经济学人文章10篇

Dominant and dangerous

As America's economic supremacy fades, the primacy of the dollar looks unsustainable

IF HEGEMONS are good for anything, it is for conferring stability on the systems they dominate. For 70 years the dollar has been the superpower of the financial and monetary system. Despite talk of the yuan's rise, the primacy of the greenback is unchallenged. As a means of payment, a store of value and a reserve asset, nothing can touch it. Yet the dollar's rule has brittle foundations, and the system it underpins is unstable. Worse, the alternative reserve currencies are flawed. A transition to a more secure order will be devilishly hard.

When the buck stops

For decades, America's economic might legitimised the dollar's claims to reign supreme. But, as our special report this week explains, a faultline has opened between America's economic clout and its financial muscle. The United States accounts for 23% of global GDP and 12% of merchandise trade. Yet about 60% of the world's output, and a similar share of the planet's people, lie within a de facto dollar zone, in which currencies are pegged to the dollar or move in some sympathy with it. American firms' share of the stock of international corporate investment has fallen from 39% in 1999 to 24% today. But Wall Street sets the rhythm of markets globally more than it ever did. American fund managers run 55% of the world's assets under management, up from 44% a decade ago.

The widening gap between America's economic and financial power creates problems for other countries, in the dollar zone and beyond. That is because the costs of dollar dominance are starting to outweigh the benefits.

First, economies must endure wild gyrations. In recent months the prospect of even a tiny rate rise in America has sucked capital from emerging markets, battering currencies and share prices. Decisions of the Federal Reserve affect offshore dollar debts and deposits worth about $9 trillion. Because some countries link their currencies to the dollar, their central banks must react to the Fed. Foreigners own 20-50% of local-currency government bonds in places like Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey: they are more likely to abandon emerging markets when American rates rise.

At one time the pain from capital outflows would have been mitigated by the stronger demand—including for imports—that prompted the Fed to raise rates in the first place. However, in the past decade America's share of global merchandise imports has dropped from 16% to 13%. America is the biggest export market for only 32

countries, down from 44 in 1994; the figure for China has risen from two to 43. A system in which the Fed dispenses and the world convulses is unstable.

A second problem is the lack of a backstop for the offshore dollar system if it faces a crisis. In 2008-09 the Fed reluctantly came to the rescue, acting as a lender of last resort by offering $1 trillion of dollar liquidity to foreign banks and central banks. The sums involved in a future crisis would be far higher. The offshore dollar world is almost twice as large as it was in 2007. By the 2020s it could be as big as America's banking industry. Since 2008-09, Congress has grown wary of the Fed's emergency lending. Come the next crisis, the Fed's plans to issue vast swaplines might meet regulatory or congressional resistance. For how long will countries be ready to tie their financial systems to America's fractious and dysfunctional politics?

That question is underscored by a third worry: America increasingly uses its financial clout as a political tool. Policymakers and prosecutors use the dollar payment system to assert control not just over wayward bankers and dodgy football officials, but also errant regimes like Russia and Iran. Rival powers bridle at this vulnerability to American foreign policy.

Americans may wonder why this matters to them. They did not force any country to link its currency to the dollar or encourage foreign firms to issue dollar debt. But the dollar's outsize role does affect Americans. It brings benefits, not least cheaper borrowing. Alongside the “exorbitant privilege” of owning the reserve currency, however, there are costs. If the Fed fails to act as lender of last resort in a dollar liquidity crisis, the ensuing collapse abroad will rebound on America's economy. And even without a crisis, the dollar's dominance will present American policymakers with a dilemma. If foreigners continue to accumulate reserves, they will dominate the Treasury market by the 2030s. To satisfy growing foreign demand for safe dollar-denominated assets, America's government could issue more Treasuries—adding to its debts. Or it could leave foreigners to buy up other securities—but that might lead to asset bubbles, just as in the mortgage boom of the 2000s.

It's all about the Benjamins

Ideally America would share the burden with other currencies. Yet if the hegemony of the dollar is unstable, its would-be successors are unsuitable. The baton of financial superpower has been passed before, when America overtook Britain in 1920-45. But Britain and America were allies, which made the transfer orderly. And America came with ready-made attributes: a dynamic economy and, like Britain, political cohesiveness and the rule of law.

Compare that with today's contenders for reserve status. The euro

is a currency whose very existence cannot be taken for granted. Only when the euro area has agreed on a full banking union and joint bond issuance will those doubts be fully laid to rest. As for the yuan, China's government has created the monetary equivalent of an eight-lane motorway—a vast network of currency swaps with foreign central banks—but there is no one on it. Until China opens its financial markets, the yuan will be only a bit-player. And until it embraces the rule of law, no investor will see its currency as truly safe.

All this suggests that the global monetary and financial system will not smoothly or quickly wean itself off the greenback. There are things America can do to shoulder more responsibility—for instance, by setting up bigger emergency-swaplines with more central banks. More likely is a splintering of the system, as other countries choose to insulate themselves from Fed decisions by embracing capital controls. The dollar has no peers. But the system that it anchors is cracking. 主宰的和危险的

随着美国经济支配地位的衰落，美元的霸主地位看上去是不可持续的

霸主的好处在于能够给它主导的体系带来稳定。70年来，美元一直是金融和货币体系的霸主。尽管有人民币崛起之说，但是，美元的主导地位是不可挑战的。作为一种支付手段、一种价值载体和一种储备资产，没有什么能够触动它。然而，美元的统治存在着易碎的基础，而且它支撑的体系也不稳定。更糟糕的是，备选的储备货币是有缺陷的。向一种更安全的秩序的转变将异常艰难。

当美元止步时

几十年来，美国的经济实力赋予了美元合法的称霸诉求。但是，正如我们本周专题报道所示，一条断层线已经在美国的经济实力和金融实力之间裂开了。美国占全球GDP和商品贸易的份额分别为23％和12％。但是，大约60％的世界产出以及同样比例的人口位于一个事实上的美元区之内，其间的各种货币，不是与美元挂钩，就是大致与美元同步变动。美国企业的国际企业投资占比已经从1939年的39％降至今天的24％。但是，华尔街为市场定调的全球性却超过了以往。美国基金经理管理下的世界资产比例，已经从十年前的44％升至今天的55％。

美国经济与金融实力之间日渐拉大的差距给美元区内外的其他国家造成了许多问题。究其原因，在于美元主宰力的成本正在开始超出盈利。

首先，各个经济体必须承受剧烈的动荡。美国方面极为微小的加息前景，在最近几个月中从新兴市场吸走了大量的资本，重创了它们的货币和股价。美联储的决定影响着大约9万亿美元的离岸美元债务和存款。由于一些国家将货币与美元挂钩，它们的央行必须要对美联储做出反应。外国人拥有印尼、马来西亚、墨西哥、南非和土耳其等国20％－50％的本币政府债券：他们更有可能在美联储加息时放弃新兴市场。

资本外流的痛苦，在某个时间点，或许会因为推动美联储第一个加息的需求——包括对进口的需求——的增强而得以缓解。但是，在过去十年中，美国在全球商品进口中的占比已经从16％跌至13％。现在的美国仅是32个国家的最

大出口市场，比1994年的44个国家有所下降；中国的数字已经从2个上升至43个。一种美联储派发、全世界震动的体系是不稳定的。

第二个问题是离岸美元体系在面临危机时的缺乏支撑。在2008－09年间，美联储曾经不情愿地出手救援，通过给外国银行和央行提供1万亿美元流动性的方式，扮演了最后贷款人的角色。一场未来危机所涉及的数额会远远高于这个数字。现在的离岸美元世界几乎是2007年的2倍之大。到本世纪20年代，它可能与美国银行业一样大。自2008－09年以来，美国国会已经厌倦了美联储的紧急放贷行为。当下次危机来临时，美联储发起巨额互换协议的计划或许就会遭遇监管部门或者国会的抵制。各国还准备将它们的金融体系捆绑在美国难以驾驭且功能失调的政治上多长时间？

这个问题之被强调是因为第三个担忧：美国正在越来越多地将经济实力当作一种政治工具来使用。决策者和检察官不仅利用美元支付体系区来维持他们对刚愎自用的银行家和诡计多端的足球官员的控制，还利用这套体系来维持对俄罗斯和伊朗这样的迷途政权的控制。敌对势力对这种容易受美国外交政策影响的弱点愤愤不平。

美国人可能会对这种重要性背后的原因感到不解。他们没有强迫任何国家将自己的货币与美元挂钩，也没有鼓励外国企业发行美元债券。但是，美元的超级角色的确影响着美国人。它带来各种各样的好处，不仅仅是更便宜的借贷。然而，在拥有储备货币的“过度特权”的同时，还存在着各种各样的代价。如果美联储没能在某次美元流动性危机中扮演最后的贷款者，随之而来的国外的崩盘将反作用于美国经济。同时，即便是没有危机，美元的主宰力也会让美国决策者处于一种两难的境地。如果外国人继续积累储备，到本世纪30年代，他们将主宰美国国债市场。为了满足外国人日渐增长的对于美元资产的需求，美国政府或是发行更多的国债——增加自身的债务；或是任由外国人购买其他证券产品——但是，这可能导致像本世纪头十年的抵押贷款狂热那样的资产泡沫。

这全都关乎美元

理想的情况是，美国会与其他货币分担这一重担。然而，如果美元的霸主地位不稳定，潜在的继承者是不适合的。金融超级大国的指挥棒之前曾经被传递过，那是在美国超越英国的1920年－1945年之间。不过，英国和美国是盟友，这使得那次传递得以有序进行。再者，当时的美国已经具备了接棒的条件：一个活力四射的经济体，以及像英国那样的政治凝聚力和法治。

