耶鲁大学开放课程—哲学：死亡.08.Open.Yale.course—Philosophy：Death.DivX-YYeTs人人影视 [字幕转换助手

之前我们讨论了柏拉图灵魂不朽的观点
We've been looking at Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul,
但到目前为止
and so far
我觉得没有一个能令人信服
I have to say I haven't found them very compelling arguments.
接下来 我们继续讨论一个
In a minute, I'm going to turn to an argument that
至少我个人觉得更为有趣的论点
at least strikes me as more interesting.
想找出它的具体错误更为不易
It's more difficult to pin down where it goes wrong.
不过讨论之前
But before we do,
我想对上节课末尾讨论的那个观点
I want to make a couple of comments about the arguments
简单的再讨论一下
we were considering at the end of last class.
上堂课最后我们谈到了"回忆论"
That was the argument from recollection.
它的大意为
You recall the basic idea was that
尽管在我们所熟知的现实世界里面
although objects in the ordinary familiar empirical world
没有绝对的公正
are not perfectly just,
没有正圆 或者其他
perfectly round, what have you,
但这些事物却让我们联想到绝对公正
they're able to remind us of perfect justice,
正圆等等
perfect roundness and the like.
于是柏拉图问自己
And when Plato asked himself,
那是为什么
"How could that be?"
他给出的答案是
the answer he gives is,
这是因为我们来到这个世界之前
"Well, it's got to be that we were previously acquainted
就已经熟知那些事物了
with the forms before our life in this world."
这就说明
And that shows that
灵魂必须先于肉体而存在
the soul must be something that existed prior to the creation of the body.
人人影视
https://www.sodocs.net/doc/de9411580.html,
这就是"回忆论"的观点
That's the argument from recollection.
还有在下课前我提到
And at the very end of class I suggested that,
即使柏拉图的观点是对的
look, even if we were to grant to Plato that
他说为了探讨正义 正圆 或者其他
in order to think about justice,circularity, what have you,
我们必须对柏拉图型相有所了解
we had to somehow grasp the forms,
就算我们承认柏拉图是对的
and even if we were to grant to Plato that
这个世界上并不存在绝对的正圆和公正
nothing in this world is perfectly round or perfectly just,
但这并不意味着
it's not necessarily correct to say,
对此唯一合理的解释
"So the only possible explanation of what's going on is
就是这个现实世界里的事物
that these things in the empirical world
让我们想起了曾经遇见的型相
remind us of our prior acquaintance with the forms."
还有可能是因为
It could be that what goes on is,
当我们接触到一些
when we bump up against something
并非绝对公正 绝对美丽 绝对正圆
that's partially just or partially beautiful or partially round--
即有缺陷的事物时
imperfectly round--what happen

s is,
这些事物会在某种程度上驱使我们
those things sort of trigger our minds in such a way that
去首次开始认知这些型相
we begin to think about the forms for the very first time.
因此可以说为了探讨公正和正圆
So it might be, in order to think about justice and roundness,
我们必须先掌握型相
we have to grasp the forms.
但也可能我们只是此生才开始
But it could be that we only grasp the forms in this life,
认知这些型相
for the very first time.
在接触并
Exposure to the things that
见识了这些型相后 它们会
participate in the forms may nudge our minds or our souls in such a way
驱使我们的心灵或灵魂去认知它们
that at that point--given that exposure--we begin to grasp the forms.
就好比生活中最平常的琐屑小物
It's as though the ordinary earthly objects,
与我们彼此相遇之后
we bump into them or they bump into us,
会指引我们仰望美好的柏拉图境界
and they get us to look upwards to the heavenly Platonic realm.
我不是说真的仰望
I don't mean literally upwards.
这不是在说数字3
It's not as though these things--the number three--
在上面
is up there.
而是说一旦你理解了这个隐喻
But if you accept the metaphor,
在现实世界中碰到一些东西
running into things in the empirical world
使我们的心灵开始第一次的思考
gets our minds to start thinking about, for the first time,
美好的柏拉图境界的型相和理念
the heavenly realm of the Platonic forms and ideas.
这个解释和之前的那个理论一样合理
That would be just as likely a possibility as the alternative explanation
就是说普通的现实物体
that what's going on is that ordinary empirical objects
使我们想起之前的印象(不是唯一解释)
are reminding us of our prior acquaintance.
或许这些普通物体就像入门引言一样
Perhaps these ordinary objects act like letters of introduction,
指引我们 帮助我们
getting us to, helping us to,
去开始首次思考这些型相上的事物
think about the forms for the very first time.
如果这是对的
Well, if that's right, then of course,
我们当然就不必相信柏拉图之后的
we don't have any good reason to follow Plato when he says,
灵魂一定是先于肉体而存在的观点
"It must be the case that the soul existed prior to the--prior to birth."
我刚刚提出的这个反驳不是柏拉图
Now, the objection I've just raised is not an objection
在《斐多篇》中提到的
that Plato raises in the Phaedo,
不过他提出了另外一个异议
but he does raise a different objection.
请记住我们的讨论
Remember our concern isn't,
严格来讲不仅仅是问
strictly speaking, with the question,
灵魂在我们出生前存在吗
"Did the soul exist before our birth?
灵魂是先于肉体的存在吗
Did the soul exist before our bodies?

"
而是要问 灵魂是不朽的吗
but rather, "Is the soul immortal?"
现在根据他的"回忆论"
And so, having now given the argument from recollection,
柏拉图假设出的苏格拉底的两个门徒
Plato envisions two of Socrates' disciples,
西米亚斯和塞贝斯
Simmias and Cebes,
做了如下的反驳
responding, objecting, by saying,
就算灵魂在人出生前就存在
"Look, even if the soul existed before birth,
这并不能说明它在肉体死亡后依然存在
it doesn't follow that it exists after death.
毕竟这才是
And that's, after all,
我们真正想要的
what we really want,
并且在思考的
are wondering about.
我们想知道
We want to know,
我们能否在死亡之后继续存活
will we survive our deaths?
灵魂是否不朽
Is the soul immortal?
但是苏格拉底
And you haven't yet
你还没有进行证明呢
shown that Socrates,"
他们继续反驳道
they object.
也许它先前确实存在
Could be that it existed before,
但此后它未必依然存在
but won't exist afterwards.
但有趣的是
But very nicely--
这里的结构非常巧妙
it's quite elegant structure at this point--
苏格拉底把我们前面提到的
Socrates puts together the two arguments that
这两种观点
we've just been rehearsing--
即"回忆论"及其之前的另一种观点
the argument from recollection and the argument that came before that,
我称作"循环论"的观点结合起来了
the one that I dubbed "the argument from recycling."
回忆一下 "循环论"的观点认为
Remember, the argument from recycling says,
当你组装一件东西时
when you build something,
你用的是零件
you build it out of parts,
当东西解体后则又变成了各种零件
and when that thing falls apart you go back to the parts.
所以先前的零件被循环利用了
So the prior parts get recycled.
而灵魂 我们可以说
The soul, we now say--
根据"回忆论"的观点
based on the argument from recollection--
灵魂好比我们出生前的一零件
the soul is one of our prior parts.
灵魂在我们出生之前就存在
The soul existed before we were put together,
或者说灵魂先于肉体而存在
or before we were put together with our bodies.
如果把"循环论"和之前的观点结合起来看
If you then combine the argument from recycling and say,
之前存在的零件 之后依然存在
the parts that existed before are going to exist afterwards,
那就说明了如果灵魂之前就存在
it must follow that if the soul existed before,
那么之后它也一定存在
it will exist afterwards as well.
由此我们就证明了灵魂是不朽的
And so we've got the immortality of the soul after all.
但是 事实上
Now, bracket the fact that,
如我之前所说
as I just explained,
我本人并不认为"回忆论"很有说服力
I don't myself find the argument from recollection persuasiv

