耶鲁大学开放课程—哲学：死亡.11.Open.Yale.course—Philosophy：Death.DivX-YYeTs人人影视 [字幕转换助手

上节课 我们讲到了
Last time, we turned to the question of
人格同一性的的形而上学标准
what the metaphysical key to personal identity might be.
到底是什么
What makes it be the case that one person,
使得未来的我
some person that exists in the future,
和现在的我是同一个人
is the same person as me.
我们讨论的第一种理论是
The first approach to this that we considered
人格同一性的灵魂理论
was the soul theory of personal identity:
即成为同一个人的关键是拥有同一个灵魂
the key to being the same person is having the same soul.
灵魂同则人同
Same soul, same person.
灵魂不同则人不同
Different soul, different person.
这一理论的问题在于
And the difficulty with that approach,
即使我们先把灵魂是否存在
even if we bracket the question
这个问题放在一边
whether or not there are souls,
这一理论的问题还在于
the difficulty with that approach was that
灵魂似乎
it seems as though the soul
可以不断变化
could constantly be changing
而我们所说的人格却始终不变
while the personality, as we might call it, stays the same.
我可以有不变的信念
I have the same beliefs,
记忆 欲望 目标
memories, desires, goals,
还有偏好等等
preferences and so forth.
但是我内心的灵魂却
But the soul underneath it all keeps
每隔五分钟就发生变化
being swapped every five minutes.
如果人格同一性的灵魂理论成立
If the soul theory of personal identity were right,
那么后来的那个人就不是我了
that would not be me.
人人影视
https://www.sodocs.net/doc/b53594158.html,
每隔五分钟就会死掉一个旧的我
I would be--every five minutes that person would die
由一个全新的人取而代之
and we'd have a new person,
尽管我们有着相同的人格
despite having the same personality.
大多数人难以接受
Most of us find that a rather difficult thing to believe,
人可以通过这种方式不断变化
that the person could be constantly changing in this way,
但却无法识别
without having any way at all to tell.
而倘若我们不愿接受这种结果的话
And if we're not willing to accept that implication,
我们似乎就得拒绝接受
it seems as though we need to reject
人格同一性的灵魂理论
The soul theory of personal identity.
我之所以说这么多
Now, I use this cumbersome phrase because, of course,
并非是在否认灵魂的存在
I'm not here talking about rejecting the existence of souls.
而是在思考
What I'm considering right now is the question
灵魂的一致性
whether sameness of soul
是否就是成为同一个人的关键
is the key to being the same person.
而这是个
And this is a--
这里有个逻辑上的区别值得一提
There's a logical distinction here that's worth drawing.
就算你相信灵魂存在
Even if you believe in souls,
你也无须说
you don't have to say
成

为同一个人的关键
that having the very same soul is the key
就是拥有不变的灵魂
to being the very same person.
当然 如果你不信灵魂
And trivially, of course, if you don't believe in souls,
不相信灵魂的存在
if you don't believe that souls exist,
那么你当然不会认同灵魂的存在性
then you certainly can't appeal to the existence of souls,
灵魂的连续性 灵魂的一致性
the continuity of soul, the sameness of soul,
是人格同一性的关键
as the key to personal identity.
但接下来我们可能要问
But we might then ask,
"还有什么别的选择吗"
"Well what's the alternative?"
自然而然 另一个观点就是
Now, the natural alternative is to say,
"成为同一个人的关键
"The key to being the same person
不是灵魂的一致性
is not the sameness of the soul,
且不论灵魂存在与否
whether or not it exists,
而是拥有同一肉体"
but rather having the very same body."
再说一遍 我不打算
And again, although I'm not going to
反复讨论这个问题
go on and on about this point,
值得注意的是
it's worth noticing that
就算你真的相信灵魂存在
even if you do believe that souls exist,
也不妨碍你接受
nothing stops you from accepting
人格同一性的肉体理论
the body theory of personal identity.
不能排除这种可能
Nothing rules out the possibility that
即肉体同一是
having the very same body
成为同一个人的关键
is the key to being the very same person over time.
即使你相信灵魂存在
Even if you believe in souls,
你也可以接受肉体理论
you can accept the body theory.
而且显然
And it certainly looks as though
如果你不相信灵魂
if you don't believe in souls,
你就只能接受人格同一性的肉体理论了
you have to accept the body theory of personal identity.
事实证明
Now, as it turns out,
这种说法站不住脚
that appearance is deceptive.
对物理主义者来说还有其它的可能性
There are still other alternatives open to the physicalist,
这点我们等会儿再说
but let's come to that other alternative later.
先花点时间
Let's take a few minutes
来探讨下肉体理论
and consider the nature of the body theory,
人格同一性的肉体理论
the body theory of personal identity.
当然 就这个理论来说
On this theory, of course,
要成为同一个人必须肉体同一
the secret to being the same person is having the same body.
所以当我们问
So when we ask,
还记得上节课我说的
well, you remember last lecture I was talking about
怎么会有个人星期二
how there'd be somebody here lecturing to you,
在这里给你们讲哲学课
philosophy, on Tuesday.
这个人现在就在这里
Well, here somebody is.
这是同一个人吗
Is that the same person?
现在正给你们讲课的人
Is the person who's lecturing to you now
和之前给你们讲课的那个人