将此与今天的储备地位竞争者做一比较。欧元是一种连自身的存在还都不一定的货币。只有在欧元区就全面的银行联盟和联合债券的发行达成一致时，这些担忧才会完全平息下来。至于人民币，中国政府已经打造好了一个巨大的与外国央行进行货币互换的网络，这就好比是一条8车道的货币高速公路。只是，这条高速公路目前还空空如也。在中国开放其金融市场之前，人民币将仅仅是一个配角；在中国全面接受法治之前，没有投资者会把他们的货币视为真正安全的货币。

这一切表明，全球货币和金融体系将不会顺利地摆脱美元，也不会快速地摆脱美元。存在着许多美国能够以之而承担起更多责任的事情——例如，同更多的央行设立额度更大的紧急互换协议。随着其他国家通过资本管制的方式来选择让自己摆脱美联储决定的影响，更大的可能是当前这个体系的崩塌。美元没有平起平坐的货币与之为伴。但是，它维系的这个体系正在分崩离析。

The two Mexicos

With its combination of modernity and poverty, Mexico provides lessons for all emerging markets

“IN ESTABLISHING the rule of law, the first five centuries are always the hardest.” For much of the past two decades, that quip by Gordon Brown, a former British prime minister, has seemed not just dour, but wrong. Buoyed by China, by trade growth and capital inflows, by talk of new middle classes and the bottom billion, it was easy to forget old truths about how hard it is for poor countries to become rich. A breezy assumption took hold: that emerging market s would surely follow the likes of South Korea and Taiwan on the path to wealth.

That view of development has crumbled of late, along with emerging market s' growth rates. China, the locomotive to which many are still hitched, is slowing. Russia, South Africa and Brazil are in reverse gear. Their currencies drop with every fall in commodity prices; they will no doubt weaken further if the Federal Reserve raises American interest rates in a meeting due to end after we went to press. Trade is growing more slowly than global GDP, a trend that seems unlikely to reverse soon. All of this makes the trajectory taken by the East Asian tigers seem ever more exceptional.

A more realistic model of development is Mexico, a country that has parlayed its considerable advantages into patch es of modernity but has singularly failed to eradicate poverty nationwide. Some of its disappointments can be laid at the door of specific policies. But they also reflect the difficulties countries face throughout the emerging world.

Duet for one

Mexico has a lot going for it just now. Its economy is tied to America's rather than China's: in a week it sells more exports to the world's largest consumer market than it does to China in a year. Once dependent on oil, it has Latin America's largest and most sophisticated industrial base, exporting more cars than any country except Germany, Japan and South Korea. For two decades its macroeconomic management has been impeccably orthodox. Recently, it has thrown open its oil industry to private investment, and has tackled private monopolies. A vibrant Mexican middle class prospers along an industrial corridor running from the American border down to Mexico City. Its political system is essentially stable. Yet despite decades of reforms—at times half-hearted, at times full-throttled—Mexico has failed to bridge the gap between a globalised minority and a majority that lives in what Enrique Pe?a Nieto, the president, admits is “backwardness and poverty”. Since 1994, when Mexico joined the North American Free Trade Agreement,

income per head has grown by an annual average of barely 1%. About half the population remains stuck inpoverty; another quarter risks slipping back into penury. Lawlessness, corruption and conflicts of interest prevail among the police, courts and politicians supposed to care for the marginalised.

Mexico's duality shows that getting macroeconomic policy right is necessary to success, but not sufficient. The difficulties it still faces are a cautionary tale. The first lesson, and easiest to learn, is the centrality of urbanisation. Cities offer people opportunities to prosper that cannot be found in the countryside: about 120,000 people in Asia are migrating to cities every day, for example. But unless cities provide transport, power, sanitation and security, they will fail to fulfil their economic potential. Violent, drug-related crime stalks Mexico's scruffy barrios, where city-dwellers live. In South Africa the lack of public transport obliges slum-dwellers to take expensive minibus-taxis to work. Cities in Pakistan and the Philippines are plagued by blackouts. Slums ought to be every moderniser's priority. They are where most people live, and where jobs, schools and technology are closest to hand.

Roads and rails

The second is the importance of infrastructure, and not just in the cities. Many of the foundations of the modern Mexican economy were laid a century ago, in the form of roads and railways tying its industrial heartland to its ports and the northern border. That leaves swathes of the country unconnected. Centralisation breeds anomalies: beach resorts often buy their seafood in Mexico City's wholesale market, hundreds of miles from the coast. Yet linking up parts of a country is not easy. It takes both investors willing to bear risk and also politicians prepared to take on the status quo. In India, for example, plans for big infrastructure projects have been frustrated by squabbles over land and a dearth of long-term financing.

A third lesson from Mexico is the need to bring the informal economy into the light. Small, unregistered firms provide employment to most of the labour force, but are shunned by banks and anxious to remain below the taxman's radar. That saps the domestic economy. In the past decade and a half, while the productivity of the biggest Mexican companies has grown by 5.8% a year, that of the smallest has plunged by 6.5% a year. This problem is as prevalent in Mexico's changarros, where tacos sizzle alongside every bus stop, as it is in the shops and stalls of India, where only 2% of food and grocery retailing is in the formal sector. Electronic invoicing, which creates digital trails for the taxman, and mobile banking, which brings poor people out of the cash economy, both offer promise.

But the ubiquity of informal firms also points to a final lesson—the corrosive effects of a general lack of trust. Without enforce able laws and contracts, public services that make taxes seem worth paying and a political establish ment that serves the national interest, the only institution that most people can rely on is the family. As Mr Brown hinted, it can take generations to build institutions that enable people to trust arm's-length transactions. But it is not im possible. Witness the confidence now invested in Mexico's and Brazil's central banks, or South Africa's tax authorities.

Even the boldest reformer could not rapidly resolve all of these problems. This is the less cheering message of the two Mexicos: for all but a handful of countries, the road to prosperity is hard and long. But Mexico's success es also demonstrate that it does exist. Even if the gains must be measured in decades, perseverance eventually brings rewards.

双面墨西哥

墨西哥以其现代性和贫困的兼具给所有新兴市场上了一课

“在建立法治方面，开始的5个世纪向来是最艰难的。”在过去20年的大部分时间中，这句出自英国前首相戈登·布朗的讥讽之语似乎，而且还可能是错误的。受到中国、贸易增长和资本流入、新兴中产阶层和底层民众的话题的提振，忘记国家由穷到致富多坎坷的古老真理是容易的。一种轻松活泼的假设业已形成：新兴市场肯定会在致富之路上追随韩国和台湾。

最近，这种发展观已经随着新兴市场的增长率一起破产了。作为仍为众人搭便车的火车头，中国正在减速；俄罗斯、南非和巴西正在开倒车。他们的货币与大宗商品的价格一起下跌；他们无疑将在美联储定于本报付印之后结束的一次会议上提高美国利率后进一步走弱。贸易正在以比全球GDP增长还慢的速度增长，这是一种似乎不可能很快就发生逆转的趋势。所有这一切都使得被东亚虎所选择轨迹看上去更加另类。

一种更加现实的发展模式是墨西哥——一个将其巨大的优势成功地转变为种种现代性的同时却又没能在全国范围内消除贫困的国家。它的一些令人失望之处可以归咎于各种具体的政策。但是，它们也反映了整个新兴世界所面临的种种困难。

二重奏

墨西哥如今还有很长的路要走。它的经济是同美国而不是同中国捆绑在一起的：它对世界最大消费市场一周的出口量超过了对中国一年的出口量。由于之前依赖于石油，它拥有拉丁美洲最大、最成熟的工业基础，汽车出口量仅次于德国、日本和韩国。20年来，它的宏观经济管理中规中矩，无可挑剔。最近，它又对私人投资敞开了石油工业的大门，而且还解决了私人垄断。一个充满活力的墨西哥中产阶层正沿着从美国边境直到墨西哥城的工业走廊繁荣兴盛。它的政治体系基本稳定。

然而，尽管经历了数十年的改革——时而三心二意，时而全力以赴——墨西哥仍然没能缩小全球化了的少数人与生活在总统涅托所承认的“落后与贫穷”之中的多数人之间的差距。自墨西哥加入北美自由贸易协定的1994年以来，人均

收入的增长仅为年均1％。大约一半的人口仍旧为贫穷所困；另有四分之一的人口存在着倒退回贫穷的风险。无法无天、贪污腐败和利益冲突盛行于本应关心边缘人群的警察、法庭和政客之中。

墨西哥的双面性表明，做到宏观经济政策正确无误是成功的必需，但还不够。该国仍然所面临的问题是一个警世良言。第一个，也是最容易吸取的教训是城市化的集中。城市给人们提供了不可能在乡村中被发现的繁荣机遇：例如，在亚洲，每天约有12万人正向城市移民。但是，除非城市能够提供交通、电力、公共卫生和安全，不然的话，它们将无法实现自己的经济潜力。暴力、与毒品有关的犯罪充斥着墨西哥的肮脏社区，而这里正是城市居民生活的地方。在南非，公共交通的匮乏迫使贫民窟居民乘坐高价小巴去上班。在巴基斯坦和菲律宾，城市深受断电的困扰。贫民窟应当成为每一个现代主义者优先处理的事情。它们是大多数人的生活所在，是最接近工作、学校和技术的地方。