e.
我认为我们没有理由去相信
I don't think we've got any good reason to believe--
根据柏拉图那些
based on the sort of things that
引起我们注意的理论
Plato is drawing our attention to--
我不觉得我们有充分的理由去相信
I don't think we've got any good reason to believe that
灵魂先于肉体而存在
the soul existed before we were born.
即便我们认为他是对的
But even if we grant him that,
我们也不要过早认为
we shouldn't be so quick to conclude,
根据"回忆论"和
on the basis of combining the argument from recollection
"循环论"的结合
and the argument from recycling,
灵魂在肉体死亡之后会继续存在
that the soul will continue to exist after the death of our bodies.
我们举个熟悉的例子
After all, take a more familiar,
一个平常的例子
humdrum example.
汽车在造出来之前不是汽车 对吧
Cars are built out of non-cars, right?
它由引擎 轮胎 和方向盘组装而成
Cars get built out of engines and tires and steering wheels.
但是引擎不是汽车
{\c
方向盘也不是汽车
the steering wheel is not a car.
你是用零件将汽车组装起来的
So you build the car out of its parts.
引擎是先于汽车存在
Now, the engine is a prior-existing part.
那么我们是不是可以做出这样的结论
So can we conclude then that from the fact that--
根据"循环论"
argument from recycling:
零件可以再利用 可以再装配
parts get reused, get rebuilt,
当车坏掉了以后
when cars get destroyed,
零件依然还存在
the parts are still around--
那我们能不能根据"循环论"
can we conclude from the argument from recycling
以及引擎是先于汽车存在的
and the fact that the engine is a prior-existing part
这一个事实
from which the car was built,
来断言说引擎会
that the engine will continue
在汽车毁坏之后依然永远存在呢
to exist forever after the destruction of the car?
很显然 我们不能做出这样的结论
No, obviously you can't conclude that at all.
有时车子毁坏的同时
Sometimes when cars get destroyed the engine
引擎也一起损坏了
gets destroyed right along with it.
当然了
And of course, even if--
即使有时候
in many cases--
引擎在车子毁坏了之后
the engine continues to exist for a while
还是会存在一段时间
after the destruction of the car,
但这不是说引擎是不朽的
it certainly doesn't follow that the engine is immortal,
引擎会永远存在
that it continues to exist forever.
引擎终将分解 变成原子
Engines will eventually decompose and turn back into atoms.
所以仅仅根据引擎是一个
So from the mere fact that the engine was a part
先于汽车存在的零件
that existed before the car existed,
以及后来当汽车被拆解时
and the further fact that when the car breaks down,
它又变成了零件的这

一事实
it decomposes back into parts,
自然不能说明
it certainly doesn't follow that
所有先于汽车存在的零件
all of the parts that existed prior
都会永远存在
to the existence of the car will be around forever.
这是错的
That would just be false.
纵使我们接受了苏格拉底的假设
So even if we were to give Socrates the assumption that--
或者说他的理论
the thesis that--
即使(承认)灵魂先于我们存在
the soul existed before we were put together,
在我们出生前存在
before we were born,
但这仍不能表明
it still wouldn't follow that
当我们的肉体分解后灵魂依旧存在
the soul will continue to exist after we're taken back apart.
灵魂可能迟早会像引擎那样
The soul might eventually decay just like the engine
慢慢地消散
will eventually decay.
我们需要
What we need,
一个真正能说服我们灵魂是不朽的理由
to really become convinced of the immortality of the soul,
不能仅仅依靠假设
is not the mere suggestion,
即使是
even it was--
即使我们确信
even if we were convinced--
灵魂的确是先于肉体存在的
is not the mere suggestion that the soul was around before our birth.
我们需要证明
We need to believe that the soul,
灵魂不同于引擎
unlike an engine,
它不会被毁灭
can't itself be destroyed,
不会分解
can't itself decompose,
不会消亡
can't fall apart.
这才是让使我们信服
That's what we need if we're really going
灵魂是不朽的有力证据
to become convinced of the immortality of the soul.
正如我前面提到的
Now, as I remarked previously,
最不可思议的是
one of the amazing things--
不该说不可思议 应说柏拉图的著作里
not amazing but one of the really attractive things
最引人入胜的是
about Plato's dialogues is,
当你刚要反驳他的观点时 柏拉图本人
you raise an objection and it often seems as though Plato himself,
不管是否已经直白地阐述了这些异议
whether or not he explicitly states the objection,
好似已经知道这些异议了
seems aware of the objection,
因为接下来他一定会对此进行回应
because he'll go on to say something that is responsive to it.
如果你认为
And again, that makes sense
这些对话录是完善你哲学思维的
if you think of these dialogues as a kind of pedagogical tool
学习工具 这就显的很合理
to help you get better at philosophizing.
所以我认为 柏拉图接下来的对话
So the very next argument that Plato turns to can be viewed,
可以看作对这个没表达出来的异议的回应
I think, as responding to this unstated objection--
我在这里说了
well, I stated it,
柏拉图可没有在他的书中这么说
but Plato doesn't state it in the dialogue--
(他没有问)即使灵魂是我们的一零件
the worry that even if the soul was one of the parts,
尽