the same person as the person
是同一个人吗
who was lecturing to you before?
根据肉体理论
According to the body theory,
答案就是 问题转化为
the answer is--turns on the question,
"这具肉体是否就是
"Well, is this the same body as the
上星期在这里讲课的
lump of flesh and bone
那堆皮肉骨头呢"
that was here last week?"
如果是 顺便说一下 确实是
If it is--and by the by it is--
那么这就是同一个人
if it is, then it's the same person.
所以 我是上周给你们讲课的那个人吗
So am I the person who was lecturing to you last week?
是的 因为我的肉体没有改变
Yes, I am, because it's the very same body.
这就是肉体理论的观点
That's what the body theory says.
不像灵魂理论那么神秘
And unlike souls, where it's all rather mysterious
你很难辨别灵魂
how you could tell whether soul swapping
改变了没有
was taking place or not,
而分辨到底是不是同一个肉体
it's not all that mysterious how we check out to see
则没有那么神秘
whether the same body's been around.
就算你不辨别
Even though you didn't do it,
你也可以潜入我的屋子
you could have snuck into my house,
监视我的肉体入睡又醒来
watched my body go to sleep, get up in the morning,
跟着我的肉体一整天
followed the body around over the course of the day,
然后看着它再次入睡
see it go to sleep again.
你可以追踪这个肉体的
You could have tracked that body
时空轨迹 然后说
through space and time and said,
"看 这是同一个肉体"
"Hey look. It's the very same body."
同样地
In the same way
我们也可以追踪汽车
that we are able to track in principle cars,
这是我们之前讨论过的例子
our earlier example, and talk about yeah,
这是由同一金属
it's the same hunk of metal
电线 橡胶和塑料组成的物体
and wire and rubber and plastic.
同样的车身 同样的汽车
This is the same hunk, same body.
所以 同一个肉体 同一个人
All right, same body, same person.
这就是人格同一性的肉体理论
That's the body theory of personal identity.
现在 如果我们接受肉体理论
Now, if we accept the body theory,
那我们来看看这个问题
then of course if we turn to the question,
"我死后还能幸存下来吗
"Could I survive my death?
我在肉体死亡以后还能存活下来吗"
Could I survive the death of my body?"
乍一看
At first glance,
好像答案是
it looks as though the answer's going to have to be,
"当然不会"
"Well, of course not."
因为当我的肉体死亡
Because when my body dies, then,
它最终会腐烂
oh eventually the body begins to decay.
随之被分解成为分子
It decomposes, turns into molecules
被土壤吸收什么的
which get absorbed into the soil or what have you.
整个过程可能会花上几年
This may take years
几十年甚至几百年
or deca

des or even centuries.
但我的肉体一旦死亡
But my body no longer exists
就将不复存在
after death of my body.
那么在肉体死亡后我该如何存活
And so how could I survive the death of my body,
如果我要在肉体死亡后活下来
if for me to survive the death of my body,
那么就必须得有个人是我
there's got to be somebody who's me,
倘若他是我 就要求我们拥有同一肉体
and if being me requires it being the same body,
我的肉体就得继续存在
my body would have to still be around,
但它实际上已经不存在
but it's not.
这就是最初形成的答案
That's what it looks like at first glance.
但再想一想就会发现
But at second glance we see that
至少在逻辑上
there's at least a logical possibility
肉体死亡却仍然活着是有可能的
of surviving the death of my body.
条件就是把我的肉体拼回来
All it takes is for my body to be put back together.
肉体复活
Bodily resurrection.
现在我不打算追问
Now I'm not going to here pursue the question of,
"我们是否相信肉体复活
"Do we believe bodily resurrection
确有其事或者可能发生"
occurs or will occur?"
我只想指出有些宗教传统
I'll note that there have been religious traditions
宣扬这样的教义并且笃信这种可能性
that have taught and believed in this possibility.
特别值得一提的是
In particular, it's probably worth mentioning
早期的基督徒就相信
that early Christians believed in
某种类似于人格同一性的肉体理论的教义
something like the body theory of personal identity
并且相信在审判日
and believed in bodily resurrection
神会于审判日出现 将死者复生并对他们进行裁决 分为永生者和打入地狱者
会发生肉体复活
that would happen on Judgment Day.
我们当然可以理解
We can certainly understand the possibility
上帝可能会导演一场奇迹
that God would perform a miracle,
将分子重新排列组合起来
put the molecules back together,
把肉体拼回来
turn the body back on.
同一个肉体 意味着同一个人
Same body, same person,
在审判日复活
come Judgment Day.
存在那种可能性
That's the possibility.
所以至少要强调这样一个事实
So it's at least worth emphasizing the fact
即使我们不相信灵魂
that even if we don't believe in souls,
我们仍然可以相信在肉体死亡后
we could still believe in the possibility
人有可能活下来
of surviving one's death, the death of one's body,
只要我们愿意相信肉体复活
if we're willing to believe in bodily resurrection.
这就是其大意
Well, that's how it looks.
让我们再深入一点
Now let's take a harder look.
这种说法假设
Talking that way assumes
当你把肉体复原的时候
that when you put the body back together,
当上帝在审判日把肉体拼起来的时候
when God puts the body back

together on Judgment Day,
那个肉体仍旧是我的
that that's still my body.
是那样吗
Is that right?
我倾向于认为那是对的
I'm inclined to think it is right.
如果上帝将所有组成我肉体的不同分子
If God gathers up all the various molecules
都聚集起来
that had composed my body,
以正确的方式排列
reassembles them in the right order,
将这个钙分子置于
putting this calcium molecule next to that
那个氢分子旁边 如此这般
hydrogen molecule and so forth and so on,
以正确的方式重新组装
reassembles them in the right way--
当然 如果上帝用我的肉体分子
obviously, if what He makes out of
造出一辆凯迪拉克的话
my body's molecules is a Cadillac,
那就不是我的肉体
then that's not my body--
但如果他以正确的方式组合分子
but if He puts them together in the right way,
那似乎就应该是我的肉体
that seems like it should be my body.
我打个比方
So here's an analogy to give you
便于你们理解
a sense of what's going on.
假设我去修手表
Suppose I take my watch to the jeweler
因为它不走了
because it stopped working.
为了清洗和修理它
And in order to clean it and fix it, repair it,
钟表匠要把它拆开
what the jeweler does is he takes it apart.
从齿轮间剔除铁锈
He takes the rust off of the gears,
如果说现在的手表里还有齿轮的话
if there are still gears in watches.
想象这是一只坏了的旧手表
Imagine it's an old stop watch.
他清洗擦亮并且润滑了所有零件
And he cleans all the pieces and buffs them and polishes them
然后把它们重新组合起来
and then reassembles the whole thing.
一星期后我回来问他"表修好了吗"
And a week later, I come back and ask, "Where's my watch?"
他就把表递给我
And he hands it to me.
一切都很好
Well, all well and good.
现在想象一下 某个形而上学者要说
Now imagine some metaphysician saying,
"等会 伙计 别急
"Wait a minute, buster. Not so quick.
那不是我的手表
That's not my watch.
确实 它的零件
Admittedly, it's composed of all the very same pieces
都是我手表里的
that made up my watch.
这些零件也的确是按我表里的次序排列的
Admittedly, all these pieces are in the very same order as my watch,
但它就不是我的表"
but still that's not my watch."
我的观点则恰恰相反
On the contrary, it seems to me
这个例子的正确答案应该是
the right thing to say about that example is,
"不 那是我的手表"
"No, that is my watch."
我的手表在一段时间内被拆分了
My watch was disassembled for a period of time.
也许我们应该说我的手表
Perhaps we should say my watch didn't exist
在那一段时间里并不存在
during that period of time.
但它被重新组装起来了
But it got put back together.
于是我的手表回来了
Now that's my watch.
如果