公路和铁路

第二个教训是基础设施的重要，而且不单单是城市基础设施的重要。当代墨西哥经济的许多基础都是在一个世纪前、以将其工业中心同港口和北部边境连成一体的公路和铁路的形式打下的。这就使得这个国家的大部分地区处于未得到连接的状态。集中化孕育出种种怪事：海边景点经常在距离海岸线数百公里的墨西哥城批发市场中购买海鲜。然而，将国家的各个部分连接起来不是一件容易的事情。这既需要甘愿承担风险的投资者，也需要做好了承认现状准备的政客。例如，在印度，针对大型基础设施项目的计划就因为围绕着土地的争吵和长期财政支持的匮乏而屡屡受挫。

来自墨西哥的第三个教训是把非正式经济带到阳光之下的必要。小型的、未注册的企业能够给劳动力大军中的大多数人提供就业，却遭到了银行的刻意回避，并且急于躲避税务部门的监管。这消耗了本国的经济。在过去15年中，就在墨西哥的大公司的生产力以每年5.8%的速度增长的同时，小企业却以6.5%的速度逐年下滑。这个问题的普遍性，在每一个公交站点旁边都有的炸玉米饼咝咝作响墨西哥的路边摊同在只有2％的食品和日用品零售是在正式部门进行的印度的商店和货摊是一样的。能够成为税务人员数字踪迹的电力发票和能够将穷人带出现金经济的手机银行双双提供了广阔的前景。

但是，非正式企业的这种普遍性还指向一个终极教训——普遍信任缺失的腐蚀效应。没有了可强制执行的法律和合同、没有了让税变得似乎值得缴纳的公共服务，没有了服务于国家利益的政治制度，大多数人能够依赖的唯一制度就只有家族了。正如布朗所暗示的那样，构建能够让人们托付正常商业行为的制度可能需要几代人的时间。但是，这不是不可能的。看看如今寄托于墨西哥和巴西央行或者南非税务部门的信心吧。

纵然是最大胆的改革者也不可能迅速解决所有这些问题。这就是墨西哥的双面性所传达出来的那种不那么令人兴奋的信息：对于一个国家而言，通向繁荣的道路漫长坎坷。但是，墨西哥的成功也表明，这条道路是的确存在的。即便收获的时间必须以几十年来衡量，持之以恒终将带来回报。

Migrant, refugee, asylum-seeker…

THIS year, hundreds of thousands of people, mostly from Africa and the Middle East, have tried to make their way to Europe, for a variety of reasons. Some are fleeing wars engulfing their countries generally; some are fleeing threats to themselves and their families specifically; some are hoping to work for far higher wages in Europe than they could get in the countries they have left. And some have heard, no doubt, that in Europe, healthcare and small incomes are given even to people not in work. The press often lacks the time or the space to describe the people in question in even these broad brushstrokes. So what do we call them? “Migrants” seems to be the answer.

But there are many problems w ith this word. “Migration” is what people do voluntarily, in order to seek their fortunes. Traditionally “migrants” have been called either “immigrant s” (if they are coming to the country you liv e in) or “emigrants” (if they're leaving the one you live in). “Migrant”, at least, has the virtue of being relatively perspective-neutral.

But then again, it implies making a considered decision to seek a new life. It does not conjure hastily grabbing whatever you can carry and fleeing the imminent threat of violence. The traditional words for the people doing the latter, too, are problematic. “Refugee” is a passive word (it comes from an ending that denotes a literal past participle in French, though not all English –ee words represent passive subjects). But a bigger problem is that a “refugee”, legally defined, cannot be sent home. The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, to which all civilised countries are signatories, defines a refugee as someone “unable or unwilling to return [to the country of origin] due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on his or her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group”.Under established international refugee law (the so-called principle of non-refoulement), it is illegal to send someone back to face such well-founded fear of persecution. A recent headline in the Sunday Times, “UK deports 52 Syrian refugee s”, means (legally speaking) that Britain has committed a serious breach of international law.

But the text of the article makes it clear that that is not what happened: the deportees (there's that passive –ee suffix) were not yet refugee s, legally, but “asylum-seekers", or those seeking refugee status. This more neutral term gets the journalist or politician off the hook, but “asylum-seeker” itself is problematic: it is clunky and bureaucratic, and has come to take on the taint many anti-migration politicians have sought to give it. Namely, many people

in Europe assume that “asylum-seekers” are really leaving home voluntarily to seek a comfortable life with free income and benefits in Europe. Once it is clear that many people use “asylum-seeker” as a synonym for “scrounger”, the shameful treatment many asylum-seekers get—being corralled as if proved guilty of crimes—makes more sense.

Mixed up in the whole messy flow are people who really are voluntarily moving to work in Europe, where incomes, healthcare and housing are far better than they places they have left. These people are often called, with some scorn, “economic migrants”. (That means they are not "genuine refugees".) To move where wages are higher is economically efficient, and to do so for one's family is also noble, but since many people do not have the right to move to Europe on this ground, they claim another one—like asylum. This is a dereliction of their duty to be honest, no matter how decent their motives. In America, such migrants typically just slip across the border and work without papers; their supporters seize on that lack of papers and call them “undocumented”, while their opponents call them “illegal immigrant s”, then hasten to shorten this to “illegals”.

Rich countries have not come to terms with the fact that many people either want to or need to move across political borders, as they have always done. If motivations are mixed, that is no crime. Pia Oberoi of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights writes that "for many millions of migrants, varying degrees of coercion and voluntariness characterise their journey. Journeys themselves are long and multi-directional, and a person's circumstances and status can change, often dramatically, as the journey progresses." In other words, as she eloquently puts it, "the boundaries of human experience are not as well-ordered or as neatly separated as our finely drawn legal categories would like them to be."

Words are neat; life is messy. The dog's breakfast of vocabulary available is appropriate to the half-chewed mess of policies that Western countries have formulated, trying to get the best of migration without any of the uncomfortable bits. "Migrants" may be the best general term for all those people on the move, but it lacks in urgency. Politicians and voters must remember that economic migrants and asylum-seekers alike are, first and foremost, "human beings".

移民、难民和寻求避难的人

今年以来，数十万主要是来自非洲和中东的民众一直都在试图进入欧洲。原因多种多样。有的人是在逃离通常会让国家陷入水深火热的战争；有的人是正在逃离针对他们自己或者家庭的威胁；有的人是正在希望为了欧洲那种远远高于在已经离开的国家所能够拿到的工资而工作。同时，有的人显然是听说，在欧洲，

医疗保险和小笔收入甚至能够分给没有工作的人。媒体经常缺少时间或空间，用甚至是这些大致的表述，来描述这些问题之人。那么，我们怎么称呼他们？“Migrants （移民）”似乎是答案。

但是，这个词语带来许多问题。“Migration 迁徙”是人的自愿行为，为的是寻求财富。传统上来说，“migrants”或是被称为“immigrants 移入之人”（倘若他们来到你的国家），或是被称为“emigrants 迁出之人”（如果他们正在离开你住的地方）。“Migrant”至少具有视角相对中立的的特点。

但是，在此又出现了问题。migrant 这个词语具有“做出一个深思熟虑的决定，以寻求一种新生活”的含义。它不会让人想起“匆忙地抓起能够携带的任何东西并迅速逃离即将来临的暴力威胁”的行为。特指后一种行为传统词语也是有问题的。“Refugee 难民”是一个被动性的词语（这种被动性来自一种在法语中表述过去分词的后缀ee，尽管在英语中不是所有以ee结尾的单词都代表被动的对象）。但是，一个更大的问题是，合法的“refugee”不能被遣返。所有文明国家都是签约方的《1951年难民地位公约》把refugee 定义为“因种族、宗教、国籍、政见或特殊社会团体资格关系，确据充分理由恐遭迫害而无法或者无意愿回归（出生国）的人”。根据现有的国际难民法律（即所谓的不推回原则），将一个人遣返让其面对这种理由充分的恐遭迫害的行为是非法的。《星期日泰晤士报》的一个最新标题——“英国遣返52名叙利亚难民”，（从法律上来说）意味着，英国严重违反了国际法。

但是，那篇文章的内容却表明，违反国际法的事情并没有发生：deportee 被遣返者（deportee有表示被动含义的后缀ee），从法律上来讲，还不是refugees 难民，而是“asylum-seekers” 寻求避难者，或者是寻求难民地位的人。虽说这个更加中立的词语给记者和政客解了围。但是，asylum-seeker 这个词语本身是有问题的：它体形笨重，官腔十足；而且带有许多反对移民的政客一直想给予它的那种污点。也就是说，欧洲有许多人认为，“asylum-seekers”实际上就是自愿离开家乡，以便在欧洲寻求一种有着自由收入和种种福利的舒适生活的行为。一旦人们把“asylum-seeker”用作“scrounger”（拾荒者）的同义词这个事实明了了，许多asylum-seekers所得到的可耻待遇——被当作是已被证明是有罪的罪犯给关起来——就更有意义了。

真得是自愿流动到收入、医疗保险和住房都要比他们已经离开的地方好很多的欧洲工作的人则被夹杂在了拥挤不堪的人流中。这些人经常称为“economic migrants 经济移民”。这个词带有些许嘲笑的意味。（也就是说，他们不是真正的难民。）向工资更高的地方的流动行为，从经济上说，是有效率的，而且为了家庭去做这种事也是高尚的。但是，由于许多人没有流动到欧洲的权利，他们宣称的是另一种权利——比如避难。说实话，不管动机如何体面，这都是对他们责任的一种放弃。在美国，这类移民通常只是偷越边境和无证务工；他们的支持者抓住了他们没有证件这一点，称他们为“undocumented”（无证者），而他们的反对者则把他们称为“illegal immigrant s”（非法移民），或者干脆简称为“illegals”。