管灵魂先于肉体而存在
even if the soul was already around before we were born,
我们怎么能证明它不会分解
how do we know it can't come apart?
我们怎么证明它不会被摧毁
How do we know the soul can't be destroyed?
由于我们想知道灵魂到底是不是不朽的
Since what we want to know is whether the soul is immortal,
我们怎么证明它不会消散
how do we know it can't break?
柏拉图的下个观点直接回答了这个疑问
Plato's next argument then tries to deal directly with this worry,
而且这是一个很有趣的观点
and it's a quite interesting argument.
我给它一个
I'll give it another--
新的名称
a new label--
称为 "精简论"
I'll call it the "argument from simplicity."
苏格拉底做了如下的探讨
Socrates turns to a discussion of
什么样的东西会消散
what kinds of things can break
什么样的东西不会消散
{\c
什么样的东西会损毁
what kinds of things can be destroyed,
什么样的东西不会损毁
and what kinds of things can't be destroyed.
他举了些例子
{\c
他想通过研究这些例子
he surveys examples and tries
来总结出一条形而上学的原理
to extract a kind of metaphysical principle from this.
然后 我们就会看到
And then, as we'll see,
他希望运用这条原理使我们信服
he's going to use this principle to convince us--
或者尽量说服我们相信 灵魂是不朽的
or to try to convince us--that the soul is immortal,
是坚不可摧的
it's indestructible.
很多东西都能被摧毁
Well, lots of things can be destroyed.
这有一张纸
Here's a piece of paper.
我能撕坏它 对吧
It can be destroyed [sound of ripping paper] Right?
那么为什么这东西可以被摧毁呢
Why was it that this was the sort of thing that could be destroyed?
最直接的回答就是这张纸是有组成部分的
Well, the straightforward answer is the piece of paper had parts.
损坏它
And in breaking it,
撕掉它
in ripping it,
我其实是把其中的一部分与另一部分撕开
what I literally did was I ripped one part from another.
为了损毁这张纸
To destroy the piece of paper,
我把它的部分分开了
I take its parts apart.
这有一根粉笔
Here's piece of chalk.
它可以被我折断
The piece of chalk can be broken.
我现在在干什么
What am I doing?
我把它的各个部分分开
Taking its parts apart.
可以被摧毁的东西都有"部分"
The kinds of things that can be destroyed have parts.
它们是合成的
They are composite.
它们由各个"部分"组成
They are composed of their parts.
肉体可以被摧毁 因为你可以拿一把刀
Bodies can be destroyed because you can take a sword to it
然后切切切 把它切割成片
and go sweep, sweep, sweep and chop it into pieces.
合成的东西是可以被摧毁的
Composite things can be destroyed.
有"部分"的事物是可以被

摧毁的
Things that have parts can be destroyed.
什么样的东西不会被摧毁呢
Now, what kind of things can't be destroyed?
不例外的
Well, it won't surprise you
柏拉图在寻找永恒的
that when Plato looks for an example of something
并且不可摧毁的例子时
that's eternal and indestructible,
他直接开始思考柏拉图型相
his mind immediately starts thinking about the Platonic forms.
比如说数字3
Take the number three.
数字3是不能被摧毁的
The number three can't be destroyed, right?
即使发生了核爆炸
Even if nuclear explosion took place
地球上的一切
and everything on Earth
都在某种诡异的科幻式连锁反应中毁灭了
got atomized and destroyed through some bizarre science fiction chain reaction,
就像是电影里经常出现的那样
like they're always doing in movies,
数字3仍旧毫发无损
the number three wouldn't be touched.
数字3不会受到任何影响
The number three wouldn't be fazed.
3加1等于4依然是成立的
It would still be true that three plus one equals four.
你不可能损害到数字3
You can't hurt the number three.
你无法改变或摧毁正圆
You can't alter or destroy perfect circularity.
为什么不能 因为它没有任何”部分”
Why not? Well, it doesn't have any parts.
这就是他的观点
That's the thought.
像柏拉图型相的东西是永恒的
Things like the Platonic forms are eternal,
它们永远存在 固定不变
and they're eternal, changeless,
坚不可摧
and indestructible,
因为它们简单
because they are simple--
简单在此是一个形而上学的概念
simple here being the metaphysical notion that
指它们不由任何事物组成
they're not composed of anything.
对于所有由”部分”组成的物体 你会
Anything that's built up out of parts you could,
最起码从理论上
at least in principle,
会担心它们的”部分”会分崩离析
worry about the parts coming apart and,
因而导致整个物体的毁灭
hence, the thing being destroyed.
不过所有简单的事物
But anything that's simple
是不会以那样的方式毁灭的
can't be destroyed in that way.
因为它没有"部分”可分
It has no parts to take apart.
因此所有能够被摧毁的事物都是有"部分"的
So the kinds of things that can be destroyed are the things with parts,
这些就是能够变化的东西
and those are the sorts of things that change, right?
即使它们现在没有被摧毁
Even if they're not destroyed,
又如何判断某物是否是合成的呢
what's a tip off to something being composite?
要看它会不会变化
The fact that it changes.
假设我拿来一根金属条 然后把它掰弯
Suppose I take a bar of metal and I bend it.
我并没有摧毁它 但我改变了它
I haven't destroyed it, but I've changed it.
我可以通过改变各部分之间的关系
I'm able to change it by rearranging the relation

ships
来改变它
between the various parts.
我的身体一直在变化
My body is constantly changing
因为我的胳膊 头 及其他器官
because the relationships between
之间的关系改变了
my arms and my head and so forth,
我的肌肉在活动
my muscles are moving.
调整了"部分"之后
You rearrange the parts,
这个东西就变了
the thing changes.
这就意味着这东西是由”部分”组成
Oh, but that means it's got parts
而且它可以被摧毁
and could be destroyed.
现在我们可以归纳出一些有趣的结论
So we've got some nice generalizations.
会改变的事物是由"部分"组成的
{\c
而由"部分"组成的事物是可以被摧毁的
things with parts can be destroyed.
哪些事物是可以改变和摧毁的呢
What are the kinds of things that you can change and destroy?
那些现实世界里为我们所熟悉的事物
Those are the familiar empirical objects that we can see:
比如纸 身体 粉笔和金属条
pieces of paper, bodies, pieces of chalk, bars of metal.
与此相对 另一方面
In contrast, on the whole other side,
有些事物则是无形的
you've got things that are invisible,
比如数字3
like the number three--
数字3是看不见的 是无形的事物
nobody sees the number three--things that are invisible,
它从不改变
that never change.
数字3从不改变 对吧
The number three never changes, right?
3是一个奇数
The number three is an odd number.
不会说
It's not as though,
今天3是奇数明天它就变成偶数了
oh, today it's odd but maybe tomorrow it'll be even.
它永远是个奇数
It's eternally an odd number.
3加1今天 昨天 且永远都等于4
Three plus one equals four today, yesterday and forever.
这些关于3的事实是永远不会变的
These facts about the number three will never change.
数字3不会改变
The number three is changeless.
因此型相是永恒的
{\c
它们无形
{\c
它们不变
they are changeless.
它们简单 而简单的事物无法被摧毁
{\c
型相是无法被摧毁的
forms can't be destroyed.
把这些合并在一起
{\c
这些是苏格拉底集中归纳的观点
these are the sorts of thoughts that Socrates assembles,
我已经把刚才谈到的观点写在黑板上了
and I've got the initial thoughts up there on the board.
[见图8.1] 好的
[See Figure 8.1] All right.
前提一 只有合成的事物才能被摧毁
So premise number one, only composite things can be destroyed.
前提二 只有会改变的事物才是合成的
Premise number two, only changing things are composite.
因此如果把两者结合起来 就可以得到
So if you put one and two together, you'd get:
只有会改变的事物才可以被摧毁
only changing things could be destroyed.
现在加上前提三 无形的事物不会改变
And now add three, invisible things don't change.
那么 如果事物必须可以改变
Well, if yo

