外包(service outsourcing)随之出现。服务外包也称之为离岸服务,是一种新兴的国际贸易现象,使得曾经必须在一国国内实现的服务现在可以在国外实现。 (4)旧规则依然可行吗?

克鲁格曼《国际经济学》(国际金融)习题答案要点

〈〈国际经济学》(国际金融)习题答案要点 第12章国民收入核算与国际收支 1、如问题所述,GNP仅仅包括最终产品和服务的价值是为了避免重复计算的问题。 在国民收入账户中,如果进口的中间品价值从GNP中减去,出口的中间品价值加 到GNP中,重复计算的问题将不会发生。例如:美国分别销售钢材给日本的丰田公司和美国的通用汽车公司。其中出售给通用公司的钢材,作为中间品其价值不被计算到美国的GNP中。出售给日本丰田公司的钢材,钢材价值通过丰田公司进入日本的GNP,而最终没有进入美国的国民收入账户。所以这部分由美国生产要素创造的中间品价值应该从日本的GNP中减去,并加入美国的GNP。 2、(1)等式12-2可以写成CA =(S P-I)? (T -G)。美国更高的进口壁垒对私人储蓄、投资和政府赤字有比较小或没有影响。(2)既然强制性的关税和配额对这些变量没有影响,所以贸易壁垒不能减少经常账户赤字。 不同情况对经常账户产生不同的影响。例如,关税保护能提高被保护行业的投资,从而使经常账户恶化。(当然,使幼稚产业有一个设备现代化机会的关税保护是合理的。)同时,当对投资中间品实行关税保护时,由于受保护行业成本的提高可能使该行业投资下降,从而改善经常项目。一般地,永久性和临时性的关税保护有不同的效果。这个问题的要点是:政策影响经常账户方式需要进行一般均衡、宏观分析。 3、 (1)、购买德国股票反映在美国金融项目的借方。相应地,当美国人通过他的瑞士银行账户用支票支付时,因为他对瑞士请求权减少,故记入美国金融项目的贷方。这是美国用一个外国资产交易另外一种外国资产的案例。 (2)、同样,购买德国股票反映在美国金融项目的借方。当德国销售商将美国支票存入德国银行并且银行将这笔资金贷给德国进口商(此时,记入美国经常项目的贷 方)或贷给个人或公司购买美国资产(此时,记入美国金融项目的贷方)。最后,银行采取的各项行为将导致记入美国国际收支表的贷方。 (3)、法国政府通过销售其持有在美国银行的美元存款干预外汇市场,代表美国金融项目的借方项目。购买美元的法国公民如果使用它们购买美国商品,这将记入美国国际收支账户经常项目的贷方;如果用来购买美国资产,这将记入美国国际收支账户金融项目的贷方。 (4)假定签发旅行支票的公司使用支票账户在法国进行支付。当此公司支付餐费给 法国餐馆时,记入美国经常项目的借方。签发旅行支票的公司必须销售资产(消耗 其在法国的支票账户)来支付,从而减少了公司在法国拥有的资产,这记入美国金融项目的贷方。 (5)、没有市场交易发生。 (6)离岸交易不影响美国国际收支账户。 4、购买answering machine记入New York收支账户的经常项目借方,记入New Jersey 收支账户经常项目的贷方。当New Jersey的公司将货款存入New York银行时,记入New York的金融项目的贷方和New Jersey金融项目的借方。如果交易用现金进 行支付,则记入New Jersey金融项目的借方和New York金融项目的贷方。New Jersey 获得美元现钞(从New York进口资产),而New York则减少了美元(出口美元资产)。最后的调整类似于金本位制下发生的情况。5、

李坤望《国际经济学》课后习题答案

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Home's PPF 200400600800200400600800 Q apple Q banana Foreign's PPF 200400600800100080160240320400 Q*apple Q*banana Chapter 2 1a.画出本国的生产可能性边界: b. 用香蕉衡量的苹果的机会成本是, 5.1=Lb La a a c .劳动力的自由流动使两部门的工资率相等,自由竞争使得他们生产两种产品的机会成本相同。相对价格等于相对成本,后者可以表示为(*)/(*)a a b b w a w a ,由于两部门间的工资率相等,a b w w ∴=,只有在Lb La b a /a a /P P =,两种商品才都会被生产。所以 1.5 /P P b a = 2a. b. 3 a. a b b a /P P /D D =∵当市场达到均衡时, 1b a ) (D D -**=++=b a b b a a P P Q Q Q Q ∴RD 是一条双曲线 x y 1 =