富裕国家至今还没有像以往一贯所能做到的那样，同许多人既想越过政治边界又需要越过政治边界这个事实达成妥协。如果动机复杂，这是无罪的。联合国人权办公室高级专员Pia Oberoi 写道：“对于数百万移民来说，强制性和自愿性程度的差异化让他们旅途具有了一些特点。旅途本身是漫长的，多方向的，而且个人的情况和地位也可能随着旅途的进展而经常发生戏剧性的变化”。正如她

用精准语言所描述的那样，“人类经历的界限是不像我们细致划分的法律类别所希望的那样整齐划一，间隔分明的。

词语是整齐划一的；生活是纷繁复杂的。相对于西方国家已经成形的政策的乱象，现有的语言表达是合适的，它们试图在没有任何令人不适的含义的情况下最好地表述移民这种行为。“migrants”可能是对所有正身处迁徙旅途的人的最佳通用词语。但是，它在时效性方面是有所欠缺的。政客和选民必须记住的是，无论是经济移民还是寻求避难的人，他们首先都是“人”。

Marketing in the digital age

A brand new game

As people spend more time on social media, advertisers are following them

EARLIER this year BMW advertised on WeChat, a popular messaging app in China with around 550m monthly users. But its ads were shown only to those whose profiles suggested they were potential buyers of expensive cars. Others were shown ads for more affordable stuff, such as smartphones. The campaign bruised a few egos. Some of those not shown the BMW ad complained, referring to themselves as diao, or (putting it politely) losers.

The carmaker’s experience shows the complexities of advertising today, when it is so easy for dissatisfied customers to make their voices heard. But it was also an example of how marketing chiefs are struggling to find the right way to reach consumers on new digital platforms, where they are spending ever more of their time.

Not long ago social-media marketing was something that brand

managers might ask their summer interns to deal with. Today it has become a pillar of the advertising industry. Social networks like Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn have cultivated vast audiences: 2 billion people worldwide use them, says eMarketer, a research firm. Online advertising of all sorts continues to grow, and within that category, spending on social-media ads has gone from virtually nothing a few years ago to perhaps $20 billion this year (see charts).

Advertisers like social-media platforms because they gather all sorts of data on each user’s age, consumption patterns, interests and so on. This means ads can be aimed at them with an accuracy that is unthinkable with analogue media. For example, Chevrolet, an American car brand, has sent ads to the Facebook pages and Twitter feeds of people who had expressed an interest in, or signed up to test-drive, a competitor’s vehicle.

Such fine-tuned targeting means that the distinction between advertising and e-commerce is becoming blurred. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and other platforms are selling ads containing “buy now” buttons, which let users complete a sale on the spot. It is too early to tell how many consumers want such a convenience, but the social platforms foresee a future in which they get paid by advertisers to provide instant-shopping services that make the platforms more useful to their members, and get them to spend more time on them.

To wring the most out of the ability to target consumers precisely on social media, ad agencies are making big changes to their campaigns. Instead of creating a single, broad-brush message that will run across television, radio, print and outdoor, they are producing many variations on a theme, matching each to the subset of consumers they judge most likely to respond to it. Last month Lowe’s, an American home-improvement retailer, ran a campaign on Facebook in which users were sent one of several dozen versions of its ad, depending on which part of their homes they had mentioned on social media.

The iterative nature of digital marketing has meant lots of work for ad agencies and public-relations firms. However, the brands that hire them must weigh the “production-cost trade-offs” that come with personalisation on social media, says Pete Blackshaw of Nestlé, a food manufacturer. “You can target too much.”

Marketing chiefs also need to think through efforts to give their brands “online personalities”. Twitter has been the main place where brands try to sound authentic and clever. When Apple announced its gold iPhone in 2013, Denny’s, a restaurant chain, sent out a gently mocking tweet showing a photo of its pancakes, which are “always available in golden”. It seemed to go down well with consumers.

But in attempting to ride social-media trends, companies can easily fall flat on their faces. DiGiorno, a frozen-pizza maker, noticed that a number of people were using the hashtag “#WhyIStayed” on Twitter and sent out a jocular tweet that they had stayed for the pizza. It turned out that the comment thread was about domestic violence and why women remained in abusive relationships. DiGiorno took to social media again—this time to apologise.

In spite of such pitfalls, social platforms are likely to receive an ever larger part of market ers’ budgets. But the digital-media business is still young and volatile, and it is hard to predict which social networks are destined to become the new-media equivalents of America’s big four broadcast-TV networks. For a time, Twitter seemed to be the place to be for advertisers; more recently it has been dogged by management turnover and slowing user growth. Now Facebook is the favourite among marketing folk: it claims nearly five times as many users and nine times as much revenue as Twitter. Facebook has bought several nascent social-media services that might have grown to become challengers, such as Instagram, a photo-sharing app, and WhatsApp, a messaging app. It has been rolling out ads cautiously on Instagram, to see how users react, but has yet to start doing so on WhatsApp.

Some old media have yet to feel much pain from the loss of ad revenue to digital rivals. TV advertising has until now kept growing. But as time goes on, and as TV audiences both decline and shift to services that do not have ads, such as Netflix, the competition will be more keenly felt. However, social networks, and TV advertisers interested in switching to them, have yet to work out what is the optimal format for video ads. In 2012 Twitter acquired Vine, which lets people post six-second videos; several months ago Periscope, an app for live video also owned by Twitter, was all the rage. Advertisers have experimented with both services, but as yet neither has taken off as a marketing medium.

It still makes sense for marketers to try these new services out, because there is something of a first-mover advantage in digital advertising. Brands that are early to use new platforms benefit disproportionately, explains Linda Boff, a marketing chief at General Electric, because their users have not yet become saturated with marketing messages.

The latest social platforms to get the attention of marketing types are a bunch of messaging apps, such as Snapchat (see article), WeChat and Kik, where young users send messages, photos and videos directly to friends. Brands are also starting to do more with Pinterest, where users can “pin up” images of things that appeal to them. It seems a fair assumption that users may want to buy the

things they are pinning up, although the platform, which has 70m users, may never achieve the scale of Twitter (300m), let alone Facebook (1.5 billion).

Even if marketers master social media without coming across as clumsy, grating or intrusive, there will surely be a limit to how much advertising will shift to the platforms. Television ads are still great for reaching big audiences with simple messages. Print ads can lend brands an ai r of credibility (we would say that, wouldn’t we?). Like fund managers, advertisers will always want a balanced portfolio.

数字时代的营销

崭新的玩法

大家花越来越多的时间玩社交媒体，广告商也随大潮而动

今年早些时候，宝马公司在拥有5.5亿用户的中国大众信息软件平台微信上打起了广告。但是宝马的广告只对那些资料上显示有购买豪车可能的用户可见，而其他人看到的则是一些他们能负担得起的商品，例如智能手机。这样的行为伤到了一些人的自尊。有些没有看到宝马广告的人抱怨宝马把他们当成了“屌丝”，或者用文雅一点的说法——“撸sir”。

宝马的遭遇很好地告诉我们现在打广告的难处，一个不小心就会因为急于求成而冒犯消费者。但这个案例也很好地说明现在广告部的负责人们怎么费尽心思想在人们越来越频繁光顾的电子平台上与消费者互通。

不久前，在社交媒体上的营销是那些品牌经理吩咐他们的假期实习生做的事；但现在者变成了广告业中的起支柱作用的一个部分。类似脸书、推特和领英这样的社交网络有着庞大的使用人数，根据调查公司eMarketer数据显示，全球使用社交网络的人数高达20亿。各式各样的网络广告不断发展，在这样的趋势下，花费在社交媒体上的广告费用从几年前的近乎为零到今年将近200亿美元之巨。

广告商偏爱社交媒体平台的原因是他们能够再上面收集每一个用户的各种信息，包括年龄、消费方式、兴趣偏好等等。这就意味着广告能够以大众传媒无法企及的精确程度投放给消费者。举个例子，美国汽车制造厂商雪佛兰公司在脸书和推特网上投放广告的对象是一些曾经对他们竞争对手的车辆表现出购买兴趣甚至对其预约试驾的用户。

这种对症下药的投放方式使得广告和电子商务间的界线变得愈渐模糊。脸书、推特、照片分享和其他的平台上的广告都附带有“立即购买”的按钮，方便用户即时完成交易。现在说有很多消费者享受这种快捷带来的方便似乎为时尚早，但社交平台预见到了未来的发展方向：社交平台从广告商获得资金并为用户提供即时购物服务，这样平台对用户来说更加方便实用，用户就会花费更多时间在这些平台上，据此社交平台就可以吸引更多广告商。

为了尽最大可能在社交媒体上精确定位用户，广告商们在策略上做出巨大改变。和以往投放在电视、电台、印刷品和户外广告上单一笼统的信息不同，广告商们依据一个主题做出许多不同的样式，再根据用户最有兴趣的类别进行匹配。上个月，美国家政零售商劳氏公司在脸书网上投放了几十个不同样式的广告，根据用户在社交媒体上提及到他们房子的某部分进行针对性广告。

电子营销不断变化的特性让广告和公关公司的工作负担不轻。但食品生产商雀巢的皮特布莱克肖认为，雇用这些公司的品牌领导人们也要权衡在社交媒体上

私人定制背后的“生产成本”。他说：“他们的目标用户有可能超过他们能承受的范围。”