u've got to be the kind of thing
才能是合成的
that can change in order to be composite
而且必须是合成的事物才可以被摧毁
and you've got to be composite in order to be destroyed,
无形的事物不会改变
invisible things don't change,
可以得出四 无形的事物无法被摧毁
follows four, invisible things can't be destroyed.
这就是苏格拉底根据思考
That's the metaphysical thesis that Socrates comes to
得出的形而上学的论题
by thinking about cases.
而那正是关于灵魂不朽的
And that's the crucial premise or sub-conclusion
关键前提或说是次级结论
for the immortality of the soul,
因为接下来 苏格拉底将促使
because then Socrates invites
我们思考灵魂的问题
us to think about the soul.
灵魂是有形还是无形
Is the soul visible or invisible?
他说 很明显
He says, pretty obviously,
灵魂是无形的
"it's invisible."
如果无形的事物不能被摧毁
But if invisible things can't be destroyed,
那么灵魂也就不能被摧毁
the soul can't be destroyed.
因此前提一二三可以导出次级结论四
So one, two and three got us four,
无形的事物是不能被摧毁的
invisible things can't be destroyed,
前提五 灵魂是无形的 得结论六
but five, the soul is invisible so six,
灵魂不能被摧毁
the soul can't be destroyed.
这是我在基于"精简论"
That's my best attempt
重构论点的前提下能给出的最好解释
at reconstructing the argument from simplicity.
这些并不是柏拉图
It's not as though Plato himself spells it out
明确说明的前提和结论
with premises and conclusions like that,
不过我认为这是忠于
but I think this is fairly faithful
他提出的论证方式的
to the kind of argument he means to put forward.
一会儿我将评估
And in a moment I'll turn to evaluating
这个论点是否是个好论点
whether that's a good argument or not.
不过我认为这是一个非常有趣的论点
{\c
是一个值得我们认真对待的论点
it's an argument worth taking fairly seriously.
不过 我必须承认
Except, I've got to confess to you
苏格拉底并不一定会完全按照
that Socrates doesn't quite conclude the way
我所预料他将采取论证的方式进行论证
I would've thought he would've concluded.
这样我们通过论证得出结论六
So I've had the argument conclude six,
灵魂不能被摧毁
the soul can't be destroyed.
但苏格拉底实际说的是
But what Socrates actually says is--
他实际的结论是
his actual conclusion is--
因此灵魂是坚不可摧的
"And so the soul is indestructible
或几乎不可摧毁的"
or nearly so."
一个相当古怪的限定
That's rather an odd qualification,
"或几乎不可摧毁"
"or nearly so."
苏格拉底通过关于改变
The conclusion that Socrates reaches from his examination of change
无形等等概念的讨论
and invisibility

and so forth and so on,
以及合成性与简单性的对比
and compositeness versus simplicity,
所得出的结论是
is that
"灵魂不可摧毁或几乎不可摧毁"
"the soul is indestructible or nearly so."
现在 这个限定带来了新的问题
Now, adding that qualification opens the door to a worry.
这个问题是塞贝斯提出来的 他说
The worry gets raised by Cebes who says,
即使我们承认灵魂几乎不可被摧毁
even if we grant that the soul is nearly indestructible,
也不足以说明灵魂的不朽
that's not good enough to get us immortality.
而且他还提出了一个十分有趣的类比
And he gives a very nice analogy of somebody who's--
一件衣服可能比它的主人存在更久
a coat, which could outlast the owner
不过它绝非不朽
but isn't immortal.
或者说主人也可能穿过好几件衣服
{\c
然而在某个时刻主人仍旧会死亡
but still at some point the owner's going to die as well.
主人远比衣服不朽
The owner is far more immortal,
或者可以说是更接近不朽
in that sense, closer to immortality.
我本人这一辈子也穿过很多的衣服
And I've gone through many coats in my life,
虽然如此 我并非坚不可摧
but for all that, I'm not indestructible.
如果我们最终所得仅仅是
If all we've got is the mere fact that the soul
灵魂是"几乎"不可摧毁的
is "nearly" indestructible,
需要花费很大的功夫才能摧毁它
it takes a whole lot more work to destroy it,
人人影视
https://www.sodocs.net/doc/de9411580.html,
也许它存在的时间更久一些
{\c
也许一个灵魂会经历很多的肉体
maybe it goes through a whole lot of bodies
在消耗殆尽被摧毁前转世六次
being reincarnated a half-dozen,
或是十二次 或是好几百次才最终消亡
or a dozen, or hundred times before it wears out and gets destroyed.
这些都不足以使我们得出灵魂不朽的结论
That's not enough to give us the immortality of the soul.
这就是塞贝斯提出的质疑
That's the objection that Cebes raises.
奇怪的一点是
And one of the oddities is that,
在我看来
as far as I can see,
苏格拉底从未回应过这个质疑
Socrates never responds to that objection.
提出这个质疑
Raises the objection--
即是说
that is,
柏拉图凭借塞贝斯之口道出了自己的质疑
Plato raises the objection in the voice of Cebes--
然而苏格拉底
but Socrates,
柏拉图笔下的苏格拉底
on Plato's behalf,
从未应答过这个质疑
never answers the objection.
很难道明这其中的缘由
It's hard to say what exactly is going on.
有可能是因为柏拉图担心
It might be that Plato's worried that
他并未真正证明灵魂是不朽的
he hasn't really shown that the soul is immortal afterwards.
也许这个从"精简论"推理出的论点
Maybe this argument from simplicity isn't really
并不如预想中那么严密
as good as it needs to be.
而那也许