对于手表这样说是正确的
If that's the right thing to say about the watch--
其实我觉得这种说法并无任何问题
and it does seem to me to be the right thing to say about the watch--
那么上帝大概也可以在审判日做同样的事
then God could presumably do the same thing on Judgment Day.
他可以把我们那些分解掉的分子
He could take our molecules, which had been scattered,
重新组合起来 然后说
put them back together and say,
"哈 那就是你的肉体"
"Ha! That's your body."
如果人格同一性的肉体理论成立
And if the body theory of personal identity is right, well,
那么那个人就是我了
that would be me.
所以我觉得这个说法正确
So it seems to me.
不过还有
But there's a different example
另一个不同的例子
that we have to worry about as well,
它反驳了肉体可以被分解
which argues against this proposal
再被重构的说法
that the body could decompose and then be recomposed.
由彼得·范·因瓦根提出
This is an example that's due to Peter van Inwagen.
他是当代形而上学者
He's a contemporary metaphysician,
在巴黎圣母院传教
teaches at Notre Dame.
假设我儿子用积木
Suppose that my son builds a tower
搭了一座塔
out of wooden blocks.
我家里有一套积木
We have a set of wooden blocks at home.
假设他搭了座很精致的塔
Suppose that he builds some elaborate tower.
搭得非常好 然后他说
It's very impressive. And he says,
"妈妈回来的时候请让她看看吧"
"Please show it to mom when she comes home."
然后他就睡觉去了 我很高兴
And he goes to bed. And I'm very good.
等他睡觉后我就开始打扫卫生
I'm cleaning up the house after he goes to bed
可是一不小心
and oops,
我把塔给撞翻了
I knock over the tower.
"上帝啊 他肯定要气死了
I say, "Oh my god, he's going to be so angry.
我答应过他我会当心的"
I promised him I'd be careful."
于是我捡起积木
So what I do is I take the blocks
把它们重新搭起来
and I put them back together,
按照我儿子的搭法
building a tower
把塔搭回原来的形状
in the very same shape
按照原来的结构
and the very same structure,
以及原来的次序重新搭建
the very same order as the tower that my son had built.
我真的很小心
And in fact I'm so careful--
猜想这些积木可能都被编了号
perhaps the blocks are numbered--
我很小心地把所有积木
I'm so careful that every block
都恢复原位
is in exactly the same position
和我儿子搭的一模一样
as in the case where my son built it.
我重搭或者说是我搭了这座塔
All right, I rebuild or I build this tower
我妻子回到家 我说
and my wife comes home and I say,
"看看咱儿子的杰作
"Look what our son built.
这是他造的塔"
This is the tower that our son built."
听起来不太对哦
Ah, that doesn't sound right.

那不是我儿子搭的塔
That's not the tower that our son built.
而是我搭的塔 只是个复制品
That's a tower that I built. This is a duplicate tower.
当然 如果儿子醒后我不告诉他的话
Sure, if my son were to wake up and I didn't tell him,
他就不会知道那是赝品
he wouldn't know that it was a duplicate.
但当你把构成塔的木块拆开
But when you take a wooden block tower apart
再把它们拼回去
and then put the pieces back together,
一块一块地复制回去
piece for piece, duplicate,
你搭出来的与拆开前的
you don't have the very same tower
就不是同一个塔
that you started out with.
这就是范·因瓦根的观点
That's what van Inwagen says and,
对此我表示赞同
I've got to admit, sounds right to me.
如果我指着那个塔说
If I were to point to that tower and say,
"那是阿里搭的塔" 我便是在说假话
"Ari built that," I'd be saying something false.
"那个塔与阿里搭的是同一个塔"
"That's the very same tower that Ari built."
我则在胡说八道
No, I'd be saying something false.
所以范·因瓦根得出
So van Inwagen concludes,
如果你把一个物体拆开
if you have an object and you take it apart
再照原样拼回去
and then put it all back together again,
你无法得到与拆开前
you don't have the very same object
相同的物体
that you started out with.
所以即使审判日到来
So even if Judgment Day were to come,
上帝重组了那些分子
and God were to reassemble the molecules
从而使肉体复活
and resurrect the body,
重组前后的肉体
it's not the very same body
也截然不同
that you started out with.
所以如果人格同一性的关键
And if having the very same body
是拥有相同肉体的话
is the key to personal identity,
那复活的便是另一个人
it's not the same person.
审判日到来时
Come Judgment Day,
会生成我的一个复制品
we've got a duplicate of me,
但我将不复存在
but we don't have me.
范·因瓦根认为
That's what van Inwagen would say,
肉体即是以这种方式复活
if that's the way bodily resurrection would work.
即便抛开神学避而不谈
I don't know, theology aside,
我也不知该怎样回答这个形而上学的问题
I don't know what to say about the metaphysical questions.
当我想到塔的例子时
When I think about the tower case,
我自己也倾向于范·因瓦根的观点
I do find myself inclined to say, with van Inwagen,
赞同那不是我儿子建的塔
that's not the tower my son built.
但当我想到手表的例子时
But when I think about the watch case,
我又会说
I find myself saying
那的确是同一只表
that is the very same watch.
现在 我唯一能做的就是请你们
Now, all I can do is invite you
去思考这两个例子
to think about these two cases
然后问问自己 到底该如何解释
and ask yourself, what should we say h