营销负责人也要思考怎么样才能赋予他们品牌一个“网络特点”。推特变成这些品牌希望表现出可信度和创意的主战场。2013年苹果发布土豪金iPhone时，食品连锁公司丹尼公司发了一条稍带嘲弄的推文，其中图片是它们生产的一款班戟，内容是“我们什么时候都是土豪金”。这条推文在消费者中间似乎引起了不错的反响。

但在企图搭上社交媒体这趟快车的时候，有些公司可能很容易就会摔一跤。冷冻披萨制造商DiGiorno注意到很多人都在推特中涉及到话题“WhyIStay（为什么我待着）”，所以它们发了一条调笑的推文称，那些人待着的原因是在等披萨。但其实这个话题的内容都是关于家庭暴力以及遭受家庭暴力的妇女默不作声的问题。DiGiorno再一次在社交媒体上开口，但这次是为前面一条推文道歉。

虽然有着这样的问题，社交平台在营销人员的预算中占得比例越来越重。但数字媒体商业依然处于不成熟和不稳定的状态，同时我们也很难去预测那家社交网络公司最会成长为美国四大电视广播公司那样级别的新媒体巨头。推特一度是广告商比较钟爱的地方，但最近却受到管理周转问题和用户增长减缓问题的困扰。由于脸书是推特用户量的五倍而是其收入九倍，所以现在脸书成为营销人员最为青睐的地方。脸书网公司已经收购了一些有可能成长为有力竞争对手的新生社交媒体服务公司，例如图片分享软件Instagram和即时聊天软件WhatsApp。脸书网公司谨慎地在Instagram上放入广告，来测试一下用户的反应；而最近WhatsApp上也出现了广告。

一些传统媒体也开始为流失到电子媒体对手的广告费用感到痛心。到目前为止，电视广告一直保持增长态势。但随着时间推移，电视观众因为向类似于网飞公司这样无广告的服务公司转移而减少，竞争就变得愈发激烈。但是，社交网络和希望向这些平台转移的电视广告商都还没有研究出视频广告的最好方式。2012年，推特收购了能发布六秒微视频软件Vine；而几个月前，推特还收购了能够进行现场直播的Periscope，而这款软件大受欢迎。广告商在这两款软件上都开始进行试验，但都没有取用任何一个作为其营销媒体。

对于营销人员来说，在这些新媒体服务平台尝试还是很有必要，因为数字广告中所谓先动优势还是存在的。通用电气公司的营销总裁琳达·波弗认为，那些早就开始使用新平台的公司品牌能从中获得巨大收益，因为这些用户对营销广告的忍耐没到达极限。

现在，那些最能让人注目的营销类型是一大堆的聊天软件，例如snapchat、微信、kik等，年轻消费者能够用这些软件直接给朋友发送信息、照片和视频。那些公司也开始在“虚拟看板”软件上做文章，而用户能够将他们喜好的照片“钉”在虚拟看板上。尽管这个平台的用户人数可能永远也达不到推特（3亿）那个程度——脸书（15亿）就更别说了——但这些用户大概都会对他们订在看板上的东西有购买欲望。

即使营销在没有遇到任何困难的情况下入驻了社交媒体，从传统媒体转向这些平台的广告数量肯定有些限制。电视广告由于信息明确、受众面广的特点依然会占有巨大份额，而印刷广告能够让产品更具可信度（我们一般都这么认为的，对吧？）。和资金管理人一样，广告商也总是在寻找均衡投资组合。

The kin and I

LIU CAIPING is a former maths teacher, now 71, who has lived alone in the western city of Xi’an since her husband died last year. The radio is her steadfast companion. Her eyesight is failing and she rarely goes out. Like many city residents, her former neighbours have scattered, and her two daughters are far away. When she can no longer cope on her own she will go to a nursing home, she says. That option remains extremely rare for old Chinese. And that highlights the problem: China is struggling to cope with a rapidly ageing society and a rising number of elderly people living by themselves.

For most of the past two millennia the family has been central to how Chinese have seen themselves—and the state has been seen as a family writ large. Filial piety was somewhere near the heart of a Confucian order regulating society, and the family was an extended, stable unit of several generations under one roof. A very common saying encapsulated it all: yang er fang lao—“raise children for your old age”.

Today multi-generation families are still the norm. Almost three-fifths of people over 65 live with their children, a higher proportion than in most rich countries. Yet things are changing fast. Increasingly, parents are living apart from their children—and when one spouse dies, as with Ms. Liu, the other often lives alone.

A fifth of all single-person households in China are made up of over-65-year-olds. In contrast to younger Chinese living alone, few elderly do so by choice. Many are poorly educated. Women predominate, because they tend to outlive their husbands.

China is unprepared for the consequences of solo dwelling among the elderly. Government policy enshrines the idea that families should live together and provide for the old and others unable to look after themselves. Despite efforts to extend pensions and other social protection, provisions fall far short because the state assumes offspring will help the old and sick. The welfare system is ill-equipped to help the elderly living alone.

State financial support has improved in the past decade, but many millions of elderly Chinese still have no pension or retirement

income. Health insurance is increasingly widespread, but usually covers only the basics. Rural areas lag far behind cities in the provision of pensions and health care for the old.

By 2025 nearly one in four Chine se will be over 60. China’s

one-child policy has made a mockery of yang er fang lao—fewer among the younger generation are around for the old to move in with, a trend reinforced by starting families later. By 2050 there are likely to be just 2.5 working-age adults for every person over 65, down from eight today. Chinese born in the boondocks who migrate to far-off cities in search of work cannot easily take older family members with them even if they want to.

Despite the challenges, many in China still regard responsibility towards their family as a defining feature of their culture. Not much difference with other countries there. But the expectation of filial piety means that those who are not recipients of it often feel ashamed or isolated, says Jean Wei-Jun Yeung of the National University of Singapore. Many are reluctant to seek the help of neighbours when they need it, for instance. A study of old people in Shanghai by Yu Chen of Fudan University found that 84% rarely or never attended social activities.

The government acknowledges the problem. When it relaxed the one-child policy somewhat in 2013, one reason it cited was a growing number of elderly singletons. Some enterprising local governments have introduced schemes aimed at the lonely old. Young trainee doctors in Hangzhou in eastern China can have free board with old people living alone in return for companionship and basic medical care. Several cities encourage “time banks”, a model borrowed from America and Japan, where over-60s help those.

With a weak social-safety net, little support is in place for when families fail to help those living alone. A study in 2013 by Na Yu of the Beijing Institute of Technology found almost no neighbourhood communities in the capital offering the full range of basic services elderly people needed. Elsewhere, cities offer social activities but little personal care. Because of a lack of doctors in the community, old people with chronic conditions tend to linger in hospital. Social workers are in short supply, underpaid and overworked and have minimal training. Residential care is growing but still scant. China has

5.8m beds (enough for nearly 3% of over-60s), but there are often long waiting lists.

This is the background to a rise in the suicide rate among China’s elderly, even as that for other age groups is falling. In 2009-11 people over 65 accounted for just under half of all suicides, and more in rural areas: living alone in old age can be harsh anywhere, but in China it may be particularly isolating, given that so many young Chinese have left their villages, and parents, in search of work.The government has tried to enforce filial piety, passing a law in 2013 that threatens fines or jail if people fail to visit parents and feed their “spiritual needs”. It is a futile response. In a rapidly changing China, much greater state provision is needed.

至亲和我

今年71岁的刘彩萍曾经是一位数学老师，自从她的丈夫去世后，她就一个人独自住在西安西城。收音机是她不离不弃的伙伴。她的视力不好，也很少出去。和许多城市居民一样，她的前邻居住的都很分散，女儿住的也很遥远。她说当她不能生活自理的时候就去养老院，这个选择其实对中国的老年人来说仍然是非常罕见的。现在凸出的问题是：中国正在努力应对迅速老龄化的社会，以及一个正在增长的，要由自己养活的老年群体。

在过去的两千多年中，家庭一直是中国人如何看待自己的核心，而国家一直被视为一个大家庭。孝道一定程度上是一个儒家社会秩序的核心，家庭是一个延续的，在一个屋檐下几代人稳定生活的集合。一句很普通的话就解释清楚：养儿防老----“养孩子为你的晚年”。

今天几世同堂仍然是常态。65以上的人超过五分之三与他们的孩子住在一起，和最富裕的国家相比，这是一个较高的比例。然而事情正在快速变化。越来越多的父母和他们的孩子分开居住，当一方的配偶去世后，像刘女士一样，另一方往往会独自生活。中国单身家庭的五分之一超过了65岁。相比年轻独居的中国人，很少有老年人做这样的选择。他们当中很多都是受教育程度低的女性占主要角色，因为她们往往比丈夫寿命要长。

中国对老年人独居的后果是没有准备好的。政府政策认为家庭应该生活在一起，供养老人和那些不能照顾自己的家庭成员。尽管付出了提高养老金和其他社会津贴的努力，但提供的还远远不够，因为中国假设子女将帮助老年人和生病疗养。这个福利制度对独自生活的老年人来说还不齐全。

在过去十年中，国家财政支持有所改善，但仍有上百万的老年人没有养老金或退休金。健康保险越来越广泛，但通常只涵盖基部分。农村地区在提供老年人在养老金和健康护理方面远远落后于城市。

到2025年，几乎每四个中国人中，就有一个年龄超过60岁。中国的独生子女政策嘲弄了养儿防老这个传统理念，因位年轻的一代很少和老年人住到一起，这一趋势在以后的家庭中加强了。到2050年，可能刚好是2.5个工作年龄的成年人照顾一个老年人，今天是8个，降低了不少。出生在中国偏远地带移居到遥远的城市找工作的人，并不容易把年长的家庭成员接来生活到一起，即使他们如此的希望。