解释了为什么柏拉图接下来
And maybe that explains why Plato then goes on
提出了另外一个论点
to offer yet another argument.
毕竟 如果这个论点确实
After all, if this argument really
证明了灵魂的不朽
did show the immortality of the soul,
他为什么还要给出另外一个论点呢
why would he need to offer a further argument?
"必要属性论"
The argument from essential properties,
我们以后会讨论它
which we'll be turning to later.
因此也许柏拉图觉得
So maybe Plato just thought
对于塞贝斯的质疑
there wasn't a good answer
并没有什么完善的答案
to Cebes' objection.
不过我想说
But I want to say,
站在柏拉图的立场来说
on Plato's behalf,
或者至少是从这个论点的角度来说
or at least on behalf of the argument,
苏格拉底不应该以如此奇怪的
Socrates should never have concluded the argument
一个限定式的结论
with this odd qualifying phrase that
灵魂"是或几乎是不可摧毁的"来结束
the soul is "indestructible or nearly so."
他应该说灵魂就是不可摧毁的 结束
He should've just said the soul is indestructible, full stop.
毕竟
After all,
在前提一 二 和三成立的情况下
if we have premises one, two, and three--
只有合成的事物才能被摧毁
only composite things can be destroyed,
只有会改变的事物才是合成的
only changing things are composite,
无形的事物不会改变
invisible things don't change--
如果把这些结合起来
if you put those together,
就可以得到四 无形的事物不能被摧毁
you get four, invisible things can't be destroyed.
你是不会得出更加宽泛的结论
You don't get the more modest conclusion,
无形的东西不能被摧毁
"invisible things can't be destroyed
或是很难被摧毁
or it's a whole lot harder to destroy them."
如果我们有前提一 二 和三
If we've got one, two and three,
我们应该得到更加肯定的结论
we're entitled to the bold conclusion:
无形的东西不能被摧毁 句号
"invisible things can't be destroyed, period."
没了
Full stop.
然后如果前提五成立
And then if five is true,
如果灵魂真的是无形的
if the soul really is invisible,
我们就可以得到结论六
we're entitled to conclude six,
灵魂是不能被摧毁的
the soul can't be destroyed--
而不是 灵魂不能被摧毁
not, the soul can't be destroyed,
或是很难很难被摧毁
or if it can be destroyed it's very,
需要很长很长的时间摧毁
very hard and takes a very, very long time.
我们理应得出更肯定的结论
We are, rather, entitled to the bolder conclusion,
灵魂不能被摧毁
the soul can't be destroyed,
句号 完了 讨论结束
full stop, period, end of the discussion.
所以说尽管苏格拉底
So despite the fact that Socrates
得出了这个相对无力的结论
draws this weaker conclusion,
对我来说

他提供的论证似乎
it seems to me that the argument he's offered us,
如果论证正确
if it works at all,
促使我们得出了更加肯定的结论
entitles us to draw the bolder conclusion.
不是"灵魂是或几乎不可摧毁"
Not that the soul is indestructible or nearly so,
而是"灵魂确实不可摧毁"
but that the soul is indestructible.
也许柏拉图意识到了这一点
{\c
也许这就是为什么
maybe that's the reason why
他根本没顾上回答塞贝斯问题的原因
he doesn't bother giving an answer to Cebes.
也许他想让读者意识到
Maybe it's an invitation to the reader to recognize that
还有一个比剧中的人物所提出的
there's a better argument here than even the characters
更好的论证存在 我们不知道
in the drama have noticed--don't know,
我们无从知道柏拉图的想法
don't know what Plato had in mind.
不过无论如何
But at any rate,
我们的问题都不应该是
our question shouldn't be,
"柏拉图在想什么"
"What was Plato thinking?"
而是"这个论点合理吗"
but, "Is the argument any good?"
我们得到关于灵魂的不朽结论了吗
Do we now have an argument for the immortality of the soul?
毕竟 如果灵魂不能被摧毁
After all, if the soul can't be destroyed,
那它就是不朽的
it's immortal.
这是一个好的论点吗
Is it a good argument or not?
西米亚司提出了另一个质疑
Simmias raises a different objection.
西米亚司说我们不应该下结论说
Simmias says we can't conclude that
灵魂是或几乎不可摧毁的
the soul is indestructible, or nearly so,
或者其他的结论
or whatever,
因为我们不应相信四所说的
because we should not believe the sub-conclusion four,
无形的物体不能被摧毁
invisible things can't be destroyed.
西米亚司认为无形的物体能够被摧毁
Simmias says invisible things can be destroyed.
如果这一点成立
And if that's true,
那么当然 关于灵魂是不可毁灭
then of course we no longer have an argument
或者是几乎不可摧毁的论证就不成立了
for the indestructibility or near indestructibility of the soul.
因为即使灵魂是无形的
Because even if the soul is invisible,
即前提五 然而
five, if nonetheless,
如果与苏格拉底所声称的相反
contrary to what Socrates was claiming,
无形的事物能够被摧毁的
invisible things can be destroyed,
那么无形的灵魂也能被摧毁
then maybe the invisible soul can be destroyed as well.
西米亚司并不是仅仅草率地断言
Now, Simmias doesn't merely assert, boldly,
无形的物体能被摧毁
invisible things can be destroyed.
他给出了能被摧毁
He offers an example of an invisible thing
但无形的事物的例子 音乐
that can be destroyed--harmony.
他开始讨论音乐
He starts talking about the harmony
由弦乐器演奏出来的音乐
{\c
比方说竖琴
let's