ere?
当然 有些人会认为
Of course, for those people who think
那的确是同一个塔 没问题
it really is the same tower, no problem.
这样我们就可以说 在手表和塔
Then we say, the watch and the tower,
这两个例子中 重组之后
in both cases, it's the very same object
得到的是同一个物体
when it's reassembled.
肉体复活后
Reassemble the body,
也仍旧是同一个肉体
that'll be the very same body as well.
还有另一些人认为
For those people who say,
"范·因瓦根关于塔的观点正确
"Yeah, van Inwagen was right about the tower,
同样适用于那个手表
and the same thing would be true about the watch.
重组前后不是同一只表"
The reassembled watch isn't the very same watch,"
那我们就可以说复活后的肉体
then we have to say bodily resurrection
和之前的肉体并不相同
would not be the very same body.
所以在审判日复活的那个人就不是我
So that wouldn't be me waking up on Judgment Day.
还有个选择就是
The alternative is to try to find some relevant difference
找出这两个例子的异同点
between the watch case and the tower case.
这样我们就能说
Something that allows us to say that
"手表重组后还是那支手表
"Well, when you reassemble the watch it is the same watch.
而塔经过重组后
When you reassemble the tower,
却不再是原来那座塔
it's not the same tower.
关于为何
Here's the explanation of why
两者重组后有着不同结果的解释是这样的
those two things work differently in the reassembly cases."
当然 我们还要更进一步研究
And then of course, we'd have to further investigate
到底肉体重组
whether when you reassemble a body,
更接近于手表的例子
is it more like the watch case
还是与塔的例子比较相像
or is it more like the tower case?
我必须承认
I just have to confess,
我找不到
I don't know what the best thing to say
对这些例子的最佳解释
about these cases is.
我倾向于认为重组手表时
I find myself inclined to think reassembled watch,
前后是同一只手表
same watch.
而重组塔后 得到的是不同的塔
Reassembled tower, not same tower.
也许这两例的确存在不同
Maybe there's a difference there.
但我就是没找到一个最佳理论
I don't have a good theory as to
来解释这个不同点到底是什么
what the difference is.
正因为此
Since I don't have a good theory as to what the difference is,
我也就无法确定
I'm not in a good position to decide
重组前后的肉体
whether a reassembled body
到底是否相同
would be the same body or a different body.
我也不知道
I don't know.
因此这里有一个形而上学的问题
So there's metaphysical work to be done here
亟待那些对同一性理论
by anybody who's at least interested in
感兴趣的人们来解决
getting this theory of identity worked out properly.

不过至少
Still, at least the possibility
这个问题是有可能被解决的
that we could work this out is still there.
所以我认为最起码
So I suppose there's still at least the possibility
按照这种方式
that bodily resurrection
重新组合的肉体
would be coherent in such a way
仍有可能是同一个肉体
that it would still be the same body.
所以如果我们接受肉体理论的话
So if we accept the body theory,
那么人死后还有生命吗
could there be life after death?
肉体死亡之后还能够复活吗
Could there be survival of the death of my body?
似乎我只能说
Seems like, as far as I can tell,
有这个可能
it's still a possibility,
尽管还存有一些
although there's some puzzles here
我不知该如何回答的未解之谜
that I don't know how to see my way through.
请注意 这并不是说我相信
Mind you, that's not to say that I myself do believe
所谓的审判日的确存在
that there will be a Judgment Day,
上帝将在那天令肉体复活
and on that day God will reassemble the bodies.
但至少它的存在看上去比较合理
But it at least seems like a coherent possibility.
让我们来对肉体理论稍作提炼
Let's refine the body view.
我一直在说该理论的关键点
I've been suggesting that the key here,
即 是否是同一个人的关键
the idea of whether it's the same person or not,
在于肉体是否同一
is whether it's the same body.
但是对于那些为我们所熟悉的物体
But of course as we know in thinking about familiar objects,
我们不必苛求要整体的每一部分
we don't need to have every single piece of an object,
都相同时它们才相同
of an entity, stay the same to have the same thing.
就像我之前说的那个
So I think I previously talked about
汽车方向盘的例子
the steering wheel in my car.
每当我转动方向盘时
Every time I drive the steering wheel in my car,
会磨损掉一些原子 但这无关紧要
I rub off some atoms. But that's okay.
它仍然是同一物体
It's still the very same physical object.
在此例中
The steering wheel is--
转动前后是否为同一个方向盘
having the same steering wheel
与其中某些部分改变
is compatible with
并不矛盾
changing of a few pieces.
这也同样适用于肉体 对吧
The same thing is true for bodies, right?
你被晒伤了 皮肤脱落
You get sunburned, your skin peels,
你失去了肉体的一些原子
you've lost some atoms in your body.
这没什么大不了的 那仍然是同一肉体
It doesn't really matter. It's still the very same body.
如果肉体是人格同一性的关键
So if body is the key to personal identity,
我们也不需要担心自己
we don't have to worry about the fact
在不断地增加或失去一些原子
that we're constantly gaining and losing atoms.
请提问
Yes, question?
好的 问题是说
Good. The question was,
"

如果某人大瘦身后会怎样"
"What about somebody who loses a huge amount of weight?"
他感觉不同了
They feel different.
人们对他的方式也不同了
People treat them different.
怎样解释这个例子
What about that case?
我认为我们这是在讨论形而上学
Well, I think if we're doing metaphysics,
而非心理学 从心理学角度来看
as opposed to psychology--Psychologically,
我们理解为何减轻体重
we understand why losing weight
会使你觉得
might make a real difference as to
自己与以往有所不同
how you feel about yourself.
我们甚至可以这么说
And we might even say, loosely,
她好像是变了个人
it's as though she's a whole new person.
但严格来说 我们不认为
But strictly speaking, we don't think
那的的确确是换了个人
it is literally a whole new person.
就好像我们不能说
It's not as though we say,
"可怜的琳达在进美容院时就死了
"Poor Linda died when she entered the spa.
或是说她去美容院一周
Or a week into the spa
减掉50磅的体重之后就死了
when she dropped those 50 pounds.
出来的只是个拥有琳达儿时记忆的
Somebody else who remembers all of Linda's childhood,
仿真人类"
some imitator came along."
我们不会说"另一个人"
We don't say "different person."
我们会说是"减了些体重的同一个人"
We say "same person, lost a lot of weight."
对肉体理论来说这完全不是个问题
Now that's not a problem for the body view,
因为在肉体理论看来
because on the body view,
问题只在于那是否是同一个肉体
the question is, is it the same body?
我们会说 当然是
And what we want to say is, of course, look,
就好比即使你没有了胳膊
just like it's still your body
但那仍然是你的肉体
even if you break your arm.
甚至在你吃完饭后
Even though--it's still your body
那也仍然是你的肉体
after you've eaten dinner,
虽然有些分子被吸收到你的肉体中
and so now some molecules have been absorbed into your body
而之前它们并不在那里
that weren't there before.
即使失去一些分子也还是你的肉体
It's still your body after you lose some molecules,
甚至在失去大量分子时亦然
even a lot of molecules.
肉体发生变化
There can be changes in your body
与变化前后为同一肉体并不矛盾
that are compatible with it still being the same body.
我们可能会问哪些变化适用于这种说法呢
Now, we might worry about the--which changes?
是不是所有变化都适用呢
Are all the changes?
当然并不是任何变化都适用于此
You know, it's certainly not as though any change will do.
我是说 假设琳达睡着后
I mean, suppose what happens is Linda goes to bed
然后我们三更半夜跑到床边
and what we do in the middle of the night
拿走旧肉体并放上一个新肉体
is we take away that body and put some new bod