尽管面临诸多挑战，中国仍有许多人认为对自己的家庭有责任感，这是他们文化的一个典型特征。与其他国家没有太大的差异。但新加坡国立大学杨文军说，孝道中的期望意味着那些没有得到照顾的人往往感到羞愧或孤单，他们许多人不愿意在需要时寻求邻居的帮助，一项由上海复旦大学的研究发现，84%的当地老年人很少或从未参加过社会活动。

中国政府承认这个问题。2013年就稍微防松放松独生子女政策，原因之一是越来越多的独居老人。一些有进取心的地方政府已经出台了针对这个孤独老人的方案。在中国东部城市杭州，年轻的见习医生会免费为独居老人提供为关心和基本医疗服务。一些城市鼓励“时间银行”，这是一股来自美国和日本的模型，帮助那些在60岁以上的老人。

在一个脆弱的社会保障网络中，当家庭不能帮助那些独居的人时,其他很少有人支持。2013年，北京理工大学的Na Yu做了一项研究发现，在首都附近的社区几乎没有能提供老年人所需要的全方位基本服务。在其他地方，城市会提供社会活动，但却很少有人关心。由于社区医生的缺乏，老年人的慢性病往往只能在医院里逗留。社会义工是短缺的，他们工资过低和过度劳累，并经受很少的专业训练。住宅护理正在增长，但仍然很少。中国有五百八十万张养老床位（够60岁以上老年人中近3%足够使用），但往往有长长的等待入住名单。

正如其他年龄段的自杀率正在下降，这就是中国老年人自杀率上升的背景。在2009年到2011年，年过65的人占所有自杀人数的接近一半，更多的农村孤寡老人在晚年生活窘迫，但在中国这可能是特别的分离，那么多的年轻人位了找工作离开了他们的村庄和父母。政府一直试图强制执行孝道：在2013年通过法律，如果人们不去看望父母，并给他们的“精神需求”，会以罚款或者违法的处罚作为威胁。其实这是徒劳的回应。在一个快速变化的中国，需要更多的国家层面的支持。

The young and the restless

British and American fiction gets off to a promising start in 2010;

The Unnamed. By Joshua Ferris.

VLADIMIR NABOKOV, who liked to observe other people, once declared that “professional book reviewers are veritable bookmakers”. They g leefully declare who's in, who's out, and ask: “Where are the snows of yesteryear?” Hot young novelists, many believe, are meant to follow a predictable script. First, burst onto the scene with some bold, voice-of-the-generation debut—preferably with a comely author photo. Then, years later, deliver to the expectant public a sophomore effort that is, alas, disappointing. Critics favour lamenting squandered promise to praising yet another fine book from someone with unlined skin.

2019经济学人考研英文文章阅读八十五

Leopard seals share their suppers 豹海豹会分享它们的晚餐 Bad news if you are a penguin 假如你是一只企鹅，这真是个坏消息 Leopard seals resemble their terrestrial namesakes in two ways.They have polka-dot pelts.And they are powerful,generally solitary carnivores that are quite capable of killing a human being if they so choose—as has indeed happened once,in2003,when a British marine biologist was the victim. 豹海豹与生活在陆地上的同名动物（豹）有着两点相似之处。其一，它们的皮毛上都有着圆点花纹。其二，它们都是强大的独栖性食肉动物，只要它们愿意，是完全有能力杀死一个人的——正如2003年真实发生的那样，当时一位英国海洋生物学家就成了受害者。 Curiously,though,there have also been reports of leopard seals behaving in a friendly manner towards people—apparently trying to present gifts,in the form of prey,to divers. 但奇怪的是，也有报道称豹海豹对人类表现得十分友好——它们很显然把猎物作为礼物赠送给了潜水员。 Until now,there has been no explanation for this philanthropy.But work just published in Polar Biology by James Robbins of Plymouth University, in Britain,suggests that what the seals are actually looking for is a dining partner.

经典文章摘抄

经典文章摘抄 经典文章摘抄 经典文章摘抄，能够哭就好，哭是开始痊愈的象征，以下的经典文章摘抄范文，很值得阅读哦。 经典文章摘抄【1】 1、生命从来不是公平的，得到多少，便要靠那个多少做到最好，努力的生活下去。《我们不是天使》 2、聪明人，无谓争意气。《连环》 3、爱一个人决不潇洒，为自己留了后步的，也就不是爱《星之碎片》 4、一个成熟的人往往发觉可以责怪的人越来越少，人人都有他的难处。《我们不是天使》 5、能够说出的委屈，便不算委屈;能够抢走的爱人，便不算爱人。《开到荼蘼》 6、行乐及时，上天给你什么，就享受什么。千万不要去听难堪的话，一定不去见难看的人。或者是做难做的事情，爱上不应爱的人。《电光幻影》 7、人一定要受过伤才会沉默专注，无论是心灵或肉体上的创伤，对成长都有益处。《花解语》 8、要生活得漂亮，需要付出极大忍耐，一不抱怨，二不解释，绝对是个人才。《变形记》

9、结婚与恋爱毫无关系，人们老以为恋爱成熟后便自然而然的结婚，却不知结婚只是一种生活方式，人人可以结婚，简单得很。爱情????完全是另外一回事。《我的前半生》 10、做一个女人要做得像一副画，不要做一件衣裳，被男人试完了又试，却没人买，试残了旧了，五折抛售还有困难。《喜宝》 11、何必向不值得的人证明什么，生活得更好，乃是为你自己。《忽而今夏》 12、麻烦来找你，你才去应付它，如不，任它沉睡《花解语》 13、我也想清楚了，婚姻根本就是那么一回事，再恋爱得轰动，三五年之后，也就烟消云散，下班后大家扭开电视一齐看长篇连续剧，人生是这样的。《独身女人》 14、做人要含蓄点，得过且过，不必斤斤计较，水清无鱼，人清无徒，谁又不跟谁一辈子，一些事放在心中算了。《蔷薇泡沫》 15、通常吸引男人的是这种冷漠，但是男人终于娶的是仰慕他的女人，没才干的女人靠嫁人过活，有本事的女人靠自己过活。《城市故事》 16、最佳的报复不是仇恨，而是打心底发出的冷淡，干嘛花力气去恨一个不相干的人。《我的前半生》 17、能够哭就好，哭是开始痊愈的象征。《绝对是个梦》

2019经济学人考研英文文章阅读一三六

Japanese commuters try new ways to deter gropers 日本通勤族尝试用新方法防止性骚扰 Victims are fighting back with apps,badges and invisible ink 受害者正在用应用程序、徽章和隐形墨水来反击 Throughout her20s,Yayoi Matsunaga was groped,almost daily,on packed rush-hour trains going to and from work.Three decades later,she discovered that her friend’s daughter was being molested on her commute to high school. 在松永弥生20多岁的时候，她几乎每天都会在上下班高峰拥挤的列车上被人骚扰。30年过去了，她发现她朋友的女儿仍会在上高中的通勤路上被人骚扰。 The teenager,after fruitless talks with the police and railway companies, decided to hang a sign from her bag that read:“Groping is a crime.I will not cry myself to sleep.”The groping stopped immediately. 在与警方和铁路部门交涉无果后，这名女孩决定在她的书包上挂一个牌子，上面写着：“性骚扰就是犯罪，我不会暗自哭泣的。”效果立竿见影。 Inspired,Ms Matsunaga launched a crowdfunding campaign in2015to create badges with the same message.They proved as effective as the sign: nearly95%of users stopped experiencing groping on public transport, according to a survey.

2020考研：考研同源外刊《经济学人》最常用600个词汇(下)

考研同源外刊《经济学人》最常用600个词汇（下） 401、Final goods最终产品 旨在最终使用而非转卖或进一步加工的商品。(参见"中间产品"，intermediate goods) 402、Financial economics金融经济学 经济学的一个分支。分析理性投资者如何通过最有效的方式使用资金和进行投资以期达到目标。 403、Financial intermediary金融中介 接受储蓄存款并将其出借给借款者的机构。包括存款机构(如商业银行和储蓄银行)和非存款机构(如货币市场共同基金、经纪人商行、保险公司或养老基金)。 404、Firm(business firm)厂商 (企业)经济体系中基本的私人生产单位。它雇用劳动，购买其他投入品，以制造和销售商品。 405、Fiscal-monetary mix财政-货币政策组合 用以干预宏观经济活动的财政政策和货币政策的组合。紧缩的货币政策和宽松的财政政策，倾向于鼓励消费和抑制投资。而宽松的货币政策和紧缩的财政政策，则具有相反的功效。 406、Fiscal policy财政政策 一种政府计划。内容包括：(1)商品和服务的购买及转移支付等支出；(2)税收的数量和种类。 407、Fiscal cost固定成本 见固定成本(cost，fixed)。 408、Fixed exchange rate固定汇率