b.苹果的均衡相对价格由RD 和RS 的交点决定: RD: y x 1 = RS: 5 ]5,5.1[5.1],5.0(5.0) 5.0,0[=∈=??? ??+∞∈=∈y y y x x x ∴x=0.5, y=2 ∴2/=b P a P e e c. ∵b a b e a e b a P P P P P P ///>>**∴只有两个国家的时候,本国专门生产苹果,出口苹果并进口香蕉:外国则正好相反。 d . 国际贸易允许本国和外国在阴影区内任何一点消费,专门生产某种产品然后和另一个国家进行贸易的间接方式,要比直接生产该商品的方式更有效率。在没有贸易时,本国要生产3单位的香蕉必须放弃2单位的苹果,外国要生产1单位的苹果要放弃5单位的香蕉。贸易允许两国以两单位香蕉交换一单位苹果。通过出让2单位苹果,本国可以获得四单位的香蕉;而外国可以用2单位向交换得1单位苹果。所以两个国家都从贸易中获利。 4. RD: y x 1 = RS: 5 ]5,5.1[5 .1] ,1(1)1,0[=∈=?? ???+∞∈=∈y y y x x x →5.13 2==y x →5.1/=b P a P e e 在这种情况下,外国将专门生产并出口香蕉,进口苹果。但本国将同时生产香蕉和苹果,并且香蕉相对于苹果的机会成本在本国是相同的。所以本国既没有得益也没有受损,但外国从贸易中获益了。 5.在这种情况下,劳动力总量加倍了而劳动生产率减半,所以有效劳动力总量仍是相同的。答案类似于第三小题,两国都从贸易中获益了。但是,相对于第四小题,外国的获益减少了。 6.实际上,相对工资率由相应的劳动生产率和对产品的相对需求决定。韩国的低工资率反映了韩国大部分行业的劳动生产率比美国低。和低劳动生产率,低工资率的国家进行贸易可以提高像美国那样高劳动生产率国家的福利和生活水平。所以这种贫民劳动论是错误的。

国际经济学克鲁格曼考试重点

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李坤望《国际经济学》(第4版)学习辅导书-第1~4章【圣才出品】

第1章国际贸易理论的微观基础 1.1 课后习题详解 1.为什么说生产和消费只取决于相对价格? 答:相对价格是两种或多种商品之间的价格对比关系。生产和消费只取决于相对价格,这是因为: 当生产处于生产可能性边界线上,资源则得到了充分利用,这时,要想增加某一产品的生产,必须降低另一产品的生产,也就是说,增加某一产品的生产是有机会成本(或社会成本)的,也就是以另一种产品的产量为机会成本。生产可能性边界上任何一点都表示生产效率和充分就业得以实现,但究竟选择哪一点,则还要看两个商品的相对价格,即它们在市场上的交换比率。相对价格等于机会成本时,生产点在生产可能性边界上的位置也就确定了。所以,生产和消费只取决于相对价格。 2.仿效(教材中)图1-6和图1-7,试推导出Y商品的国民供给曲线和国民需求曲线。 答:在图1-1(a)中,横坐标表示Y商品的供给,纵坐标表示X商品的供给,得出相应的生产可能性边界线;在图1-1(b)中,横坐标表示Y商品的供给,纵坐标表示Y商品的相对价格P Y/P X。Y商品的国民供给曲线和国民需求曲线的推导如下: 首先,推导Y商品的国民供给曲线NS Y。任意选取Y商品的三个不同的相对价格:1/2、1和2。这三条相对价格线与生产可能性边界线的切点分别决定了三个生产均衡点D、E、F,对应于这三点的Y商品的产出分别为:S1、S2、S3。在图1-1(b)中,横坐标表示Y商品的供给,纵坐标表示Y商品的相对价格,根据图1-1(a),在图1-1(b)中画出对应于各

个相对价格的Y商品的供给量,最后得出一条曲线NS Y,即Y商品的国民供给曲线。该曲线斜率为正,表示随着Y商品的相对价格的提高,其供给水平也随之提高。 采用同样的方法,可得出国民需求曲线ND Y,如图1-2所示。 3.在只有两种商品的情况下,当一种商品达到均衡时,另一种商品是否也同时达到均衡?试解释原因。 答:在只有两种商品的情况下,当一种商品达到均衡时,另一种商品也同时达到均衡。理由如下: 在只有两种商品的情况下,生产要素只能在两者间分配,两种商品间的相对价格是唯一的世界市场价格。当其中一种商品达到均衡时,该商品的相对价格得以确定,其供给与需求