y there.
那就是百分百的改变了
Well that 100% change,
显然变化太大了
that's clearly too much.
改变一小部分
Change of some small percentage,
例如吃饭 那没问题
from eating, not a problem.
人人影视
https://www.sodocs.net/doc/b53594158.html,
改变一个大点的部分
Change from a somewhat larger percentage of
减轻相当比例的体重好像也没问题
losing a fair bit of weight doesn't seem to be a problem.
所以肉体上的哪些变化
So which changes in bodies
会使其变成另一个人
make for a different body
哪些变化又使其仍是同一个人呢
and which changes in body make for the same body?
尤其是在我们探讨肉体
And in particular, how should we run
是人格同一性的关键这一前提下
that if we're thinking about the body
又该如何甄别
as the key to personal identity?
我想如果我们之前就有这个疑虑
I think if we have that question in front of our minds,
我们则会说
we're going to want to say
肉体的每个部分并非同等重要
not all parts of the body are equally important.
你通过瘦身
You lose a fair bit of weight,
减掉些赘肉 那没问题
some fat from your gut, not a problem.
这有一个我喜欢的例子
Here's one of my favorite examples.
在电影《星球大战》里
In the Star Wars movies,
黑武士达斯·维德挥动他的光剑
Darth Vader whips out his light saber
砍掉了
and slashes off
天行者卢克的手
the hand of Luke Skywalker.
"卢克 我是你的父亲"
"Luke, I am your father."
"不" 然后他的手就没了 对吧
"No!" Then the hand goes, right?
接下来一幕
The very next scene
我一直觉得这是最精彩的一幕
--this has always amazed me--the very next scene,
卢克装上了一付假肢
Luke's got an artificial hand that's been attached to his body
之后就再也没人提起它了
and they never even mention it again.
没有人会说 "噢 可怜的卢克
No one says, "Oh, poor Luke.
被达斯·维德砍掉手后就挂了
He died when Darth Vader cut off the hand."
所以很明显
It seems pretty clear
并非肉体的所有部分都很重要
that not all parts of the body matter.
你失去手后仍可以存活
You can lose a hand and still survive.
即使失去一个手 你仍旧是同一个肉体
Same body, except now without a hand.
假设达斯·维德选择在更高的位置下手
Suppose Darth Vader had aimed a little higher
切掉了卢克的整个胳膊
and cut off Luke's entire arm.
他仍然是卢克 那仍然是卢克的肉体
It would still be Luke. It would still be Luke's body.
假设再糟糕一点
Suppose, even worse,
达斯·维德砍掉了卢克的四肢
Darth Vader slices off both arms and both legs.
那还是卢克
It would still be Luke.
仍然是卢克的肉体
It would still be Luke's body,
即便他失去了胳膊和腿
though now without arms and legs.
那究竟肉体的哪个部分才必不可少呢
What part of

the body,if any, is essential?
我有个提议
Well here's a proposal.
要是弄烂卢克的脑袋
It seems to me we'd say something rather different
情况估计就不大一样了
if what happened was that what got destroyed was Luke's brain.
假如黑武士达斯·维德用原力
Suppose that Darth Vader uses the force--
当然 是黑暗面的原力
the dark side of the force of course--
黑武士达斯·维德利用黑暗面的原力
Darth Vader uses the dark side of the force to destroy,
把天行者卢克·行者的脑袋弄成了豌豆汤
to turn into pea soup, Luke Skywalker's brain.
现在我们就可以说
Now I think we might want to say,
"看吧 卢克没了"
"Well look, no more Luke."
如果他们替换掉
And if what happens is they drag out
卢克大脑的一部分
some replacement brain,
那仍然不是卢克
it's still not Luke.
至少 肉体理论可能
At least, that's a possible version
会这么解释
of the body view.
按照这种说法
According to this version,
这种我觉得最靠谱的说法
which I take to be the most promising,
同时也是肉体理论的最佳说法
the best version of the body view,
人格同一性的关键问题在于
the crucial question in thinking about personal identity
是否是同一肉体
is whether it's the same body--
但肉体的所有部分并非都同等重要
but not all parts of the body matter equally.
肉体中最重要的部分是大脑
The most important part of the body is the brain.
那么 为什么是大脑 毫无疑问
Well, why the brain? No surprise there,
因为我们都知道大脑
because of course the brain is the part, we now know,
大脑是肉体中
the brain is the part of the body
形成人格的地方
that is the house of your personality,
你的信仰 欲望 恐惧
your beliefs, your desires, your fears,
你的野心 目标 记忆
your ambitions, your goals, your memories.
都是由大脑产生的
That's all housed in the brain.
所以大脑这个部分
And so that's the part of the brain
便是肉体
that's the key part of the body
形成人格同一性的关键
for the purpose of personal identity.
这就是我最为欣赏的
That's what I'm inclined to think
肉体理论的最佳说法
is the best version of the body view.
有关大脑重要性的例子
We find examples of this thought,
其实有很多
that the brain is the key, in odd places.
我来给你们举个例子
So let me actually share one with you.
这是从网上找到的
This was something from the Internet
数年前我哥把它发给了我
that my brother sent to me some years ago.
据说取材于一个真实的案例
It purports to be from a transcript from an actual trial
律师对医生提起诉讼
in which a lawyer's cross examining the doctor.
你们会看到
And you'll see.
我无法确定此例的真实性
I don't actually know whether it's true or not,
也不知道这是不是别人瞎编的
wh