见外汇汇率(foreign exchangs rate)。 409、Flexible exchange rates弹性汇率制 一种国际汇率制度。在该制度条件下，汇率主要由市场力量(即供给和需求)决定，政府不设定及维持某种特定的汇率。有时也称作"浮动汇率制"(floating exchange rates)。当政府对外汇市场不加干预时，该制度称为纯粹的浮动汇率制。 410、Floating exchange rates浮动汇率制 见弹性汇率制(flexible exchange rates)。 411、Flow vs stock流量与存量 流量是指，带有时间跨度或曰在一个时段上所累积变动的量(好比通过一个河段的水流)。存量则指，在某一个时点上某一变量的量值(如同湖中所盛的水)。收人代表每一年的美元流入数，因此是一个流量。而到1998年12月为止某人的财富则是一个存量。 412、Foreign exchange外汇 各国用以偿付对他国所欠债务的通货(或其他金融票据)。 413、Foreign exchange market外汇市场 不同国家的通货进行交易的市场。 414、Foreign exchange rate外汇汇率 一国通货与他国通货的交换比率或曰价格。例如，如果你可以用1美元购买19德国马克，那么马克的汇率就是19。如果一国通货钉住某一汇率水平，并准备随时捍卫这一汇率，则称该国实行的是固定汇率制(fixed ex-change rate)。而由市场供求力量来决定的汇率称为弹性汇率制(flexible exchange rates)。 415、Fourfirm concentration rate四企业集中度 见集中度(concentration ratio)。 416、Fractional-reserve banking部分准备金 银行制度现代银行体系的一种管制形式。依法要求有关金融机构将其所吸收的存款

《经济学人》科技类文章整合

Autism? 自闭症 Why it's not “Rain Woman”? 为什么它不是“雨女” Women have fewer cognitive disorders than men do because their bodies are better at ignoring the mutations which cause them? 与男性相比，患有认知障碍的女性较少，因为她们自身的身体能更好的忽略导致认知障碍的基因突变 AUTISM is a strange condition. Sometimes its symptoms of “social blindness”(an inability to read or comprehend the emotions of others) occur alone. This is dubbed high-functioning autism, or Asperger's syndrome. Though their fellow men and women may regard them as a bit odd, high-functioning autists are often successful (sometimes very successful) members of society. On other occasions, though, autism manifests as part of a range of cognitive problems. Then, the condition is debilitating. What is common to those on all parts of the so-called autistic spectrum is that they are more often men than women —so much more often that one school of thought suggests autism is an extreme manifestation of what it means, mentally, to be male. Boys are four times more likely to be diagnosed with autism than girls are. For high-functioning autism, the ratio is seven to one.?

经典散文经典文章大全

携一份美好幽居禅意里 清晨醒来，打开窗帘，一抹慵懒的阳光照进来，暖暖的，柔柔的，时光瞬间变得温婉静美，打开音乐，沏一杯花茶，躺在床上，暖阳淼淼，茶香淡淡，音乐袅袅，闭上眼睛，嘴角轻轻上扬，算是对着光阴的镜子，和自己撒个娇。 时钟滴答滴答，一秒一秒的走着，毫无表情，不缓不急，过去了就是过去了，或许，有很多事情，我们会缅怀，会留恋，会铭刻，会珍藏，但那还是属于过去，还是被盖上了刻有“曾经”两字的印章，来不及细思量，来不及描绘，来不及逗留，转瞬即逝，洒下一地落英碎碎念，留下一串心语声声慢。生命只是时间中的一个停顿，一切的意义都只在它发生的那一时刻，如果可以，不要等！ 人生没有预定的轨迹，一切都在不确定中前行，你根本就无法预知明天会是什么样，好想把日子过成诗，爱为主题，幸福为背景，思考为主线，微笑为韵脚，日月星辰，花草树木，雨霜雪露为载体，经历和感受为表达方式，想象和幻想为延伸，时光温婉，岁月静好，让生活充满美妙旋律。至于生活中出现的一切不爽就让沉默来掩埋，让雨雪去消融，不论怎样，都不能让灵魂发出惨淡苍白的声音，哪怕是孤独轻影茕茕孑立，也要播一曲梵音，在柔和典雅，清澈湛寂，明净清幽的音乐中，把寂寥坐穿，把浑浊驱散，在心间开出一朵莲。

向往一种回归自然的生活，于心间修篱种菊，在一山一水间领悟悠幽禅意，滋养灵魂，静居幽谷，晨霭缭绕，晚霞轻舞，幽竹拔节，翠林窸窣，溪水潺潺，泉水叮咚，蜂飞蝶舞，鸟语花香，青苔萋萋，煮一壶茶，揽一抹暖阳，铺一卷唐诗宋词，摊一纸素笺，于文字间追寻一份淡然优雅，不去考量对错好坏，不去思忖是非曲直，守望一个不老的传说，典藏一份徜徉在生命里的馈赠，静看烟火悠悠绕山腰，聆听雨声淅沥诉缠绵，悦赏白雪飘飘任逍遥，清风朗月，云卷云舒皆美画，花开花落，风吹叶落尽诗意，只要有爱，世界就不会一片荒凉，只要有情，满眼都是潋滟清波，一路风光旖旎。 菩提本无树，明镜亦非台，本来无一物，何处惹尘埃。空灵的境界，不染世俗，不受困于贪念囹圄。一份真情，种在心田，汲取日月精华，沐浴甘甜雨露，根深叶茂，葱茏浓郁。历经岁月沧桑，风虐霜寒，一年又一年，收了又收，几度轮回，滤掉了浅薄，滤掉了浮华，滤掉了嗔痴，滤掉了怨恨，滤掉了冷漠，剩下的大概就是慈悲了吧！轻如云，重如山，浅如白，深如黑，柔如水，坚如石，如天对地，雨露对花朵，无声无息，无私无欲。电影《致我们终将逝去的青春》里郑微在结尾说过这样一句话：“爱一个人应该像爱祖国，爱山川，爱河流……”咋一听，觉得够矫情，细想锥心不已。爱就是爱了，一个人的事，无关他人，无需回应，无需复返，正如山川的静默不语，河流的奔流不息。需要经过多少沉淀，才会有如此厚重绵延的感悟？有即是无，无即是有，有无之间，一切在心。

2019经济学人考研英文文章阅读八十九

The dash off cash 挥金如土 Rich countries must start planning for a cashless future 发达国家必须开始为无现金的未来做计划 For the past3,000years,when people thought of money they thought of cash.From buying food to settling bar tabs,day-to-day dealings involved creased paper or clinking bits of metal. 在过去的3000年里，每当提起钱，人们总会想到现金。从购买食物到酒吧吧台结算消费，日常交易用到的都是皱巴巴的纸币或叮当作响的硬币。 Over the past decade,however,digital payments have taken off—tapping your plastic on a terminal or swiping a smartphone has become normal.然而，过去十年间，数字支付已经兴起——在终端上刷卡或刷手机已经变得平常。Now this revolution is about to turn cash into an endangered species in some rich economies.That will make the economy more efficient—but it also poses new problems that could hold the transition hostage. 如今，这场革命即将要把一些发达国家的现金变为“濒危物种”。数字支付能够让经济更高效，但同时也带来了一些可能会阻碍经济转型的新的问题。 Countries are eliminating cash at varying speeds.But the direction of travel is clear,and in some cases the journey is nearly complete.In Sweden the number of retail cash transactions per person has fallen by80%in the

0113期经济学人第一篇The digital proletariat

Free exchange 自由交易 The digital proletariat 数字无产阶级（无产阶级，不占有生产资料的阶级，这里意思我们产生数据，却无偿的交由互联网公司使用） 导读： Economists propose a radical solution to the problems posed byartificial intelligence 经济学家提出了一个彻底解决人工智能相关问题的方法。 正文： YOUhave multiple jobs, whetheryouknowitornot. 不管你有没有意识到，你身上都有多种生意。 Most begin first thing in the morning, when you pick up your phoneand begin generatingthe data thatmake up Silicon Valley’smost importantresource. 大多数生意在早晨开始，你拿起手机时就开始产生了数据。这些数据组成了硅谷最重要的资源 That, atleast, ishowwe oughtto think aboutthe role ofdata-creation in the economy, according to a fascinating new economics paper. 至少，这就是我们应该思考的：数据创造在经济里扮演怎样的角色，这是根据一篇很有吸引力的新经济文章提到的。

We are all digital labourers, helpingmake possible the fortunes generated by firms like Google andFacebook, the authors argue. 其中作者认为，我们就是所有数字的劳工，帮助像谷歌和脸书这样的公司创造财富。（fortunes命运，幸运，富有）Ifthe economy is to function properlyin the future—and ifa crisisoftechnological unemployment isto be avoided—we musttake accountofthis, and change the relationship between biginternetcompaniesand theirusers. 在未来经济运转良好的情况下，如果想要避免工业发展带来的失业危机，我们必须着眼于这件事情，并且改变大型互联网公司和他们用户之间的关系。 Artificial intelligence (AI) is getting better all the time, and stands poised totransform a host of industries, say the authors 作者说，人工智能势头一直越来越好，势必（准备）改变一大批工业。 But, in orderto learn to drive a carorrecognize a face, the algorithmsthatmake clever machines tick（滴答，拟声词，表示机器运作）mustusuallybe trained on massive amountsofdata. 但是，为了做到自动驾驶和人脸识别（主语是AI），使智能机器运作的法则必须经常用非常大量的数据进行测试。Internetfirms gather these data from users every time they click on aGoogle search result, say, orissue a command to Alexa.