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Chapter 1 Introduction ?Chapter Organization What Is International Economics About? The Gains from Trade The Pattern of Trade How Much Trade? Balance of Payments Exchange Rate Determination International Policy Coordination The International Capital Market International Economics: Trade and Money ?Chapter Overview The intent of this chapter is to provide both an overview of the subject matter of international economics and to provide a guide to the organization of the text. It is relatively easy for an instructor to motivate the study of international trade and finance. The front pages of newspapers, the covers of magazines, and the lead reports on television news broadcasts herald the interdependence of the U.S. economy with the rest of the world. This interdependence may also be recognized by students through their purchases of imports of all sorts of goods, their personal observations of the effects of dislocations due to international competition, and their experience through travel abroad. The study of the theory of international economics generates an understanding of many key events that shape our domestic and international environment. In recent history, these events include the causes and consequences of the large current account deficits of the United States; the dramatic appreciation of the dollar during the first half of the 1980s followed by its rapid depreciation in the second half of the 1980s; the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and the Mexican crisis in late 1994; and the increased pressures for industry protection against foreign competition broadly voiced in the late 1980s and more vocally espoused in the first half of the 1990s. The financial crisis that began in East Asia in 1997 and spread to many countries around the globe and the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe highlighted the way in which various national economies are linked and how important it is for us to understand these connections. These global linkages have been highlighted yet again with the rapid spread of the financial crisis in the United States to the rest of the world. At the same time, protests at global economic meetings and a rising wave of protectionist rhetoric have highlighted opposition to globalization. The text material will enable students to understand the economic context in which such events occur. ? 2012 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Addison-Wesley

克鲁格曼《国际经济学》(第8版)课后习题详解(第9章 贸易政策中的政治经济学)【圣才出品】

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福利的获得需要两个或者两个以上的人的共同努力才能完成,集体行动问题就出现了,即决策集体的每个成员必须单方面决定是否参与提供某种集体产品。因为集体产品具有非排他性和非竞争性的特征,所以使得不为集体产品的提供付出成本的集团成员也可以获得集体产品。集团越大,分享收益的人越多,个人的行动对集团利益的影响越小,集团内的成员“搭便车”的动机就越强烈。这就意味着仅仅依靠个人的自愿,集体产品的供给将是不足的,集体产品不可能依靠个人的自愿提供来解决。因此,个人理性并不必然导致集体理性,个人理性不是实现集体理性的充分条件。 4.特惠贸易协定(preferential trading agreement) 答:特惠贸易协定是指各签约方之间相互减让关税或实行其他贸易优惠措施,但不将其给予非签约方的贸易优惠协定。由于这种协定违反了最惠国待遇原则,因而一般被世界贸易组织所禁止。但是,如果它能够促进签约方之间的自由贸易,那么世界贸易组织就允许其存在。如下两种方式的特惠贸易协定是世界贸易组织允许的: (1)自由贸易区,各签约方设立对外关税率,但相互之间免除关税和取消非关税壁垒; (2)关税同盟,各成员国制定统一的对外关税率,而成员国之间则是“特惠”的。 5.关税同盟(customs union) 答:关税同盟是指两个或两个以上参加同盟的国家划为一个关税区域,在区域内取消关税和非关税壁垒,实行自由贸易,同时对区域外采取统一的关税及其他贸易限制等措施。关税同盟是跨国区域经济一体化的一种基本形式。关税同盟可以分为完全关税同盟和不完全关税同盟。完全关税同盟是指将各加盟国的关税完全废除,这种关税同盟按惯例不受最惠国待遇原则的约束。但事实上,当关税同盟成立时,各国原有的关税并不能立即完全废除,为避

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李坤望国际经济学第四版课后习题答案(自 整理)

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第二章 1.下列() 属于李嘉图模型的假定前提条件。 A.生产过程中使用资本和劳动力两种要素 B.没有运输成本和其他交易成本 C.生产要素可以在两国间自由流动 D.生产要素非充分利用因此机会成本不变 2.下列()不属于重商主义的观点。 A.货币是财富的唯一表现形式 B.通过国际贸易可以提高所有贸易参与国的福利水平 C.出口意味着贵金属的流入 D.进口意味着贵金属的流出 3.下列关于技术差异论的表述哪一项是不正确的() A.分为绝对技术差异论与相对技术差异论 B.劳动力在国内两个部门之间自由流动,而且机会成本保持不变 C.参与贸易的两个国家福利水平都可以得到提高 D.一国比另一国家的技术优势越大,则通过国际贸易获得的福利增加越大 4.下列哪一条不是重商主义的理论主张() A.贸易不是“零和”的 B.多卖少买,保持贸易顺差,是获得财富的基本原则 C.国家应干预经济,鼓励出口,限制进口 D.金银货币是财富的唯一形态

国际经济学题库(英文版)知识分享

Part Ⅰ. Fill in the blank with suitable content. 1.Seven themes recur throughout the study of international economics. These are the gains from trade , the pattern of trade , protectionism the balance of payments, exchange rate determination, international policy coordination, international capital market. 2. Countries engage in international trade for two basic reasons : comparative advantage and economics of scale . 3. A country has a comparative advantage in producing a good if the opportunity cost of producing that good in terms of other goods is lower in that country than it is in other countries. 4. Labor is the only one factor of production. LC a 、LW a and *LC a 、* LW a are the unit labor requirement in cheese and wine at Home and Foreign, respectively. If aLC/aLW

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