ether it's just somebody made it up.
但据说是真的
But it purports to be true.
问 医生 你在验尸前
Question: Doctor, before you performed the autopsy,
有检查过脉搏吗
did you check for a pulse?
答 没有
Answer: No.
问 那你检查过血压吗
Question: Did you check for blood pressure?
答 没有
Answer: No.
问 那你检查过呼吸吗
Question: Did you check for breathing?
答 没有
Answer: No.
问 那这么说有可能
Question: So then it is possible
患者在你开始验尸的时候还是活着的咯
that the patient was alive when you began the autopsy?
答 不可能
Answer: No.
问 你凭什么这么肯定呢 医生
Question: How can you be so sure, doctor?
答 因为他的大脑
Answer: Because his brain
在我桌上的一个罐子里
was sitting on my desk in a jar.
问 虽然如此 但这位患者
Question: But could the patient
还有可能依然活着吗
have still been alive nevertheless?
答 他有可能还活着
Answer: It is possible that he could have been alive
并且在什么地方当律师
and practicing law somewhere.
这例子好笑是因为
The point--The reason that this is funny,
除了其明显的寓意以外
other than of course the obvious moral,
即律师都是白痴
which is that lawyers are morons,
这点显而易见
is that of course.
我们为何一眼就能看出这个律师很白痴呢
Why is it so clear the lawyer's got to be a moron?
因为我们很容易想到
Because of course we think,
失去一只手这人也能活
look, lose a hand, the guy could still be alive.
失去一只胳膊 一条腿也一样能活
Lose an arm, lose a leg.
但失去大脑 他就活不了了
Lose the brain, he's not alive.
所以这在哲学上也不成立
So again this is, this is hardly philosophical proof,
但它表明我们都深信
but it shows that we're drawn to the thought
大脑是人体的关键部位
that the key part of the body is the brain.
现在想想我们持有那种想法意味着什么
Now, think about what the implication of holding that view.
假设我们采用这个肉体理论
Suppose we adopt that version of the body view.
如果我做肝脏移植
If I get a liver transplant,
那么在这里
so here I am
大家取出我的肝脏
and we take out my liver
植入琼斯的肝脏
and we put Jones' liver inside.
我虽然做了肝脏移植 但我还是我
I've gotten a liver transplant. It's still me.
假设我切除了心脏
Suppose we rip out my heart
植入琼斯的心脏
and put Jones' heart in here.
我虽然做了心脏移植 但我还是我
I've gotten a heart transplant. It's still me.
假设我切除了肺
Suppose we rip out my lungs
植入琼斯的肺
and put in Jones' lungs.
我虽然做了肺移植 但我还是我
I've gotten a lung transplant. It's still me.
假设我切除了大脑 植入琼斯的大脑
Suppose we rip out my brain, put in Jones' brain.
那我是做了

大脑移植吗
Have I gotten a brain transplant?
非也 事实上是
No. What's happened is that
琼斯做了
Jones has gotten
肉体移植
a body transplant.
也可以说是躯干移植
Or, as we might put it, a torso transplant.
如果我们接受这种肉体理论
If we accept this version of the body theory,
那我们就可以说人格同一性中肉体的关键
we say the crucial part of the body for personal identity
并非躯干的同一性
is not sameness of torso.
而是大脑的同一性
The crucial part of the body is sameness of brain.
就像如果我们相信人格同一性的灵魂理论
Just like "Follow the soul" was the answer
给出"跟随灵魂"这个回答一样
if we believe in the soul theory of personal identity,
如果我们相信人格同一性的肉体理论中
if we believe in the brain version
大脑是关键的话
of the body theory of personal identity,
那辨别是否是同一个人只需通过大脑
same person or not? Follow the brain.
大脑同则人同
Same brain, same person.
大脑不同则人不同
Different brain, different person.
正如我多次提到的
As I've now been saying several times,
我认为这是肉体理论的最佳说法
I think that's the best version of the body view,
尽管并非所有的肉体理论学家都认同这点
although not all body theorists believe that.
你们通过阅读作业中佩里的作品已经知道
As you know from reading your Perry, the assigned reading,
他关于人格同一性和永生的对话
his Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality,
故事的女主人公格特鲁德
the heroine of that story, Gertrude
其实格特鲁德认为
Gertrude actually thinks
肉体的关键部位是躯干
the key part of the body is the torso.
躯干同则人同
Follow the torso, follow the person.
这是她的观点
That's what she thinks.
我倾向于说 非也
I'm inclined to say, no.
如果我接受肉体理论的话
In those moods, when I accept the body theory,
我会更倾向于认为应该根据大脑来辨别
I'm inclined to think, no, follow the brain.
估计格特鲁德会说你做了大脑移植
Gertrude would presumably say you get a brain transplant,
你之所以能做大脑移植
you got a brain transplant,
是因为躯干没变
because it's the same torso.
而我想说 作为一个大脑理论的粉丝
I want to say, as a fan of the brain theory,
你做的大脑移植
you get a brain transplant,
其实是
what's really happened
另一个人做的躯干移植
is somebody else has gotten a torso transplant.
根据大脑来决定
Follow the brain.
根据大脑的多大部分呢
How much of the brain?
我们需要整个大脑吗
Do we need all of the brain?
正如我们无须考虑身体中
Well, just like we didn't have to follow the parts of the body
与人格同一性
that aren't essential for housing
无关的部分一样
the personality,
我们或许会问自己
we might as

k ourselves,
"我们需要整个大脑来保存人格吗"
"Do we need all of the brain to house the personality?"
研究表明
Research suggests
大脑中有不少冗余的部分
that there's a fair bit of redundancy in the brain.
你可以失去大脑的某些部分
You can lose portions of the brain
而依然运作完好
and still have a perfectly functioning,
而且还是个功能健全的人
P-functioning person.
你们或许有人知道曾经在有些实验中
Some of you may know that there have been experiments in which,
因为各种原因
for one reason or the other,
大脑的两个半球被分开过
the two halves of the brain have been separated.
你会发现
And you often end up there with,
就像两个人
well, something closer to two persons
住在同一个头骨里一样
being housed within one skull,
因为它们仍可经常以各种方式交流
because they can often still communicate in various ways.
对此我们并不是非常理解
We don't quite get that.
我收集了最好的研究结果以证明
I gather that the best research suggests
我们的大脑半球中并不存在绝对的冗余
we don't really have complete redundancy with hemispheres.
但假如有的话
But suppose that we did.
大家可以想得科幻一些
Let's be science-fictiony.
假设有理论支撑
Suppose that, as a kind of backup security,
进化使大脑中
what evolution has done
产生了如此多的冗余
is produced so much redundancy in the brain
只要半个大脑就够用了
that either half of the brain would suffice.
考虑一下大脑移植的例子
All right, so think about our brain transplant example.
琼斯和史密斯发生了意外
So there's an accident with Jones and Smith.
琼斯的躯干遭到破坏
Jones's torso gets destroyed.
但他的大脑却完好无损
His brain is fine.
史密斯的大脑被毁 但躯干完好
Smith's brain has gotten destroyed. His torso is fine.
我们将琼斯的大脑移植到史密斯的躯干上
{\c we put it in Smith's torso.
按原来那样接好所有的神经
We hook up all the wires, as it were.
然后他醒了
The thing wakes up.
他是谁
Who is that?
琼斯的大脑 史密斯的身体
Jones's brain, Smith's torso.
根据大脑理论来看
Follow the brain.
醒来的是琼斯
That's Jones that woke up.
版本二
Version two.
一场可怕的事故
Horrible accident.
使得琼斯的躯干被毁
Jones's torso has been destroyed
他的左脑也受损
and the left half of his brain has been destroyed.
但右脑无碍
But the right half of his brain is still there.
史密斯的躯干完好
Smith's torso is fine,
但他的整个大脑都损坏了
but his entire brain has been destroyed.
我们将琼斯的右脑
We take the right half of Jones's brain,
植入史密斯的躯干中
put it into Smith's torso,
接好所有神经
hook up all the wires the right way,
然后他醒了
the thing wakes up.
他是谁
Who