经济学人科技类文章中英双语

The Brain Activity Map 绘制大脑活动地图 Hard cell 棘手的细胞 An ambitious project to map the brain is in the works. Possibly too ambitious 一个绘制大脑活动地图的宏伟计划正在准备当中，或许有些太宏伟了 NEWS of what protagonists hope will be America’s next big science project continues to dribble out. 有关其发起人心中下一个科学大工程的新闻报道层出不穷。 A leak to the New York Times, published on February 17th, let the cat out of the bag, with a report that Barack Obama’s administration is thinking of sponsoring what will be known as the Brain Activity Map. 2月17日，《纽约时报》刊登的一位线人报告终于泄露了秘密，报告称奥巴马政府正在考虑赞助将被称为“大脑活动地图”的计划。 And on March 7th several of those protagonists published a manifesto for the project in Science. 3月7日，部分发起人在《科学》杂志上发表声明证实了这一计划。 The purpose of BAM is to change the scale at which the brain is understood. “大脑活动地图”计划的目标是改变人们在认知大脑时采用的度量方法。 At the moment, neuroscience operates at two disconnected levels. 眼下，神经学的研究处在两个断开的层次。 The higher one, where the dimensions of features are measured in centimetres, has many techniques at its disposal, notably functional magnetic-res onance imaging, which measures changes in tissues’ fuel consumption. 在相对宏观的层次当中各个特征的规模用厘米来衡量，有很多技术可以使用，尤其是用来测量组织中能量消耗变动情况的核磁共振成像技术。 This lets researchers see which bits of the brain are active in particular tasks—as long as those tasks can be performed by a person lying down inside a scanner. 该技术可使研究人员找出在完成具体的任务时，大脑的哪些部分处于活跃状态。At the other end of the scale, where features are measured in microns, lots of research has been done on how individual nerve cells work, how messages are sent from one to another, and how the connections between cells strengthen and weaken as memories are formed. 而另一个度量的层次则要求用微米来测量各种特征，这一层次的研究很多都是关于单个神经细胞是如何工作的、信息在神经细胞之间是如何传递的以及当产生记忆的时候神经细胞之间的联系是如何得到加强和减弱的。 Between these two, though, all is darkness. 然而，位于这两个层次之间的研究还处于一片漆黑当中。 It is like trying to navigate America with an atlas that shows the states, the big cities and the main highways, and has a few street maps of local neighbourhoods, but displays nothing in between.

经典散文-经典文章大全

经典散文/经典文章大全 各位读友大家好，此文档由网络收集而来，欢迎您下载，谢谢 “漆漆一片间，亮亮一点光。独舞池塘边，伴我入梦乡。” 小时候，我和伙伴们经常念这样的儿歌。我们也都知道儿歌唱的是萤火虫。在空旷的山野里、小院的梧桐树下、村口的柴垛子里、池塘的草丛里、乡野的地畔头，萤火虫是随处可见的。从夏至秋的夜晚，伙伴们成群结队不知疲倦地追随着那些在低空中轻轻飘飞的萤火虫，脸上露出惊喜的神色。我们追啊，赶啊，仿佛小小的萤火虫就是童年黑夜里最明亮的灯光。曾经那样的夜晚不知陪我走过多少，那样的黑夜不知扑捉了多少只萤火虫。时光渐远，那些儿时的往事像珍珠一样，串接在记忆的门扉里至今璀璨夺目。

小时候，我是在乡村度过的。那时候的乡村淳朴得像一幅山水画，人们的生活清净简单，在我心里仿佛是一首纯净的田园牧歌。春种秋收，年复一年。在乡下我们能见到很多种小昆虫，萤火虫是其中最常见的一种。离我家不远处有一方池塘，夏天的时候，池塘边长满了野草，到了晚上，田野里、池塘边的草丛上空萤火虫飞来飞去，就像一个个小小的灯笼，照耀着恬静的乡村。有了这些萤火虫，我们这些顽皮的孩子便有了很多趣事。那时整个村子里只有三台电视机，夏天的晚上，人们常聚在村头的树下，拉拉家常，说说笑话。我们这些孩子便跑到野地里去扑捉那些漫天飞舞的流萤，因看到萤火虫身上的发光体总是让我们感到好玩。我们走在水塘边，看萤火虫的倒影在水中一闪一闪，我们数着天上的星星，也数着水塘上面飞舞的流萤，一只，两只，三只…… 在迷人的夏夜里，我们结伴而行去野外扑捉萤火虫。去之前，妈妈会给我

们准备一个透明的瓶子，我们便蹦蹦跳跳地奔向池塘。晚上，月光明媚、星光灿烂，我们轻快地奔跑着，凉风在耳边呼呼飘过，仿佛在为孩子纯真的梦想助威。许多萤火虫从我们面前飞过，在深蓝的夜空里一闪一闪的，煞是可爱，它们轻盈的身影伴着我们童年的梦一起装进了透明的瓶子里。 我仔细地观察过，那些萤火虫的飞行速度都比较慢，由于时刻发出亮光，所以飞行轨迹十分明显。只要我们发现亮光，十有八九都能扑捉到萤火虫。如果它停息在小树上或草叶上，我们就直接用手去扑捉。因为萤火虫身体娇弱，有时候稍不留意便会把它们捏伤，很快会死掉。那时候，我们只知道玩，压根也不觉得死掉几只萤火虫有什么可怜，反正乡村漫山遍野到处都是，永远也扑不完捉不尽。有时候，我还会荒唐地想：要是萤火虫能像秋蝉的体型那么大该多好，那样我们可以把捉来的萤火虫当电灯使了。

经济学人两篇+翻译

Disney Star Wars, Disney and myth-making How one company came to master the business of storytelling FROM a galaxy far, far away to a cinema just down the road: “The Force Awakens”, the newest instalment of the Star Wars saga, is inescapable this Christmas. The first Star Wars title since Lucasfilm, the owner of the franchise, was acquired by Disney in 2012 for $4.1 billion, it represents more than just the revival of a beloved science-fiction series. It is the latest example of the way Disney has prospered over the past decade from a series of shrewd acquisitions (see article). Having bought Pixar, Marvel and Lucasfilm, Disney has skilfullycapitalised on their intellectual property—and in so doing, cemented its position as the market leader in the industrialisation of mythology. Its success rests on its mastery of the three elements of modern myth-making: tropes, technology and toys. From Homer to Han Solo Start with the tropes. Disney properties, which include everything from “Thor” to “Toy Story”, draw on well-worn devices of mythic structure to give their stories cultural resonance. Walt Disney himself had an intuitive grasp of the power of fables. George Lucas, the creator of Star Wars, is an avid student of the work of Joseph Campbell, an American comparative mythologist who outlined the “monomyth” structure in which a hero answers a call, is assisted by a mentor figure, voyages to another world, survives various trials and emerges triumphant. Both film-makers merrily plundered ancient mythology and folklore. The Marvel universe goes even further, directly appropriating chunks of Greco-Roman and Norse mythology. (This makes Disney's enthusiasm for fierce enforcement of intellectual-property laws, and the seemingly perpetual extension of copyright, somewhat ironic.) The internal mechanics of myths may not have changed much over the ages, but the technology used to impart them certainly has. That highlights Disney's second area of expertise. In Homer's day, legends were passed on in the form of dactylic hexameters; modern myth-makers prefer computer graphics, special effects, 3D projection, surround sound and internet video distribution,

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What went wrong IN RECENT months many economists and policymakers, including such unlikely bedfellows as Paul Krugman, an economist and New York Times columnist, and Hank Paulson, a former American treasury secretary, have put “global imbalances”—the huge current-account surpluses run by countries like China, alongside America’s huge deficit—at the root of the financial crisis. But the IMF disagrees. It argues, in new papers released on Friday March 6th, that the “main culprit” was deficient regulation of t he financial system, together with a failure of market discipline. Olivier Blanchard, the IMF's chief economist, said this week that global imbalances contributed only “indirectly” to the crisis. This may sound like buck-passing by the world’s main interna tional macroeconomic organisation. But the distinction has important consequences for whether macroeconomic policy or more regulation of financial markets will provide the solutions to the mess. In broad strokes, the global imbalances view of the crisis argues that a glut of money from countries with high savings rates, such as China and the oil-producing states, came flooding into America. This kept interest rates low and fuelled the credit boom and the related boom in the prices of assets, such as houses and equity, whose collapse precipitated the financial crisis. A workable long-term fix for the problems of the world economy would, therefore, involve figuring out what to do about these imbalances. But the IMF argues that imbalances could not have caused the crisis without the creative ability of financial institutions to develop new structures and instruments to cater to investors’ demand for higher yields. These instruments turned out to be more risky than they appeared. Investors, overly optimistic about continued rises in asset prices, did not look closely into the nature of the assets that they bought, preferring to rely on the analysis of credit-rating agencies which were, in some cases, also selling advice on how to game the ratings system. This “failure of market discipline”, the fund argues, played a big role in the crisis. As big a problem, according to the IMF, was that financial regulation was flawed, ineffective and too limited in scope. What it calls the “shadow banking system”—the loosely regulated but highly interconnected network of investment banks, hedge funds, mortgage originators, and the like—was not subject to the sorts of prudential regulation (capital-adequacy norms, for example) that applied to banks. In part, the fund argues, this was because they were not thought to be systemically important, in the sense that banks were understood to be. But their being unregulated made it more attractive for banks (whose affiliates the non-banks often were) to evade capital requirements by pushing risk into these entities. In time, this network of institutions grew so large that they were indeed systemically important: in the now-familiar phrase, they were “too big” or “too interconnected” to fail. By late 2007, some estimates of the assets of the bank-like institutions in America outside the scope of existing prudential regulation, was around $10 trillion, as large as the assets of the regulated American banking system itself. Given this interpretation, it is not surprising that the IMF has thrown its weight strongly behind an enormous increase in the scale and scope of financial regulation in a series of papers leading up to the G20 meetings. Among many other proposals, it wants the shadow banking system to be subjected to the same sorts of prudential requirements that banks must follow. Sensibly, it is calling for regulation to concentrate on what an institution does, not what it is called (that is, the basis of regulation should be activities, not entities). It also wants regulators to focus more broadly on