say a harp.
事实上 他说
In fact, he says,
这是一个非常值得我们深思的例子
this is a very nice example for us to think about
因为有人提出 西米亚司说道
because some people have suggested--Simmias says--
有些人提出心灵就好像音乐
some people have suggested that the mind is like harmony.
似乎心灵就像躯体演奏的音乐
It's as though the mind is like harmony of the body.
为了更加详细完整地说明这个类比
So to spell out the analogy a bit more fully,
我待会儿会做更详细的解释
and I'll say a bit more about it later,
音乐之于竖琴就好像精神之于躯体
harmony is to the harp as the mind is to the body.
他说 有人提出了这样的观点
He says, there are people who put forward views like this,
不管怎么说 音乐是肯定能被损毁的
and at any rate harmony can certainly be destroyed.
你不能看见音乐 对吧
You don't see harmony, right?
音乐是无形的
Harmony is invisible.
但尽管如此
But for all that,
你能够损毁音乐
you can destroy harmony.
一台竖琴正演奏旋律 演奏美妙的音乐
So there's the harp making its melodious, harmonious sounds,
这时有人拿着一把斧子去砍这台竖琴
and then you take an ax to the harp,
梆 梆 梆 嚓 嚓 嚓
bang, bang, bang, chop, chop, chop,
或者用个锤子 或其他什么东西
{\c
这时音乐就被损毁了
now the harmony's been destroyed.
所以说尽管它是无形的
So even though it's invisible,
你能够通过破坏乐器这个音乐的载体
you can destroy it by destroying the musical instrument
来破坏音乐
on which it depends.
当然
And of course,
存在这种顾虑 对吧
there's the worry, right?
如果精神之于躯体就像音乐之于乐器的话
If the mind is like the harmony of the body,
人们就可能通过破坏躯体这个精神的载体
then maybe you could destroy the mind, the soul,
来破坏心灵 或者灵魂
by destroying the body on which the mind depends.
所以现在问题的关键点是
So the crucial point right now is that thinking about
音乐作为"无形的物体不能被摧毁"
harmony is offered as a counterexample to the generalization
这个结论的反例是否合适
that invisible things can't be destroyed.
音乐是无形的
Harmony is invisible.
音乐能够被摧毁
Harmony can be destroyed.
所以无形的物体是能被摧毁的
So invisible things can be destroyed.
因此你错了 苏格拉底
So you're wrong, Socrates,
你的"无形的物体不能被摧毁"(是错的)
when you say invisible things can't be destroyed.
即使我们承认灵魂也是无形的
So even if we grant that the soul is invisible as well,
但灵魂也可能是一种能被摧毁的无形事物
maybe the soul also is an invisible thing that can be destroyed.
这是极好的质疑
That's a great objection.
这是一条值得我们认

真探讨的质疑
It's an objection worth taking very seriously.
但奇怪的是
And the oddity is,
苏格拉底 并没有以他应有的
Socrates doesn't respond to it in the way that
正确的方式
he should have,
对这一点做出回应
in the way that he needed to.
相反 苏格拉底花费了很多时间在
Socrates instead spends some time worrying about
讨论灵魂是否真的像音乐一样
the question, "Is the soul really like harmony or not?"
这个比喻
Is this metaphor--
探讨心灵和躯体之间的关系
think about the relationship between the mind
与音乐和竖琴的关系是否类似
and body as similar to the relationship between harmony
苏格拉底花费了一些时间批判这个类比
and a harp--Socrates spends some time criticizing that analogy.
待会我们再继续说这个
Now, in a few minutes I'll turn to the question,
关于苏格拉底是如何批判这个类比的问题
what about Socrates' criticisms of the analogy?
这是否是有力的批判
Are they good criticisms or not?
但即使这是有力的批判
But even if they are good criticisms,
我想说的是
I want to say,
这并不足以支持你的论证 苏格拉底
that's not good enough to help your argument Socrates.
即使我们说
Even if we were to say,
你知道吗
you know what?
精神与音乐并不相似
The mind isn't very much like harmony at all.
这个类比也确实比较烂
That analogy really stinks.
那又如何
So what?
西米亚司要给苏格拉底的论证挑刺
All that Simmias needs to cause problems for Socrates' argument
只需要说明音乐是无形的且音乐能被摧毁
is the claim that harmony is invisible and harmony can be destroyed.
只要这些成立
As long as that is true,
我们就不能再相信无形的事物不能被摧毁
we can't continue to believe that invisible things can't be destroyed.
苏格拉底所需要做的
So what Socrates needs to do is to say
要么是说明音乐是不能被摧毁的
either harmony can't be destroyed,
但显然它是能够被摧毁的
but pretty obviously it can,
由乐器发出的乐声是能够被摧毁的
the melodious sounds coming out of an instrument can be destroyed.
那么 他需要表明
So he would need to argue then,
也许 音乐不是真的无形
perhaps, that harmony is not really invisible.
如果他能向我们展示这一点
If he could show us,
如果他能说服我们
if he could convince us,
音乐不是真的无形
that harmony is not really invisible,
那么关于无形的物体不能被摧毁
then we would no longer have a counterexample to the claim
这个观点的反例就不存在了
that the invisible can't be destroyed,
这条论证就能继续成立
and the argument could still then proceed as it was before.
那才是苏格拉底应该采取的应对
So that's what Socrates should have done.
他应该说
He should have said,
你

知道么
"You know what?
音乐不见得是无形的
Harmony is not really invisible,"
或者说 它不能被摧毁
or "It can't be destroyed."
但实际上并没有一点跟以上相关的信息
But there's not a whiff of that,
至少在我们现有的对话录当中
at least in the dialogue as we've got it,
我都没有看到一点相关的信息
not a whiff of that as far as I can see.
苏格拉底从没说过
Socrates never says,
西米亚司 你的质疑错在这里
"Simmias, here is where your objection goes wrong.
音乐是真的无形 也不能真的被摧毁
Harmony is not really invisible, can't really be destroyed,
或者类似的话
whatever it is.
所以 我们不见得真有一个反例
So we don't really have a counterexample."
相反 他纠结于这样一个问题
Instead, he gets hung up on this question,
这是一个好的类比吗
"Is it a good analogy?
这是一种思考心灵的合适方式吗
Is it a good way for thinking about the mind or not?"
但即使它不是
But even if it isn't,
也不能拯救这条论证
that wouldn't save the argument.
现在 我将花一点时间来说明
Now, I am going to take some time to think about
音乐是否是一个合适的类比
whether or not harmony is a good analogy,
因为我认为这确实是一个好类比
because I actually think it is a good analogy.
我觉得关于音乐的
I think what's going on in the harmony--
心灵像音乐的这个建议
the suggestion that we should think about the mind like harmony,
好比它是躯体演奏的音乐这种提法
as though it was the harmony of the body--
是一种早期的现实主义者尝试表达的观点
is an early attempt to state the physicalist view.
对于心灵的探讨
Talk about the mind,
现实主义者认为
says the physicalist,
只不过是一种谈论躯体的方式
is just a way of talking about the body.
或者 更确切地说
Or, more carefully,
这是谈论躯体在正常运转时
it's a way of talking about certain things the body can do
具备的某些能力的一种方式
when it's functioning properly,
当它被调整的很好时
when it's well tuned,
就像
Just like,
谈论音乐或者乐声
talk about the harmony or the melodious sounds
或者由竖琴演奏出的其他乐曲
or what have you of the harp,
是一种
is a way--
这是一种谈论竖琴具备的能力的方式
these things are a way of talking about what things the harp can do.
当它被调好音并正常运转时
It can produce melodious,
它能够产生旋律
harmonious sounds when it's functioning properly,
能产生和谐的乐声
when it's well tuned.
所以关于音乐的类比
So the harmony analogy is,
我认为是一种尝试
I think, an attempt,
一种并不坏的尝试
and not a bad attempt,
一个探讨现实主义者
at gesturing towards the question,
如何思考心灵的尝试
how do physicalists th