is it?
是琼斯
It's Jones.
根据大脑理论来看
Follow the brain,
更确切地说
and more particularly,
不论占用了多少大脑
follow however much of the brain it takes
只要它足以
to have enough of the brain there
赋予你记忆 信仰 欲望
to still give you the memories, beliefs, desires,
等等即可
and so forth and so on.
如果它成立 它也可能是错的
If it were true--it probably isn't true,
但假若半个大脑就够用
but if it were true--
这一命题成立的话
that half of the brain was enough,
那么半个大脑就足够了
then half the brain would be enough.
所以说醒来的是琼斯
That would be Jones that woke up.
有问题吗
Question?
很好 他的问题是
Great. The question was,
"照这个理论说的话
"On this theory, what do we say about the case
如果我们将琼斯的左右脑都取出
where we take the two halves of Jones's brain,
并将它们分别植入到两个不同的躯干中去
split them, put them in two different torsos.
那当他们醒来后 两个人都是琼斯吗"
They both wake up. Would they both be Jones?"
这问题非常好
That's a wonderful question.
这的确是个非常值得思考的情况
It's a wonderful case to think about and, indeed,
我等会儿会来谈谈这个问题
I am going to come back to it.
但我暂时想把它抛在一边避而不谈
But I just want to bracket it for the time being.
不过在你们思考
But it's a great question to keep in mind
肉体理论的合理性的时候
as you think about
这个问题不容回避
the plausibility of the body theory.
我倾向于认为
All right, so I'm inclined to think
肉体理论的最佳说法
that the best version of the body theory
就是依据大脑来甄别
has to do with following the brain.
那么一个不相信灵魂的物理主义者
So one thing that a physicalist, who does not believe in souls,
他可能就会说
one thing that a physicalist could say is,
"什么是人格同一性的关键呢
"What's the key to personal identity?
是肉体 肉体的同一性"
The body. Sameness of body."
我更倾向于认为
And then I'm inclined to think
肉体理论的最佳说法是
the best version of the body view
大脑理论
is the brain view.
这就是物理主义者的观点
So that's something that a physicalist can say.
这样一来 有关灵魂的观点
And for that matter, it's something that a soul,
相信灵魂的人也会说
somebody who believes in souls, could say as well:
即使有灵魂
even though there are souls,
它也可能不是人格同一性的关键
that may not be the key to personal identity.
也许肉体同一性才是
Maybe sameness of body is the key to personal identity.
这或许是物理主义者或是二元论者的观点
That's something a physicalist or dualist can say.
但这并不能
But, and this is not--
帮我自圆其说
to make good on a promissory note I offered earl

ier.
这不是物理主义者或是
It's not the only view available to physicalists or,
二元论者的唯一观点
for that matter, dualists.
即便灵魂不存在
Even if there are no souls,
我们也不必说
we don't have to say that the key to
人格同一性的关键就是肉体同一性
personal identity is the sameness of the body.
我们也可以说人格同一性的关键
We could instead say the key to personal identity
就是人格的一致性
is the sameness of the personality.
最后 回到洛克派学者
After all, go back to the Lockean
约翰·洛克 英国哲学家 经验主义的开创人 认为人类所有的思想和观念都来自或反映了人类的感官经验
对人格同一性的灵魂理论的担心
worries about the soul theory of personal identity.
似乎很难相信
It seemed very hard to believe
当记忆 信仰 欲望
that it isn't the same person
目标 野心 恐惧都相同时
when the memories and beliefs and desires
人却不同
and goals and ambitions and fears are all the same,
虽然灵魂在不断变化
even if a soul is constantly changing.
我们也许会说这还是同一个人
It seems as though we wanted to say same person.
为什么呢 简单来说就是因为人格相同
Why? Roughly speaking, because it's the same personality.
至于肉体理论
And with the body view,
当我刚才说
when I started arguing a few moments ago
肉体理论的最佳说法就是大脑观点时
that the best version of the body view was the brain view,
为什么听起来有点不可信
why did that seem plausible?
为什么我们不说卢克手被砍了他就死了
Why didn't we say that Luke died when he lost his wrist?
因为毕竟大脑才是
Because the brain, after all,
肉体保存人格的地方
was the part of the body that houses the personality.
我说过只要大脑足够就好
Enough of the brain was good enough, I said.
多少算足够呢
What counts as good enough?
足够保持他的人格就行
Enough to keep the personality.
既然我们在这里把人格
Well, if what we think is really important here
看得这么重要
is the personality,
我们何不直说
why don't we just say
人格同一性的关键就是人格呢
the key to personal identity is the personality?
以我为例
Let's just say it's me,
倘若有人
provided that there's somebody
和我有相同的信仰
who's got the same set of beliefs,
欲望 目标 记忆
desires, goals, memories,
野心 恐惧
ambitions, fears.
一言以蔽之 就是相同的"人格"
To coin a word, the same "Personality."
那么在这一新的假设下
So the secret to personal identity on
人格同一性的关键并非肉体的同一性
this new proposal isn't sameness of body,
而是人格的同一性
it's sameness of personality.
切记
Now, it's important to bear in mind
这一观点与物理主义者的身份
that this view is perfectly compatible
并不冲突