ink about the mind?
当我尝试向你们解释
Now, when I tried to get you
现实主义者如何认识心灵的时候
to grasp how physicalists think about the mind,
我列举了电脑 机器人这样的例子
I used examples about computers and robots and the like.
而不出意外的
Well, it's not remotely surprising
柏拉图没有使用这样的类比
that Plato doesn't use those kinds of analogies.
他没有电脑
{\c
也没见过机器人
he doesn't have robots.
但他有具备某些能力的现实实体
Still, he has physical objects that can do things.
该物体是否能做一些事情取决于
And the ability to do things depends on the proper functioning
它是否正常运转
of the physical object.
因此 我认为他可以预见
And so, I think he can see that
二元论外还存在另一种理论
there's this alternative to his dualism.
他料想到现实主义者会说
He can see you could be a physicalist
心灵是依赖于躯体的
{\c
心灵只是一种在谈论到
the mind is just a way of talking about
躯体正常工作时所具备的能力罢了
what the body can do when it's working properly.
它的这种依赖性与
It's dependent just the same way that,
例如
well, for example,
音乐依赖于乐器实体一致
harmony is dependent upon the physical instrument.
所以我想
So I think
这是一次很好的
it's a very nice attempt
讨论二元论之外的现实主义观点的尝试
to discuss the physicalist alternative to Plato's dualism.
这也是我们值得花点时间来问自己
And that's why it will be worth taking some time to ask ourselves,
柏拉图会对此作出怎样的反驳呢
well, what about Plato's objections then?
如果他能说服我们
If he can convince us that
灵魂不是身体奏出的音乐
the soul is not like harmony of the body,
这也许会给现实主义者提出新的问题
maybe that will be some sort of problem for the physicalists.
待会儿我们再继续讨论这些
So I'll come back to that in a few more minutes.
但首先 考虑一下我之前强调过的观点
But first, let's worry about the point that I was emphasizing earlier,
那就是 即使灵魂与音乐并不十分相似
namely, even if the soul's not very much like harmony,
那又怎样
so what?
如果音乐确实是无形的
If harmony really is invisible
并且音乐确实能被摧毁
and harmony really can be destroyed,
那么无形的事物就能被摧毁了
then invisible things can be destroyed.
即使灵魂与音乐完全不相似
Even if the soul's nothing like--
从现实主义者或其他角度来看
that's not a good analogy for thinking
这并不是一个好类比
about the physicalist position or what have you--
那又怎样
so what?
如果有一些无形的事物能被摧毁
If some invisible things can be destroyed
而音乐是其中的一个例子
and harmony is an example of that,
那么的确

then, by golly,
接下来
it's going to follow that
我们不能从灵魂的不可见性
we can't conclude from the invisibility of the soul
得到灵魂不能被摧毁的结论
that the soul cannot be destroyed.
即使苏格拉底没有回应这条质疑
So even though Socrates doesn't respond to that objection,
我们也要替苏格拉底问
we need to ask on Socrates' behalf,
有回应这条质疑的潜在答案吗
is there a possible answer to this objection?
我认为在讨论之前
And I think there are at least the beginnings of one.
我们不得不问
We have to ask:
当我们说
when we say,
无形的物体不能被摧毁时
"invisible things can't be destroyed,"
"无形"这个词究竟是什么意思
what did we mean by "invisible?"
我想分别罗列出三种不同的可能解释
And I want to distinguish three different possible interpretations,
三种不同的说明
three different claims.
"无形"的意思是
So invisible means,
一 第一种可能 不能被看到
one, there's one possibility, can't be seen.
二 第二种可能 不能被察觉到
Two, different possibility, can't be observed.
三 无形的又一种可能的概念
Three, different possible interpretation of invisible,
不能被探测到
can't be detected.
我们必须问自己
What we have to ask ourselves is,
当苏格拉底提出他的论证时
when Socrates puts his argument forward,
他采用的是哪一种意思
which of these did he have in mind?
首先 我们要弄清这些概念之间的区别
First, let's be clear on how these things are different.
有一些事物看不见
Some things can't be seen
但可以通过其他方式感觉到
but can be sensed some other way.
色彩能被看见
{\c
味道不能被看见
smells cannot be seen,
但是气味
but of course smells--
咖啡的气味可以通过五感被感觉到
the smell of coffee--can be sensed through the five senses.
声音不能被看到
Sounds can't be seen,
它们是无形的
they're not visible,
但它们能被感觉到
but for all that they can be sensed.
人能够通过耳朵听到它们
You can hear them through your ears.
所以 别再纠结于
So, without getting hung up on
"无形"这个单词的字面意思
what does the English word "invisible" mean,
我们注意到
let's just notice that
”不能通过眼睛看见“和"不能通过一种
there's a difference between saying "it can't be seen through the eyes"
或其他感观觉察到"之间有区别
and "can't be observed through one sense or the other."
之后前提三就是一个完全不同的概念
And then three is a different notion altogether,
一个更有力的概念
a stronger notion altogether.
可能存在无法被五感中的
There might be things that can't even be detected
任意一种探测到的事物
through any of the five senses.
前提三说的
The number three--
我不仅看不到它
not o