with being a physicalist.
毕竟我们不能
After all, we're not saying
要求你为了接受人格同一性理论
that in order to have personalities
就非得有点非物理主义的思想
you need to have something nonphysical.
作为物理主义者
As physicalists, we can still say
我们还是可以说人格的基础就是
that the basis of personality
以特定方式运作的肉体
is that there are bodies that are functioning in certain ways.
不过话虽如此
But for all that,
判断是否是同一个人的关键还是人格
the key to the same person could have to do with the personality
而非肉体的同一性
rather than the sameness of bodies.
当然 通常我们判断人格是否一致
Of course, normally the way you get the same personality
就是看肉体是否同一
is by having the same body.
如果我们再问
Still, if we ask,
"形而上学论在这里有什么作用
"What's doing the metaphysical work here?
成为同一个人的关键到底是什么呢"
What's the key to being the same person?"
我们可以说
we can say
肉体的同一性使我们拥有相同的人格
sameness of body gave us the same personality,
但是是相同的人格
but it was sameness of personality
使之成为同一个人
that made it be the very same person.
有可能在具备相同人格的情况下
Could there be some way to get sameness of personality
肉体却不相同吗
while not having sameness of body?
有可能
Maybe.
假使有种疾病
Suppose that we had some disease.
医生告诉我一个坏消息
The doctor tells me the horrible news
说我得了这种病
that I'm going to have some disease
我的大脑最后会变成豌豆汤
that's going to eventually turn my brain into pea soup.
但幸运的是 在病变前
But luckily, just before it does it,
他们能先取出我所有的人格
they can take all of my personality
并将其储存在一个人造的替代大脑中
and put it into an artificial replacement brain.
就像安个人造心脏 人造肝脏一样
So there'll be --just like you can have artificial hearts, artificial livers,
你也可以安个人造大脑
you can have artificial brains,
并装入相同的人格
which will get imprinted with the same personality.
相同的记忆 相同的信仰
Same memory, same beliefs,
相同的欲望 恐惧 还有目标
same desires, same fears, same goals.
很显然我们做不到
We obviously can't do that.
这只是个科幻故事罢了
This is a science fiction story.
但至少我们可以从中了解到
But at least it allows you to see how the body
肉体和人格可以分离
and the personality could come apart.
这样一来我们就可以在大脑不同的情况下
And so we could have same personality
依然拥有相同的人格
without literally the same brain.
如果人格是人格同一性的关键
If personality is the key to personal identity,
那么那个人就依然还是我
that would

still be me.
先花几分钟
Hold off again for a few minutes,
来看下这个问题
at least, on the question,
"我们该相信哪种观点
"So what should we believe here,
躯干 还是人格"
the body, the personality view?"
让我们来试着提炼一下人格理论
Let's try to refine the personality theory.
我要再强调一下
So again, the point I was just emphasizing was
即便我们接受了人格理论
even if we accept the personality theory,
这也不会影响我们的物理主义立场
this doesn't threaten our being physicalists.
我们还是可以说
We can still say the reason
在通常情况下 人之所以有相同人格
that we've got the same personality in the normal case,
是因为人格所在之处
is there's some physical explanation of
是存在物理主义上的解释的
what houses the personality.
不过话虽如此
But for all that,
人格同一性的关键在于人格相同
the key to personal identity is same personality.
顺便说一下 要注意
Notice, by the way,
相信灵魂的人也可以接受
that somebody who believes in souls could also accept
人格同一性的人格理论
the personality theory of personal identity.
洛克就相信灵魂
Locke believed in souls.
只不过他不认为这是人格同一性的关键
He just didn't think they were the key to personal identity.
你们或许会觉得
So you might think,
"不会吧 物理主义者错得也太离谱了
"Oh no. The physicalist is wrong
还说什么人格
when the physicalist says that personality--
记忆 信仰 意识
memory, belief, consciousness,
这些都储存在躯干中
what have you--is housed or based in the body.
其实是建立在非物质的灵魂的基础上的"
It's based in an immaterial soul."
二元论者就会这么说
Dualists could say that.
不过话虽如此 二元论者还是会说
And yet, for all that, the dualist could consistently say,
"灵魂同一并不是人格同一性的关键
"Still, same soul is not the key to personal identity.
人格同一才是人格同一性的关键
Same personality is the key to personal identity.
如果上帝每十分钟就要替换一次我的灵魂
If God replaces my soul every 10 minutes,
上帝之所以要这么做
as long as He does it in such a way as to imprint
是为了保证灵魂具有完全相同的人格
the very same personality on the soul,
这样就万事大吉了
it doesn't matter any more than
即使肉体的某些部分发生了变化
it didn't matter whether or not
也没什么关系
some of my body parts were changing."
所以人格同一性的人格理论
So the personality theory of personal identity
既能为物理主义者所接受
can be accepted by physicalists
也能被二元论者接受
and it can be accepted by dualists.
记住了
So, just to keep score, right now
我们现在已经讲了人格同一性的
we've got three basic theories
三种基本理论了
of person

al identity on the table.
灵魂理论
The soul theory,
即人格同一性的关键在于灵魂同一
the key to personal identity is the same soul.
肉体理论
The body theory,
即人格同一性的关键在于肉体同一
the key to personal identity is the same body.
我认为肉体理论的最佳说法是
Where the best version, I think,
大脑理论
is the brain version of the body theory.
还有人格理论
And the personality theory,
即人格同一性的关键
the key to personal identity
在于人格同一
is having the very same personality.
同样 我们得谨慎
Well again, we've got to be careful
提炼这些理论
about refining this.
我先假定大家都认可
Just like we all agreed, I suppose,
你可以保持肉体不变
that you can have the very same body,
即使发生新陈代谢
even though some of the parts come and go,
增加了一些原子 又脱落了一些原子
atoms get added, other atoms get knocked off.
我们可以说 我们最好说
We can say, we'd better say,
你的人格不会发生变化
that you can have the very same personality
即使组成人格的一些元素
even if some of the elements
发生了变化
in your personality change.
毕竟 我们定义人格
After all, we defined the personality
是由一系列诸如信仰 记忆
in terms of it being a set of beliefs and memories
需求 目标 恐惧等东西组成的
and desires and goals and fears and so forth.
而这些东西实在不断变化的
But those things are constantly changing.
我现在所拥有的记忆
I have all sorts of memories now
在我十岁时是绝不会有的
that I didn't have when I was 10.
例如 我有关于结婚的记忆
I have memories of getting married, for example.
但我十岁时却并没有结婚
I wasn't married when I was 10.
那么人格理论学家要说
So does the personality theorist have to say,
"人格不同了
"Uh-oh, different personality.
那孩子已然消失了
That kid no longer exists.
那人已经死了
That person died,
结婚了 记忆没了 人也就死了"
got married, no memories, died."
要这么说的话
If we say that,
我们的生命就极为短暂了
we have very, very short lives.
因为毕竟
Because after all,
我现在具有的一些记忆
right now I've got some memories
是我两小时前所没有的
that I didn't have two hours ago.
还有些记忆是我二十分钟前所没有的
I have some memories I didn't have 20 minutes ago.
倘若每获得新的记忆
If every time you got a new memory
就会产生新的人格的话
you had a new personality
并且人格理论认为
and the personality theory said
人存活的关键就是人格同一
having the very same personality was the key to survival,
那我们就只能活几秒钟
then none of us survive more than a few seconds.
如此推测 那么答案可能就是
Well, the answer presumably is going to be
人格理论的最佳解释
t