nly can't I see it,
也不能尝出它
I can't taste it,
不能听到它
I can't hear it,
不能闻到它
I can't smell it,
不能触摸到它 对吧
can't touch it, right?
前提三里的"无形"是这种更宽泛的解释
The number three is invisible in this much bolder way.
它完全不能被五感探测到
It can't be detected at all by the five senses--
它不能被探测到
can't be detected in terms of its--
那它也不会留下痕迹 对吧
it doesn't leave traces behind, right?
我看不到恐龙
I don't see dinosaurs,
但是恐龙的化石留下了它们的行迹
but of course they leave traces behind in fossils.
你研究了它产生的效果之后
There's a way in which you can talk about it
就可以讨论它
being detected by its effects.
好了 再强调一遍
All right. So again,
不要纠结在英语中"无形"的解释上
don't get hung up on what does the English word invisible mean.
我们问问自己
Let's just ask ourselves,
无形的这个概念
what notion of invisibility--
如果我们用这个单词的三种解释之一
if we'll use the word between these three ways--
那么苏格拉底的论证用的是哪一个呢
what notion did Socrates' argument turn on?
最直接的方式
Well, the most natural way
是用解释一来解释苏格拉底的论证
to start by interpreting him is with number one.
当他说 无形的东西不改变时
When he says, "Invisible things don't change,"
他的意思是
what he means is,
看不见的东西不会改变
things that you can't see don't change,
在前提四中继续沿用刚才"无形"的解释
and so--continue to interpret invisible in number four the same way--
无形的东西不能被毁灭
invisible things can't be destroyed.
采用第一种解释 他说的是
On the first interpretation what he'd be saying is,
如果你的眼睛不能看到它
"If you can't see it with your eyes,
它就不能被摧毁
it can't be destroyed."
现在的问题是
Now, the trouble is,
音乐的例子表明这并不成立
harmony shows that that's not so.
按照解释一 音乐确实是看不见的
Harmony is indeed invisible in sense number one.
眼睛看不到音乐
You cannot see it with your eyes.
尽管如此
But for all that,
音乐能够被摧毁
it can be destroyed.
如果苏格拉底按第一种解释来说明无形
So if what Socrates means by invisibility is the first notion,
即不能通过眼睛看到
can't been seen with your eyes,
那么这个论证就不成立了
then the argument's not any good.
音乐的确是个很有说服力的反例
Harmony is a pretty compelling counterexample.
但可能苏格拉底所说的无形不是这个定义
But maybe that's not what Socrates means by invisible.
可能不是解释一
Maybe instead of one,
而是解释二
he means two.
当他说灵魂无形
When he talks about the soul being invisible
以及无形的事物不

能被摧毁时
and invisible things being indestructible,
这里的无形可能是不能
maybe he means things that can't be observed
通过五感感知到的意思
through any of your five senses.
实际上 我觉得这正是他想要表达的
Now, in point of fact, i think that is what he meant.
我快速的引用一段
Let me just give a quick quote.
在我们这个版本的二十九页
In our edition, this is page 29.
你们可能注意到了
Some of you may have noticed that
我们这一版上有挺小的段落码
there are little standardized paginations in our edition as well.
这是学术的编码
So it's in the academy paginations,
第七十九段
{\c
他阐述了有形的事物
he's talking about the difference
与无形的事物之间的不同
between the visible and the invisible things,
椅子和型相的对比
chairs versus the forms.
他说 信件 椅子 树 石头
And he says, "These latter, chairs, trees, stones,
你能看得见摸得着
you could touch and see
或者以其他感知方式感觉到
and perceive with the other senses.
但是那些一直保持不变的事物
But those that always remain the same,
如型相 只能通过思考推理才能领会
the forms, can only be grasped by the reasoning power of the mind.
它们是看不到的 是无形的
They are not seen but are invisible."
所以 我认为这一点很清楚
So I think it's pretty clear that
苏格拉底在开始讨论有形与无形时
when Socrates starts talking about what's visible versus invisible,
他并未拘泥于视觉感受
{\c
他谈论的是五感的感知
he means to be talking about all of the five senses.
所以 当我们说 他说
So when we say--when he says--
无形的事物不能被摧毁时
"Invisible things can't be destroyed,"
他指的是你看不见摸不到听不着
he means the things that you can't see or touch
感觉不到的事物
or hear or feel--
或者其他
whatever it is--
视觉 触觉 嗅觉 味觉
see, touch, smell, taste.
这样的事物都不能被摧毁
Those things can't be destroyed.
注意 如果我们这样解释他的论证
Now, notice that if that's the way we interpret his argument,
音乐就不再是反例了
harmony no longer works as a counterexample.
按照"无形"的第一解释"不能看到的"
Harmony was invisible when we meant definition number one,
音乐才是无形的
can't be seen.
但如果用解释二
But it's not invisible
音乐就不再无形了
if we mean definition number two,
(解释二)即不能感知
can't be sensed,
不能观察
can't be observed.
因为耳朵能够感受到音乐
Harmony can be sensed through the ears,
在这种情况下 它就不再是反例了
in which case it's not a counterexample.
对于结论四 音乐作为反例亦不成立
It's not a counterexample to four.
四说 无形的事物不能被摧毁
Four says, "Invisible things can't be destroyed.

"
苏格拉底要说的应该是
And what Socrates should have said is,
就无形的感官含义 音乐不是无形的
harmony is not invisible in the relevant sense of invisible,
因为人们能够听到音乐
since it can be sensed.
但是注意 这一点很重要
But--and this would be the crucial point--notice,
苏格拉底应当继续论证
Socrates should've continued,
从这方面讲灵魂是无形的
the soul is invisible in that sense.
你看不到灵魂的样子
{\c
尝不到灵魂的味道
{\c
无法触摸到灵魂
{\c
也听不到灵魂的声音
you don't hear the soul.
所以我们如果明白
So if we understand
论证建立在无形第二种解释的基础之上
the argument in terms of the second interpretation of invisible,
看上去论证仍然成立
it looks as though the argument still goes through.
西米亚司的反例失败了
Simmias' counterexample fails.
从感官的角度而言 音乐并非无形
Harmony is not invisible in the relevant sense,
无形的事物不能被摧毁
so it could still be true
这条论证仍然成立
that invisible things can't be destroyed.
既然灵魂从感官的角度来说是无形的
Since the soul is invisible in that sense,
那么就能推出灵魂不能被摧毁
it would follow that the soul can't be destroyed.
然而 即使 西米亚司的质疑
However, even if Simmias' objection,
他所举的反例
his particular counterexample,
音乐 不再成立
harmony, fails,
这并不代表
that doesn't mean that
我们就能接受这条论证
we should still accept the argument
因为可能还存在其它的反例
because there might be a different counterexample.
这里给出我的见解
So here's my proposal.
假如我们用电波而不是音乐来作为反例
Suppose we think not about harmony but radio waves.
电波是感觉不到的
Radio waves are not sensible.
我们无法观察电波
They are not observable.
你看不到电波
You don't see a radio wave.
你摸不到电波
{\c
你闻不到电波的味道
you can't smell a radio wave,
有趣的是
and interestingly enough,
你无法直接听到电波
you can't hear radio waves.
但是即便如此
But of course, for all that,
电波是可以被摧毁的
they can be destroyed.
即使我们同意苏格拉底所说
So even if we grant that what Socrates meant
无形意味着不能被观察到
by invisible was "cannot be observed,"
我们仍然得赞同西米亚司的说法
we still have to say, with Simmias,
第四条不成立
"You know, four is just not true.
一些无形的事物是可以被摧毁的
Some invisible things can be destroyed."
即使从感官角度上讲 电波亦是无形的
Radio waves can be destroyed even though
但它可以被摧毁
they're invisible in the relevant sense.
对吗 有问题吗
Yeah? Question?
好的 所以你的意思是
Okay. So the suggestion was,
电波有点像型